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ORIGINAL ARTICLES

CERTAIN NEUROTIC MECHANISMS IN JEALOUSY, PARANOIA AND HOMOSEXUALITY

BY

SIGM. FREUD

VIENNA

A. Jealousy is one of those affective states, like grief, that may be described as normal. If anyone appears to be without it, the inference is justified that it has undergone severe repression and consequently plays all the greater part in his unconscious mental life. The instances of abnormally intense jealousy met with in analytic work reveal themselves as constructed of three layers. The three layers or stages of jealousy may be described as (1) *competitive* or normal, (2) *projected*, and (3) *delusional* jealousy.

There is not much to be said from the analytic point of view about normal jealousy. It is easy to see that essentially it is compounded of grief, the pain caused by the thought of losing the loved object, and the narcissistic wound, in so far as this is distinguishable from the other wound; further, of feelings of enmity against the successful rival, and of a greater or lesser amount of self-criticism which tries to hold the person himself accountable for his loss. Although we may call it normal this jealousy is by no means completely rational, that is, derived from the actual situation, proportionate to the real circumstances and under the complete control of the conscious ego; for it is rooted deep in the unconscious, it is a continuation of the earliest stirrings of the child's affective life and it originates in the Oedipus or family complex of the first

sexual period. Moreover, it is noteworthy that in many persons it is experienced bisexually; that is to say, in a man, beside the suffering in regard to the loved woman and the hatred against the male rival, grief in regard to the unconsciously loved man and hatred of the woman as a rival will add to its intensity. I even know of a man who suffered exceedingly during his attacks of jealousy and who, according to his own account, went through unendurable torments by consciously imagining himself in the position of the faithless woman. The sensation of helplessness which then came over him, the images he used to describe his condition—exposed to the vulture's beak like Prometheus, or cast fettered into a serpent's den—he himself referred to the impressions received during several homosexual aggressions which he had undergone as a boy.

The jealousy of the second layer, the *projected*, is derived in both men and women either from their own actual unfaithfulness in real life or from impulses towards it which have succumbed to repression. It is a matter of everyday experience that fidelity, especially that degree of it required in marriage, is only maintained in the face of continual temptation. Anyone who denies this in himself will nevertheless be impelled so strongly in the direction of infidelity that he will be glad enough to make use of an unconscious mechanism as an alleviation. This relief—more, absolution by his conscience—he achieves when he projects his own impulses to infidelity on to the partner to whom he owes faith. This weighty motive can then make use of the material at hand (perception-material) by which the unconscious impulses of the partner are likewise betrayed, and the person can justify himself with the reflection that the other is probably not much better than he is himself.¹

Social conventions have taken this universal state of things into account very adroitly, by granting a certain amount of scope to the married woman's thirst to find favour in men's eyes and the married man's thirst to capture and possess, in the expectation that this inevitable tendency to unfaithfulness will thus find a safety-valve and be rendered innocuous. Convention has laid down that neither partner is to hold the other accountable for these little

¹ cp. Desdemona's Song:

I called my love false love; but what said he then?
If I court moe women, you'll couch with moe men.

excursions in the direction of unfaithfulness, and it achieves the result on the whole that the desire awakened by the new love-object is gratified by a kind of turning-back to the object already possessed. The jealous person, however, does not recognize this convention of tolerance; he does not believe in any such thing as a halt or a turning-back once the path has been trod, nor that a social 'flirtation' may be a safeguard against actual infidelity. In the treatment of a jealous person like this one must refrain from disputing with him the material on which he bases his suspicions; one can only aim at bringing him to regard the matter in a different light.

The jealousy that arises from this projection has, it is true, an almost delusional character; it is, however, amenable to the analytic work of exposing the unconscious phantasies of personal infidelity. The jealousy of the third layer, the true *delusional* type, is worse. It also has its origin in repressed impulses towards unfaithfulness—the object, however, in these cases is of the same sex as the subject. Delusional jealousy represents an acidulated homosexuality, and rightly takes its position among the classical forms of paranoia. As an attempt at defence against an unduly strong homosexual impulse it may, in a man, be described in the formula: 'Indeed I do not love him, *she* loves him!'² In a delusional case one will be prepared to find the jealousy arising in all three layers, never in the third alone.

B. Paranoia. Cases of paranoia are for well-known reasons not usually amenable to analytic investigation. I have recently been able, nevertheless, by an intensive study of two paranoiacs to discover something new to me.

The first case was that of a youngish man with a fully-developed paranoia of jealousy, the object of which was his impeccably faithful wife. A stormy period in which the delusion had possessed him uninterruptedly already lay behind him. When I saw him he was still subject only to clearly-defined attacks, which lasted for several days and, curiously enough, regularly appeared on the day following an act of intercourse, which was, incidentally, satisfying to both of them. The inference is justified that after every satiation of the

² cf. remarks on the Schreber case in my *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, Dritte Folge, S. 198: Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia paranoides).

heterosexual libido the homosexual component, likewise stimulated by the act, forced for itself an outlet in the attack of jealousy.

The jealousy of the attack drew its material from his observation of the smallest possible indications, in which the utterly unconscious coquetry of the wife, unnoticeable to any other person, had betrayed itself to him. She had unintentionally touched the man sitting next her with her hand; she had turned too much towards him, or she had smiled more pleasantly than when alone with her husband. To all these manifestations of her unconscious feelings he paid extraordinary attention and always knew how to interpret them correctly, so that he really was always in the right about it, and could justify his jealousy still more by analytic interpretation. His abnormality really reduced itself to this, that he watched his wife's unconscious mind much more closely and then regarded it as far more important than anyone else would have thought of doing.

We are reminded that sufferers from persecutory paranoia act in just the same way. They too cannot regard anything in others as indifferent, and into their 'delusions of reference' they too take up the smallest possible indications which these others, strangers, offer them. The meaning of their delusion of reference is that they expect from every stranger something like love; these 'others' show them nothing of the kind, however—they laugh to themselves, fiddle with their sticks, even spit on the ground as they go by—and one really does not do these things while anyone in whom one takes a friendly interest is near. One does them only when one is quite indifferent to the passer-by, when one can treat him like air; and when we consider the fundamental kinship of the words 'stranger' and 'enemy', the paranoiac is not so far wrong in regarding this indifference as hate, in comparison with his claim for love.

We begin to see that we describe the behaviour of both jealous and persecuted paranoiacs very inadequately by saying that they project outwards on to others what they do not wish to recognize in themselves.

Certainly they do this; but they do not project it into the sky, so to speak, where there is nothing of the sort already. They let themselves be guided by their knowledge of the unconscious, and displace to the unconscious minds of others the attention which they have withdrawn from their own. Our jealous husband perceives his wife's unfaithfulness instead of his own; by becoming conscious

of hers and magnifying it enormously he succeeds in keeping unconscious his own. If we accept his example as typical, we may infer that the enmity which the persecuted paranoiac sees in others is the reflection of his own hostile impulses against them. Since we know that with the paranoiac it is precisely the most loved person of his own sex that becomes his persecutor, the question arises where this reversal of affect takes its origin; the answer is not far to seek—the ever-present ambivalence of the feelings provides its source and the unfulfilment of his claim for love strengthens it. This ambivalence thus serves the same purpose for the persecuted paranoiac as jealousy serves for our patient—that of a defence against homosexuality.

The dreams of my jealous patient contained a great surprise for me. They were not simultaneous with the outbreaks of the attacks, though they occurred within the period influenced by the delusion; they were completely free from the delusion and showed themselves based on homosexual tendencies which were disguised no more strictly than usual. In view of my slight knowledge of the dreams of paranoiacs I was inclined to suppose at that time that the disease did not penetrate into dreams.

The homosexuality of this patient was easily surveyed. He had made no friendships and developed no social interests; one had the impression that the delusion had constituted the first actual development of his relations with men, as if it had taken over a piece of work that had been neglected. The fact that his father was of no great importance in the family life, combined with a humiliating homosexual trauma in early childhood, had forced his homosexuality into repression and barred the way to its sublimation. The whole of his youth was governed by a strong attachment to his mother. Of all her many sons he was her declared favourite, and he developed marked jealousy of the normal type in regard to her. When later he made his choice of a wife—mainly prompted by the impulse to enrich his mother—his longing for a virgin mother expressed itself in obsessive doubts about his wife's virginity. The first years of his marriage were free from jealousy. Then he became unfaithful to his wife and entered upon an intimate relationship with another woman that lasted for a considerable time. Startled by a certain suspicion he at length made an end of this love affair, and not until then did the jealousy of the second, projected type break out, by means of which he was able to assuage his self-

reproaches about his own unfaithfulness. It was soon complicated by an accession of homosexual impulses, of which his father-in-law was the object, and became a fully-formed jealousy paranoia.

My second case would probably not have been classified as persecutory paranoia without analysis: but I had to recognize the young man as a candidate for this termination of the illness. In his attitude to his father there existed an ambivalence which in its range was quite extraordinary. On the one hand, he was the most pronounced rebel imaginable, and had developed manifestly in every direction in opposition to his father's wishes and ideals; on the other hand, at a deeper level he was still the most utterly abject son, in loving remorse after his father's death denying himself all enjoyment of women. His actual relations with men were clearly dominated by suspiciousness; his keen intellect easily rationalized this attitude; and he knew how to bring it about that both friends and acquaintances deceived and exploited him. The new thing I learned from studying him was that classical persecution-ideas may be present without finding belief or acceptance. They flashed up occasionally during the analysis, but he regarded them as unimportant and invariably scoffed at them. This may occur in many cases of paranoia; it may be that the delusions which we regard as new formations when the disease breaks out have already long been in existence.

It seems to me that this is an important recognition—namely, that the qualitative factor, the presence of certain neurotic formations, has less practical significance than the quantitative factor, the degree of attention, or more correctly, the measure of cathexis that these formations engage. Our consideration of the first case, the jealousy paranoia, led to a similar estimate of the importance of the quantitative factor, by showing that there also the abnormality essentially consisted in the hyper-cathexis (over-investment) of the interpretations of another's unconscious behaviour. We have long known of an analogous fact in the analysis of hysteria. The pathogenic phantasies, derivatives of repressed instinctual trends, are for a long time tolerated alongside the normal life of the mind, and have no pathogenic effect until by a revolution in the libidoeconomy they undergo hyper-cathexis; not till then does the conflict which leads to symptom-formation break out. Thus as our knowledge increases we are ever being impelled to bring the *economic* point of view into the foreground. I should also like to throw out the

question whether this quantitative factor that I am now dwelling on does not suffice to cover the phenomena for which Bleuler and others have lately wished to introduce the term 'switching'. One need only assume that increased resistance in one direction of the psychical currents results in hyper-cathexis along some other path and thus causes the whole current to be switched into this path.

The dreams of my two cases of paranoia showed an instructive contrast. Whereas those of the first case were free from delusion, as has already been said, the other patient produced great numbers of persecution-dreams, which may be regarded as fore-runners or substitutive formations of the delusional ideas. The pursuer, from whom he managed to escape only in terror, was usually a powerful bull or some other male symbol which even in the dream itself he sometimes recognized as representing his father. One day he produced a very characteristic paranoiac transference-dream. He saw me shaving in front of him, and from the scent of the soap he realized that I was using the same soap as his father had used. I was doing this in order to induce in him a father-transference on to myself. The choice of this incident out of which the dream was formed unmistakably betrays the patient's depreciatory attitude to his paranoiac phantasies and his disbelief in them; for his own eyes could tell him every day that I never require to avail myself of shaving-soap and that therefore there was in this respect nothing to which a father-transference could attach itself.

A comparison of the dreams of the two patients shows, however, that the question whether or not paranoia (or any other psychoneurosis) can penetrate into dreams is based on a false conception of dreams. Dreams are distinguishable from waking thought in that for their content they can draw from material (belonging to the region of the unconscious) which cannot emerge in waking thought. Apart from this, dreams are merely a *form of thinking*, a transformation of preconscious thought-material by the dream-work and its conditions. Our terminology of the neuroses is not applicable to repressed material; this cannot be called hysterical, nor obsessional, nor paranoiac. The other part of the material which is woven into the structure of a dream, the preconscious thoughts, may be normal or may bear the character of any neurosis; they may be the effects of all those pathogenic processes in which the essence of neurosis lies. It is not evident why any such morbid idea should not become woven into dreams. A dream may therefore quite simply represent an hysterical

phantasy, an obsessional idea, or a delusion, that is, may reveal it upon interpretation. Observation of the two paranoiacs shows that the dreams of the one were quite normal while he was subject to his delusion, and that those of the other were paranoiac in content while he treated his delusional ideas with contempt. In both cases, therefore, the dream took up the material that was at the time being forced into the background in waking life. This too, however, need not necessarily be an invariable rule.

C. Homosexuality. Recognition of the organic factor in homosexuality does not relieve us of the obligation of studying the psychical processes of its origin. The typical process, already established in innumerable cases, is that a few years after the termination of puberty the young man, who until this time has been strongly fixated to his mother, turns in his course, identifies himself with his mother, and looks about for love-objects in whom he can re-discover himself, and whom he wishes to love as his mother loved him. The characteristic mark of this process is that usually for several years one of the 'conditions of love' is that the male object shall be of the same age as he himself was when the change took place. We know of various factors contributing to this result, probably in different degrees. First there is the fixation on the mother, which renders passing on to another woman difficult. The identification with the mother is an outcome of this attachment, and at the same time in a certain sense it enables the son to keep true to her, his first object. Then there is the inclination towards a narcissistic object-choice, which lies in every way nearer and is easier to put into effect than the move towards the other sex. Behind this factor there lies concealed another of quite exceptional strength, or perhaps it coincides with it: the high value set upon the male organ and the inability to tolerate its absence in a love-object. Depreciation of women, and aversion from them, even horror of them, are generally derived from the early discovery that women have no penis. We subsequently discovered, as another powerful motive urging towards the homosexual object-choice, regard for the father or fear of him; for the renunciation of women means that all rivalry with him (or with all men who may take his place) is avoided. The two last motives, the clinging to the condition of a penis in the object as well as the retiring in favour of the father, may be ascribed to the castration complex. Attachment to the mother, narcissism, fear of castration—these are the factors

(which by the way have nothing specific about them) that we have hitherto found in the psychical aetiology of homosexuality; and on them is superimposed the effect of any seduction bringing about a premature fixation of the libido, as well as the influence of the organic factor favouring the passive rôle in love.

We have, however, never regarded this analysis of the origin of homosexuality as complete; and I can now point to a new mechanism leading to homosexual object-choice, although I cannot say how large a part it plays in the formation of the extreme, manifest, and exclusive type of homosexuality. Observation has directed my attention to several cases in which during early childhood feelings of jealousy derived from the mother-complex and of very great intensity arose against rivals, usually older brothers. This jealousy led to an exceedingly hostile aggressive attitude against brothers (or sisters) which might culminate in actual death-wishes, but which could not survive further development. Under the influences of training—and certainly not uninfluenced also by their own constant powerlessness—these feelings yielded to repression and to a transformation, so that the rivals of the earlier period became the first homosexual love-objects. Such an outcome of the attachment to the mother shows various interesting relations with other processes known to us. First of all it is a complete contrast to the development of persecutory paranoia, in which the person who has before been loved becomes the hated persecutor, whereas here the hated rivals are transformed into love-objects. It represents too an exaggeration of the process which according to my view leads to the birth of social instincts in the individual.³ In both processes there is first the presence of jealous and hostile feelings which cannot achieve gratification; and then both the personal affectionate and the social identification-feelings arise as reaction-formations against the repressed aggressive impulses.

This new mechanism in the homosexual object-choice, its origin in rivalry which has been overcome and in aggressive impulses which have become repressed, is often combined with the typical conditions known to us. In the history of homosexuals one often hears that the change in them took place after the mother had praised another boy and set him up as a model. The tendency to a

³ See *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922.

narcissistic object-choice was thus stimulated and after a short phase of keen jealousy the rival became a love-object. Otherwise, however, the new mechanism is a separate one, in that the change takes place at a much earlier period and the identification with the mother recedes into the background. Moreover, in the cases I have observed it led only to homosexual attitudes which did not exclude heterosexuality and did not involve a horror of women.

It is well-known that a good number of homosexual persons is distinguished by a special development of the social instincts and by a devotion to the interests of the community. It would be tempting, as a theoretical explanation of this, to say that the behaviour towards men in general of a man who sees in other men potential love-objects must be different from that of a man who looks upon other men first as rivals in regard to women. Against this there is only the objection that jealousy and rivalry play their part in homosexual love also, and that the community of men also includes these potential rivals. Apart from this speculative explanation, however, the fact that the homosexual object-choice not rarely proceeds from an early conquest of the rivalry in regard to men cannot be unimportant for the connection between homosexuality and social feeling.

In the light of psycho-analysis we are accustomed to regard social feeling as a sublimation of homosexual attitudes towards objects. In the homosexual person with marked social interests the detachment of social feeling from object-choice has not been fully carried through.

THE CASTRATION COMPLEX IN THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER

BY

F. ALEXANDER

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Preliminary Remarks on the Dynamics of Symptom-Formation

A particularly favourable opportunity to gain some comprehension of the dynamics of symptom-formation presents itself in the study of those so-called 'transitory symptoms' which arise under our eyes in the course of analytic work—a sort of product of the laboratory. Ferenczi, who first described these manifestations, pointed out their theoretic importance in that they enable experimental observations to be made of the dynamics of falling ill. Ferenczi¹ explains these symptom-formations arising during analytic work as manifestations of resistance against the process of making conscious certain unconscious tendencies which are displeasing to the ego and which have been brought near to the level of consciousness by analysis. Driven out of their old neurotic 'positions' these tendencies are seeking an outlet in new symptoms and struggling to reach equilibrium afresh by this means. Truly a unique opportunity to study symptom-formation!

These transitory artificial products of the neurosis make their appearance in an unusually pronounced form during the analysis of what are called 'neurotic characters'. These are types well-known to the analyst, people who suffer from no very definite symptoms of illness but whose behaviour in life is in the highest degree impulsive and frequently even compulsive; they are unusually subject to the domination of their unconscious instinctual tendencies. The lives of such people display some remarkably irrational feature and their apparently senseless behaviour—like the symptoms of neurotics—is comprehensible only to the trained eye of the analyst, able to

¹ Ferenczi: *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis*, 1916, p. 164. Chap. vii, Transitory Symptom-Constructions during the Analysis.

perceive the unconscious motives behind it. This irrational behaviour is obviously equivalent to neurotic symptoms in others; these people form a transition-type between the neurotic and the healthy. Their neurotic way of living has also some resemblance to the blunders of everyday life, which also owe their origin to unconscious motives; only, these impulse-ridden characters gratify their repressed tendencies, not in trivial everyday blunders, but in irrational compulsive actions literally at the most important and decisive moments of their lives. Whereas in the neuroses the unconscious makes use of special mechanisms, such as hysterical conversion, symbolic obsessive acts, delusional ideas, all characteristically isolated as far as possible from the rest of the person's life, the neurotic character interweaves his life with his neurosis—his life constitutes his neurosis. Teleologically considered, the symptoms of illness serve the purpose of satisfying, in a relatively harmless manner, those wishes that are in conflict with the conscious ego, of *localizing* them to the symptoms, and thereby preventing them from injuring the rest of life. The best illustration of the self-healing function of symptoms is provided by the final state of the paranoiac, which corresponds to a recovery with disablement. His behaviour in and capacity for the common activities of life is often perfectly normal, his delusional system alone excepted; it has absorbed the whole of the pathologic matter into itself, as it were. All feeling of illness is lacking, too, and with some justification; the analyst will certainly reflect carefully before disturbing this equilibrium. Naturally in most types of neuroses the outcome is not so favourable, the tendencies that are incompatible with the ego cannot always be isolated in this way. As a contrast to this recovery with disablement we have many phobias, in which the anxiety encroaches ever further and further into life, making it at last intolerable; or certain obsessional neuroses, inhibiting every activity. With neurotic characters, however, the morbid process has not yet reached the stage of symptom-formation; the unconscious tendencies that would otherwise form symptoms can still find an outlet in certain irrational actions which are hardly influenced by consciousness, and make no use of any particular mechanisms.

It is difficult to find an answer to the dynamic problem: whether the pressure of the factor leading to illness—the damming-up of the libido—is not great enough to open up new paths and form symptoms as an outlet, or whether the defence-reaction of the

organism—the repression—is not powerful enough altogether to exclude satisfaction in reality. In any case, the irrational neurotic behaviour of the abnormal character entails more real satisfaction than a neurotic symptom does, and in its blind impulse-ridden way often creates more misery than a neurosis. Indeed, we know from Freud, especially from his recent work, that the repressing faculty (*Instanz*) is the conscience, that is, a social faculty, one that guards the individual from the satisfaction in reality of his asocial wishes and even punishes him for the satisfaction of them in phantasy. A section of the neurotic characters, certain impulse-ridden criminal types, plainly suffer from a deficiency of these defence-reactions. And it is just as unquestionable that another section of these people, driven by their instinctual tendencies perpetually to injure themselves in life do not fall ill of a neurosis simply *because*, by means of their apparently senseless self-injuries, they replace the symbolic over-compensations (self-punishments) of the obsessional neurotic by real ones, and in this way keep their over-sensitive consciences clear. Should they be at any time deprived of the possibility of this real satisfaction, then, if these dynamic considerations are scientifically sound, we should expect them to fall ill of a neurosis. In actual fact, when such people come into the hands of an analyst, it is found that they already suffer from various neurotic symptoms. Yet as long as it is possible for the tendencies that are incompatible with the ego to be realized in behaviour which eludes the vigilance of the censorship, all consciousness of illness is lacking; and this is the reason why, when such people are induced by those around them to undergo analysis, they are so particularly difficult. Even when this impulse-ridden behaviour leads to the greatest hardships it is still consistently maintained, while its calamitous consequences are ascribed to the cruelty of fate or to chance. The unconscious is always victorious and seizes its satisfaction at the expense of the most elementary interests of the ego, as is plainly shown by the not at all uncommon final fate of such people—death by suicide.

The conclusion to which we are led by these reflections is that every 'neurotic character' contains in it the germ of a particular form of neurosis, which must then break out if any deprivation ensues of the satisfaction in reality of the neurotic tendency. Curtailment of the real satisfaction may occur in two ways: by external circumstances, or by internal ones—the interference of the

conscious ego. This second way occurs in the course of the analytic work, when the meaning of the irrational impulse-ridden conduct is made conscious on the occasions of its repetition in transference; so that under the control of consciousness the previous satisfactions are renounced. According to the considerations adduced above, it would be in this stage of the analysis that the transitory symptoms would arise—more, that a transitory and hitherto latent neurosis would develop. The analytic work removes the previous possibilities of satisfaction, by bringing the tendencies incompatible with the ego more and more under the control of the conscious faculties; under the pressure of this artificially-induced damming of the libido these tendencies escape into those neurotic symptoms which have hitherto been replaced by the actual neurotic satisfactions in life, and in which the tendencies find a fresh subterranean outlet. Neurosis is here also the obverse of neurotic behaviour, just as it is of the perversions, with this difference, that the perverse satisfaction is accepted by the ego, whereas the neurotic behaviour with its illogicality is unrecognized as a satisfaction.

The conditions under which 'transitory symptoms' appear are in these cases unusually pronounced; the lines on which the interchangeable occurrence of neurosis or neurotic behaviour may proceed are laid down by the patient's previous life. The circumstances are thus peculiarly favourable to comprehension of the origin and mechanism of development of a neurosis, because the disease is then a product of the laboratory and actually develops before our eyes out of apparent health. We can thus observe the universal mechanism by which the neuroses develop ordinarily, since it is even probable that an attempt at actual satisfaction *always* precedes the symbolic satisfaction of the incompatible tendencies in symptoms, and that symptoms only arise as substitutive satisfactions after this attempt is found to be impracticable or in consequence of an inner prohibition.²

It must not be forgotten that these transitory illnesses during the treatment are actually nothing but transference-manifestations in the Freudian sense and consequently produced by resistance; they are the last attempts of the repressed tendencies to find a discharge in the form of action. Freud describes the transference as a 'new edition' of an old disease.³ The analysis of neurotic characters, in

² I would point to the development of children in this respect.

³ Freud: *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, 1922, p. 371.

which the transitory symptoms and other transference-manifestations arise, not as substitutes for previous neurotic symptoms, but as an apparently quite new neurosis, show the transference in this character of a neurosis in a peculiarly convincing, perhaps even at first in a startling manner. The predilection shown by such cases for forming transitory symptoms may also be explained by the fact that with them it is not a *symptom* that is being discharged into the transference, but a much more real sort of satisfaction; consequently more is expected in the transference. Dynamically considered, every 'transitory symptom' is merely an expression of the fact that a neurotic attachment has been loosened so quickly that it is not possible for the cathexis which has been set free to work itself out in transference-manifestations; that is, by resolving the symptoms one takes from the patient more satisfaction than can at the moment be made good to him in the transference or still less in reality. The block leads to new symptoms which nevertheless still retain a relation to the transference. In treating abnormal characters we destroy, not symptoms, but real or almost real satisfactions; the tension caused by the difference between the real satisfaction and the transference-satisfaction is too great, and so there arise transitory symptoms, or even a transitory neurosis, as by-products or also as transition-stages.

After these dynamic considerations I will add some observations.

The Castration Complex in the Formation of Character

In his essay 'Some Character Types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work'⁴ Freud gives us the prototype of an analytic understanding of neurotic characters. Our knowledge of certain more definite character-traits begins with his treatment of the subject of anal erotism. A sharp line of demarcation between certain exaggerated character-traits and neurotic characters could hardly be drawn. By a character-trait we mean a certain stereotyped attitude in life; those people whom we call neurotic characters show this stereotyped attitude in the whole rhythm of their lives, at the most decisive moments and most important turning-points. Whereas the hysteric makes his body and the obsessional neurotic makes the everyday performances of life the medium in which he expresses

⁴ Freud: Einige Charaktertypen aus der Psychoanalytischen Arbeit. *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, Vierte Folge, S. 521.

his neurotic wishes, for the neurotic character, ridden by his instinctual tendencies, this medium consists of the whole course of his life, his actual *destiny*.

Freud gives us in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*⁵ a profound insight into the essential unity of neurotic symptoms, transference, and human destiny, by his view of them as the expression of a compulsion towards the repetition of an attempt to solve an unresolved conflict, to master subsequently a real experience that had been insuperable.

In the analytic re-adjustment of a neurotic character, therefore, we pursue the same object as with the neuroses, namely, that of discovering the real experience which is forever being repeated in the impulse-ridden behaviour, and in which the irrational actions would for once have been justified.

During the analysis of such a neurotic character I was able to observe with unusual clearness the impulse-ridden actions being successively replaced by conversion-hysterical and paranoid symptoms. The dynamic processes described above came out with particular clearness in the course of the analysis. After the almost complete amnesia covering the first six to seven years of his life had been gradually dispersed, the patient's whole life lay before us as a series of situations and actions repeated again and again since his earliest childhood, under the weight of a truly daemonic compulsion in the sense of an ever-recurring attempt to solve a primal conflict. His neurotic behaviour in life took the place of the symptoms of this latent neurosis, so that, as the meaning of the actions replacing these symptoms was revealed and they were brought under the control of the judging, inhibiting faculty of consciousness and given up, this latent neurosis was bound to come to the fore. The dynamic process involved was similar to that in 'active therapy', by which the patient is required to refrain from certain symptomatic acts, only that here the analyst's prohibition was replaced by the patient's conscious renunciation actuated by his new knowledge.⁶ The life of this heavily impulse-ridden character contained nothing worthy of special mention; and yet the transparent way in which his life had

⁵ International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922.

⁶ In another analysis of a neurotic character, the meaning of an attitude in life which was continually reproduced under compulsion was not discoverable until, after a prohibition in regard to it, it had taken the form of repetition in dreams and transitory symptoms.

formed itself under the pressure of the castration complex, and still more the paranoid symptoms which transiently appeared during the analysis—I might call it a paranoia in a nutshell, developing and dispersing before my eyes—offered an unusual opportunity for discovering much about the mechanism of this disease. The circumstances were also favourable in that the patient, though an intelligent man, was not of a complicated type; his youth had been spent in rough, uncivilized surroundings and his later life in a large metropolis, so that he had been forced to go through ontogenetically in a double manner the phylogenetic adaptation of humanity to the requirements of a civilized community. This adaptation he accomplished externally quite well; he rose high in the business world and acquired a large fortune.

He came for advice on account of difficulties in his married life. He was beginning to doubt his wife's love and yet he somehow felt as if he himself were also responsible for the unhappiness of his marriage. After many years of married life he was just beginning to realize that his wife had married him for his money. He treated his wife—unconsciously, it is true—like a prostitute, overwhelmed her with luxury and demanded nothing from her but intercourse. Their married life consisted of nothing but the man's struggles to be allowed intercourse, which was always paid for in the same material way. These payments were often grotesque; the wife wanted a hat, perhaps, and he would give her six hats at once. The woman, who was sexually frigid in any case, began to perceive in her unconscious the meaning of this strongly anal-erotic tendency and reacted to it with a corresponding craving for presents. They were bound to each other, like the nut and the screw. His experience with women had always been the same; his first marriage and his earlier love-affairs were merely unfinished versions of the same drama. His type of love-object was always the cold, calculating woman, who if she possessed a remnant of capacity for love was always forced back into anal-erotic regression by deliberate measures. One unconscious tendency in this was the well-known one described by Freud—the tendency to debase the love-object—which played an important part.⁷ The woman is paid and thereby becomes a prostitute, being thus detached from the mother-*imago*; instead of

⁷ Freud: Über die allgemeinste Erniedrigung des Liebeslebens. *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, Vierte Folge, S. 213.

tenderness she receives money. The repressed idea came back in another form, however. His wife was far superior to him in refinement, she corrects his speech, writes his letters, represents him in society; he feels inferior to her and thus reproduces the mother-son relationship. In his marriage therefore he made use of the well-known mechanism of a partial repression. The wife is made into a prostitute and the love regresses to an anal-erotic form of satisfaction, but along with this the superiority of the woman in the mother-*imago* is retained as an important factor.

The libido which was not attached anal-erotically sought an outlet by many and devious paths in his social^{7a} activities, his relations with friends and other business men, in the form of disguised (sublimated) homosexuality. Affectionate love for any woman was completely unknown to him; the remnant of love which had not regressed and become fixed on the anal-erotic level was fixed homosexually and sublimated. In the analysis the fate of this remnant came to be investigated first, and from it arose during the treatment the paranoid symptoms which will interest us principally.

The dissatisfactions and difficulties in his marriage first arose when his social activities began to be destroyed by external catastrophes. Social upheaval made it necessary for him to leave his home and to give up his occupation. In a few months all that he had achieved was reduced to nothing; he saved a small part of his fortune, it is true, but was condemned to almost complete inactivity by the outer circumstances. The outlet that the libido had hitherto found in his work, which on account of its neurotic element must be discussed in more detail, was thus cut off, and the dammed-up libido led to dissatisfaction in his married life. It appeared as a dim longing for love, which was unrealizable in the married life that had been formed on the anal-erotic level and had satisfied the previous needs of the libido. Efforts to take up his former activities again also came to nothing, on account of both internal and external difficulties. And yet, since it seemed that the capacity to absorb libido anal-erotically had reached its height and no more libido could be dealt with in this manner, it was essential that the previous social activities, which as we shall see were already highly neurotic, should be replaced by new ones, in order to re-establish an equilibrium of

^{7a} [*Sozial*. This Latin word is confined to scientific usage in German and has not the wide and often tendentious implications that it has in English. It simply means 'in the world', 'among people'.—Tr.]

the mental forces. There remained two possible alternatives: either the neurosis which was already latent in the neurotically-tinged sublimations must be replaced by a manifest neurosis, or the marriage must be dissolved and an attempt made to find an outlet for the libido dammed-up by the overthrow of the sublimations in a new love-relationship on the genital level. At the beginning of the treatment the second alternative was much in the patient's mind; but the several attempts he had already made to leave his wife had come to nothing, which made him hesitate now. We know of course that this path was impassable and that every attempt to find a genital outlet would have come to grief. The Oedipus complex which had never been overcome stood in the way; even without a neurotic disposition, indeed, it stands as a formidable barrier against unlimited genital satisfaction and necessitates the formation of sublimations, that is, it forces a part of the sexual energy into social paths. In a neurotic character such as this the capacity for love on the genital plane which is so narrowly restricted by the Oedipus complex must first be enlarged by analysis, in order to make satisfaction of a normal kind in the relation to the love-object possible.

The external changes in his life were not of course alone responsible for the overthrow of the sublimations. The analysis showed that the social upheaval merely provided an occasion for the daemonic feature in the neurosis of his life to appear in a more pronounced form and bring it about that the life's work of this man, who was in any case continually injuring himself in life from a neurotic sense of guilt, should be finally destroyed. He was forty years of age and it was indeed in reality no light matter for him to begin again; but the difficulty was materially increased by the neurotic tendency to self-injury which throughout his whole life had hindered the healthy tendencies towards sublimation and had rendered a great part of his energy sterile. The situation was similar to that of a professional violinist suffering from a neurotic cramp in his fingers, who then by chance or by some blunder injures his hand as well.

Attempts to take up his activities again under difficult external circumstances failed on account of neurotic behaviour in the course of his work, which now evinced itself more and more. As a young man in favourable external conditions he had tolerated these neurotic inhibitions without serious disadvantage; but in the difficult

conditions after the collapse of his business, they made it impossible for him to succeed in obtaining a position in the world even approximating to what he had had before, and thus to obtain a similar field for his activities.

This was the situation when the analysis began. Without following the course of the analysis chronologically, I shall endeavour to describe the course taken by that part of the libido which had hitherto been attached to social activities (homosexual), and which by being blocked had led to the dissatisfactions in married life and to the slight hypochondriacal symptoms which brought him to the analyst.

As has been said, the patient had never in his best years succeeded in sublimating his homosexual libido without neurotic signs, especially as it was strongly reinforced from the heterosexual libido, which was driven into a narrow channel by the Oedipus complex and found no adequate outlet. Analysis soon revealed a remarkable attitude which had been repeated in a stereotyped manner throughout his whole business career, the first occurrence of which was traced back to early childhood. He showed an impulsion to injure himself and, as it turned out, in a particular way—by being exploited or defrauded in some way. I should like to describe this impulsion as *passive kleptomania*, kleptomania become narcissistic and turned against the self. With an instinctive knowledge of men he knew how to choose his friends in such a way and how to combine with friendship some material transaction or other, usually of a financial nature, that in the end he was invariably simply cheated and defrauded. He did business only with friends and made his friends his business clients. Friendship and business were intimately connected, and always so that in the end he came off badly. Or else he lent money, pressed it on the borrower, especially when he knew that he would never get it back. He applied the proverbial saying, 'Opportunity makes the thief', with an amazing ingenuity so that he might be stolen from. It was astonishing to find, as the story of his friendships unrolled itself in the analysis, that he had not had a single friend with whom there had not been some monetary transaction and by whom he had not in the end been more or less seriously injured. It had not been difficult to gratify his peculiar need; he could reckon upon one of the strongest impulses in man, his avarice, and had been able to select the right objects for his purpose with sure intuition. Nor

was it difficult for him to ascribe his misfortunes among his friends to the cruelty of fate; in any case he learned nothing from his experiences and would learn nothing, but always repeated the same trick.

His peculiarity also showed itself in a well-known and less pathological form, in meticulous over-conscientiousness and honourableness, to which quality he owed in part his considerable success in his career. It would have been tempting to regard his peculiar passive kleptomania as an exaggerated, caricatured conscientiousness and thus as an anal-erotic over-compensation; but the almost complete removal of the infantile amnesia showed that it represented first and foremost a persistent attempt to realize a castration wish, and that the equivalence of 'money' and 'penis', with a slighter emphasis on the connecting-link 'faeces', formed the unconscious basis of his impulse-ridden behaviour. Through his whole career his attitude to those in authority and to representatives of the father had been highly characteristic. His great conscientiousness and trustworthiness always won him their good opinion and he had often been entrusted with very responsible offices. He always formed his relation with those in authority more and more into that of a father and son; and then, urged on by a dim sense of guilt, he worked with tense energy and utter self-sacrifice for their business interests. Through these qualities he acquired a high position in a trade syndicate in his own country and great wealth. Yet every acquisition of money made him feel guilty, and he relieved his conscience partly by devotion to work and partly by losing a part of it again in the passive kleptomaniac manner described above.⁸ This attitude is well known to us as an anal-erotic over-compensation, but in this case its origin in the Oedipus complex was clearly betrayed by transference-factors involved, and was only fully comprehensible after elucidation of his castration complex. By transference-factors I mean that it was not a matter of indifference to him who caused him these

⁸ In this light his behaviour looked like a caricature of charitableness and betrays the unconscious motives of this social expression of a sense of guilt. I found the anal-erotic basis of this attitude in an unsublimated form in another patient; as a child he used to retain the faeces as long as he could, then evacuate a small portion of them and let it dry on the orifice, then take it off with his hand and throw it away, retaining the remainder for a while longer.

material losses; but that he always selected as the objects of his passive kleptomania friends who were socially or intellectually superior to him, that is, who represented the father. He was inexorable against dishonesty in his subordinates; the unconscious basis of this attitude will be discussed later.

We know from Freud⁹ that the loss of the faeces is felt as one of the earliest narcissistic wounds, in that it constitutes the loss of a pleasure-giving part of the body, and that it can suitably represent castration. I should like here to emphasize that the principal factor in the equivalence of faeces and penis seems to consist in their *affective association*, to which the similarity in shape of the two objects is merely secondary. The *tertium comparationis* of this affective association may be expressed more or less as follows: The loss of a pleasure-giving part of the body *as a result* of a previous pleasurable sensation produced by it (stimulation of the mucous membrane). As he grows every human being learns that every pleasure ends in 'pain'; he learns it through the primal castration experiences—the loss of the pleasure-giving nipple after the pleasure of sucking (*oral* primal castration according to Stürcke¹⁰) and later the loss of the pleasure-giving stool after the anal pleasure of retention (*anal* primal castration according to Freud). An affective basis is therefore well prepared on which the fear or expectation of castration may arise. As the earliest affective basis of all for the expectation of castration we may regard the act of birth, which entails the loss of the mother's body, actually a part of the child's own body, and also the loss of the foetal membranes.¹¹ At the moment of birth a pleasurable condition (the pleasure of absence of stimuli) and a pleasure-giving organ (the uterus) are lost for the first time in life, and are replaced by a painful condition.

The growing human being learns that every pleasure is closely followed by the loss of the pleasure-giving bodily organ (uterus, nipple, stool); so that on reaching the pleasure of onanism he is already prepared affectively to lose the corresponding pleasure-giving

⁹ Freud: Über Triebumsetzungen, insbesondere der Analerotik. *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, Vierte Folge, S. 139, and *Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose*, *ibid.*, S. 579.

¹⁰ Stürcke: The Castration Complex. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 1921, Vol. II, p. 179.

¹¹ One is reminded of the penis-significance of garments, cloaks, etc. in dreams!

organ, the penis, and easily accepts the threat of castration as an obvious conclusion. The temporal sequence of the unconscious affective impressions is elaborated into a causal one (rationalized) and castration is to follow as a result of onanism. This affective basis also explains how the castration complex can play such an important part without any threat having been given—and that without drawing upon any phylogenetic explanation.

Whereas the loss of the nipple is felt as an impersonal cosmic necessity, the first transference-factors come into play during the training in cleanliness; and these the instinctive comprehension of the child's attendants recognizes, by endeavouring to soothe its narcissistic wound with praise and other signs of love. A sense of guilt, the conscience as an inhibitory faculty, plays no part so far. Faeces are given up in return for a narcissistic equivalent, praise and tokens of love from those around. The Oedipus complex, the first social factor, first introduces an inhibitory faculty into the ego-system in the shape of the conscience, and the first dim consciousness of guilt bears upon the incest committed in the phantasy accompanying onanism. The ideal set up within the ego (the conscience) coincides with the person of the father¹² (introjection of the father); the castration-punishment is usually expected at the hands of the father. This ideal, as Freud has shown in his *Group Psychology*, is later identified with the leader and finally with the community itself.¹³ The incest wishes are renounced first of all for love of an ideal which is identical with the father, and then later for love of an ideal which becomes woven more and more into the ego itself.

With these considerations I hoped to make it clear that money as a narcissistically valuable substance is particularly well-adapted, by the affective basis already established, to replace the penis in castration wishes. The same circumstance naturally brings about the other unconscious connection—money and faeces—which is even earlier in time; and it is in accordance with the temporal sequence

¹² Freud: Zur Einführung des Narzissmus. *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*. Vierte Folge, S. 104. 'The institution of the conscience was originally an embodiment of parental criticisms, later that of social criticisms, a process which repeats itself—the origin of a repression-tendency was originally an external prohibition or hindrance.'

¹³ Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922.

of things that the equivalence of money and penis should develop by way of anal erotism.

With his passive kleptomania our patient was first continually being castrated by those of his friends who were in some way superior to him; and then, when the social revolution brought in a new standard and private property was condemned, he rendered up his fortune to the community itself by a series of quite transparent blunders, and thus transferred to the community the rôle of the castrator. In order to make comprehensible the paranoid symptoms which appeared during the treatment I must trace back to his youth the history of his castration wishes—which so far have only been mentioned as an impulse-ridden tendency to self-injury.

At the time of the revolution he rescued the fortunes of certain of his friends and got them transferred abroad—and literally forgot to do the same for his own! It is true that he concealed a few articles of value, but later he allowed them to get into the hands of a friend who absconded with them. Before this he once performed a very great service for a business friend, for which he took nothing in return, and was later suspected of high treason for it. His whole life was a series of such incidents, which most frequently ended simply in money being stolen from him. In his youth he reacted with a quite special affectivity to detecting anyone, particularly a subordinate, in an attempt to defraud his chief. At the age of twenty he one day discovered a fellow-employee in the act of embezzling a large sum; the man offered him a big price for his silence, but he denounced him nevertheless. After this affair, which agitated him exceedingly, he suffered for a year from a gastric neurosis. He could take no food but fluids, and had a strong aversion to almost anything solid. After this recollection came up in the analysis there followed a transitory symptom in the form of an attack of diarrhoea, which took the place of his habitual constipation. Hypochondriacal sensations of a globular nature in the larynx—he felt a stick in his throat—were repetitions of similar sensations which he had first had in youth at the same time as the gastric symptoms, after the affair of the embezzlement.

The analysis of these transitory bodily symptoms brought a mass of material into consciousness, of which one little kleptomaniac incident in his childhood deserves special attention. It first gave me the assurance that I could justly regard his later tendency to self-injury, which I have called passive kleptomania, as a reversal of a

primarily active tendency into a passive one. The mechanism of this reversal is that of a 'turning of sadism upon the self', and here too the prominent part played by a sense of guilt in this reversal is evident.

As a schoolboy of nine or ten he stole obsessively from two of his school-fellows—chiefly pencils, pens, money, etc. Pocket-knives he would have liked to take, but did not 'because they were too expensive'. He most particularly wanted the school-bag of one of these boys, but he could not take it; it would have been too noticeable. They were both unusually clever boys, much cleverer than he, the best in the class; and on this account he envied them, but at the same time he liked them very much. After he had stolen anything he had an intense feeling of guilt, and very often put back the stolen article. He struggled with this compulsion and begged God to free him from this vice. It is to be noted that he stole only from these two friends.

Although the unconscious determination of this 'relative kleptomania'—by which I would describe its restriction to particular persons—is transparent enough, I asked him to associate to the stolen articles, but without success. Nothing came to his mind. Only in regard to the school-bag which he so much wanted to steal did the censorship permit a gleam of light to fall on to the unconscious; probably because the chain of associations connecting this object to the repressed idea was longer than that connecting pens, pencils, etc. to it.

Associations to school-bag: 'The school-bag had fur; it was made of hide... of an undressed deer-skin... deer... antlers... I am very fond of deer, they are so gay and lively'. Deer represented manliness to him, as he remarked next.

I would call attention here to the idea of a 'hide', which will play an important part in a later dream-interpretation. Behind this kleptomania was clearly the castration wish, which, as the analysis revealed in other ways, was directed first and foremost against the father's genital organ. The clever boys were well-suited by their industry and mental superiority to reactivate at the beginning of the second puberty-period the first and earliest feelings of jealousy.

I will make use of this material to point out a surprising difference between the attitude of my patient and that of women with the classical type of kleptomania, who steal obsessively, regardless of whom they are stealing from. They steal on the

principle of stealing for stealing's sake, without any affective impulse to injure someone else; I should say they steal without any object-transference. By their thefts they are trying to make good the cosmic injustice of their bodily configuration; their thefts have more of a narcissistic tone. Since there is no intention to injure there is also no sense of guilt; their actions are directed against an impersonal injustice. In my patient's obsessive thieving, however, it is just the transference-factor, the choice of those who were to be stolen from, which is characteristic. He stole only from superior school-fellows; he envied only a bigger penis, and not, like women, the penis in itself.

I do not suppose that this single observation suffices for us to draw any contrast in principle between male and female kleptomania in regard to the presence or absence of transference-factors (absolute and relative kleptomania) and of the sense of guilt.¹⁴ I know that hardly a single analysis goes through without revealing minor kleptomaniac tendencies in childhood and that in women too the person stolen from often plays an important part. It seems to me, however, that the above considerations explain why the classical objectless kleptomania is met with *only in women*.

In the development of the patient's castration complex this kleptomaniac episode marks an important period; for it shows in its active form the same impulse that, by a reversal into a passive form,

¹⁴ In a conversation I had with Dr. Abraham, he informed me that he had often found in analysis other determinants of obsessive stealing, beside the envy of the penis mentioned by me, such as the impulsion to take by force the parent's love which was not forthcoming or any unobtainable pleasure of any kind. This last motive is obviously the ruling one in the habit very common among children of stealing good things to eat. The longing to take the mother from the father also unconsciously plays an important part. In the course of this conversation we came to the conclusion that in all these cases the ultimate impulse to obsessive stealing comes, at the deepest unconscious level, from the longing for the first source of pleasure; it is the unwillingness to be parted from the mother's breast. The nipple is the first love-token, the first source of pleasure to the child; this oral origin is evident in thefts of sweetmeats. Stealing because love or pleasure is not forthcoming merely shows that the first refusal of the mother's love, the withdrawal of the nipple, has not been overcome. Obsessive stealing would thus always arise out of an active castration-wish, if we take the castration-wish in Stürcke's extended meaning.

later on expressed itself in the peculiarity of his neurotic character. The intense sense of guilt shows the struggle for repression which the conscience was waging against the envious attitude towards the father or his representatives—an attitude which in earliest childhood (the first puberty-period) had been overcome, but was revived again shortly before the second puberty-period. And in the course of further analysis an even earlier kleptomaniac episode was actually recalled. As a boy of five or six he often stole money from his father's pockets, and also other things like those he stole at school; even at that time, however, he did not keep the stolen property, but gave it away to his playmates.

Repression of this asocial impulse was not successful, and so an attempt at defence was sought by means of other mental mechanisms—first of all by *projection*. We see this method of defensive warfare in his behaviour under temptation to steal, and in his impulsions generally to put himself into situations where the temptation to dishonesty is strong. As early as his fourteenth year he obtained by his honesty a position of great personal responsibility in a shop. After severe resistances in the analysis a series of recollections with a strong affective tone in regard to this period of his life came out; they were memories of the attempts of the customers to bribe him and of his strongly ambivalent feelings towards the head of the firm. He fought the temptations, remained honest, and projected the struggle between his conscience and his own aggressive tendencies outwards, despatched the enemy within him in his struggle with the dishonest customers. His better nature, his ego-ideal, played the part of the head of the firm by identification; the repressed (or better, to-be-repressed) part of his personality was identified with the customers. He dealt with his ambivalence by dividing his ego into two by means of projection and identification, and thus satisfied both the repressed and the repressing tendencies. For this solution (the paranoid mechanism) of his conflict he required situations in which he met with temptation. He kept up this defence-mechanism until his twenty-second year, when the affair of the embezzlement occurred; then for the first time this form of defence against his asocial tendencies failed him. He delivered up the thief and withstood the temptation, but yet he fell ill with hypochondriacal and conversion symptoms in the whole alimentary canal. Eating solid food was given up, as an oral representation of the castration-wishes; the formation of a hard stool, affectively overcharged on

account of its penis-significance and so rendered suspicious to the repressing tendency, was prevented by diarrhoea. While in these symptoms the fluid contents of the bowel served the purpose of the higher repressing ego-system, the repressed active castration-wish obtained expression in the form of a hypochondriacal sensation of a stick in the throat—he had swallowed a penis. These symptoms strengthen the surmise that the patient was suffering from a latent narcissistic neurosis, which was replaced by neurotic behaviour in life and thereby prevented from breaking out. These symptoms did in fact re-appear during the analysis at a time when his impulse-ridden behaviour came to light, and when he was coming to believe that the unhappy end of all his friendships and the stereotyped repetition of material losses was not due to the cruelty of fate, but to his own impulses to self-injury, by which he relieved the burden on his conscience and from which at the same time he extracted a passive masochistic pleasure.

His recognition of this had a far-reaching effect. He suddenly began to review all the relationships with friends that he had at the moment, which were very numerous, and discovered that he had invested the remnant of his fortune again systematically in his friends' business undertakings, in such a way that all control over it and insight into the inner conduct of affairs was out of his hands. Examination into things showed him that he had again suffered serious losses in several directions. His attitude now underwent a very sudden and unnatural change. He who had never been capable of exercising any control over his own financial affairs, who regarded it as an insult to ask a friend for an account, now became suspicious and demanded balance-sheets; he changed completely, to the utter astonishment of all his friends and their circle. It was at this time, after the passive satisfaction that he had previously obtained in life had been brought under the control of the censorship and become impossible, that the hypochondriacal and conversion symptoms appeared as a substitute. The analysis and interpretation of these symptoms brought, as has been said, a mass of forgotten memories back into consciousness, and led to the rapid disappearance of these symptoms; only to be followed very shortly, however, by the paranoid symptoms, which had already been heralded by the sudden change of character shown in his suspicious attitude (character-regression, as Ferenczi has called it).

Among the memories unearthed at this time one was accompanied by especially strong feeling; as a child of six he had flung himself sobbing upon the body of his dead father, kissing his face, and had cried out: 'I will do everything I can to make up for all that I have done against you!' The revival of this memory gave the impression of a cathartic abreaction; the repressed displaced affect broke out during the analytic session in all its original intensity. Sobbing and crying he saw before him with hallucinatory clearness the completely forgotten face of his dead father.

We may pause for a moment over this memory and consider that in it we have found the actual experience which was for ever being reproduced again by the repetition-compulsion, and which brings sense and meaning into the patient's senseless behaviour in life. His whole life literally consisted in 'making up' for a dark mysterious sin, in perpetually discharging an oppressive unpayable debt. The oath that he swore by his father's dead body he literally carried into action in life; driven by a truly daemonic compulsion, he paid back the pennies he had taken from his father's waistcoat pocket to any and every father-substitute who crossed his path in life.

These memories and the recognition they brought sufficed to effect the astonishing change of character described. But these analytic discoveries merely exposed the reaction of the conscience that, under the pressure of the sense of guilt, had turned the impulse to its passive form; behind it there lay, for the present still concealed, the necessary reconstruction of the aggressive active impulse—surmised and theoretically inferred, except for the transitory kleptomaniac episodes in school. Corresponding to this was the too sudden appearance of the change of character and the way in which it grew more and more marked: it replaced (with a character-regression) the memory of the repressed aggressive attitude. He became more and more suspicious, quarrelled with all his friends, and could no longer endure their superiority which before he had sought so eagerly. He scented fraud in everything; was at one moment furious, at the next depressed; he went so far as to make a scene with one friend in a public place. His condition approached continually nearer to paranoia.

One day he told me he had been put on the Bolsheviks' black list and was living in fear of the world-revolution that was soon going to take place; he would be one of the first victims, for he was already being watched. Now that he could no longer pay the

world by damaging himself, by being deceived and stolen from, anxiety had developed. His neurotic behaviour, like every neurotic symptom, had served as a protection against anxiety, forming as it did the passive discharge of an originally active libido. He felt guilty and paid, let himself be stolen from, in order to avoid a worse fate; he paid *in order to be able to keep his penis*. And then analytic recognition took away this defence against his neurotic fear of the community and the anxiety broke out in ideas of persecution. Indeed he had not been persecuted before because he had paid out money to prevent it.

One day, during the analysis of a dream, quite unmistakable paranoid symptoms appeared; they bore, however, a strong transference-character.

Dream: He was in a stable and saw hidden in a corner (? perhaps behind a wall) a bear; it was on two legs like a human being. The bear went up to a dark heap which he could not see clearly and *very carefully* picked up a furry hide off the heap; then went slowly along, and *very carefully* put the skin down in another place on the stable floor. In the background he saw two horses, one of which moved (? perhaps it kicked out its hind leg) while the bear was carrying out this performance.

The first associations came without difficulty. The bear made him think that as a child he was called 'Bear', and that his baptismal name meant 'bear' in his own language. Then he remembered an incident of his childhood. He was perhaps five or six years old when a bear came into his father's stable-yard and tried to get into one of the stalls; it disappeared again, however, without taking anything. Then followed memories about being overtaken and robbed by gypsies. When I asked him for associations to a 'hide', he became irritable. Nothing came to his mind... then a hesitating mutter... 'Perhaps it was a wild boar's skin.' The next association was... 'Fur collar'. Then he was silent a long time; suddenly he broke out:

'I feel something cold streaming on to me from you. You're sending out electricity on to me!'

Intense anxiety came over him; he was quite convinced of the reality of his delusional ideas. ('The man has electricity in his body!')

To complete the account in full of the course of this transitory paranoid condition I will interpolate here that interpretation of these

delusional ideas led during this very session to relief of the anxiety and to understanding on the part of the patient. The way had been well prepared by the foregoing analysis. The dream was interpreted in the following sessions, and in a relatively short time we arrived, through a series of memories with a strong affective tone (among which was that already mentioned of stealing money from the father), at a practically complete mastery of his castration complex. The paranoid attitude also gave way and the exaggerated change to suspiciousness relaxed, but without any return of the impulsion to self-injury. The character change showed itself also externally; his expression, his manner, his hand-writing, and above all his gait, altered conspicuously. He started a new business undertaking, and for the first time since his break-down he again achieved success in it.

The meaning of the dream, however, was only revealed fully when the significance of the 'very careful' operations of the bear came to light.

The bear steals the hide and goes about it very carefully like a thief (please refer to the memory of the bear, followed by that of being attacked by robbers). The hide obviously serves as a penis-symbol, as it did it in the former chain of associations: school-bag—hide—deer—maleness, and as is indicated too by the first associations to it: wild boar—fur collar. His next associations explain the intense anxiety that supervened together with the paranoid ideas of reference (the physician was sending out electricity on to him) when I first asked him for associations to 'hide'. As a child he was once terrified by a wild boar and another time by an otter. The next association to otter was: 'Men often wear fur collars of otter skin'... 'It was a big powerful otter' (otters are smooth, long, and cylindrical in shape). He had once as a child of five seen a stable-man having intercourse with a peasant girl in the stable which he saw in his dream; it frightened him intensely because the girl screamed horribly. This brought memories of observing parental intercourse.

In the dream the hide stands for the greatly feared penis of the grown-up man (stable-man, father); it is strongly endowed with affect, as is the chain of associations throughout: penis—fright—wild boar—otter, and it is to be noted that the exaggerated impression made by these animals is due to association by similarity of shape (otter and penis). In the dream, however, these terrifying animals

are condensed into a *hide*, that is, are *dead*; and in the appearance of the bear as a body-snatcher (hide = corpse) the repressed wish is gratified—the wish that threatened to break forth from the unconscious at the moment when he stood by the dead body of the father he had feared and envied and who was now so harmless—the wish to rob the dead father of his penis. Instead of this wish there appeared in consciousness the sense of intense guilt: 'I will do everything I can to make up for all that I have done against you!'

At the sight of his father lying dead, the conflict in the ambivalence surged up, if not for the first time, yet certainly with greatest intensity, when the death-wishes of phantasy were suddenly realized.

In the dream the hide is also a symbol of faeces; the bear picks it up from a 'heap'. The first association to heap was 'dungheap'; a heap in a stable is obviously a heap of horse-dung. The word hide (*Fell*) also made him think of refuse (*Abfall*). At the moment that the bear picks up the hide the horse makes a threatening movement. The connection is clear: the bear steals horse-dung (money) from the horse (father). Directly after relating the dream the patient himself interpreted the two horses as the two parents. I should also like to emphasize that in the dream the bear behaves in the same way as the patient had behaved in life as a child when, because of his sense of guilt, he did not keep the things he had stolen from his father, but gave them away to his play-mates. The bear puts the hide carefully back on the floor. As we have seen, he too in later life cannot keep the money he has earned and is impelled to give up some of it again.¹⁵

We saw that by the dream-work of condensation the hide has acquired a central significance. Besides this, the dream makes use of the (paranoid) projection mechanism. The division of the ego into two is clear: conscience (ego-ideal) is hidden behind a wall (endopsychic perception of repression) and looks on at the bear's operations; the latter at the same time stands for himself, the repressed part of himself which he projects into the outer world. The complete interpretation of this dream amounted to an explanation

¹⁵ His unconscious, which was in this respect so unusually sensitive, perceived only too plainly the structure of present-day commercial organization, i.e., that the money a man earns is taken away from someone else.

of the neurotic trait in the patient's character. The envy of the father's penis was displaced on to money, and then under the weight of the conscience was turned against himself in the form of an impulse to self-injury. Behind this last line of defence, by displacement, projection and reversal of the instinct, against the primitive aggressive castration wish, there lies as an intermediate stage the passive homosexuality, which comes to expression during the interpretation of the dream in the transitory paranoid delusion: the physician is sending out electricity on to him. A complete account of this transformation of the libido would be as follows:

1. *Primary attitude of envy directed against the father: the positive castration wish* (stealing money from the father).

2. Institution of an ego-ideal identified with the father (introjection of the father as the ego-ideal). As a result of this ambivalence a conflict of the conscience ensues (scene by the father's dead body). Under the pressure of the sense of guilt a transformation of the active castration wish into a passive one takes place by 'turning upon the self' (talion punishment). Together with the passive castration wish appears the passive-homosexual attitude to the father as a punishment, by identification with the suffering partner (sadistic-masochistic conception of coitus: the sexual act witnessed in the stable). This passive-homosexual current of feeling undoubtedly proceeds mainly from heterosexual libido dammed up by prohibitions against incest and parricide. It cannot remain in this crude homosexual form, however, because of fear of castration and fear of homosexual assault; it is therefore sublimated as:

3. *Passive submissive attitude to superiors and friends* (passive homosexuality) and *passive kleptomania* (castration wish). This last phase serves as an outlet for the libido at the same time sanctioned by conscience, and serves also as a defence against anxiety. The object of this anxiety was originally the paternal penis; later the anxiety takes the form of a dread of the community.

The defence-formula against the aggressive impulses runs therefore: It is not I that wish to castrate my father and possess my mother, but *he* that wishes to castrate me and do to me what I should like to do to her. This defence-formula leads to anxiety, nevertheless; only after displacement from the penis to money and only after social sublimation of the passive homosexuality does it

become adapted to keep the anxiety in check. At the moment when the analysis was undoing this whole process backwards, when the wish-tendency behind the apparently accidental money-losses was exposed and had been renounced, the anxiety which lay concealed behind this defence-mechanism broke out as dread of the Bolsheviks. The analysis went deeper, however, and in the interpretation of the 'bear' dream substituted castration for the money losses, by bringing up the equivalence of money and penis. The anxiety which by displacement and sublimation had been disguised as dread of the community regressed to the naked dread of the homosexual assault that was now expected as a consequence of castration: 'You are sending out electricity on to me!'

This quite unambiguous analysis of the mechanism by which a transitory paranoid anxiety developed will perhaps enable us to add a small contribution to the theory of paranoia or, rather, of delusions of persecution. This contribution becomes possible when we regard the result of this analysis in the light of Freud's recent more extended investigations into the ego-system.

The homosexual genesis of the paranoid ideas is quite clear in the case described, but we also obtain an insight into the original evolution of homosexuality—namely, projection of the aggressive castration wish and thereby division of the ego into two. The ego-ideal which arose out of introjection of the father is saved by a projection of the aggressive tendency incompatible with it; this latter then directs itself against the ideal. This aggressive side of the ego-system, which remains at this primitive level, after projection gratifies its castration wish against the higher side which is identified with the father, against the ideal. So that, by being deceived and stolen from by his friends, he was not merely punished for his aggressive covetous tendencies, but was also—as the man in possession who could be defrauded and robbed—their superior; and thus he acquired a father's position towards his friends. This contradiction made the passive attitude to his friends more tolerable. The whole mechanism, therefore, is similar to that described by Freud for melancholia; it is only less narcissistic, because the aggressive side remains projected. The incest wish is also at the same time guarded against by a similar process which, however, appears to be independent of the first process described; the active wishes in regard to the mother are resolved into an identification with her, through the passive homosexual attitude to the father.

Both the active impulses which have been turned upon the self pass over together into passive homosexuality: the aggression against the father and the heterosexual impulse towards the mother turn into a passive female attitude in regard to the father (this entails at the same time self-punishment).¹⁶ To sum up, in the libido-development under investigation three great stages are distinguishable:

1. The primary, sadistic, active, heterosexual. (Primal crime of incest and castration wishes.)
2. Following this, a defence against these asocial impulses by transformation of them into masochistic, passive-homosexual, and finally into
3. A defence by displacement and sublimation against the passive-homosexual outlet for the libido.

I should wish not to go further without pointing out that Freud has already described these three great stages as occurring in the evolution of civilization and particularly in the evolution of religion. The primal crime is the *first* stage. The passive submissive attitude to the totem-animal and later to the god is the *third* stage. The *second* stage of unsublimated homosexuality is not manifest; it is repressed, as also in the character-development I have been describing, only to appear after displacement from the father to the totem-animal or after sublimation from the father to the god. Freud has shown the supreme importance of repressed homosexual tendencies for the origin of religion in his paper, 'The History of an Infantile Neurosis',¹⁷ which constitutes a confirmation out of individual psychology of the theory developed in *Totem and Tabu*. The part played by the unconscious passive homosexuality, which provokes anxiety and is guarded against, is the same in his case as in mine. In his case, in so far as it is not worked off in hysterical bowel-symptoms, it leads to a caricature of religion, in my case to a caricature of the morals of capitalism.

¹⁶ My speaking of the incest wish in connection with the castration wish is only apparently an arbitrary digression; for the latter already includes the former. The envy of the father's penis is only intelligible when the incest wish is already in existence to give cause for this envy. With regard to the patient's tendency to identify himself with his mother, I may mention that he had since childhood had a habit of pinching his right nipple, which had grown considerably larger in the course of years as a result.

¹⁷ Freud: *Sammlung kleiner Schriften*, Vierte Folge, S. 703.

The neurosis which expressed itself in the patient's whole career in life did not, however, constitute the entire solution of the father-conflict. He further made use of a more narcissistic mechanism: of the sense of inferiority, which also had its root in the castration complex.

Exaggerated feelings of inferiority strike the analytic eye at once as an intermediate stage on the way to delusions of inferiority, and it is not difficult to recognize in them the wish-tendency: i. e., the tendency to self-punishment for a primary attitude of envy. The feeling of inferiority has indeed always an envious attitude inherent in it, and behaves reciprocally with it; envy is sadistically toned and inferiority masochistically. 'I am too weak' means also 'Another is stronger than I'. The craving to create situations in which inferiority is felt is the same process that Freud has described as the repetition-compulsion to conjure up again and again a traumatic situation that had not been overcome. In feeling himself weaker than someone else, whether justifiably or not, a person with feelings of inferiority is recreating the father-son situation which he has never overcome. The later course of this conflict is known: identification with the father and introjection of the father as ideal. The solution of the conflict is now attempted within the ego-system and the feeling of inferiority represents a feeling of tension between the ideal and the ego, as Freud remarks in his latest work.¹⁸ Solution of the conflict is attempted narcissistically, as in melancholia. One part of the ego is raging against the other; to the ego-ideal this is a sadistic solution and to the ego it is a masochistic one. The ego envies the ideal and is punished for it by torturing feelings of inferiority, but it obtains masochistic pleasure from the punishment. This is the well-known sadistic-masochistic game of such characters; it takes place within the ego-system and absorbs the primary aggressive impulses which would otherwise be sublimated and applied in useful occupations. Delusions of grandeur are an extreme form of the outcome of this conflict; in them ego and ideal have combined; the ideal is cannibalistically incorporated into the ego, in the way that Freud has described in maniacal insanity.¹⁹ Thus the tension

¹⁸ Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 106. International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922.

¹⁹ *loc. cit.* I should only be following Freud's train of thought if I described the coincidence of the ego and the ideal as a cannibalistic form of identification, for he compares fits of mania with the festivals

is relieved and therefore this condition is so frequently a final one. These two ways of solving the conflict are well known to us in a milder form as character-traits; they are the 'inferiority'-character, with his shy, anxious manner (melancholic type), and the exuberant character, with his self-confident, unrestrained manner (hypomanic type).

In my patient this origin of the feelings of inferiority in rivalry with older persons, in penis envy, was clearly visible. His first recollection of strong feelings of inferiority dated from his school-days, when he envied the cleverer boys and stole from them. Later the feeling of inferiority took a particularly tormenting form: 'I've learnt nothing; I don't know anything.' Since he tried to soothe this envy by stealing penis-symbols, it is clear that the mechanism was one of displacement and sublimation (of the envy on to the cleverness of the boys).

The other manifestation of his feeling of inferiority was his shame about his Jewish birth. This shame was so pronounced that he concealed the fact from his greatest friends and even from his wife (he had been baptized). The connection between this form of inferiority-feeling and the castration complex is well-known. The two circumstances, that he had had little education and was a Jew, were his most painful conscious conflicts, and they expressed nothing else but the envious attitude of his early years which had never been overcome. When we reflect that the source of the ego-ideal is the identification with and introjection of the father, it is easily comprehensible that the inferiority-feeling, the conflict between ego and ego-ideal, should assume the form of the primal conflict between father and son. The way in which he relieved this tension, at times by an arrogant hypomanic manner and fantastic pseudologia, at times by depressive self-torturing, is a good illustration of the applicability of the Freudian melancholia mechanism as an explanation of feelings of inferiority. Perhaps one might venture the assumption that the difference between

originating in the totem-feast, which is a cannibalistic act with an identification-tendency. Mania would then be a further step on the way to the narcissism which is entered upon in melancholia. In the latter the love-object is absorbed into the ego-system; in mania the splitting within the ego-system itself disappears, the cannibalistic identification of the ego with the object is then completed within the ego-system and an even more complete narcissism is thus achieved.

delusions of grandeur and delusions of inferiority, on the one hand, and mania and melancholia, on the other, consists simply in this: that in the first pair of neuroses it is *homosexual* libido that is narcissistically introverted and sadistic-cannibalistically gratified within the ego-system (between ego and ego-ideal), whereas in the second pair of neuroses the *heterosexual* libido undergoes the same fate.

A Primal Form of Castration

In the course of my discussion of this case the patient's castration complex has been found to represent the castration wish against the father turned upon himself, as a self-punishment in order to relieve the sense of guilt. We know that this is only one root of the complex, the one proceeding from the father-conflict. We cannot forget, though, that the father-conflict is only one side of the Oedipus complex, that is, it is the consequence of an incest wish. Castration is not merely the talion punishment expected for the penis envy directed against the father; it is also the punishment for the incest wish. In fact, the latter source of it is the best known and best recognised.

The part played by the incest wish in the formation of this patient's castration complex was followed back very far. Analytic recognition was again linked up with the solution of transitory symptoms; understanding of them did not advance our knowledge of his social character-traits, which were, as we have seen, fully explicable from the father-conflict, but only they explained his behaviour in his marriage.

The transitory symptoms which replaced memories in this connection were again hypochondriacal—feelings of strangulation in the throat, quite different from that of the stick in the throat already mentioned, and feelings of pressure on the chest and back. All these sensations felt as though the pressure was an external one. These symptoms lasted for some days and were peculiarly trying during the analytic session. Analysis of them brought to light a mass of memories belonging to the period from his fourth to his seventh year, which I can collate shortly in view of the traumatic character which recurred monotonously in them all.

One day in the engine-room he put his finger into the machinery and was severely injured. Another time he swallowed a fish-bone

and barely escaped choking to death. When his father beat him he used to run to the water-mill and listen in a melancholy mood to the water rippling; on one such occasion he fell into the water and was nearly caught by the mill-wheel. Once in the open he was badly frightened by a mouse that ran up on to his leg; he caught it on his thigh under his knickers (a patent falsification of memory and screen-memory!). As a boy of six he often rode bareback without saddle or stirrup; on one occasion his horse shied and bolted into a wood, where his neck caught in a low bough and he was left hanging. Another time his horse shied and bolted into a stable and he only escaped by ducking his head in the nick of time, so as to get through the low door, and even so his back scraped against the door-jamb and his throat was pressed tight against the horse's neck. After this last memory had emerged the feelings of pressure on his throat, chest and back disappeared suddenly. While he was relating this adventure he became very much moved, and suddenly he said with tears: 'I wish I was alone in a small dark place now or near some water'.

I will not now try to decide how far these recollections represent actual experiences or how far they are the products of phantasy. It is not important for us whether they were actual faulty actions on the part of the child which constantly brought his life into danger, or creations of phantasy: in any case they were the products of his unconscious (faulty actions are also determined by the unconscious). What is conspicuous in all these recollections is the mortal danger and the *form* of the threatened death—*suffocation*; among them are interpolated some memories of the castration type (finger cut off, mouse in knickers, hanging by the neck—the last also a danger of suffocation).

I should like here to refer back to my earlier remarks on the subject of *affective association*, in order to bring in the evidence of these other observations in support of them. Behind the anal and the oral loss of a pleasure-giving part of the body there lies the *first* traumatic experience, the act of birth: the loss of the enveloping womb, accompanied by strangulation in the throat, feelings of pressure on chest and back, and the danger of suffocation. The earliest affective experience of pleasure followed by 'pain' through the loss of a part of the body is unquestionably the act of birth, and it is thus suited to express the expectation of castration in the manner of the most primitive level of the unconscious. *The patient's*

transitory hypochondriacal sensations of pressure were repetitions of the sensations present during the act of birth. These hypochondriacal sensations were resolved in the analysis partly by memories of faulty acts in childhood dangerous to life entailing similar sensations, and partly by memories of the castration type. Hanging by the neck, falling into water, riding into a small space through a narrow passage in danger of strangulation are clear representations of birth, the last two, indeed, in the reverse direction: representations of a return into the womb.

The double meaning so characteristic of unconscious processes here comes clearly to expression. The meaning of all these transitory bodily sensations, memories, faulty acts, and associations replacing one another is at once incest wish and castration wish, return into the womb and birth. The unconscious equations run: castration = birth, incest wish = return to the womb.²⁰ The incest wish and the punishment for it are carried through in one and the same process, expressing the compromise between ego and libido with which we are so familiar. Falling into water and being drowned, riding into a small closed space through a narrow passage and thereby being strangled, serve, by their element of suffering, as punishments for the wish which is at the same time symbolized in these performances: the return into the womb = incest.

A few more remarks about the equation 'return to the womb = incest'.

During coitus a part of the body, which in dreams, as we know, so often stands for the whole personality, presses up against the womb; further, through cell-division the germ-cells, detached particles of the body which also biologically correspond to an extract of the personality—one remembers the fact of heredity—also reach the womb. On the genital level the libido is indeed, speaking biologically, an impulsion to introduce the germ-cells into the uterus. The pressure of the penis against the uterus can in this light be regarded as the symbolic representation of the wish to return to the womb.

²⁰ Freud has interpreted the phantasies of re-birth as wishes for incestuous intercourse with the mother. 'The re-birth phantasy is probably always a milder form, a euphemism, so to speak, of the phantasy of incestuous intercourse with the mother.' *Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose. Sammlung kleiner Schriften. Vierte Folge, S. 693.*

Reality, however, necessitates two deprivations: the mother is replaced by another woman and the return is accorded only to a part of the organism, to the germ-cells.

On the basis of the compulsion to repetition discovered by him, which seems to be the fundamental fact underlying all mental and biological processes, Freud conceives the sexual instinct to be an impulsion towards the re-union of matter which has at some time become divided.²¹ I have attempted²² to equate this division with the cell-splitting which ensues upon growth, and to identify the impulsion to re-union with the impulsion to re-establishment of the mature state before division. As an act preparatory to the union of the two products of division (the germ-cells) coitus is the first step on the way to this re-establishment of the mature state. The germ-cells and the complete individual are actually the asymmetrical products of cell-division and correspond essentially to the two equal halves of the single-cellular protozoa which reproduces itself by division.

In conclusion, I will sum up the essential points of this paper. In the castration complex two self-injuring tendencies met in one stream: on the one hand, the talion punishment for active castration wishes, out of the father-conflict; on the other hand, the punishment for incest wishes. Further, in this second source the expectation of castration is only *one* manifestation of an expectation of a general narcissistic wound. It is the deposit of an ontogenetic experience—that every pleasure has its outcome in loss, in pain.²³

²¹ Freud: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

²² Metapsychologische Betrachtungen, *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1921, Bd. VII, S. 270.

²³ The uncanny sense of expectation, often felt by neurotics but also by the healthy, that an indefinite vague misfortune will follow just when great success has been achieved or when life seems for a moment to have granted perfect happiness, also rests upon the affective expectation of a narcissistic wound, deeply imprinted by the affective experiences of ontogenetic development. Polycrates throws his ring into the sea at the moment when he has attained complete happiness, in order to ward off, by this symbolic self-castration, the envy of the gods and the misfortune it brings. This symptomatic act too has its reverse meaning: he throws the ring into the water and thus expresses the wish to return to the womb.

The patient's behaviour in his marriage now becomes completely comprehensible. His impulsion to give, to pay for every act of intercourse, is a need to give out a substance of narcissistic value and thus a sublimated anal representation of his castration wish, by which he allays his sense of guilt in regard to coitus. In spite of depreciating her by payment the wife remains to him the superior being—the mother. He thus behaves exactly as in his youth when he did penance for his incest-phantasies by his blunders, whose double meaning was at once castration and incest, a guilty impulsion to death by water and by suffocation: to birth and the return into the womb.

The castration wish stood as the central point of his whole character-formation and that is why he was such an unusually favourable object in which to study this complex. The analytic solution of it led not merely to a complete change in his social character-traits, but also to a change in his sexual character. This change too did not take place without disturbances. The dissolution of the sense of guilt led at first to an unbridled longing for a mother instead of a wife, only later on to be gradually brought into adjustment with reality.

THE TEMPEST

BY

HANNS SACHS

VIENNA

I

INTRODUCTION

Man lacks a means of communication between soul and soul. Speech well suffices to convey our wishes and needs to one another, but does not inform us of the conditions of our mind in which they are rooted. We have therefore, on the whole, to be content to imagine another's soul like our own and to rejoice if but a corner of the curtain which our individuality spreads over every other soul is lifted. To transform your own soul into that of another so as to be able to divine not only the desires and cares of the day, but also the flickering phantasies, even down to the dreams, and afterwards to retain this state of identification so that others may see the miracle with their own eyes—that is, without doubt, the greatest work in the liberation of man.

It is this psychagogy that has from the very beginning been the poets' aim, but only one poet has ever attained it.

Shakespeare's characters do not speak only from the situation that is given to them by the poet, but from their own ego, and with such masterly truth that every one of them is a complete and never recurring personality; and yet the words that are spoken by his heroes and his knaves, his queens and wenches, are even to-day on every tongue.

One who reigns so supremely over the spirits of others must love to hide his glory and to wander unknown through life like Harum al Raschid through the streets of Bagdad. Whether by intention or by chance, Shakespeare succeeded entirely in hiding the identity of his soul.

Not that we know little of him. From the dunghill at the door for which his father was fined, and the half-enforced marriage with

the pregnant peasant girl, to the summonses and lawsuits after he had been recognized and attained prosperity, enough and more than enough has come to our knowledge. But of that which moved his inner self, of his passions and his resignations, we do not even know the motives and circumstances. Numerous commentators have tried to read into his works those things that the story of his life left unsaid. But just his greatness, his ability to transform himself into every personality his art evoked, has frustrated these efforts.

Psycho-analysis may undertake this task in the hope of better results. The source of this inexhaustible wealth, of this never-ending ability for transformation, is the unconscious, which, being common to all men, is able to assume every sort of personality. Psycho-analysis stands, Pythia-like, divining and prophesying where the vapours rise to the surface out of the dark impenetrable abysses of the unconscious; it alone can tell us of the circumstances in which the unconscious forms itself into the shapes of artistic creation.

In what follows, only a modest use has been made of the new possibilities, enough to comprehend a single trait of Shakespeare's mind in his latter years. Psycho-analysis likes to go backwards, and therefore it seems not inconsistent to begin with his last love.

II

DATE AND OCCASION OF COMPOSITION

No separate edition of *The Tempest* appeared before the Folio edition of 1623, so that the clue which the Quarto editions furnished as to the latest possible date of composition in the case of other plays is in this instance missing. In the Folio *The Tempest* is placed first of all. As the works in the Folio are decidedly not in chronological order it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this fact. Yet it seems not improbable that when the editors of the Folio began to collect the plays of their illustrious colleague they should almost involuntarily have given his latest work precedence. Perhaps they had originally intended to proceed chronologically in the inverse order of their production, and as they went along gave up this project—because even then they were not certain of this order—in favour of a system of grouping into comedies, histories and tragedies, which was not consistent with the chronological order. Suppositions of this sort, unimportant in themselves, gain weight

if all the other sources of information tend in the same direction. And, indeed, both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence points to the fact that *The Tempest* was Shakespeare's last work, if we disregard *Henry VIII* which was certainly only in small part written by him.

There has been much sneering at the counting up of rhymed couplets, the accented end-syllables and the regular or irregular number of syllables in the lines; these negligible details, it has been said, would never make it possible to assign a work to a particular period or to make a trustworthy grouping of the works. It has been scoffingly asked whether anyone really believed that Shakespeare said to himself 'No, in this play I may not permit myself to add another rhyme, it would transgress the number proper to my present epoch'. This is a very cheap gibe, and the doubts which it implies are quite unjustified. Behind these apparently insignificant details there are really very important facts, such as a freeing of the poet from the troublesome shackles which rivet the thought during versification, or a renunciation of the superficial ornament of rhyme. The insignificance of the details in which the development becomes manifest, besides having the advantage of being able to be counted and so excluding the factor of subjectivity, is just the great advantage of this method; in the apparently accidental exists really the most certain conformity to some hidden law, and the smallest and most negligible things are its best revealers. Psycho-analysis has proved beyond contention that just these little details that accompany an action, details withdrawn wholly or partly from conscious attention, that just these 'symptomatic acts', as they were called by Freud, are most closely and accurately determined by the psychical constellation. So the growing freedom of form, the stronger craving for adequate expression of thought and passion have determined the flow of Shakespeare's verses even in those details concerning the number of syllables in a line, of which he was probably quite unaware.

Several scholars, working from various points of view, have counted over the syllables in Shakespeare's plays. The results, however, are nearly identical, and this fact alone shows that they merit the highest consideration.

Charles Bathurst divided the plays into four groups, according to the versification, and placed *The Tempest* in the fourth and latest of these. Dr. W. A. Hertzberg examined the ratio, in seventeen

plays, of the eleven to the ten syllable lines. He found the smallest number of the former in *Love's Labour Lost*, in which only 4% of the lines were of eleven syllables. *The Winter's Tale*, *Cymbeline* and *The Tempest* had the highest numbers, namely 31.09% in the first and 32% in the other two. F. G. Fleay counted the rhymed couplets and found least in *The Winter's Tale*, which has two, and none at all in *The Tempest* (the songs and masques, of course, omitted), while *Coriolanus* and *Antony and Cleopatra*, for example, each have 42 couplets. Professor Ingram, however, takes most consideration of the growing liberation of thought from the limitations of versification. He counted, line by line, the number of weak endings, i. e. those lines of which the final word is an unaccented monosyllable closely attached in pronunciation to the first word of the following line. This 'jumping' of the meaning over the barrier constituted by the end of the line was quite unknown to Shakespeare's predecessors and even he only acquired it by slow degrees. Thus Professor Ingram has a schedule in which *Love's Labour Lost* with the least number of 'weak endings' comes first, *Pericles* 28th, *The Tempest* 29th, *Cymbeline* 30th and *The Winter's Tale* 31st.

Now all these tests are unanimous in placing *The Tempest* at the end of Shakespeare's development, i. e. as being one of his last plays, and in closest relation with *The Winter's Tale* and *Cymbeline*. Concerning the order of writing of the single plays constituting a group, the metrical tests can, of course, tell us nothing.

The quotations, whether they were borrowed consciously or unconsciously, form an important clue to the fixing of the date, in so far as they are taken from publications that were new at that time. This is true of the famous quotation from Montaigne: the description of the ideal state where there is no state, which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Gonzalo (ii, 1). This quotation keeps to an astonishing degree to the words of Florio's translation of Montaigne, which appeared in 1603. There is indeed a dispute, in which we fortunately need not interfere, whether the translation was not already circulated in manuscript before this date, thus coming into Shakespeare's hands, or whether this assertion is proved to be untenable by a misprint which appears only in the later French editions of Montaigne¹ and was taken over by Florio.

¹ In the edition of 1600, Book I, Chapter 19, occurs *maneant* instead of *manent*.

The name of Caliban's god Setebos comes from a description of Magellan's Travels, which appeared in 1577, where the Patagonian prisoner 'cried upon their great devil Setebos to help him' and when the sign of the cross was made over him 'suddenly cried out, Setebos!' The names of Trinculo and Antonio appear in *Albumazar*, a play which was first printed in 1614, but which had probably already been played some years previously.

Prospero's invocation (v, 1) is partly a literal borrowing from Medea's invocation of the gods in Golding's translation of Ovid (*Metamorphoses* vii, 197-206). But as this work had already appeared in 1567 the fact is of no importance for our purpose.

On the other hand it is worth observing the similarity between the words of Prospero about the illusion of existence and a passage in *The Tragedy of Darius* by William Alexander, later Earl of Sterling, printed in 1603, as it indicates, similarly to the quotation from Montaigne, that *The Tempest* was written after 1603.

The mention of the name of the Bermudas would not, by itself, be of great interest, as this name had been known in England since the voyages of discovery of Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Robert Dudley, that is to say at least since 1596. But there is another fact connected with the mention of this name that goes far further than a borrowing or appropriation of a detail.

At the founding of the colony of Virginia, in 1609, an event had occurred which had attracted much notice in London and had engendered shortly afterwards a rather extensive literature. A company of ships with emigrants to Virginia had been overtaken on the way by a storm and had been scattered. The admiral's ship, on board of which was Sir George Somers, the commander of the expedition, together with several others, was missed and was counted as lost by those who reached their destination, the American coast. It had been wrecked, however, near to the shores of the Bermudas without a single life being lost, the ship having been caught, as if by magic, between two rocks. On the island, which was ill-famed as the Devil's Island, and was avoided by sailors because of its storms, the shipwrecked people found to their surprise a fertile soil and a wonderful climate. They renewed their provisions, knocked together some rafts, and so reached their comrades in the new colony happily. The news that those who had been reported lost had arrived safe and sound caused the greatest joy in London, and in

1610 a number of the saved people came home, several accounts of their experiences being published.

The records dealing with this occurrence, amongst which are the *Reports and Proposals of the Council for the Founding and Government of the New Colony* and also verses (*News from Virginia*), have been thoroughly examined and arranged with regard to their possible use in *The Tempest*. Only three accounts are of interest, as they contain traits which may have served Shakespeare as a stimulus.

In October 1610 there appeared *A Discovery of the Bermudas, otherwise called the Isle of Divels* by Silvester Jourdan. Dated November 8 of the same year is entered in the Stationer's Register *A True Declaration* originating from the Council for Virginia. A still earlier date than those of these two narratives is borne by Strachy's *Reportorie*,^{1a} namely, July 15, 1610. This letter was, it is true, not printed until much later, but it is not at all improbable that it was known to the poet in manuscript, as Strachy was an author by profession and might have been personally known to Shakespeare. Thus all these sources date from the second half of the year 1610. Besides these, a short story by Rudyard Kipling deserves to be mentioned. He relates how Shakespeare makes the acquaintance of a sailor who was wrecked with Sir George Somers, makes him describe his experiences to him, and so receives the inspiration for the first scenes and the setting of *The Tempest*. This oral communication, which is so poetically invented, would also have to be placed in the second half of the year 1610.

What, then, has Shakespeare taken from the reports of Sir George Somers' expedition? It behoves us to use much care in answering this question. Many details claimed as borrowed are the inevitable components of any description of storm and shipwreck. They are common to *The Tempest* and the reports, but they are found in Harrington's translation of *Orlando Furioso* which has also been named as a model, and are probably not absent from any description of such events. Black clouds, towering waves, the

^{1a} *Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes*, Part II, Bk. IX, Chap. VI: 'A true reportorie of the wrack, and redemption of Sir Thomas Gates, Knight; upon, and from the Islands of the Bermudas, his coming to Virginia, and the estate of that Colonie then, and after, under the Government of the Lord La-Warre, July 15, 1610, written by Wil. Strachy, Esq;...'

howling of the storm, the pitiful cries of the crew, do not tell us anything; at the utmost we can see a reference in Ariel's words (i, 2) to the Saint Elmo's fire mentioned in Strachy's *Reportorie* and in Harrison's translation.² Of small significance, also, is the coincidence that both in *The Tempest* and in Somer's wreck the ship carrying the highest commander, being parted from the others, and its crew being deemed drowned, is saved by a miraculous landing on a magic island and rejoins the remainder of the fleet. This detail, however, was an essential part of Shakespeare's plot, for, whereas he could not let the ship that bore a king be unaccompanied, he could, at the same time, naturally only use one ship for the real action of his play. *The Tempest* coincides with these other accounts also in the fact that the shipwrecked people find the climate and the fertility of the island more favourable than they could have foreseen.

But this characteristic trait, together with the shipwreck on the same coast and the escape out of it, recurs also in the following story: 'The ship on which he crossed was wrecked on a small uninhabited isle of the Bermudas, and most of the crew, with the exception of the chaplain and his family, were miserably drowned. The chaplain found this island so pleasant, so healthy, and so rich in all that goes to the maintenance of life [cp. *Tempest*, ii, i. 'Gon. Heere is euery thing aduantageous to life. *Ant.* True, saue meanes to liue.']*³ that he was quite content to end the days of his pilgrimage there.' (cp. *Tempest*, iv, i. 'Fer. Let me liue here euer;') Nevertheless, one cannot maintain that there is a connection between these lines and the shipwreck of 1609 on the one hand, or *The Tempest* on the other, for they occur in the *Axiomata wider den Herrn Pastor Goeze in Hamburg* by G. E. Lessing. Still less weight would I attach to the parallel between the daughter of the Red Indian chief Powatan and the incomparable Miranda. But even though the coincidence of particular details may prove to be but shadowy, the impression of the general suggestion which Shakespeare received from those sources nevertheless remains undiminished. The use of the two strange expressions 'Setebos' and 'still vexed

² And black thick clouds, that with the storme did rise
From hence sometime great ghastly flames did sparke.

³ [The quotations from *The Tempest* and *The Winter's Tale* are throughout taken from the Folio edition of 1623, that is to say, from the first edition of these plays.—Tr.]

Bermouthes' alone proves that the poet had come across these descriptions of travel and that his mind was crowded with material gleaned from them. The rather arbitrary interweaving of the Bermudas into the dialogue between Prospero and Ariel seems to indicate that Shakespeare had some special purpose in mind, which can only have been the exploitation of its topical value. But if one accepts this as established, then, indeed, no single trait, but the whole complex of similarities and allusions becomes sufficiently important to justify the assertion that the reports of the shipwreck on the Bermudas must have lain before the poet when he wrote *The Tempest*; in which case it becomes quite certain that the play was not written before the second half of the year 1610.

Malone, one of the earliest of Shakespeare's commentators, pointed out yet another topical event which, in his opinion might have had an influence on the choosing of the title of the work; this event was the great storm which raged in England from October till December 1612. The work, he thinks, might have been already completed when Shakespeare decided to call it after the great catastrophe. Malone therefore placed the composition of *The Tempest* in the year 1612, until, later on, he changed his views and brought the work into immediate connection with the news of Sir George Somers' rescue. He adds: 'as I know that it had "a being and a name" in the Autumn of 1611, the date of the play is fixed and ascertained with uncommon precision, between the end of the year 1610 and the Autumn of 1611 and that it may with great probability be ascribed to the Spring of the latter year'. Unfortunately Malone does not indicate the source from which he drew the certain knowledge that *The Tempest* had 'a being and a name' in the Autumn of 1611. But as he is generally considered very trustworthy, and as in his time—the beginning of last century—there may still have been records, since lost, that he had examined, his statement deserves notice in spite of its incompleteness.

So far we have concerned ourselves with those indications of the time of its composition which the play itself contains. Before we proceed to the group of records and allusions emanating from the pens of contemporaries, we are obliged to discuss the hypothesis of the Rev. Joseph Hunter, who placed *The Tempest* in the year 1596, in opposition to nearly all other commentators, who give the year 1610 as the earliest possible date of composition.

Hunter starts from the well-known passage in Francis Mere's *Palladis Tamia* (published in 1598) which enumerates amongst Shakespeare's works his *Love's Labours Lost* and *Love's Labours Wonne*. It is generally assumed that the second work is not lost, but that it has passed into the Folio under a changed title. According to Hunter's views this new title is *The Tempest*, and the play which bears it is just this *Love's Labours Wonne*. He bases this opinion on the fact that the essential content of *The Tempest* is Ferdinand's wooing of Miranda; the wooing succeeds because Ferdinand humiliates himself out of love and stoops to the menial work of carrying logs. So, by his labour, he wins the reward of love. It has been argued against this view that Ferdinand does not fulfil any 'Love's Labour', as he is completely under Prospero's yoke and has in any case to obey his commands. This is wholly false. When Prospero imposed the labour on Ferdinand he broke the spell and restored to him freedom of movement; at least Ferdinand believes himself to be quite free. He has indeed experienced Prospero's power; but in not attempting to rebel against him once more he does not refrain out of any lack of courage, but rather because he does not wish to oppose the father of his beloved. Had it been otherwise, his words

and would no more endure
 This wodden slauerie, then to suffer
 The flesh-flie blow my mouth: hear my soule speake.
 The verie instant that I saw you, did
 My heart flie to your seruice, there resides
 To make me slaue to it, *and for your sake*
 Am I this patient Logge-man. (iii, 1)

would have been senseless vapouring, and a grotesque distortion of the conception of his character. Hunter can also quote Prospero's words:

All thy vexations
 Were but my trials of thy loue, and thou
 Hast strangely stood the test: (iv, 1)

It is certainly true that the play might very justly have been called *Love's Labours Wonne*, but it does not by any means follow from

this that it really was so called. Hunter's remaining arguments are untenable. He refers to what he supposes to be an allusion to *The Tempest* in the Prologue of Jonson's *Every Man in his Humour*, which was performed in 1598. But this allusion probably refers only to the 'Histories', and, moreover, the Prologue is not contained in the Quarto edition of 1601, but appears for the first time in the Folio of 1616. In order properly to appreciate the question of the title one must constantly keep in mind the fact that in Shakespeare's time nobody attached very much importance to the name of a work. The only aim was simply to give a clear and striking distinguishing mark, and thus many plays, like *Twelfth Night* and *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, were called after the day of the original production. How undecided the titles were is shown in the records of the Master of the Revels of 1613. We find there a '*Hotspur*', evidently an erroneous title for 1 *Henry IV*, for not Percy, but the Prince is the hero; nevertheless the title is certainly well adapted to avoid confounding the several plays. Later occurs *Benedict and Beatteris*, which can only refer to *Much Ado about Nothing*. And finally, 'labour' does not necessarily mean physical work, such as carrying logs, but rather, as in its counterpart *Love's Labours Lost*, any and every sort of 'labour of love'. But this being so the title can be applied not only to *The Tempest*, but to almost any play where after some difficulties the hero and heroine eventually 'get each other'. This applies fully to *All's Well that Ends Well*, which to-day is, by general consent, held to be the former *Love's Labours Wonne*. M. A. E. Brae, who says this play is *Much Ado about Nothing*, Craig and Hertzberg, who believe it to be *The Taming of the Shrew*, have equal right to claim that the title fits both these comedies. For *Love's Labours Wonne* fits practically every comedy, and would lend itself just as readily to *Twelfth Night*—where the labours of Viola in her love for the Duke, or of Olivia in her love for Viola, are eventually successful—as to *As You Like It*—where Orlando's service to the merry page is rewarded by the hand of Rosalind. Hunter's conclusions with regard to the title go, therefore, decidedly too far, and all the other indications contradict his opinions.

The first mention of *The Tempest* in the contemporary literature is found at a rather late date. It occurs in a play by Ben Jonson,

who was Shakespeare's friend, and with whom, as we know from a fairly reliable source, he frequently indulged in duels of wit which Jonson appears to have extended to his literary work. Jonson's allusions and jokes were, as a result of his nature, rather broad; thus a passage in the Epilogue to his *Bartholomew's Fair* runs: 'If there be never a Servant monster i' the Fair, who can help it, he says? nor a nest of Anticks? He is loth to make nature afraid in his Playes like those that beget Tales, Tempests and such like drolleries'. Caliban is called 'Seruant Monster' in *The Tempest*; 'nest of Anticks' is an allusion to the dances in *The Winter's Tale*; the fact that *Tale* and *Tempest* are mentioned immediately afterwards removes every doubt.⁴

The official records enable us to pursue *The Tempest* somewhat further back than to the year 1614. It is true that of the two documents that come into consideration one has been found to be forged, but even as a forgery it merits a certain amount of attention. For it was not forged by an ordinary swindler, but by a man who was respected as a critic, Peter Cunningham, treasurer of the 'Shakespeare Society'. He said that in 1842 he had found, among the records at Somerset House in two books containing the Revel Accounts for 1600 to 1605 and 1611 to 1612, a few loose leaves on which were records of, amongst others, eight plays by 'Shaxberd' which had been performed at the Court. Together with these, and dated 1611, was the following note: 'By the Kings Players: Hallomas nyght was presented at Whithall before the Kings Maj, a play called the "Tempest"'. The forgery was detected in 1868, but many critics are of the opinion that Cunningham, who had access to Malone's papers, may have known when he effected the forgery of proofs that *The Tempest* was written in 1611, proofs which Malone

⁴ Only Gifford, a biographer of Jonson, has tried to deny the allusion by pointing out that 'drolleries' means a puppet-show and that 'Servant Monster' was the name given to the trained beasts shown at the fairs—to which, by the way, Stephano himself seems to refer in *The Tempest*. But Gifford quite overlooks both the fact that the masque in *The Tempest* is expressly called 'A liuing Drolerie' (iii, 3), and that it cannot be a mere chance that the same passage should contain such a striking combination of words as 'Seruant Monster' together with, immediately afterwards, the title of the play in which it frequently occurs.

had not disclosed. It is thus held that Cunningham has given the facts, even though by means of fraud.⁵

There is no doubt about the authenticity of the second record, the so-called 'Vertue Manuscript'. It contains the accounts of James I's Lord High Chamberlain for the sum paid to John Heminge by order of the Privy Council for performances given at Court, and is dated May 20, 1613. Fourteen plays are mentioned in it, including six of Shakespeare's, one of which is *The Tempest*. The performances formed part of the festival in honour of the marriage of Elizabeth, daughter of James I, to the Elector Palatine, as is shown by the remark 'for presenting before the Princess Highness Lady Elizabeth, the Prince Pallatyne Elector'.

The marriage took place on February 14, 1613, and on April 10 the young pair left Whitehall to take ship for Holland fourteen days later. The performances must have taken place between these two dates.

The natural supposition was that this first mention of a performance of *The Tempest* on the occasion of this wedding was more than an accident; a series of arguments have been given to demonstrate the existence of a deeper connection, in other words to show that *The Tempest* was written for the celebration and commemoration of this wedding in the Royal House. Tieck was the first to express this hypothesis: 'I presume that "The Tempest" was performed in the same year (1613) as the opening of the larger summer theatre, The Globe in Southwark, when the impressions of the wedding and its celebrations were still fresh in the memory and all allusions were still comprehensible enough to be recognized with pleasure. For this wedding of the young Ferdinand, the long voyage, the blessings, and above all the solemn words of the good Gonzalo were certainly meant to be just so many compliments to the Elector Palatine and the Princess Elisabeth. That is also the reason why the masque takes up so much space.' Tieck, then, does not seem

⁵ Furness says on this question: 'The dates of 1611 are given for performances of "The Tempest" in the Revels Accounts forged by Peter Cunningham. That sixty years before Cunningham offered his forgery for sale to the British Museum Malone should have said that he knew these dates to be true deepens the mystery involved in these forged Revels Accounts, whereof their manuscript record is as unquestionably forged as their dates seem to be unquestionably true'.

yet to have known the fact of the performance at court; the internal evidence was alone enough for his assumption. Later authors, especially Garnett⁶ and Brandes, have associated themselves with him and have broadened his arguments.

One of the most striking features of *The Tempest* is its exceptional brevity, which makes it appear very suitable for performance at a festival. It is true that to this it can be objected that in the Lord High Chamberlain's Account *The Tempest* is found amongst other plays that lack this characteristic, that were not then new, and that were certainly never meant to be played at a wedding, as, for example, *Othello*. Far more difficult to dispose of is the argument drawn from the masques, that is, from the interludes which were meant for the amusement of the spectators with singing, dancing and pageantry, without having necessarily any close connection with the plot of the play. It is indeed true that such masques were also introduced into everyday plays, but it is certainly exceptional for the structure of a play to be able to bear two such masques, as in *The Tempest* (iii, 3., iv, 1).

The masque in the fourth act occupies so much space that without it hardly anything would remain; all the rest of the act is really only a frame for this masque, which is its real content and purpose. Moreover one feels very clearly that the felicitations of the goddesses are addressed not only to the couple on the stage, but also to a distinguished newly-married couple amongst the spectators, just like the benedictions of Oberon and his band of fairies in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. There is a general resemblance in the construction of *The Tempest* to this work of youth, which was undoubtedly written for the glorification of a marriage. As in that play, the figures in *The Tempest* divide themselves into three groups: the spirit world; the princely sphere in which happen the adventures of love and human frailty; and finally the clowns with their consistently comic stupidity. Oberon and Puck in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Prospero with his servants Ariel and Caliban in *The Tempest*, form the bond uniting the three worlds. Yet another point of similarity between the two plays is worthy of notice. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream* there are but very small changes of place and time; all the scenes are laid either in Athens or in its immediate vicinity, and occur within the space of three days. This

⁶ Dr. Garnett, *Universal Review*, April 1889.

is unusual in Shakespeare and is especially astonishing in a play of his last period; for in *Pericles* and in *The Winter's Tale*, which is closely related to *The Tempest*, changes of scene from Bohemia to Sicily and from Sicily to Delphi are freely used, and no less than fifteen years lie between the third and fourth acts. But in *The Tempest* the unity is even more strictly observed than in the earlier nuptial play, for the whole action covers only three hours and takes place exclusively on Prospero's island and on the ship wrecked on its shores. Such economy of space and time seems to suit very well a play written for the celebration of a marriage and the amusement of the guests. For a play of that kind aims only at offering graceful diversion, and does not attempt to impel the spectators to abandon themselves to the daring flights of fancy expected by an everyday audience. On the contrary, the festive crowd in the state rooms at Whitehall must be continually reminded of the joyful occasion of their assembly. This also explains why *The Tempest* has so little tension and such a slender plot. At the beginning already we hear from Prospero that all his enemies are in his power and we do not doubt that he knows how to make appropriate use of it. From here onwards, we are no longer concerned with the 'What' but only with the 'How'; it only remains for the self-evident sequence of events to be carried through in a graceful and entertaining manner.

The parallel, also, between the content of the play and the circumstance of the performance is unmistakable. The magician Prospero is a compliment to James I, who was so proud of his scientific learning and especially of his knowledge of witchcraft and sorcery; the king had even written a book on these subjects. The noble lover who woos and takes away the daughter of the island prince is an allusion to the young bridegroom of the Princess Elizabeth. Brandes sees also another event mirrored in *The Tempest*. Shortly before the wedding, on November 6, 1612, Henry Prince of Wales had died. In Alonzo's lamentations for his son Ferdinand who was supposed to be dead Brandes discerns the expression of Shakespeare's sympathy with James's paternal grief. To me this feature would seem rather to dissipate all the previous arguments and leads me to oppose the view that *The Tempest* was written expressly for this wedding. Can one think of anything more tactless than to remind a father of the loss he has just suffered and brutally to tear open the wound that is just beginning to heal by clearly representing it before his eyes on the stage? Besides, King

James was not present at the Court performance of *The Tempest*, and in all probability kept himself away from the festivities just on account of that bereavement. The offensiveness of an intentional parallel becomes still more blatant if one remembers Sebastian's words in which he blames the father for his son's death, because he insisted on giving his daughter in marriage in a foreign land across the sea. It is impossible that these words should have been written specially for the celebrations of the marriage of a bride who has just lost her brother and is going to follow her husband across the sea into a distant country.

Nearly all authorities agree in saying that *The Tempest* was Shakespeare's last work. The dissension lies only in the fact that the overwhelming majority, following Malone, maintain that the play was written between the Autumn of 1610 and the Summer of 1611, whereas that group which regards the play as having been written for the Princess Elizabeth's wedding must necessarily date its composition at the end of the year 1612. But however sound the arguments may be which seem to show that the performance at a royal wedding was in Shakespeare's mind during the composition of the work, there is—besides the discord of the reference to the death of Prince Henry—another weighty argument against dating the play at the end of the year 1612 or the beginning of 1613.

The Tempest was immediately preceded by *The Winter's Tale*; this is proved not only by the external and internal relationships between the two plays, but also by the fact that all the indications by which *The Winter's Tale* is dated point to its being Shakespeare's last play, with the sole exception of *The Tempest*. Some critics believe that it, rather than *The Tempest*, was the last of Shakespeare's works. *The Winter's Tale*, however, must have been written in the Winter of 1610-11, and at the latest in the first months of 1611, for Dr. Foreman, the astrologer, writes in his diary that he was present at a performance of this play at the 'Globe' on May 15, 1611, but does not give any indication of its having been a 'first night'. Whoever regards *The Tempest* as a nuptial play, written for the celebration of the marriage of the Elector Palatine, must conclude that Shakespeare had paused in his production for two years and broke the pause only to become completely silent afterwards.

This conclusion in itself is certainly not impossible, but stands in contradiction to the rhythm in which the rest of the poet's work

was produced. Shakespeare stands in the forefront of the poets who have been able 'to command the muse'. He certainly never knew what it was to await inspiration; he is more likely to have been troubled by the exuberance of his imagination. Only thus is it comprehensible that he, the actor, director, the much harassed business man and lover of society, should have been able to produce this wealth of plays in less than thirty years, not to mention all the small epics, the sonnets, and the works of other poets which he adapted for the stage. He is said to have written *The Merry Wives* in a fortnight, and the editors of the Folio assert that his manuscripts seldom showed even the slightest correction. This ease of production was a welcome help to him; a help not to the attainment of literary fame, for his poems and not his plays were the works he printed, but to the gaining of wealth and of social position. The partnership in a theatre was an extraordinarily lucrative business, but as an actor he would hardly have been able to have raised himself to such a position if he had not been able to write one or two successful plays every year. Whether he remained in London or returned to Stratford, it is very improbable that he would have interrupted this activity, which he continued during so many years, only to take it up again for the sake of a court festival. It is far more probable that he gave up writing only when he had cut himself off from all his professional activities in order to live in future the life of a country gentleman, and that then he did not take up his pen again except to advise and help a young friend. The other clues for the dating of the play, and especially that of its relation to Somers' expedition, all agree with this assumption in indicating the year 1611 and not the end of 1612. We must assume that soon after the completion of *The Winter's Tale*, that is to say, still during the year 1611, Shakespeare pursued his uninterrupted productivity and wrote *The Tempest*.

In this case *The Tempest* was not a 'nuptial play'; it merely happened to be played at the wedding, along with several older plays. But there remains one disturbing thought, namely, that so many significant characteristics of the play seem to mark it as written specially for the purpose which it served at that performance. Is there then no way out of this difficulty?

I believe I have found this way out, and it seems to me not merely an escape from a dilemma, for through it a new light is thrown on the subject and origin of *The Tempest*.

Negotiations with suitors for Lady Elizabeth's hand had of course taken place long before her wedding, as is usual with royal unions. Her marriage was, by the way, really one of the most significant events in the history of England, for the House of Hanover founded its claim to the English throne on its descent from Elizabeth. Amongst her suitors were the Dauphin, Maurice of Orange, and Philip III of Spain; but by far the most significant figure was Gustavus Adolphus, the future hero of the Thirty Years War, who just at this time (October 1611) succeeded to the throne of Sweden on the death of his father Charles IX. As his father's heir, Gustavus Adolphus took over the war against King Christian of Denmark. James I of England mediated between the two adversaries, but the peace of Knared was not concluded till 1613. This marriage with the Lady Elizabeth, had it actually come to pass, would have caused the hostilities to cease much sooner than they did in reality, for Elizabeth's mother, Anna, was the sister of the Danish king Christian IV. This marriage would thus have meant a conclusion of peace. But the analogy with *The Tempest* is far closer still, for Gustavus Adolphus' ancestor, Gustavus Vasa, had driven the Danish royal family, i. e. Lady Elizabeth's ancestors, from Sweden and had taken the crown himself. The marriage between Gustavus Adolphus and Elizabeth would thus be the exact model of the union between Ferdinand and Miranda in *The Tempest*, blessed by Prospero (James I). This Scandinavian marriage could easily recall the memory of the 'only romantic episode in the life of the most prosaic member of a very poetical family'. When King James's bride, Anne of Denmark, sailed for England, her ship was driven by the storm into a Norwegian port and its loss was feared. James set out to search for her; he found the bride and brought her home in triumph. This, then, would give the link to the storm and shipwreck in *The Tempest*. If the poet's attention was once directed towards the House of Vasa, he would find there more than one case of usurpation of the throne by the younger brother. Gustavus Adolphus' father had been regent for his brother Sigismund, as Antonio was for Prospero, and, like Antonio, he had driven his brother from the throne, in order to assume the crown himself. Something of all these affairs seems to be reflected clearly in *The Tempest*, but above all the settlement of an unhappy quarrel about a stolen crown by the marriage between the children of the dethroned and the usurping princes.

Unfortunately, we do not know how far the negotiations in Gustavus Adolphus' suit were successful; it is only certain that they took place in 1611. By the death of Charles IX, which made his youthful son King of Sweden, they received perhaps an increased importance. For on the one hand the King would be a more welcome son-in-law than the Crown Prince, and on the other hand Gustavus Adolphus had been trying to end the war with Denmark from the day of his accession to the throne; and to this purpose the marriage with the daughter of James was an excellent means, for the king of England enjoyed very close friendship with his brother-in-law Christian of Denmark. Shakespeare, a director of the 'King's Players' and a Court actor, was certainly not without connections at Court, and he may have heard before or after October 1611 of the probably imminent marriage of Elizabeth to the seventeen-year-old Swedish Crown Prince—or King. The theme of the hostile brothers, of whom the younger robs the elder of his inheritance, had been, as we shall see, long in his mind, and he had used it often enough in his work. Here a new solution bringing a reconciliation offered itself; this may have attracted him and so given rise to *The Tempest*.

But despite all this one has to avoid the idea that the poet had been only waiting for a royal wedding in order to be able to celebrate it by a topical play. Shakespeare was no courtier: the allusions to the virtue of the rulers and the flatteries which were the usage of the time are very seldom to be found in his work, much more seldom than one would expect from his privileged position at Court. According to the statement of his colleague, John Lacy, he went to Court only very unwillingly: 'if invited to court, he was in payne'. By this I do not in the least want to paint the poet with a trait of 'manly pride before princely thrones'; as far as we know his aims in life, the man of the world and of business simply outweighed in him the courtier. The Court was for him only a means to the most important end: to earn money and to exalt the name of his family.

When, inspired by these rumours of the contemplated marriage, he began to write a play, he did indeed in various ways take account of the fact that the work would be suited to the performance at a royal wedding. But he decidedly did not go so far as to subordinate all to this single aim and write a prologue for a wedding feast. Thus, even if he did intersperse allusions to the father of

the bride and to the occasion and consequences of the marriage, these allusions nevertheless remained so unobtrusive that they did not make the play unsuitable for performance in different circumstances. When afterwards, in 1611, the contemplated marriage came to nothing, it is improbable that Shakespeare let his play lie on his desk when its performance would mean a considerable revenue for him. In all likelihood he had it performed at his theatre. A year later *The Tempest*, along with earlier works of Shakespeare, found at last the use for which it was originally intended; but those features which were no longer topical were not retouched. Thus remained, for example, the allusions to a king's son who had just died and to the age of the princess. Miranda, the representative on the stage of the royal bride, is, as one gathers from the second scene of the play, fifteen years of age. But, in the year 1611, at the time when according to the present writer's view *The Tempest* was written with special reference to the intended marriage, the princess Elizabeth was also fifteen years of age. This coincidence would certainly seem to be more than a mere matter of chance.

It must not be overlooked that just at this time people were being agitated by a historic event which bears a close resemblance to the story that leads up to the plot of *The Tempest*. This event was 'the brothers' dispute in the House of Habsburg' and the resemblance is very much stressed by the fact that the main figure, the Imperial hermit on the Hradschin, reminds one in several traits so much of Prospero that he may very well have served Shakespeare as a model. Like Prospero, Rudolph was passionately absorbed in the secret sciences, alchemy and astrology. Like Prospero, he shut himself off from the outer world in order to be able to follow his studies undisturbed. Like Prospero, he appointed his brother, Matthias, as deputy, and like Prospero he was dethroned by his deputy. These events took place in the summer of 1611. On May 23 Matthias was crowned in Prague, and on August 11 the final negotiations between the brothers took place, when Rudolph ceded his rule to Matthias and was left by him the palace on the Hradschin as dwelling—half refuge, half prison. The news of the change of sovereign and the story of the strange circumstances were assuredly already spread abroad in England in the late autumn of 1611. They may have influenced the project of *The Tempest* or they may not, but certainly our hypothesis is not contradicted either from the point of view of time or, still less, of subject. Poetical subjects are

'over-determined', and Shakespeare, being occupied in tracing the outcome of a breach between two brothers, may have listened with interest to the similar story from Austria, and he may have taken from it for his own use features that appeared appropriate to his picture.

III

SOURCES

In very many cases the searcher for the sources of a play by Shakespeare finds that its subject is so obviously derived from some older drama, from some history, or from an earlier or contemporary story, that any doubt about the material used disappears. But it is otherwise with *The Tempest*. It is true, on the one hand, that we know two works by contemporaries of Shakespeare which, in subject-matter and even in certain details, bear so much resemblance to *The Tempest* that it is impossible to regard this last work of the poet as a production of his free invention. On the other hand, however, neither of these two works can, for definite external reasons, have been Shakespeare's model. Thus there remains a wide field for speculation. Had the two related works, which were, however, widely separated topographically, a common root? And, if so, of what kind was it? Was it a common source in literature or had the Spanish story-teller and the German dramatist drawn from the well of folk-lore, independently of each other? Did Shakespeare go back to that common root or did he know a third descendant which had grown on English soil?

In 1610 appeared the collection of stories *Noches de Invernio* (Winter Nights) by Antonio de Eslava, which was not translated into any other language during Shakespeare's lifetime. It contained in its fourth chapter a story which, freed from the unessential mythological embellishment, runs as follows:⁷ A prince demands for his son the right of succession in a neighbouring state, as he is related to the reigning family and as the neighbouring prince himself has only a daughter. This prince agrees, on condition that the son should marry his daughter. His condition is refused and his country invaded, so that he is forced to flee with his daughter into the forest. From there he reaches the coast and

⁷ From the translation by Gustav Becker, *Shakespeare-Jahrbuch*, 1907, Bd. 43.

then erects a magnificent palace under the sea. This he accomplishes by means of his magic art, which, however, he is forbidden to use against human beings. In this palace he lives with his daughter in great splendour. Meanwhile the conqueror dies and, passing over the elder son, leaves his realm to the younger one. The elder has to flee. He goes to sea and is carried off by the sorcerer to his palace, where he falls in love with the latter's daughter, whom the father had formerly intended for him, and marries her. During the wedding celebrations the younger brother, who is also newly married, sets out to sea and, when he is just above the palace under the ocean, he is overtaken by a storm—which was not caused by the magician. Part of his fleet sinks, and, as the sinking wreckage annoys the wedding party in the depths, the magician rises to the surface, gives the transgressor a severe lecture and prophesies that he will quickly die, and this prophecy is fulfilled immediately after his return home. The elder brother now ascends the throne which belongs to him by right; his father-in-law lives afterwards for two years in a palace which he builds himself on ships lying in the harbour.

The relationship to the story of *The Tempest* is obvious: the exiled prince finds an asylum for himself and his daughter in the solitude of the sea; although the desert island takes the place of the palace under the waves, both are true 'properties' of fairy-tales. By wizardry he manages to decoy his enemy's son, whom he has chosen as his son-in-law. The quarrel between two brothers is not missing, nor the storm and the shipwreck at the return from a wedding, nor the reinstalment of the rightful ruler.

Shakespeare's deviations from the story can be understood very well on the grounds of dramatic technique. Thus, the brothers' dispute, which takes place in the second generation in Eslava, is antedated by him and combined with the banishment theme; besides the usurping prince, whose son marries the daughter of the dethroned one, there is the exile's younger brother, the real author and usufructuary of the injustice committed. Thus a dramatic concentration is attained, a concatenation and counteraction of motives, which in the romance follow each other with epic amplitude. By the brother's treachery Shakespeare succeeded far better than Eslava in explaining why the magician, who could command the elements, could not defend himself against his enemies. Finally, in Eslava the meeting of the usurper, battling against the storm, with the

banished prince is a mere chance which has no further consequences, beyond the prophetic foretelling of the imminent death. Shakespeare, however, here also turning the epic into the dramatic, makes the storm as well as the landing of the prince the work of Prospero, who carries his plan, which he has built up on this, through to its happy conclusion. Thus in the foundations of the plot Shakespeare keeps as close to Eslava as is compatible with his aims, his dramatic effect, and the concentration of the action into the space of a few hours.

It would thus seem that we need not search any further for another source. Nevertheless a second one does exist which supplies us with several incidents which are missing in Eslava. This is *Die Comedia von der schönen Sidea, wie es ihr bis zu ihrer Verheirathung ergangen* (The comedy of the beautiful Sidea, and how it fared with her till her marriage), by Jakob Ayrer, Notary in Nuremberg, and as a dramatic poet a rival of Hans Sachs, but also an extremely prosaic fellow.⁸ The first three acts of his *Sidea* show how the wild and wicked Tyrant Ludolff is defeated in a feud with another prince and thus loses his country. He flees with his daughter Sidea into the forest, where they fare exceedingly badly; Ludolff, however, consoles himself, trusting to his magic art. He soon meets a situation in which he can make use of it. Engelbrecht, his enemy's son, is hunting in the same forest; he makes him defenceless by touching him with his magic wand and orders him:

Sollst meiner Tochter Holz tragen
 Und alles was sie dir tut sagen
 Sollstu verrichten und vollbringen.
 Dazu solls Dich mit Schlägen zwingen
 Und wo sies klagweis bringt für mich
 Daß du wollst etwa weigern Dich
 Als bald will ich erschlagen Dich.⁹

⁸ cp. Dr. Willibald Wodik. *Ayrers Dramen in ihrem Verhältnis zur einheimischen Literatur und zum Schauspiel der englischen Komödianten.*

⁹ [For her, my daughter, shalt thou carry
 Logs of wood and never tarry,
 Perform and do what she impose

And so Engelbrecht serves Sidea, and an attendant spirit of Ludolff, the devil Runcifal, is appointed keeper:

Und daß kein Löfflerey nit treiben
 Meine Tochter und der Engelbrecht
 Soll er auf sie acht haben schlecht.¹⁰

But the father's precaution is of no avail. Sidea is touched by Engelbrecht's prayers; she flees with him, after he has sworn to make her his wife on reaching home. First, however, she seals the devil Runcifal's mouth with the magic wand so that he should not betray their flight to her father.

It is true that the theme of the brother's quarrel is absent here, but in its stead there are other similarities which seem to bring the play even more close than Eslava's story to that of *The Tempest*. The magician lives with his daughter in great distress in the wilderness. His enemy's son falls into his power (the fact that Engelbrecht, like Ferdinand, is robbed of his ability to move and cannot draw his sword is probably not of much importance, for this feeling of restraint is a dream-sensation known to everyone, and is part of the usual equipment of sorcery) and he employs his power in order to keep the victim in the most ignominious servitude. Even the type of service is exactly the same in Shakespeare and in Ayer, and this cannot possibly be a mere coincidence: Ferdinand and Engelbrecht both have to carry wood.

One important feature is lacking in *Sidea* as well as in the *Winter Nights*, for in both of them the daughter fleeing with her father is thought of as a grown-up girl; but in *The Tempest* Miranda, who was three years old at the time of the banishment, grows up under the protection and care of her father. On the other hand, the two sources supplement each other in regard to the love-story: In Ayer as in *The Tempest* the lover is received as an enemy by the father and treated as a servant; in both cases the love-scene

And force with oft-repeated blows,
 And should she bring complaint to me
 That thou refuse what's bidden thee,
 I'll deal the blow of death to thee.]

¹⁰ [And that no spooning shall occur
 Between my child and Engelbrecht,
 He'll keep a watch on him and her.]

takes place while the prince bends his back under the weight of the logs and—apparently at least—without the knowledge and against the will of the father. Eslava, again, agrees with Shakespeare in that the prince was chosen long ago by the girl's father as his son-in-law, the father blesses the union, and the punishment of the usurper follows immediately after.

The father's consent, which would have ended the action, is necessarily absent from *Sidea* because Ayrrer continues it further. In *Sidea*, the prince, fleeing with his deliverer, reaches his home. He wants first to go alone before his father, and he hides the beautiful Sidea in a tree-top over a well, whence he promises to fetch her in a short time and take her home as his bride. There then follows a charming interlude, really like a fairy-tale. Some women from the town come one after the other to the well. In bending to draw the water, each sees on the water's surface the reflection of Sidea, and each one thinks she is seeing her own image, rejoices over her beauty, and decides that from now on she is too good for this lowly work and for her former lover. Sidea waits in vain, a magic spell has made Engelbrecht forget her; his father has summoned a princess to be his bride and is now preparing for the wedding. The deserted maiden goes to the court in disguise. At the last moment she succeeds in breaking the spell and in awakening recollection. Engelbrecht refuses the new bride and marries the recognized one. Ludolff, the father, who, also disguised, has followed his daughter, is fully forgiven.

In spite of the unbearably dry and dull dialogue, and in spite of the uncouth peasant-interlude which has nothing to do with the action (unless one wants at any price to construct a resemblance between the devil Runcifal and Ariel), the whole thing has not completely lost the poetry of a popular fairy-tale. On the whole, just as undeniable as is the resemblance in the action, just so undeniably are *Sidea* and *The Tempest* separated from each other by the breadth of the heavens, not only in level of artistic achievement, but also in every other imaginable respect. A German savant, Johannes Meissner, has, in his *Untersuchungen über Shakespeares Sturm*, nevertheless imagined that he found literal correspondences and has placed the supposed parallel passages next to each other. But the resemblance does not go further than the community of such words as 'Love', 'Power', 'Servitude'. Thus Sidea says in the love-scene, where the proximity is supposed to be clearest:

Balt keil mir das Holte zu scheiten
 Wil tu anderst die streich nit leiden
 Du bist ein rechter fauler Hunder.¹¹

Before she listens to Engelbrecht she makes him give her a thorough and quite formal promise of marriage; where is here Miranda's virginal surrender? The English comedians visited Nuremberg first in 1593 and then repeatedly, in 1601 and 1605 for instance; Ayrrer knew them and copiously plagiarised their plays. But to conclude from this that the English—who did not speak German—got to know Ayrrer's play and then told Shakespeare about it is going decidedly too far. Tieck (*Deutsches Theater*, Vorrede S. 29) also seems to have hit upon the truth: 'The prince's relationship to the sorcerer, his servitude under him, still more his carrying logs of wood, remind one of Shakespeare's *Tempest*. The English have not yet been able to discover a source for this wonderful play and to me it seems more than probable that Shakespeare took the ideas for his work from the same old story which Ayrrer imitated in his. The author seems to have changed the names and localities according to his fancy, just as he inserted the comic episode, which is devoid of any connection with the rest of the play, after the manner of the early English playwrights.' That a fairy-tale did form Ayrrer's model—directly or indirectly—seems to be beyond dispute: A king's son loses his way while hunting in the forest. He comes to the house of a sorcerer (or witch) and falls into his power. He is freed from this servitude (or from a threatening murder) by the sorcerer's daughter; they flee together, the magician pursuing them in vain. The fact that the ending—the desertion at the gate, the spell of forgetting and the breaking of it—recurs in numerous German fairy-tales (e.g. in 'Liebsten Roland' in K. H. M. Grimm) need hardly be accentuated. The beginning is also paralleled in many instances. Newell¹² claims to have found the

¹¹ [Now quickly the wood thou shalt hack,
 Or I will belabour thy back,
 Thou art a right lazy dog.]

¹² Sources of Shakespeare's *Tempest*, *Journal of American Folklore*, Vol. XVII. The article was unfortunately not directly accessible to me and I had to be content with a review. The author is apparently of the opinion that the fairy tale in which he sees the original form of *The Tempest* story was accessible to Shakespeare in a literary version, namely, in the story La Palomna of the Pentameron of Basile.

best example in an old fairy-tale 'Lady Featherflight' which was well-known in Massachusetts. But in Europe also the story still thrives of the lost king's son—or boy—whom the sorcerer's daughter frees in order to flee with him, e. g. in the Bechstein tale of 'The Boy who Wanted to Learn Sorcery' and in the *Brandenburg Stories* collected by Kuhn. In the latter the king's daughter has been stolen by the bogey and, like Miranda, 'it was now long since she had seen a human being'. The prince and deliverer is her cousin, which circumstance is avoided by Shakespeare by his division of the usurper into two characters—one, his father the king, the other, Prospero's treacherous brother. The island and shipwreck also occur in the *Brandenburg Stories*.

The plot of *The Tempest*, or rather the germ of the plot, is thus an old and genuine fairy-tale. The second part of this fairy-tale was cut out—the flight, the forgetting and recollection of the deliverer—and the first part is logically followed up by bringing out a connection between the king's son and the magician in their accidental meeting: The king's son becomes the son of the enemy who robbed the magician of his kingdom. This motivation we find in Ayler as well as in Eslava, the shortening appears only in the latter; in any case it was not left for Shakespeare to originate.

Has Shakespeare drawn directly from the fairy-tale or has he used a literary derivative of it as a model? If we take into consideration the fact that the poet regularly chose such a source in the other 'fairy-tale plays' of the same period—in *Pericles*, attention is expressly called to it in the play; in *The Winter's Tale*, we know it was the *Faunia* by Green; in *Cymbeline*, a tale by Boccaccio and an episode out of the *Mirour of Knighthood*—then the supposition lies at hand that he acted similarly in the case of *The Tempest*. His model may have resembled Eslava's story fairly closely on the whole, but it also had some other features which were used by Ayler. In *The Tempest*, as in the rest of his work, Shakespeare only needed these features—as it were, the slight memory-traces of folk-poetry—in order to reproduce them in their full beauty and power.

IV

ANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS

'Henceforth Prospero is but a man; no longer a great enchanter. He returns to the dukedom he had lost in Stratford-upon-Avon, ...'

In these words Dowden declared his conviction—which has been accepted by later critics almost without exception—that Prospero is Shakespeare,¹³ whose magic power is poetry, and that the following words express his determination to abandon art and return home:

I'll breake my staffe,
Bury it certaine fadomes in the earth,
And deeper than did euer Plummet sound
Ile drowne my booke.

(v, 1)

The gloomy foreboding which is suggested by the words: 'Euery third thought shall be my graue' was fulfilled a few years after his return by his early death.¹⁴

It has been objected that Prospero's intention of destroying his book contains no reference to Shakespeare and his work, but simply refers to the belief, embodied also in the law, that a sorcerer was not to be considered purified until he had burnt his magic book; but this objection does not merit a moment's consideration. An essential component of the crime of sorcery was that the magician was in league with the devil, but nothing of the kind was implied in Prospero's power over the spirits. Nor was there any need for him to clear himself, for nobody thought of condemning him; and, even at the time when Prospero, in Milan, was buried in study of the secret art, such a thing never entered the head of his brother—to whom all means of casting suspicion on him must have seemed

¹³ Compare the passage quoted on page 75 from Furnivall's Introduction.

¹⁴ So far as I am aware, it has not yet been specially pointed out that Prospero's life bears the strongest resemblance to that of Shakespeare's father. At first, during the poet's youth, he had been a respected and even an influential man, though of course on a small scale, as burgess, alderman, bailiff and mayor. Then suddenly he became so poor that he dared not leave his house lest he should be arrested as a debtor; he was thus quite as cut off from the world as Prospero who could not go far from his 'poor cell' on the island. Prospero also falls back on the relics of his former wealth: 'Rich garments, linnens, stuffs, and necessities Which since haue steeded much' (i, 2). Then later, quite suddenly, old John Shakespeare's star of fortune rose again. He became fully restored by being knighted, and only two years later he died.

fair means of gaining his end, that of supplanting him. Again, there is no suggestion of Prospero's having suffered from pangs of conscience, and it therefore seems out of the question that Shakespeare should at the very end have introduced an utterly new theme which he had otherwise not indicated.

If Prospero is the poet, then the island—on which he lived alone with his daughter for so long, and which he leaves on breaking his magic wand—means poetry, to which he is bidding farewell, or more accurately the stage on which he had displayed his art. We must not be surprised that immediately after we have recognized one representation of his creative art—magic—we find a second; indeed we must be prepared to find several others, just as in a dream the same mental content appears in various disguises. In dreams as well as in works of art it is not so much a matter of a literal translation from one form of expression into another as of representing all kinds of wishes, conscious, preconscious and unconscious, as fulfilled, and experiencing their satisfaction in phantasy; and this cannot occur too often. Caliban confirms our conception with the words:

... the Isle is full of noyses,
Sounds, and sweet aires, that giue delight and hurt not: (iii, 2)

In the Epilogue, which was in all probability written by Shakespeare,¹⁵ the poet speaks to the public through the mouth of Prospero. In this conscious identification he confirms the interpretation, for he calls the stage 'this bare Island', which it had actually represented till then.

Ariel—who quickens the island with his music and sweet songs, who, by his master's command, bewitches everybody that sets foot on it, who entangles the senses and then frees them again—Ariel is the very embodiment of Shakespeare's art, and it is an example of true Shakespearian irony that Ariel first leads the clowns astray and then sets dogs on them and that, to the minds of the low and the vulgar, the island is transformed into a pool and they 'smell all horse-pisse' (iv, 2).

After giving up magic and his island, and after setting Ariel free, Prospero takes a fourth farewell, and one that seems to cost him more than all the others. Having lived with his daughter as

¹⁵ Morton Luce, Editor of the *Arden Shakespeare*, is of this opinion.

sole companion for twelve long years, he resigns her to a young man with whom she fell in love at first sight. When he was exposed on a 'rotten carkasse of a Butt' and in despair, it was her presence that consoled him:

O, a Cherubin

Thou was't that did preserue me; Thou didst smile,
 Infused with a fortitude from heauen,
 When I haue deck'd the sea with drops full salt,
 Vnder my burthen groan'd, which rais'd in me
 An vndergoing stomacke, to beare vp
 Against what should ensue.

(i, 2)

Could the picture of imagination supporting the poet in every trial be drawn more beautifully than in this allegory of an infant's smile that comforts and encourages a man whom men had cast out on the desert seas?

She disobeys her father's command and divulges her name to the prince who woos her, thus giving herself away to him, for until now there was but one man whose call she would answer.¹⁶ 'Admir'd *Miranda*' says the happy lover; and the name expressed to him as well as to us the just pride with which the poet viewed his art before bidding it farewell for ever.

The renunciation of art is indicated with perfect clearness at the end when Prospero gives *Miranda*—who here embodies art—in marriage to her beloved Ferdinand; but it is also hinted at in the second scene of the first act when, fulfilling Prospero's wish, *Miranda* falls asleep:

Thou art inclinde to sleepe: 'tis a good dulnesse,
 And giue it way: I know thou canst not chuse. (i, 2)

It is curious that Prospero in inducing her drowsiness recalls to her memory all the blotted out and forgotten memories of her

¹⁶ *Ferd.* ... What is your name?

Mir.

Miranda, O my Father,

I haue broke your hest to say so. (iii, 1)

earliest childhood.¹⁷ This process of bringing memories back into consciousness is exactly the one which, according to psycho-analytical experience, is capable of stilling phantasies arising from the unconscious.

Prospero gives up both daughter and island of his own free will; but before doing so he shows that he could keep them if he would and that they are not to be taken away from him by force.

His property was claimed from three sides: by Caliban, Stephano and Ferdinand, the three different types of rival who wished to succeed him.

The gross and barbarous Caliban, who could only 'gabble, like A thing most brutish' until Prospero taught him to speak, lived on the island before Prospero came to it. He is the embodiment of Shakespeare's predecessors, the older dramatic school, with its barbarous heaping of horrors and crimes and its coarse language which only became flexible and musical under Shakespeare's influence. Caliban looks on himself as the rightful lord of the island, because he was there before Prospero's arrival. Prospero, whose skill had made the place habitable, he calls a usurper:

This Island's mine by *Sycorax* my mother,
Which thou tak'st from me: (i, 2)

In exactly the same way at least one of Shakespeare's predecessors had accused him of plagiarism and heaped abuses upon his head, Robert Green calling him 'Shakescene', 'upstart crow'

¹⁷ *Pros.* Canst thou remember
A time before we came vnto this Cell?
I doe not thinke thou canst, for then thou was't not
Out three yeeres old.

Mira. Certainly Sir, I can.

Pros. By what? by any other house, or person?
Of any thing the Image, tell me, that
Hath kept with thy remembrance.

Mira. 'Tis farre off:
And rather like a dreame, than an assurance
That my remembrance warrants: Had I not
Fowre, or fife women once, that tended me? (i, 2)

and 'tyger's heart wrapt in a player's hide'.¹⁸ Caliban tried to seize Miranda by brute force; but even if he had been able to gain possession of the lovely girl he could only have 'peopel'd ... This isle with *Calibans*' (i, 2).

But while Caliban in spite of his animal barbarity is, according to Coleridge, 'in some respects a noble being', Stephano and his companion Trinculo represent unadulterated brutishness. They had not the excuse of being the children of a witch, grown up on a desert island. Their parents were human and they had lived amongst men, but none the less their thoughts never rose above the meanest. Drunkards, liars, murderers, not able to do anything but make a few puns; as such Shakespeare portrayed them, with a contempt only lacking bitterness because he was too far from them to feel it. That such wretches should think of ruling on Prospero's island and of possessing his daughter! Snatching at the worn-out trumpery he throws to them, they are attracted and dazzled by the false lustre of phrases, the threadbare sentences and the imitation royal robes of his tragic style. Content with the insipid outward appearance of art, which they imitate to a tittle, they forget to strive after actual mastery. The shallow imitators which no great poet lacks could not be depicted better than in this scene of the fourth act in which the fools are diverted from their plot of succession to the throne by letting themselves be fascinated by the frippery which Prospero commands Ariel to put in their way. Hardly have they put on the borrowed pomp when they are set on by dogs and driven roaring from the stage. At the same time they are marked as actors by their glistening royal apparel;¹⁹ perhaps Shakespeare knew some young men who hoped to make a success like his by apeing his manner.

Caliban and Stephano contrast with the ideal picture of the successor whom Shakespeare thought really worthy of following him, so that this is thrown up in more vivid colours. Prospero—though not in earnest—accuses this successor of striving to attain power by foul means:

Pros. Thou do'st heere usurpe
The name thou ow'st not, and hast put thy selfe

¹⁸ Robert Green (1560—1592), 'A groat's worth of wit bought with a million of repentance.'

¹⁹ I owe this hint to a verbal communication from Prof. Freud.

Vpon this Island, as a spy, to win it
From me, the Lord on't. (i, 2)

But there is no ill thought in Ferdinand, and while he, a king's son, is treated most outrageously, he dismisses his pride and foregoes revenge for the sake of his beloved. He submits to Prospero's tyrannical will because it is the will of Miranda's father and wins her in the only way in which she is to be won: by voluntary servitude.

A discerning commentator²⁰ was inclined to recognize the young Fletcher in Ferdinand. I do not think Ferdinand's characteristics are drawn sharply enough for us to recognize a portrait in them; it is an ideal picture which the most brilliant and notable of those who followed him must most resemble. Fundamentally every man has only one ideal successor and that is his own son. The joy of seeing this young image of himself grow up before him was denied to Shakespeare and he therefore satisfied and immortalized this longing in phantasy.

So far we have considered and interpreted only allegoric figures suitable for the poetic representation of inoffensive ideas which need not be kept from consciousness. The inner personality of the man Shakespeare—not the poet—has but once been touched upon, with reference to Ferdinand. If we want to learn more and to reach deeper interpretations, we must no longer consider *The Tempest* as an isolated unit but in connection with all the works of the last period of which it is the culminating point.

Let us now see what those commentators have to say who have examined the inter-relation of the four last plays (*Pericles*, *Cymbeline*, *The Winter's Tale* and *The Tempest*).

Morton Luce says:²¹

'They all tell of repentance and reconciliation, of pardon, love, peace. In all we discover the thoughtful yet affectionate interest felt by maturer years in the woes and joys of youth, and not infrequently the author's graver mood is made buoyant by rejuvenescence. In each there is a restoration of children as from the dead—Marina, Miranda, Perdita, the son of Alonso, the sons of Cymbeline; and the very names *Marina*,

²⁰ Dowdon: *Shakespeare, His Mind and Art*. 'And who is Ferdinand? Is he not with his gallantry and his beauty the young Fletcher?'

²¹ *Arden Shakespeare*, Introduction, p. 25.

Miranda, *Perdita* are formed after the same pattern. In three of the plays a wife is torn from her husband, and at length reunited in a more perfect bond of affection. In all there is a delighted, almost passionate return to nature, to the fair scenes—whatever the *dramatic* locality—of England, its happy innocent life of hill and stream and field and flower.’

And Furnivall:²²

‘This play [*Pericles*] forms a fit opening for the Fourth Period, in its happy reuniting of the long-separated family, father, mother, and daughter (Shakspeare has now only two daughters, his son died in 1596).’ And later: ‘*Miranda* evidently belongs to that time, she and her fellow, *Perdita*, being idealisations of the sweet country maidens whom Shakspeare would see about him in his renewed life at Stratford.... Note too that in all the first four Fourth-Period plays are lost daughters or sons.’

And again Brandes:²³

‘They [*Marina*, *Imogen*, *Perdita* and *Miranda*] must have had their prototype or type.

‘A new world has opened out to Shakespeare, but it would be useless to spend much time on more or less profitless conjectures concerning how and by whom it was revealed. . . . There is indeed a half-fatherly tenderness in the delineation of *Miranda*, and the conception of the native charm of a young girl as a wonderful mystery of nature. . . . And now, lastly, the young girl, drawn with the ripened man’s rapture over her youth, and a certain passion of admiration. She had been lost to him, as *Marina* to her father *Pericles*, and *Perdita* to her father *Leontes*. He feels for her the same fatherly tenderness which his last incarnation, the magician *Prospero*, feels for his daughter *Miranda*.’

In short, a young girl described with exceptional love and tenderness is the central figure of all four plays.²⁴

²² *Leopold Shakespeare*, Introduction, p. 57 et seq.

²³ Georg Brandes: *William Shakespeare*, Vol. II, pp. 272-4.

²⁴ Conrad wrote in a paper published in the *Preußischen Jahrbüchern* that *The Winter's Tale* was clearly related to Shakespeare's daughter Susanna and that the play was written for her.

These characters are all seen and described from the point of view of a father, though it is worth pointing out that Brandes saw alongside this an unambiguous erotic attitude. The relation between the father and the daughter is in the foreground in all four plays, according thus with the poet's point of view. Thus, all four of the female characters are described as daughters—three of them as lost daughters, believed by their fathers to be dead, who are restored to him at the end by the grace of providence. This cannot be treated as a chance correspondence between the plays, nor can we fail to see how well it accords with the situation in which Shakespeare must now have found himself. He was just about to take final leave of his art. A quarter of a century ago he had set forth to seek his fortune and had left his daughter as a child; now he saw the day coming which was to reunite him, like Pericles, Leontes and Cymbeline, with the beloved child he had thought lost, grown to be a mature woman. We have now come to one of the few points where Shakespeare's choice of material and theme in the creation of characters was influenced by internal experiences whose causation and external origin we know. A way to mental processes that are otherwise hidden behind deep veils is here opened for us. We are necessarily therefore all the more surprised that even those biographers who recognise and point out the fact pass it over lightly without troubling to consider the details more closely or to explain the contradictions still remaining.

The most evident of these contradictions seems capable of destroying the whole of our interpretation. In the three plays preceding *The Tempest* a daughter who had been separated from her father is given back to him. However, the exact opposite happens in *The Tempest*. The daughter lives with her father from her earliest childhood in the most intimate possible circumstances, knowing no man but him; it is only when she marries at the end of the play that he loses her.²⁵ In this, therefore, *The Tempest* is the negative of the three preceding plays.

This difficulty is the best confirmation of the psycho-analytic point of view. In the unconscious opposites exist by the side of each other and in those mental products which are nearest to it—in dreams but also in primitive speech²⁶—the one can stand for

²⁵ 'for I Haue lost my daughter' (v, 1).

²⁶ Freud: Über den Gegensinn der Urworte, *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse*, 1910, Bd. II, S. 179 et seq.

the other. This is neither caprice nor paradox, but a fact, founded on primary psychical laws and most easily understood when wish and counter-wish are found together, as in this case. In the three preceding plays Shakespeare represented the actual situation and he merely added a conclusion that fitted in with his own intentions. He was now about to fulfil his longings and it was hardly worth while enjoying in phantasy what reality must offer him in a few months. But a painful thought forced itself upon him more and more the nearer he came to the reunion: the lost years would not be given back, the gulf would always remain, the estrangement caused by his long absence could not be removed. These misgivings and gloomy thoughts must have been strengthened by the occasion for which *The Tempest* was written: the royal wedding. How soon would his one unmarried daughter marry and he lose her? Starting with this question the poet turned the past into its opposite: Perdita, grown up amongst peasants and yokels, becomes Miranda, the daughter of a duke, who was schooled in wisdom by her father and only teacher, and lived with him upon a desert island cut off from all mankind.

Shakespeare had two daughters: the elder, Susanna, born in 1583, was already married in 1603 to the well-known Dr. Hall of Stratford. The younger, Judith, born twin with the little Hamnet who died as a child, was twenty-six years of age when *The Tempest* was written. That is to say she was exactly as old as her mother had been when Shakespeare took a fancy to her and shortly after, more or less willingly, married her.

Susanna is taken to be her father's favourite because he made her sole heiress in his will. The conclusion is somewhat hasty, for it overlooks the fact that one of the most important of Shakespeare's aims in life was to found a family of landed gentry that would flourish and increase for many generations.²⁷ Only by leaving his wealth to his elder daughter could there be any prospect of seeing his cherished wish fulfilled, for she was married to a capable, respected man and already had children. When the will was drawn up, on January 5, the younger daughter, Judith, was not yet married; her marriage was contracted in all haste in February. What would come of it could not be said with enough certainty to justify any

²⁷ Sidney Lee also explains this preference of the elder daughter by Shakespeare's 'aristocratic tendencies'.

alteration in the will when it was signed in March. But at the same time the will testifies clearly to Shakespeare's loving thoughts for his younger daughter. He left her the lease of a house for her lifetime, two legacies of a hundred and fifty pounds each (a very considerable sum at that time when Shakespeare paid only sixty pounds for one of the best houses in Stratford), and a 'broad gilt silver bowl', which was probably the most valuable of his household goods.

By this I do not mean to say that only the younger daughter aroused in the poet the feelings expressed in the plays of this last period. The foundation of feeling was probably the same with regard to both daughters. But, at that time, when the poet began to turn, spiritually, homewards, the elder was already married and a mother and had given away her love; in addition to this she seems to have been a zealous Puritan. The younger had remained unmarried although, as the wealthiest heiress in Stratford, she could not have lacked suitors. It was as if she wanted to receive her bridegroom, like Miranda, from her father's hands.

Neither daughter could read or write; but I have no doubt that Shakespeare was well able to conceive of girlish charm even if unaccompanied by education. I don't believe that Florizel asked to see Perdita's school certificates.

The psychical foundation of the phantasy which runs through the first three plays of the last period—of the daughter who is lost and is found again—is, then, identical with that of the apparently opposite story which is told in *The Tempest*. Now the love story of *The Tempest* contains very characteristic details not to be fully understood at first sight: the severe test to which Prospero subjects Ferdinand, although he knows him well enough and approves of and furthers the marriage from the start; also the striking repetition of the exhortation to abstinence, which even appears in the Masque, so unsuitable for the royal wedding we have taken to be the occasion of the play. In order to understand these traits we must go into the characteristic details of the other plays that are built on the same foundation.

In *Pericles* there are two other fathers with daughters, besides Pericles himself. One of these, who opens the play, lived in incest with his daughter and threatened with death any suitor who attempted to rob him of his beloved. It is of course true that this part of the play is probably not Shakespeare's; still, since he worked

out the succeeding part, he must have been well acquainted with the beginning. It was probably this that moved him to write the part which makes use of the story of the lost daughter found in the source he used in his plot.

In *The Winter's Tale* Shakespeare kept close in almost all points to his source, the popular story by Green, *Pandosto, The Triumph of Time*. The most important alteration is that he omitted an attempt of the father to seduce his—unrecognized—daughter, an incident that would have ill fitted the delicate fanciful humour in which the later part of the work is conceived. In the story the prince, who pretends to be a knight, is thrown into prison by Pandosto (Shakespeare's Leontes) who in spite of his advanced age begins to be attracted by Faunia's beauty (the name Perdita was Shakespeare's invention). Then come long soliloquies and declarations of love until Pandosto, excited by her resistance, swears that if she will not quickly be persuaded he will put aside all courtesy and violently force her to comply. The discovery comes in time to prevent the worst. He recognizes his lost child with emotion, celebrates her wedding, and soon afterwards, pursued by his guilty conscience, he kills himself. In *The Winter's Tale* this whole incident has vanished and left only a slight trace behind:

Flor. with thought of such Affections,
Step forth mine Aduocate: a your request
My Father will graunt precious things, as Trifles.

Leon. Would he doe so, I'd beg your precious Mistris,
Which he counts but a Trifle.

Paul. Sir (my Liege)
Your eye hath too much youth in't: not a moneth
Fore your Queene dy'd, she was more worth such gazes,
Then what you looke on now.

Leon. I thought of her,
Euen in these Lookes I made.

(v, 1)

So Shakespeare does not let Leontes remain absolutely unmoved, but he knows how to introduce a deep psychological motive for this which completely escaped Green. Perdita's likeness to her mother attracts him irresistibly, exactly as in Grimm's fairy-tale, to which the source of *Pericles* can be traced or at least is related; the king covets his daughter because she is the only one who is like his dead

wife. Leontes' daughter appears to him to be, as it were, his wife who has *remained young*. She is a picture of the object of his love at the time of his greatest desire, which she re-awakens in him against his will.

This tender and clearly erotically-tinged attitude of the father towards his daughter accords well with the refusal to acknowledge old age: the wish that the wife should remain ever young, ever the same, like a picture or a statue. The remarkable idea of making Hermione appear like a statue does not come in Green's story, in which the queen really dies, nor has its source been discovered. It is, however, completely comprehensible as the representation of a wish-fulfilment. This becomes most clear in the disappointment of Leontes when he first sees the supposed statue:

Leon. But yet (*Paulina*)

Hermione was not so much wrinckled, nothing

So aged as this seemes. (v, 3)

It is not necessary to point out in detail how well all this corresponds with the case of Shakespeare himself who on returning home would have to resume life together with his wife who was several years older than he.

Thus the erotic attitude which Brandes detects beside the paternal one does exist, but it has the same origin as the love of the father for his daughter.

According to Simrock the Imogen story in *Cymbeline* echoes the story of Snow White—the apparent death by poison contrived by the wicked step-mother. In the same way the Griselda story can be recognised in *The Winter's Tale* if we bear in mind the psychological content as Rank explains it in his study.²⁸ The Griselda story also tells of a daughter preferred to her ageing mother. As Griselda is exiled, Hermione is condemned; and it is highly characteristic that the condemnation follows immediately after she has given birth to a daughter. It is as if the husband were to say: 'Now that you have given me a daughter I need you no longer.' This of course only applies to the original of the tale which Shakespeare took over

²⁸ Rank: Der Sinn der Griselda-Fabel, *Imago*, 1912, Bd. I, S. 34. It is evident from *The Taming of the Shrew*, ii, 1, that Shakespeare was familiar with the Griselda story.

in a form already worked out in accordance with quite other tendencies. But his very greatness lies in his ability to discover in every case the actual, true and most fundamental elements, the unconscious factors. In this way he is able to make a profound effect by drawing on quite mediocre literary material with the help of apparently slight alterations. Leontes' incomprehensible jealousy is drawn with such truth that one is rather inclined to sympathise with than to hate him. Its unconscious root lies in his rejection of his wife because she was pregnant and later because the daughter rendered her superfluous. As in the Griselda story, the husband and wife cannot be reunited till the grown-up daughter comes back to her father's house and he has given her away. Morality comes into its own both in fairy-tale and drama—that is the condition on which a thoroughly immoral unconscious phantasy is permitted a certain degree of conscious expression.

The source of *The Winter's Tale*, like the first part of *Pericles*, contains, then, an incestuous relationship between father and daughter of a passionate erotic nature. Shakespeare softened the theme but did not erase it, and its psychological roots remained in the father's preference of the young daughter to the aged wife.

In *Cymbeline* we do not find any very intimate ties between father and daughter. We must only point out how he tries to keep her from her lover. It is true that he marries her to him, but he forbids him the house and the marriage cannot be consummated. This absurd behaviour does not at all fit in with the 'rationalized' reason which served as pretext for it—namely, Leonato's inferior family.

Antiochus and Cymbeline had to keep younger happier suitors away from their daughters in order to hold them for themselves. But Prospero, the lord of the desert island, was spared the necessity of doing this as he was the only man his daughter had ever seen. The theme of the play is Prospero's voluntary surrender of his daughter and, taking into account what we have gathered from the other plays, it is no longer difficult to explain as resistance against this surrender all that before seemed incomprehensible. Two of the three suitors, Caliban and Stephano, are described with the greatest contempt as filth whose mere thoughts would defile Miranda's maiden purity. The third and chosen suitor receives her in the end, but only after Prospero had relentlessly opposed him and made him clearly feel his superior power. Before Prospero will give him his daughter

he has to serve him as a slave and set himself to the same work as Caliban. When the father hears the lovers' vows he exclaims: 'So glad of this as they I cannot be', but collecting himself he adds: 'but my rejoycing At nothing can be more'.

When Alonso laments over the death of his son, Prospero says, half-jestingly, half in earnest, that he has suffered a like loss.

Alon. You the like losse?
Pros. As great to me, as late, and supportable
 To make the deere losse, haue I meanes much weaker
 Then you may call to comfort you; for I
 Haue lost my daughter.

(v, 1)

The meaning of the last two lines is clear. Prospero is playing with Alonso and indicates, in words Alonso cannot understand, that his son not only lives but that he can even call him to him. He, however, had lost his daughter in such a way that, though he might call her, he could not bring her back to him again.

As we learn from numberless fairy-tales and customs, primitive peoples believed that one gained power over a person if one knew his name (e.g. in the story of Rumpelstiltskin). We too feel that the name is an important part of the personality. As soon as Miranda neglected her father's command and told Ferdinand her name she no longer belonged to Prospero alone but to the younger lover.

There are numerous analogies in fairy-tales to the treatment of Ferdinand by his father-in-law, in which the hero has to perform certain services for the magician's daughter on pain of death. The difference is that Prospero's enmity is feigned; and consequently the whole conception is raised to a higher level while the original affective content still shines clearly through.

In the same way the command of abstemiousness takes refuge in a moral disguise and it is only the importunate severity with which it is impressed again and again that indicates that it is the outcome of a father's jealousy.

Just as Ferdinand's service has its analogies in fairy-tales, the command of abstemiousness echoes a widespread custom according to which, usually for the first three nights, the young couple may not have connection. Originally the defloration was the privilege of the father, later the head of the tribe took his place, and he was

eventually superseded by the lord of the manor (*jus primae noctis*).²⁹ When the sole right of the husband was established these nights were dedicated to the most exalted Father, God, and the former defloration was replaced by abstinence in the name of God (Tobiás's marriage).³⁰ Prospero demands such abstinence from Ferdinand until he gives him his daughter in marriage, when he will give her wholly and without conditions. And what happens when he has made this most difficult renunciation? Prospero tells us:

I'll bring you to your ship, and so to *Naples*,
Where I haue hope to see the nuptiall
Or these our deere-belou'd solemnized,
And thence retire me to my *Milane*, where
Euery third thought shall be my graue.

(v, 3)

There will be nothing left for the ageing man when his daughter is married but thoughts of the grave. Pandosto, the rejected wooer of his daughter, kills himself immediately after her wedding; the source is almost throughout clearer than the elaboration. The most curious thing is, however, that the prophecy was exactly fulfilled in Shakespeare's own fate. His daughter Judith married in very striking circumstances. The two families, which belonged to the gentry of Stratford, were close friends—Richard Quincey, the father of the bridegroom, wrote the only existing letter to Shakespeare—and she must have known her bridegroom, who was four years younger than she, from her earliest childhood. Nevertheless, the wedding was carried out with such haste that there was neither time to put up the banns nor to get a dispensation. The young couple was fined by the vestry and was also threatened with excommunication.³¹ The wedding took place on February 10, 1616 and a few weeks later, on April 23, William Shakespeare died.

We must return to one more departure from the original which Shakespeare made in *The Winter's Tale*. In Green the answer of

²⁹ See Freud: Das Tabu der Virginität, *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, IV. Folge, 1918. S. 229 et seq.

³⁰ In this connection see especially Storfer's valuable remarks in *Zur Sonderstellung des Vaternordes*. Deuticke, 1911.

³¹ Sidney Lee: *Shakespeare*, p. 271.

the oracle is to the same effect as that in Shakespeare where Hermione is declared guiltless. Thereupon Pandosto repents of his jealousy; but it is too late, for his little son dies and grief kills his innocent wife. In Shakespeare, while the oracle's answer convinces everyone else, Leontes says:

There is no truth at all i' th' Oracle:
The Sessions shall proceed: this is meere falsehood.
(iii, 2)

But he completely changes his mind when he learns that his son is dead.

At this point one can put one's finger on the difference between commonplace talent and genius. Green's story is logically correct but nevertheless leaves the reader cold. In Shakespeare's play, however, the plot is logically absurd and yet we are deeply moved by it because it is built up on deep psychological truth.

Brandes himself thought that Mamillus in *The Winter's Tale* must have reminded Shakespeare of his little son who had died at the early age of eleven. A step further and we find ourselves face to face with the problem of guilt and in sight of its solution. Leontes is guilty of the death of Mamillus, because he had ill-treated his wife, his son's mother, and had thrust her from him:

The Prince your Sonne, with meere conceit, and feare
Of the Queenes speed, is gone. (iii, 2)

Shakespeare too had thrust his wife from him when he went to London and settled there without her; Shakespeare too had lost his son. The parallel would be complete if the theme which connects the two facts in the play could also be traced in his life.

This connection emerges as soon as we apply the psycho-analytic dictum concerning 'the omnipotence of thought'.

When a man wants to free himself from a woman to whom he is bound by marriage, he feels that his children are the chief fetters and the hardest to throw off, and in his unconscious he reacts to this feeling by wishing for their death. Primitive savagery still rules in the unconscious, for the tender care that civilized man shows for the lives of his fellow-men has not yet penetrated so far. The belief in the omnipotence of one's own thoughts, which is clearly visible in the beginnings of civilization—animism—

continues to hold sway in the unconscious. So, on the death of someone against whom one has death-wishes, one feels oneself a murderer; and if the dead was not only hated but also tenderly loved—as is undoubtedly the case with only sons—one can never get rid of the tormenting sense of guilt. Shakespeare often took these gloomy life-companions from his unconscious and gave them flesh in his work,³² but never so clearly as here. His thoughts of returning home were the chief occasion of this; all his desires had been fruitless, foolish; nothing was left to him but the return to his deserted wife—and his poor little boy had been the victim of his boundless ambition.

The fact that Leontes was not convinced by the oracle, but by the death of his son, is then psychologically true, if we put the poet in his position. He, like Leontes, has to take the guilt of this death on his own head, and the knowledge of his own guilt meant for Leontes also the innocence of his wife.—Cymbeline also nearly murdered his sons.

There is no trace of all this in *The Tempest* and that is what gives to the play its joyous tranquillity, its sensation of safety in the face of the most vile and uncanny of mortal machinations and its release from the bonds of earth. Prospero is a perfected being to whom, as a last remnant of human weakness, clings the love for his daughter. But there can be no poetic creation without the co-operation of the unconscious, and the unconscious is beyond good and evil. In order to preserve the feeling of calm which prevails in *The Tempest* in spite of the title and the tempestuous opening, Shakespeare displaced the sinister and the depraved from the three chief characters on to the minor rôles and there indicated them but lightly and superficially. The marionnettes are already hanging limply on their strings, for the showman is soon going to sleep.

The theme of guilt for the death of the son is not lacking either, and moreover the cause of the death is exactly the same as of that in *The Winter's Tale*. He must die because his father had thrust his daughter from him—the daughter here replacing the wife. But the reproach has lost its old sting, for it is uttered by

³² See 'Shakespeares "Macbeth"' (*Imago*, 1917, Bd. V, S. 170) by Jekels, who has priority in this connection. The whole problem is unrolled in Ibsen's *The Master Builder*.

one of the villains of the play, not in the interest of truth but obviously to hurt and to wound.

Seb. Sir you may thank your selfe for this great losse,³³
That would not blesse our Europe with your daughter,
But rather loose her to an Affrican,
Where she at least, is banish'd from your eye,
Who hath cause to wet the greefe on't.

Alon. Pre-thee peace.

Seb. You were kneel'd too, & importun'd otherwise
By all of vs: and the faire soule her selfe
Waigh'd betweene loathnesse, and obedience, at
Which end o'th'beame should bow: we haue lost your son,
I feare for euer: (ii, 1)

In one more passage we catch an echo of the son's death, though this time faint and distant. When he is giving Miranda to her bridegroom, Prospero calls her 'a third of mine owne life' (iv, 1). All commentators have found this incomprehensible, for Miranda, Prospero's only child, could surely but be called the half of his life. Despite the fact that *The Tempest* is particularly well printed in the Folio of 1623, some editors³⁴ nevertheless alter the text on this account and read 'a thread [thrid] of my own life'. But this violation makes complete nonsense, for Prospero goes on: 'Or that for which I live', and he cannot wish to say that he lived for a thread, for a minute particle of his life. The passage makes very good sense, however, if we suppose that Shakespeare put himself unwittingly in Prospero's place, for, as he had two daughters, he might have called one of them a third of his life. But the sense would be still better if we took it that Prospero had not counted himself among the thirds, for the words which follow 'Or that for which I live' would then for the first time take on their full meaning. And the missing third is found if we allow ourselves to say that Shakespeare in this little blunder (*Fehlhandlung*) went back to the time when his son still lived and he possessed three children.

It seems as if Shakespeare contemned his weaknesses and his faults in the minor characters as he idealized himself in Prospero, the chief person of the play.

³³ Ferdinand's death.

³⁴ e. g. *Leopold Shakespeare*.

Without making a thorough investigation we can say nothing about the two conspiracies against the brothers (Sebastian and Antonio), for this is one of Shakespeare's favourite themes and is used in many of his plays (e.g. *King Lear*, *Hamlet*, *As You Like It*, *Much Ado about Nothing*). But Stephano and Caliban are the embodiment of failings which, if we may trust the tradition, were not strange to him.

Stephano, who could not exist without his panacea, the bottle, is the flagon incarnate. At the same time he is fond of puns and word-plays,³⁵ a partiality to which Shakespeare too appears to have been prone.

Caliban is repeatedly called 'fish'. In *Troilus and Cressida* Thersites calls Ajax 'Land-Fish' because he is dumb, but this must have another sense, for Caliban could talk very well after Prospero taught him. We must remember on the other hand that Caliban is the son of a witch who would have misused the delicate spirit Ariel for her 'earthy and abhord' desires. The son takes after his mother, for he tries to seduce his benefactor's daughter and when he is reminded of it answers 'Oh ho, oh ho, would't had bene done' (i, 2). The fish is one of the commonest symbols of the penis,³⁶ and if instead of being a fabric of poetic phantasy Caliban had been a mythological creation the mythologists would without doubt have called him a 'phallic demon'.

We can conjecture—but as Shakespeare himself gives not the slightest personal suggestion we can do no more—we can conjecture that in this play, where he bade farewell to his youth as to his art, the poet also took leave of the faults and failings of his youth.

We must leave these remote tracks and return to the centre of the play. For each of Shakespeare's plays has a central thread which is not a basis of abstract thought but a living soul, an entity deeply human, to which every event and every word refers. In *The Tempest* the poet concentrated on the problem of service; for he was himself throwing off the service of the Court and the capital, of riches and renown, in order to end his life free and independent, his own lord on his own land. All the characters in the play serve:

³⁵ 'Wit shall not goe vn-rewarded while I am King of this Country' (iv, 1).

³⁶ cf. R. Eisler: 'Der Fisch als Sexualsymbol.' *Imago*, 1914, Bd. III, S. 165 et seq.

Antonio who, to be called duke, 'confederates . . . with King of *Naples*. To give him annuall tribute' was no wiser than Caliban who can say in one breath 'Ban', Ban', Cacaliban Has a new Master, get a new Man! Freedome, high-day! high-day freedome! freedome high-day, freedome.' Caliban eggs on Sebastian, as he did Stephano, to murder his master. These represent the downright degenerate minds; to whom the word freedom means nothing at all because they cannot be free; who repeatedly slide back into shackles but yet always hate and are false to their masters. Ariel, who knows so well how to serve, represents the next class, but, like the thing of nature he is, only serves and suffers servitude unwillingly. Ferdinand, who relinquishes liberty, stands in a third class; he is not forced but elects to serve for the sake of love and not for reward. This is the right and real sort of service, that wins the richest reward.

But Prospero also serves, for in his last incantation, before he breaks his staff, he calls the spirits 'Weake Masters'. And sovereignty itself is a labour for others and thus a form of service. When Prospero has thrown off these last fetters he stands beyond the human; only one door remains open to him and that leads into the grave.

But first he confers happiness on his daughter, the single creature that still ties him to mankind, by releasing her and leading her to her lover. This is Prospero's, and was Shakespeare's, last service to his last love.

THE RELATION OF BEATING-PHANTASIES TO A DAY-DREAM¹

BY

ANNA FREUD

VIENNA

In his paper 'A Child is Being Beaten'² Freud deals with a phantasy which, according to him, is met with in a surprising number of the people who come in search of analytic treatment on account of an hysteria or of an obsessional neurosis. He thinks it very probable that it occurs even more often in other people who have not been obliged by a manifest illness to come to this decision. This 'beating-phantasy' is invariably charged with a high degree of pleasure and has its issue in an act of pleasurable auto-erotic gratification. I shall take for granted that the content of Freud's paper—the description of the phantasy, the reconstruction of the phases which preceded it, and its derivation from the Oedipus complex—is known to the reader. In the course of my paper I shall return to and dwell on it at some length.

In one paragraph of his paper Freud says: 'In two of my four female cases an artistic superstructure of day-dreams, which was of great significance for the life of the person concerned, had grown up over the masochistic phantasy of beating. The function of this superstructure was to make possible the feeling of gratified excitement, even though the onanistic act was abstained from.' Now I have been able from a variety of day-dreams to select one which seemed especially well calculated to illustrate this short remark. This day-dream was formed by a girl of fifteen, whose phantasy-life, in spite of its abundance, had never come into conflict with reality; the origin, evolution and termination of the day-dream could be established with certainty; and its derivation from and dependence on a beating-phantasy of long standing was proved in analysis.

¹ The following paper was written on the basis of several discussions which I had with Frau Lou Andreas-Salomé.—A. F.

² See this *Journal* 1920, Vol I, p. 371.

I

I shall now trace the course of development of the phantasy-life of this day-dreamer. When in her fifth or sixth year—before school, certainly—she began to entertain a beating-phantasy of the type described by Freud. In the beginning its content remained monotonous: 'A boy is being beaten by a grown-up person'. Later on it was changed to: 'Many boys are being beaten by many grown-up persons'. The boys, however, as well as the grown-ups remained indeterminate and so did the misdeed for which the castigation was administered. It is to be supposed that when enacted before the imagination of the girl the various scenes were very vivid; the record, however, given of them during analysis was anything but circumstantial or illuminating. Whenever the phantasy was called up it was accompanied by strong sexual excitement and terminated in an onanistic act.

The sense of guilt which attaches itself to the phantasy in his cases, as with this child also, is explained by Freud in the following way. He says that the form of beating-phantasy just described is not the initial one, but is the substitute in consciousness for an earlier unconscious phase. In this unconscious phase the persons who afterwards became unrecognizable and indifferent were very well-known and important—the boy who was being punished was the child who produced the phantasy, the adult who dealt out the punishment was the dreamer's own father. Further, according to Freud's paper even this phase is not the primary one, but is only a transformation of a preceding first phase, which belongs to the period of the greatest activity of the parental complex. This first phase had in common with the second that the person beating was the dreamer's father; the child that was being beaten, however, was not the one who produced the phantasy but some other one, a brother or sister, i. e., a rival in the struggle for the father's affection. The content and meaning of the phantasy of beating was, in its first phase, therefore: that the child claimed the whole of its father's love for itself and left the others to his anger and wrath. Later on a process of repression took place, a sense of guilt appeared and, to reverse the former triumph, the punishment was turned back upon the child itself. At the same time, however, in consequence of a regression from the genital to the pregenital anal-sadistic organization, the phantasy of being beaten still stood to the

child for a phantasy of being loved. Thus the second phase was formed; but it remained unconscious because of its all-too-significant content, and was substituted in consciousness by a third phase, better calculated to meet the demands of the censorship. To this third phase, however, was attached the libidinal excitement and the sense of guilt, since the secret meaning hidden under its strange form still ran: 'My father loves only me.'

With the child mentioned this sense of guilt attached itself less to the content of the phantasy itself—though the latter too was disapproved of from the beginning—than to the auto-erotic gratification which regularly occurred at its climax. The little girl therefore for a number of years made ever-renewed but ever-failing attempts to separate the one from the other, i. e., to retain the phantasy as a source of pleasure and, at the same time, to break herself of the auto-erotic habit, which was felt to be irreconcilable with the moral standard demanded by her ego. The content of the phantasy at that period went through the most complicated alterations and elaborations. In the attempt to enjoy the legitimate pleasure as long as possible, and to put off its tabooed climax indefinitely, she added on descriptions of a wealth of details indifferent in themselves. She constructed whole institutions, schools and reformatories in which the scenes of beating were imagined to take place, and established definite rules which determined the construction of the various scenes. The persons beating were at that time invariably teachers; only later and in exceptional cases the fathers of the boys were added—as spectators mostly. But even in this elaborate embroidering of the phantasy the day-dreamer left the figures indeterminate and denied them all characteristic traits, as for instance, individual faces and names, or personal histories.

I certainly do not want to imply that postponing the pleasurable situation in this way by prolonging and amplifying the whole phantasy is in all cases the manifestation of a sense of guilt, i. e., the consequence of an attempt to separate the phantasy from an onanistic act. The same technical device may be met with in phantasies which have never given rise to a sense of guilt. With these it simply serves to reinforce the excitation and thus to heighten the final pleasure gained by the dreamer.

In the case of this girl the phantasies of beating after a time entered upon a new phase of development. As years went on the ego-tendencies in which the moral demands set up by her environment

were incorporated slowly gained strength. Consequently she resisted more and more the temptation to indulge in the phantasy in which her libidinal tendencies had become concentrated. She gave up as a failure all her attempts to separate the phantasy of beating from the onanistic act, and consequently the content of the phantasy fell under the same taboo as the sexual gratification. Every re-activation of the phantasy meant a serious struggle with strong opposing forces and was followed by self-reproaches, pangs of conscience and a short period of depression. The pleasure derived from the phantasy was more and more confined to the climax itself, which was preceded as well as followed by 'pain'. Since in the course of time the phantasies of beating came to serve less and less as a source of pleasure, they were largely restricted in their activity.

II

At about the same time—apparently between her eighth and tenth year—the girl began to entertain a new kind of phantasies, which she herself distinguished by the name of 'nice stories', to separate them from the unpleasant phantasies of beating. These 'nice stories' seemed, at first sight at least, to contain a wealth of pleasurable, agreeable situations describing instances of kind, considerate and affectionate behaviour. The figures in these nice stories were distinguished by individual names, their looks and personal appearance were described in detail and their life-histories given, the latter sometimes reaching far back into their imaginary past. The circumstances of the various persons, their acquaintance and relationship with one another, were laid down and the details of their daily life moulded after the pattern of reality. Alterations in the surroundings of the day-dreamer were followed by alterations in the imaginary scenes, and the effects of reading could also be easily traced in the latter. The climax of each situation was invariably accompanied by a strong feeling of pleasure; no sense of guilt appeared and no auto-erotic gratification took place in connection with it. The girl consequently felt no resistance against indulging largely in this kind of day-dreaming. This was, therefore, the artistic superstructure of day-dreams referred to in Freud's paper. How far one is justified in assuming that it had grown up over the masochistic phantasies of beating I hope to show in the further course of this analysis.

The day-dreamer herself knew nothing about any connection which her pleasant stories might have with the phantasies of beating. If a possibility of this kind had been pointed out to her at that time she would certainly have rejected the idea energetically. The phantasies of beating were to her the personification of everything she considered ugly, prohibited and depraved, whereas the 'nice stories' stood to her for beauty and pleasure. She was firmly convinced of the mutual independence of the two kinds of phantasies, the more so since no figure out of a 'nice story' ever penetrated into the sphere of the beating-phantasies. The two were kept apart very carefully—even in regard to time: for every re-activation of the phantasies of beating had to be followed by a temporary renunciation of the 'nice stories'.

Even during analysis, as was mentioned before, the girl never gave any detailed account of any individual scene of beating. Owing to her shame and resistance all she could ever be induced to give were short and covert allusions which left to the analyst the task of completing and reconstructing a picture of the original situation. She behaved quite differently in regard to the 'nice stories'. As soon as her first resistance to free talking had been overcome, she volunteered vivid and circumstantial descriptions of her various day-dreams. Her eagerness in doing so was such that she even gave the impression of experiencing while she was talking a similar or even greater pleasure than while actually day-dreaming. In these circumstances it was comparatively easy to get a general survey of the wealth of figures and situations produced by her fantasy. It turned out that the girl had formed not one but a whole series of so-called 'continued stories', each having a different plot and describing a different set of figures. One of these 'continued stories' may be considered the cardinal and most important one; it contained the largest number of figures, existed for years, and underwent various transformations; moreover, other stories branched off from it, which—just as in legends or mythology—acquired in the course of time complete independence. Alongside this main story the girl maintained various smaller and less important ones which she employed in turn. All these day-dreams invariably belonged to the type termed 'continued stories'. To gain insight into their organization we will now turn our attention to one particular 'nice story' which, because of its brevity and clearness, is best suited to serve the purposes of this paper.

In her fourteenth or fifteenth year, after having formed a number of continued stories which she maintained side by side, the girl accidentally came upon a boy's story-book; it contained among others a short story of which the action was laid in the Middle Ages. She went through it once or twice with great interest; when she had finished, she returned the book to its owner and did not see it again. Her imagination, however, had already taken possession of the various figures and a number of the details described in the book. She immediately took up the thread of the story, continued to spin out the action and, retaining it henceforward as one of her 'nice stories', she behaved exactly as if she were dealing with a spontaneous product of her own imagination.

In spite of various attempts made during analysis it remained impossible to establish with certainty what had been included in the original story. Its content had been dismembered and devoured by her active imagination, and new phantasies had overlaid it until every attempt at distinction between spontaneous and borrowed details was bound to fail. There remained nothing, therefore, but to leave aside the question of origin and to deal with the content of the imaginary scenes without regard to the sources it had sprung from.

The subject of the story was as follows: A mediaeval Knight has for years been at feud with a number of nobles who have leagued together against him. In the course of a battle a noble youth of fifteen (the age of the day-dreamer) is captured by the Knight's henchmen. He is taken to the Knight's castle and there kept prisoner some time, until at last he gains his freedom again.

Instead of spinning out and continuing the tale (as in a novel published by instalments), the girl made use of the plot as a sort of outer frame for her day-dream. Into this frame she inserted a wealth of scenes, every single one of which was organized like an independent story, containing an introduction, development of the plot and climax. Thus there was no logical sequence in the working out of the whole tale. She was free at any moment to choose between the different parts of the tale according to her mood; and she could always interpose a new situation between two others which had been finished and previously joined up with each other.

In this comparatively simple day-dream there are only two really important figures; all the others may be disregarded, as of episodic importance merely. One of these main figures is the young prisoner, who is endowed in the day-dream with various noble

and pleasing character-traits; the other is the Knight who is described as harsh and brutal. Several incidents relating to their past and their family-histories were worked out and added to the plot to deepen the hostility between them. This furnished a basis of an apparently irreconcilable antagonism between one character who is strong and mighty and another who is weak and in the power of the former.

Their first meeting was described in a great introductory scene during which the Knight threatens to put the prisoner on the rack, so as to force him to betray important secrets. The youth thus becomes aware of his utter helplessness and begins to dread his enemy. On these two factors—fear and helplessness—all the subsequent situations were based; e. g., in pursuance of his plan, the Knight nearly goes as far as to torture the prisoner, but at the last moment he desists. He nearly kills him through imprisonment in the dungeon of his castle, but has him nursed back to life again before it is too late for recovery. As soon as the prisoner has recovered the Knight returns to his original plan, but a second time he gives way before the prisoner's fortitude. And while he is apparently bent upon doing harm to the youth, he actually grants him one favour after the other. Similar situations form the later part of the tale, e. g., the prisoner accidentally goes beyond the boundaries of the castle; the Knight meets him there, but does *not* punish him by renewed imprisonment, as he would have expected. Another time the Knight discovers a similar transgression on the part of the prisoner, but he himself saves him from the humiliating consequences of the deed. Several times the prisoner is subjected to great hardships. These experiences then serve to heighten his enjoyment of some luxuries granted to him by the Knight. All these dramatic scenes were enacted very vividly before the imagination of the girl. In every single one she shared the prisoner's feelings of fear and fortitude in a state of great excitement. At the climax of each situation, i. e., when the anger and rage of the torturer were transformed into kindness and pity, this excitement resolved itself into a feeling of pleasure.

Going through the scenes mentioned and forming some new similar situations usually took the girl from a few days up to one or two weeks. At the beginning of each of these periods of day-dreaming the elaboration and development of every single scene was methodically carried out. When forming one particular scene

in her imagination, she was able to disregard the existence of all the other adventures which had happened before or after it; consequently at the moment she honestly believed in the prisoner's dangerous position and in the actual possibility of a final catastrophe; so that the prisoner's dread and anxiety, i. e., the anticipation of the climax, were dwelt on at great length. After several days of day-dreaming, however, a disturbing remembrance of the happy issue of scenes already imagined seemed to penetrate into the day-dream; dread and anxiety were described with less conviction, the tone of gentleness and clemency which at the beginning had marked the climax spread farther and farther over it and finally absorbed all the interest formerly taken up by the introduction and development of the plot. The final result of this transformation was that the whole story was rendered unfit for further use, and had to be replaced—at least for a period of some weeks—by another story, which after a certain length of time met the same fate. It was only the main day-dream which lasted so immeasurably longer than the other less important continued stories; the reason probably lay in the great wealth of figures contained in it, as well as in its manifold ramifications. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that this broader elaboration was carried through for the very purpose of ensuring it a longer life every time it was re-activated.

A general survey of the various single scenes of the Knight and Prisoner day-dream revealed a surprising monotony in their construction. The day-dreamer herself—though on the whole intelligent and critical of what she read—had never noticed this fact, not even when relating the story during analysis. But on examination of each scene it was only necessary to detach from the plot itself the manifold minor details which at a first glance gave it its appearance of individuality; in every instance the structure then laid bare was as follows: antagonism between a strong and a weak person; a misdeed—mostly unintentional—on the part of the weak one which puts him at the other's mercy; the latter's menacing attitude giving rise to the gravest apprehensions; a slow and sometimes very elaborate intensification almost to the limit of endurance of the dread and anxiety; and finally, as a pleasurable climax, the solution of the conflict, i. e., pardon for the sinner, reconciliation and, for a moment, complete harmony between the former antagonists. With a few variations the same structure held good also for every single scene out of the other 'nice stories' invented by the girl.

It is this underlying structure which constitutes the important analogy between the nice stories and the phantasies of beating—an analogy quite unsuspected by the dreamer herself. In the beating-phantasies too, the figures were divided into strong and weak persons, i. e., adults and children respectively; there also it was a matter of a misdeed, though it remained as indefinite as the persons themselves; in the same manner they too contained a period of dread and anxiety. The only decisive disparity between the two kinds of phantasies lies in the difference between their respective solutions, which in the one case consisted of the beating-scene, in the other of the reconciliation-scene.

In the course of analysis the girl became acquainted with these striking points of resemblance in the construction of the two apparently distinct products of her imagination. The suspicion of a connection between them slowly dawned on her; once the possibility of their relationship had been accepted she quickly began to perceive a whole series of connections between them.

Even so the content at least of the beating-phantasies appeared to have nothing in common with that of the nice stories; but this too was disproved by further analysis. Closer observation showed that the theme of the beating-phantasies had in more than one place succeeded in penetrating into the nice stories. As an example we may take the Knight and Prisoner day-dream which has already been discussed. There the Knight threatened to apply torture to the prisoner. This menace always remained unfulfilled; but nevertheless a great number of scenes was built up on it, to which it supplied an unmistakable colouring of anxiety. In the light of previous considerations this menace may easily be recognized as the echo of the earlier scenes of beating; but no description of them was permissible in the nice story. There were other ways in which the theme of beating encroached into the day-dream, not in the Knight and Prisoner day-dream itself, but in the other continued stories produced by the girl.

The following observations are taken from the main story, as far as it was revealed during analysis: In the main story the passive, weak character (corresponding to the youth in the Knight and Prisoner day-dream) was occasionally represented by two figures. After committing identical misdeeds, one of these two had to undergo punishment, while the other was pardoned. Here the scene of punishment was in itself neither pleasurable nor 'painfully'

accentuated; it simply served to bring the reconciliation into relief and to heighten by contrast the pleasure derived from the latter. In other places the passive person in the day-dream had to live through in memory a past scene of beating while he was actually being treated affectionately. Here again the contrast served to heighten the pleasure. Or, as a third possibility, the active, strong person, dominated by the gentle mood necessary for the climax, remembered a past scene of beating in which, after committing the same misdeed, he had been the punished one.

Besides penetrating into the day-dream in this manner the beating-theme sometimes formed the actual content of a nice story, on the condition that one characteristic indispensable in the beating-phantasy was left out. This characteristic was the humiliation connected with being beaten. In a few impressive scenes in the main day-dream, for example, the climax consisted of a blow or punishment; when it was a blow, however, it was described as unintentional, when a punishment, it took the form of a self-punishment.

These instances of an irruption of the beating-theme into the nice stories all constituted as many arguments proving the relationship already suggested between the two phantasies. In the further course of analysis the girl furnished another convincing proof of this intimate connection. She one day admitted that on a few rare occasions a sudden reversal from nice stories into beating-phantasies had taken place. In hard times, when things were difficult, for instance, a nice story had sometimes failed to fulfil its function and had been replaced at the climax by a beating-scene; so that the sexual gratification connected with the latter had obtained full discharge for the dammed-up excitement. She had afterwards, however, energetically excluded these occurrences from her memory.

Investigation into the relationship between beating-phantasies and nice stories has so far yielded the following results: (1) a striking analogy in the construction of the single scenes; (2) a certain parallelism in the content; (3) the possibility of a sudden change over from the one to the other. The essential difference between the two lies in the fact that in the nice stories affectionate treatment takes the place of the chastisement contained in the phantasies of beating.

Now these considerations lead back to Freud's paper, in which the previous history of the beating-phantasies is reconstructed. As

already mentioned, Freud says that the form of beating-phantasy here described is not the initial one, but is a substitute for an incestuous love-scene. The combined influence of repression and of regression to the anal-sadistic phase of libido-organization has transformed the latter into a beating-scene. From this point of view the apparent advance from the beating-phantasies to the nice stories might be explained as a return to a former phase. The nice stories seem to relinquish the original theme of the phantasies of beating; but they simultaneously bring out their original meaning, i. e., the phantasy of love that was hidden in them.

This attempt at explanation is, however, so far deficient in one important point. We have seen that the climax of the beating-phantasies was invariably connected with a compulsive onanistic act, as well as with a subsequent sense of guilt. The climax of the nice stories on the other hand is free from both. At a first glance this seems inexplicable; for the onanistic act as well as the sense of guilt are both derived from the repressed love phantasy, and the latter, though it is disguised in the phantasies of beating, is represented in the nice stories.

A solution of the problem is furnished by the fact that the nice stories do not take up the whole of the incestuous wish-phantasy belonging to early childhood. At that time all the sexual instincts were being concentrated on a first object, the father. Afterwards repression of the Oedipus complex forced the child to renounce most of these infantile sexual ties. The 'sensual' object-ties were banned to the unconscious, so that their re-emergence in the phantasies of beating signifies a partial failure of this attempt at repression.

While the phantasies of beating thus represent a return of the repressed, i. e., of the incestuous wish-phantasy, the nice stories on the other hand represent a sublimation of it. The beating-phantasies constitute a gratification for the directly sexual tendencies, the nice stories for those which Freud describes as 'inhibited in their aim'. Just as in the development of a child's love for its parents, the originally complete sexual current is divided into sensual tendencies which undergo repression (here represented by the beating-phantasies) and into a sublimated and purely tender emotional tie (represented by the nice stories).

The tasks which the two phantasies were each required to fulfil may now be sketched as follows: the beating-phantasies always represent the same sensual love-scene which, expressed in terms of

the anal-sadistic phase of libido-organization, comes to be disguised as a beating-scene. The nice stories, on the other hand, contain a variety of tender emotional object-ties. Their theme, however, is also monotonous; it invariably consists of a friendship formed between two characters opposed in strength, in age, or in social position.

The sublimation of sensual love into tender friendship was naturally favoured by the fact that already in the early stages of the beating-phantasy the girl had abandoned the difference of sex and was invariably represented as a boy.

III

It was the object of this paper to examine a special case in which beating-phantasies and day-dreams co-existed side by side. The relationship between them and their dependence on each other has been ascertained. Apart from this, analysis of this particular day-dreamer also provided an opportunity for observing the further development of a continued story.

Some years after the first emergence of the Knight and Prisoner day-dream the girl suddenly made an attempt to write down its content. As a result she produced a sort of short story describing the youth's life during his imprisonment. It began with a description of the torture he underwent and ended with the prisoner's refusal to try to escape from the castle. His readiness to remain in the Knight's power suggested the beginning of their friendship. In contrast to the day-dream all the events were laid in the past and appeared in the form of a conversation between the prisoner's father and the Knight.

Thus, while retaining the theme of the day-dream, the written story completely changed the elaboration of the content. In the day-dream the friendship between the strong and the weak character developed anew in every single scene; in the written story, on the other hand, the friendship developed slowly and its formation took up the whole length of the action. In the new elaboration the single scenes of the day-dream were abandoned; part of the material contained in them was used for the story, their various single climaxes, however, were not replaced by a main climax terminating the latter. The end, i. e., a harmony between the former antagonists, was anticipated but not described in the story. Consequently here

the interest, which in the day-dream concentrated on particular points, was more equally diffused over the whole course of the action.

These modifications in the structure corresponded also to modifications in the gratification obtained. In the day-dream every new formation or repetition of a single scene provided another opportunity for pleasurable instinctual gratification. This direct way of obtaining pleasure was abandoned in the written story. The girl indeed did the actual writing in a state of pleasurable excitement, similar to her mental state when day-dreaming; the finished story, however, did not call forth this excitement. Reading the story had no more effect on the girl than reading a story with a similar content produced by a stranger.

This brings the surmise very near that the two essential changes from the day-dream to the written story, i. e., abandoning the single scenes and renouncing the pleasure derived from the various single climaxes, were intimately connected. It seems obvious that the written story had other motives and served another purpose than the day-dream. If this were not so then the development of the Knight's Story out of the day-dream would signify a transformation of something useful into something utterly useless.

When asked the reasons which had induced her to write the story the girl could give only a single conscious one. She said the story had originated at a period when the day-dream had been unusually vivid. Writing it was a defence against over-indulgence in it. The characters were so real to her and took up so much of her time and interest that she formed the purpose of creating a sort of independent existence for them. As a matter of fact, after it was written down the Knight and Prisoner day-dream actually faded away. This explanation, however, does not altogether clear the matter up. If it were the vividness of the scenes which induced her to write the story it remains inexplicable why, in writing it, she abandoned those particular scenes and dwelt on others which were not included in the day-dream (e.g. the torture-scene). The same reasoning holds good for the characters; for in the story some of the characters that were fully developed in the day-dream are lacking and are replaced by others unknown in the former (as, for instance, the prisoner's father).

Another motivation for the written story is shown by following out a remark of Dr. Bernfeld's, relating to literary attempts by

adolescents. Bernfeld says that in these cases the motive for writing out a day-dream may be extrinsic, not intrinsic. According to him it is most often prompted by certain ambitious ego-tendencies, as, for example, the wish to be regarded as a poet and to win in that capacity the love and esteem of others. In applying this theory to the case under discussion the development from the day-dream to the written story may be represented as follows:

The private phantasy was transformed under the pressure of the ambitious tendencies mentioned above into a communication for others. During the transformation all regard for the dreamer's personal needs were replaced by consideration of the future readers of the story. It was no longer necessary for the girl to gain pleasure directly from the content, since the written story as such gratified her ambition, and was thus indirectly pleasurable. After having renounced the direct way of attaining pleasure, there was then no reason left for retaining the various single climaxes which had been the source of pleasure before. Similarly she was now free to disregard the restrictions which had forbidden her to describe situations derived from the phantasies of beating. The torture, for example, could be introduced. When writing the story she regarded the whole content of the day-dream from the point of view of its suitability for representation and made her choice between the different parts accordingly. The better she succeeded in rounding off the action, the greater would be the impression she created and, simultaneously, the pleasure she indirectly derived from the story. By renouncing her private pleasure in favour of the impression she could create in others she turned from an autistic to a social activity, and thus found her way back from the life of imagination to life in reality.

COMMUNICATIONS

THE ROLE OF AN EXCEPTIONAL ORGAN IN A NEUROSIS¹

BY

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NEW YORK

The case to be reported seems to merit attention not only because it explains symptoms of psychic impotence and compulsive alcoholism, but also because it shows how a patient congenitally endowed with an exceptional organ, if one may use the term in contrast to the organic inferiority idea of Alfred Adler, unconsciously utilized this very superiority as a basis for his neurosis. Although the organ had been 'superior' as long as the patient could remember, the neurotic symptoms which the patient displaced upon the member in later days, originated, according to my interpretation, in a sense of deprivation and guilt which had developed early in childhood.

The patient, a mechanical engineer, single, first visited me in 1915, at the age of 33, having been referred for periodic but noxious alcoholic debauches in which he had been indulging for ten years, and which he always undertook in solitude. He recognized the alcoholism to be associated with a feeling of depression, the origin of which remained obscure to him. Subsequent investigations showed that the depression arose in connection with a sense of loneliness, which in turn depended upon a feeling of inability to indulge in sexual intercourse, ascribed by him, curious as it may appear, to the unusually large size of his penis.

The concentration of all the patient's difficulties about his large penis impressed me as a striking contradiction to the organic inferiority theory of Alfred Adler. By this I do not wish to imply

¹ Read before the annual meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Society, Washington, April 30, 1922.

that Adler maintains that a small organ is an inferior one or to suggest that a large one is necessarily superior. It is easy to conceive situations where an unusual or premature organic development might be a handicap, but in the case under consideration, the organ performed its function perfectly, and its increased size, according to universal standards, would be considered a desirable and advantageous attribute.²

According to Adler, the origin of neuroses in an organic inferiority is entitled to a consideration from essentially two standpoints. Firstly, congenital or early acquired organic weaknesses or defects may induce in children a feeling of inferiority in regard to the other children. Furthermore, these physical defects may be utilized by the children to secure special privileges from their environment. On the other hand, in some cases these very inferiorities may actually be the basis for unusual development in special fields, therein that they may provide an incentive for extraordinary constructive endeavors to overcome inherent weaknesses. Secondly, the child in comparison with the adults of its environment, personifies an organic weakness and makes efforts to overcome its inevitable handicap by an attempt to rule, a will to power. The wish of the child to equal its elders, or if possible, to excel them, is regarded by Adler as the mightiest force in character development. He finds in the aggression impulse an ever recurring source of neurotic conflict and of yearning for power and distinction to which he has applied the enticing term 'masculine protest'.

Adler's doubtful postulate and the apt phrase 'masculine protest' would deny the importance of the sexual impulses and with one stroke conveniently dispose on an organic basis of many unsolved and perplexing problems of the neuroses. Freud has accorded a definite recognition to the aggression impulse as a component of most impulses, although alone it quite fails to satisfactorily meet the requirements which would explain many manifestations of neurotic symptoms.³ The '*Bemächtigungstrieb*', that is, the impulse or will to overpower, finds its place among the partial impulses of the ego-

² See J. Birstein's article in the *Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse*, Vol. III, S. 595: Das Volk 'mit dem kleinen Penis.'

³ S. Freud, 'Aus einer infantilen Neurose', *Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, IV. Folge, S. 628.

libido in the present Freudian conception of impulses and in the primary pregenital stages this aggression impulse is probably not far removed from the anal-sadistic impulses of the sexual group.

Marcinowski,⁴ however, has pointed out that it is very doubtful whether the will to power is an end in itself, but must be regarded as a manifestation which is produced by impulses very closely allied to the sexual group. He maintains that the feeling of inferiority arises later in life and only at such a time when the early unreasoning and implicit faith of the child in himself has been shaken through actual denials or through disappointment in receiving attention, love and tenderness from his custodians. An injury to narcissism such as Marcinowski describes seems to have been the basis of our patient's neurosis, although the emotional reaction was displaced upon the important generative organ which had grown in early childhood to unusual proportions, even for his large physique.

It is not my intention to present a complete analytic interpretation of the patient's symptoms. Suffice it to say that the analysis revealed that the psychic impotence or more accurately, a fear to approach women for sexual purposes, did not depend upon the physical anomaly. He was fully capable of normal intercourse once he had approached a woman and had cohabited successfully on several occasions. The first time was at the age of twenty-three in a dark hovel with a Mexican half-breed woman while on an engineering expedition in Arizona. Subsequently he had been successful as a rule only with prostitutes of the lowest order but once, at the age of twenty-seven, had been practically forced into sexual relationship by a young woman of approximately his own social level. All of these women commented approvingly upon the extreme size of his penis, though one prostitute, a frail girl, had refused in fear to cohabit with him when she saw his organ. The patient referred again and again to this single protestation to rationalize his psychic impotence, extending it to a sweeping generalization that no woman would ever willingly submit to him. Thus the strong, congenitally superior organ only late in life became invested with qualifications which Adler would attribute to an organic inferiority, but the neurotic symptoms were in reality due to infantile psychic impressions.

⁴ J. Marcinowski, 'Die erotischen Quellen der Minderwertigkeitsgefühle', *Zeitschrift für Sexualwissenschaft*, Bd. IV, Heft 12, 1918.

Since the patient's alcoholism constituted his most urgent and obvious symptom, he had been treated in many institutions for alcoholism and had undergone all of the better known cures, one or more times, without the slightest alleviation in the severity or frequency of the attacks. Only his extraordinary ingenuity in mechanical problems during the short sober intervals between his dipsomania, coupled with unusual services rendered his company before the neurosis absorbed so much of his energy, enabled him to retain his position.

Three diagnostic conversations convinced me that the psycho-neurotic condition considered as an entity depended upon a sexual mal-adjustment due to influences unconscious to the patient. The situation seemed amenable to psycho-analytic approach, although the reported experiences of American analysts had not indicated great hope for success in the analytic treatment of periodic alcoholism. As the patient, who resided in one of the mid-Western cities, lacked sufficient means to abandon his position and reside in New York for the length of time required for an analysis, I referred him to the only psychiatrist with analytic knowledge in his city. Merely by way of emphasis of the necessity in a case of this type of a thorough analysis, I may mention that his first analytic treatment failed to touch the unconscious sources of his resistance, and it seems likely that for this reason his compulsive alcoholism continued unaltered. Three years after his first visit to me, he succeeded in having himself transferred to the New York office of his company in order to undergo analysis.

The patient was a powerful, broad shouldered, sturdy, six-foot man. With the exception of a striking clubbing of the fingers—though without any demonstrable affection of the heart or lungs—his excessive consumption of alcohol had left no physical traces. When he began analysis he drank four to six glasses of whisky daily, in addition to the extra quantities he consumed during the periodic debauches. Therefore at the outset of the treatment I insisted that he ingest at least one pound of eating chocolate daily in order to replace the carbo-hydrates in the alcohol which I cut off immediately. Within a short time his alcoholic craving ceased, and he soon felt no compunctions in regard to women whom he knew to be available as professional prostitutes and with whom he copulated successfully. His diffidence in the presence of other women, however, persisted for a long time.

To establish the influence of the psychic impressions let us trace chronologically the important events which determined the psycho-sexual difficulties of the patient.

Born in a small city in one of the Pacific Coast states, he lost his mother at the age of two and a half, and had no recollection of her. He and his younger sister were raised by the paternal grandparents, especially the paternal grandmother, who exercised a strong influence over him. Although his father, also an engineer, remained away from home for months at a time, the patient feared him, though without adequate reason.

At the age of eight he attempted intercourse with his younger sister without any accompanying feelings of physical disability or moral scruple. A few months later he again repeated the act with his sister and with one of her little girl playmates. After this second occurrence, he experienced a strong sense of fear and guilt which was intensified by a narrow escape from discovery. Not long thereafter, his grandmother detected him 'showing bottoms', a game which he had been in the habit of playing with his sister and which consisted of his sister's sitting on a fenestrated cane bottom chair, while he crawled underneath and looked up. Although the punishment administered by the grandmother on this occasion was not unduly severe, the patient felt himself greatly humiliated. Shortly thereafter, and perhaps because of the affair, he was sent to a boarding school in the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains where he remained until sixteen.

Even before the first incestuous attempt with his sister at six, the patient had begun manual masturbation with an ever increasing sense of shame and culpability. Although up to the age of eight or nine he had resorted to the customary boyish subterfuges to avoid going to church, he then developed a religious fervor, said his prayers during the day without any bidding on the part of his elders, and attempted to follow Biblical precepts conscientiously. He concluded that the commandment concerning adultery prohibited every form of sex activity, and could not convince himself that intercourse might be permissible even in marriage. It seemed to him that 'some married women were too pure' ever to have indulged and must have conceived their children by some asexual means.

Whether or not we interpret the religious experience as a compensatory activity for the patient's fancied sexual transgressions, it is certain that this phase of reverence lasted only a few years.

Thereupon, he began to doubt the Divinity and when he came for treatment claimed to be an avowed agnostic. He traced the alteration of his faith in religion to the fact that he had been deprived of sexual relationship, an injustice with which he felt an impartial Supreme Being would not have inflicted him.

Another incident relating to his penis must in fairness be recorded, although I believe that its influence upon the development of the neurosis was slight. Already at the age of five years he had noticed the disproportionate size of his penis, but later he began to attribute the anomaly to masturbation, just as several patients have told me that they ascribed an actual or fancied diminutive organ to the same cause. His prepuce which adhered tightly to the large glans, became inflamed as a result of the manual irritation, and at the age of ten years, the family physician suggested a circumcision as a cure for the masturbation. At the time of the operation, the patient's father called the physician's attention to the large size of the organ, and the latter expressed the opinion that the circumcision would also prevent further abnormal growth. Four months after the circumcision his grandmother who entered the bath room while the boy was taking a bath, passed a remark to her husband, who was standing near by, if he didn't think 'they had spoiled it.' Some time later, while in swimming, one of the boys who noticed the circumcision, called him a Mexican Jew. These remarks were not without their effect upon the boy, who at times would weep in solitude 'because he had been cut.'

The physician's prophesy in regard to the effect of the circumcision proved fallacious, for the organ kept disproportionately large. Although in boarding school his fellow pupils frequently commented enviously on the size of his penis, this physical distinction did not tend to hearten him or even diminish his general feeling of shyness, due to a sense of guilt in connection with masturbation. At no time did the patient impute his sexual disability to the injury (circumcision) to his penis occurring in boyhood, but always to its congenital largeness. I may also mention that among his earliest impressions was the observation of the absence of a penis on his sister, and for a number of years he clung to the idea that it would appear as she grew older.

Between the age of twelve and fourteen he submitted in a passive homosexual rôle to a few of the older school boys. He continued masturbation actively, not only at school, but up to the time he came for treatment. His bashfulness in the presence of women did not

disappear as he grew older, but on the contrary he became more reticent in making advances to them, began to drink heavily, failed in his only semblance of a love affair at 27 and lapsed into a lonely existence. A great part of his leisure time was spent in following women on the street, but never mustering sufficient courage to actually approach any one of them.⁵

Among his many psychopathic symptoms, the patient suffered from occasional somnambulism. From an analytic standpoint, it is of interest that one of these sleep-walking episodes took place at the age of thirty, while on a visit at the home of his sister, who had married many years previously. While somnambulist he wandered into the bed-room of his sister and her husband and exposed himself, and on another occasion appeared on the sleeping porch of his sister and urinated before her. He had no recollection of either of these actualities until informed the following morning. The nature of both episodes can be plausibly explained by the theory that when censorship had been weakened in sleep, the incestuous longings of childhood repressed for years through the grandmother's rebuke, unconsciously came to a partial expression.⁶

So too, at 29, while either somnambulist or alcoholic—possibly in this instance alcohol stimulated somnambulism—he attempted fellatio with his room mate. He again remained entirely unconscious of his conduct until his room-mate informed him that 'he would have beaten him up,' had he not thought that the patient was drunk at the time he made the attempt. Undoubtedly on this occasion the alcohol acted as a narcotic which weakened his inhibitions to homo-

⁵ This symptom probably depended on the unconscious feeling that he would be disappointed if he did actually come in contact with a woman, and represented an endless chase to discover the infantile fancy—i. e. the woman with the penis.

⁶ An interpretation of somnambulist activity which harmonizes with the Freudian concept is found in Hardy's *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* (Preface written Nov. 1891). 'Under the influence of any strongly disturbing force Clare would occasionally walk in his sleep and even perform strange feats'.... While somnambulist he approached Tess whom he had denounced during the day and 'carried her across the room, murmuring, "My poor, poor Tess—my dearest, darling Tess. So sweet, so good, so true!"'...

'The words of endearment, withheld so severely in his waking hours, were inexpressibly sweet to her forlorn and hungry heart.'

sexuality as well as serving its usual purpose of affording him temporary relief from his conscious sexual difficulties.

Out of the many elements in this case, the most striking is that the neurotic symptoms should have been ascribed by the patient to his large penis. Certainly it was in no sense a defective or inferior organ nor in the slightest way actually incapacitating. The criticism might be made that the circumcision had had the effect of impressing the patient with the idea that his organ had been mutilated and had thereby become inferior, but it must be repeated that there existed for some years before the circumcision the typical elements which go to make up the feeling of inferiority, namely, early incestuous experiences and the sense of guilt in connection with masturbation so often intensified by unconscious incest desires. The homosexual components, and the passive homosexuality are perhaps due to an identification with his sister. The whole neurotic conflict, therefore, seems to have been psycho-genetic, displaced upon an anomaly which is generally considered an asset rather than a handicap. In an analogous manner often patients ascribe incommensurate virtues or attractiveness to various parts of their body with or without actual grounds. The gist of the matter seems to be that an organ quite independent of its inferiority or superiority, may be used as a displacement object to assume the burden of a psychic conflict.

As a result of analysis the patient gradually overcame his resistances which depended upon a homosexual fixation, and married. After marriage he consulted me because the size of his penis made penetration of his wife difficult. I referred her to a gynecologist who found her vagina of normal size, but subsequently the vagina was mechanically stretched with satisfactory results.

The patient had not been under my care for nearly two years but in view of this report I wrote to him and found that he had been transferred back to the Western works of his company. In his letter he states that his insomnia and terrifying dreams have disappeared, that he indulges in intercourse normally with his wife, but thinks that perhaps he does not enjoy quite so much pleasure in the act as the average man, which I think is due to a lingering unconscious homosexual component. He enjoys full mental vigor and has had four patents accepted by the Government Patent Bureau since his rehabilitation. As for alcohol, he has no craving, but takes a social drink now and then, (clandestinely of course) as is so customary among the good citizens of the land of universal prohibition.

A CASE OF AFFECTIVE INHIBITION OF AN INTELLECTUAL PROCESS¹


BY

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LONDON

A student of experimental psychology was engaged in trying to discover the nature of the intellectual processes involved in the performance of certain tests devised for the determination of mechanical ability, and for this purpose was applying some of the tests to another student, who was asked to give a full introspection of what he could detect passing through his mind while attempting to perform the tests. This latter student (the 'subject' of the experiment), though of little general mechanical ability or training, had performed several of the tests with reasonable success, but found great difficulty over the solution of the following simple problem, to which he at first gave an erroneous answer and which he was only able to solve correctly after much effort and after the lapse of a considerable period.

The Test



a is a wheel fixed to a smaller wheel *b* so that both must turn together. *c* is another wheel with a handle fixed to it. Wheels *b* and *c* have grooved rims over which a band is passed as shown, so that when *c* is turned the band turns *b* and this turns *a*. *Question*: What change would you make in the model so as to increase *a*'s speed when *c* is turned?

¹ I am indebted to Mr. J. W. Cox for permission to quote the following case, and to the student collaborating with him (who for

The introspection given by the subject immediately after the completion of the test was as follows:

'Had a vague conception of the general law of gearing referred to [in a previous introspection], with vague images of colour wheels and bicycles, which seemed to hamper me considerably. They occupied consciousness too exclusively and did not seem to leave room for thought on the subject. Then it appeared that the smaller c was, the quicker it would turn and, being in a state of considerable tension owing to my inability to formulate clearly the elements of the problem, I answered "Make c smaller," this being little more than a guess, though the answer gave considerable relief. Then I saw that I had implicitly assumed that any arrangement that made c turn fast would make b turn fast. I saw further that this had nothing to do with the problem. I endeavoured again to get clear as regards the general law. I was unable to see clearly the effect of c being smaller than b . After a time I imagined c to be much bigger than b ; whereupon I immediately saw a gigantic c turning slowly and majestically and b and a turning very rapidly, giving many revolutions to one of c . There were very pleasant images, motor and visual, of riding a bicycle with a very high gear; this giving a feeling of great power. Then for the first time I realised that the analogy with the bicycle had probably caused me a good deal of difficulty all through, because I had implicitly tended to regard the bigger wheel as the driving wheel, whereas in the drawing the driving wheel was c [the smaller wheel]. I think this had something to do with the inability to see the effect on b when c was driven, so long as I took c to be smaller.'

It is pretty clear from this introspection that the subject's thought was inhibited during the experiment, so that he was unable to devote his intellectual powers freely to the task in hand. As regards the cause of this inhibition, the introspection affords little light beyond indicating that thoughts connected with colour wheels and bicycles—especially the latter—were concerned ('vague images of colour wheels and bicycles, which seemed to hamper me considerably'... 'the analogy with the bicycle had probably caused me a good deal of difficulty all through'). It is not difficult on general grounds to account for the nature of these disturbing thoughts. Colour wheels and bicycles were the two kinds of apparatus in connection with obvious reasons desires to remain anonymous) for carrying out the analysis at my suggestion and for permission to use the material brought to light by the analysis.

which the subject had come across questions of gearing and were therefore very naturally associated with the problem involved in the test. The effect of re-arranging the belting on a colour wheel had also been called up as an association in a preceding test. The subject had, further, been recently contemplating the possibility of taking part in some experiments with colour wheels as a portion of his work in experimental psychology. As regards bicycles, the subject is an ardent cyclist and had cycled earlier in the day on which the experiment took place.

These considerations however do not seem to afford a fully satisfactory explanation of the occurrence or nature of the inhibition. It is not clear for instance why the ideas of bicycles or colour wheels should have produced a marked inhibition here and not in the immediately preceding tests, which were concerned with very similar problems. Nor does an explanation on purely cognitive lines account for the degree of feeling experienced by the subject, which as indicated by the introspection,² and as testified by the subject immediately afterwards, was very considerable, nor for the various qualities and distribution of this feeling ('considerable tension'... 'considerable relief'... 'very pleasant images'... 'feeling of great power'). As these facts appeared to indicate an affective origin of the inhibition, probably from a more or less unconscious source (since there seemed to be no immediately ascertainable conscious cause of the feeling in question), an analysis of the case was attempted shortly afterwards and gave the following results. The associations are here given approximately in the order of their occurrence, with a few words of explanation where necessary.

The subject thought first of the general significance attached by him to cycling; how he was distinctly better at cycling than at any other sport; that when cycling he enjoyed a sense of power and superiority that he seldom experienced at other times. Then he remembered that as a boy he had greatly admired and envied another boy, a year or two his senior, who was a great athlete and who among his other feats was in the habit of riding a bicycle with a very unusually high gear. He had been greatly struck with the speed with which this cycle could be ridden on the level and had himself—

² The introspective account of the feelings would doubtless have been richer, had not the subject been 'set' to give an account chiefly of the cognitive processes involved in the test.

in would-be imitation of the young athlete—bought a two speed bicycle with an unusually high top gear. When riding this bicycle he would lovingly contemplate the position of the little lever on the frame, which controlled the gears, and when he moved it into the position which corresponded to the top gear would murmur to himself 'This means speed!', and would sometimes playfully imagine that he was driving an express train. He had lately acquired a new two-speed bicycle, and had observed with regret that the positions of the levers did not correspond with those of this bicycle of his earlier years. As he thought of the lever on the earlier bicycle, its position when adjusted for the high gear reminded him of an erect penis. He had on one occasion had his bicycle stolen and still retained a painful memory of the shock that the theft had caused him, which at the time he had likened to a feeling of 'helpless impotence'—a feeling which now (during the analysis) spontaneously called up the idea of castration. He then recollected his general dislike of any unauthorised person touching, moving or interfering with his bicycle in any way, and remembered that on a previous occasion, while discussing this touchiness of his with a friend, the friend (also a student of psychology) had said 'Yes, a bicycle is to you a sort of improved human body', and had gone on to suggest that he (the subject) resented anything that threatened to interfere with his cycle because such athletic prowess as he possessed was chiefly connected with his cycle, his skill as a cyclist serving to protect him from the inferiority feelings that were aroused by his lack of athletic ability in other directions.

These associations make it very plain that the problem presented to the subject in the test had tended to arouse painful lines of thought connected with feelings of inferiority and the castration complex.

Further associations revealed that another (though closely connected) aspect of the subject's affective life was also involved—namely his sadism and the desire to assert his masculine superiority. The thought of the smaller wheel *c* moving the larger wheel *b* (and therefore the still larger one *a* also) and of making more revolutions than *b* in so doing, aroused in the subject thoughts not only of inefficiency and inferiority, but also of the operation being disagreeably laborious. He to some extent identified himself with *c* and felt considerable distress at being called upon to perform all the work for *b* and to move more rapidly than *b*. This called up memories of various sadistic ideas connected with work, and more

especially with work in pulling vehicles. He had at one time frequently enjoyed the phantasy of driving in a chariot drawn by women and had a few years ago been much interested in meeting with the description of a very similar phantasy (a coach drawn by ballet girls) in a Russian author. In early boyhood he had experienced considerable sexual excitement connected with ideas of horses pulling very heavy loads, of slaves rowing in a galley and of children pulling trucks in a coal mine. He had also been excited by the effigy of a horse that is sometimes affixed to the front of steam rollers, this arousing in him the idea of the horse pulling the heavy steam roller. This recalled a very early dream of a horse being compelled to draw a vehicle while moving backwards, a dream that had had an unmistakeably erotic tinge and that had exercised a powerful influence at the time (chiefly connected with the theme of 'moving backwards'—a set of ideas which it is unnecessary to follow here). This in turn recalled a more recent dream in which he had ridden a mare (which in an analysis carried out at the time he had interpreted as *mère*) and this again a very early and hazy memory of being carried round his nursery on his mother's back, she being on all fours and pretending to be a horse; a game which he dimly remembered to have given him immense pleasure. These memories he then connected with the fact that in adolescent life he much enjoyed the idea of women taking an active part in coitus and had indulged in phantasies in which coitus meant much hard work for the woman; the woman being 'ridden' by the man, who himself lay still and contented himself with issuing commands as to alteration of *tempo* etc. (phantasies in which he had found a means of reconciling his wish for masculine superiority with his—otherwise painfully felt—lack of athletic ability).

These associations reveal very clearly that the test problem was connected in his mind with a powerful series of sadistic ideas, and it is probably safe to infer that these ideas, though beneath the threshold of consciousness (until brought to light by the analysis), were to some extent instrumental in bringing about the inhibition from which the subject suffered when asked to solve the problem. In his introspection he tells us that he was 'unable to see clearly the effect of c being smaller than b '; no doubt because c being smaller than b tended to arouse painful ideas of impotence and inferiority. The 'considerable tension' of the earlier part of the experiment, in which he actually answered that in order to make b turn faster

c must be made smaller, probably corresponded to the emergence of his fears connected with this impotence and inferiority. In fact the subject subsequently described his condition at this time as being 'something like a mild anxiety attack'.³

In strong contrast to this distress is the marked pleasure experienced by the subject when he imagined c to be bigger and to be moving faster than b ; this pleasure corresponding to a negation of his fears concerning inferiority and a realisation of his sadistic wishes for masculine superiority etc. ('a gigantic c turning slowly and majestically' and a and b —representing the woman towards whom the sadistic impulses are directed [cp. the coitus fantasies described above]—giving many revolutions to one of c , i.e. working very hard).

Corresponding to this affective difference is the cognitive difference that, whereas the subject was unable to see that when c was smaller than b it would turn quicker than b , he was immediately able to obtain a vivid image of b moving more rapidly than c , as soon as he imagined c to be the bigger wheel. The affect associated with the relative size and speed was probably also connected with the confusion of the problem occasioned throughout the whole experiment by the fact that the subject 'had implicitly tended to regard the bigger wheel as the driving wheel', i.e. had been unwilling to admit his own inferiority as symbolised by a small driving wheel.

There is thus strong evidence that the inhibition of thought occurring in this experiment was in the last resort due to the circumstance that some of the deepest factors of the subject's personality (his castration complex, inferiority complex and sadism) had been aroused by the problem presented in the test.

The facts in this case bring out four further points of general interest.

³ It is only fair to point out that on our explanation it is perhaps rather paradoxical that the guesswork answer 'Make c smaller' should have given 'considerable relief'. It may be that this relief is connected with the emergence of masochistic ideas, of which—like all persons of sadistic tendency—the subject was also capable; these masochistic ideas making it possible to become reconciled to the thought of c being smaller, i.e. of the subject himself doing hard work, being inferior etc. It is more probable however that the relief was brought about by the mere fact of answering; *any* solution of the problem (independently of the actual nature of the answer) enabling the subject to turn away from the painful associated thoughts that threatened to arise.

They show: (1) that performance in mental tests—even when these tests are apparently of a purely intellectual character—*may* be considerably disturbed by emotional factors; (2) that the presence or absence of such emotional disturbance may depend upon very small differences in the test, as is shown by the fact that, although a marked disturbance was produced in the particular case we have been considering, no such disturbance—or at least only a very slight one—took place when the subject of the experiment was engaged on the very similar tasks that immediately preceded the present test; (3) that the emotional factors involved in such disturbance are not necessarily of a general or superficial nature, such as fear of doing badly in the test, fear of appearing foolish or general nervousness at the conditions, but: (4) may be related to very deep-lying tendencies, which can only be brought to light by analysis (or some other special procedure).⁴

⁴ The relative success of the analysis in the present case is probably connected with the fact that the student who acted as subject in the experiment had already been psycho-analysed and was thus pretty well acquainted with the general character of his chief complexes. In many other cases the detection of the underlying mechanisms might of course present considerably greater difficulty.

URETHRAL EROTISM AND OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS
PRELIMINARY COMMUNICATION

BY

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In the course of analyses of obsessional neurotics, it has struck me how frequently the presence of strongly-developed urethral symptoms can be proved. Besides this, all these patients show the sadistic component-instinct, and most of them also the anal-erotic, dominating the dispositional pregenital organisation.

In infantile obsessional neuroses, as also in those of juveniles and adults, one has to deal with persons who show that they have long suffered from, or are still occasionally troubled by, enuresis or have dreams accompanied by a flow of urine. A girl of eight was driven compulsively to urinate four or five times in succession, and would remain on the stool for over an hour, 'and couldn't get up, had to count up to eight, and got very mixed.' A sixteen-year-old girl with washing mania had wetted till her fourth year; at the age of nine the trouble recommenced during the daytime for six months and now again had reappeared and had continued for the past six months with constantly increasing severity. An obsessional neurotic of twenty-one, with pronounced washing mania, had suffered from bed-wetting till his thirteenth year. Further examples could be cited.

Anal-erotism and urethral erotism both belong undoubtedly to the same period of development; they are both equally to be found in pervers in connection with sadism. For example, a sadist addicted to obsessive brooding had the following masturbation-phantasy: He punishes men and women sadistically by defaecating on them or flooding them with his urine. In his masochistic phantasies he himself must submit to be covered with men's excrement, or must lick their anal region; he must let females urinate in his face, or is forced to perform cunnilingus.

Correction of the bed-wetter gives rise to anger, and to stern punishment by those in authority, also to defiance on the part of the child, exactly as with the process of education in regard to defaecation.

We do not know of the existence of a urethral character as we do of an anal one, but two traits¹ can be empirically deduced in persons who were formerly urethral erotics. They are a 'burning' ambition and the predilection for playing and working with water. Intellectual ambition particularly is often strongly developed in obsessional neurotics, not without connection perhaps with the 'omnipotence of thought'. Excessive bathing and washing seems to be in a close relation with urethral erotism (urine = water).

Statistics prove the strong development of urethral erotism in obsessional patients; the complete unfolding of the problem is a matter of further analyses. Attention should be directed specially to whether urethral erotism is to be regarded as belonging to the disposition, or whether it plays an analogous or at least complementary rôle to the anal erotism.

Let it be added that the occurrence of enuresis as sexual gratification in the course of an obsessional neurosis must occasionally be understood also as a sign of the decay of the sexual organisation, and thus as an early sign of dementia praecox.

¹ cp. Sadger: 'Über Urethralerotik'. *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse*, 1910, Bd. II, S. 409.

ANXIETY AND BIRTH

BY

ERNEST JONES

LONDON

One of Freud's statements that has met with the greatest incredulity, and even ridicule, is his suggestion that the distressing experiences passed through by the infant during the act of birth serve as a prototype for all subsequent experiences of fear, so that in a sense it may be said that every attack of fear involves a partial repetition of that great initial experience.

It is therefore interesting to observe that this suggestion of Freud's was, to some extent, anticipated in the eighteenth century by Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles Darwin. In his *Zoonomia*, published in 1794, Vol. I, p. 148, he expresses himself as follows:¹ 'As soon as the young animal is born, the first important sensations that occur to him are occasioned by the oppression about his precordia for want of respiration, and by his sudden transition from ninety-eight degrees of heat into so cold a climate. He trembles, that is he exerts alternately all the muscles of his body, to enfranchise himself from the oppression about his bosom, and begins to breathe with frequent and short respirations; at the same time the cold contracts his red skin, gradually turning it pale; the contents of the bladder and of the bowels are evacuated; and from the experience of these first disagreeable sensations the passion of fear is excited, which is no other than the expectations of disagreeable sensations. This early association of motions and sensations persists throughout life; the passion of fear produces a cold and pale skin, with tremblings, quick respiration, and an evacuation of the bladder and bowels, and thus *constitutes the natural or universal language of this passion.*'²

¹ I am indebted to Dr. Millais Culpin for directing my attention to this passage.

² Not italicised in the original.

A SLIP OF THE TONGUE

BY

DOUGLAS BRYAN

LONDON

A patient said to me during analysis 'I have always been afraid that I might have a cancer or a duodenal *ulster*'. I drew his attention to the word *ulster* which he had not noticed and he then of course corrected it to *ulcer*, remarking that it was just a slip of the tongue.

The patient is a medical man and an Irishman. He is not altogether in sympathy with the Sinn Feiners but is a Redmondite, i. e. an ardent Home Ruler. He is very well versed in Irish history and the Irish question.

He is sexually impotent with women. He is not consciously homosexual. He masturbates by stimulating his breasts, rarely by direct manipulation of the penis. The breast stimulation produces erection and emission, the pleasure of which is greatly enhanced if he compresses his penis between his thighs. Masturbation causes him great remorse, depression and weak feelings.

Ireland is symbolic of the patient's mother. Ireland has always been represented by a female figure and spoken of by Irishmen in feminine terms. The patient also identifies himself with Ireland, therefore with his mother.

Ulster has always been the disturbing factor as far as Ireland is concerned; its 'thorn in the flesh' so to speak. Ulster has always been antagonistic to Home Rule and thwarted it. It is joined to Ireland and in a way inseparable from it, yet it holds the whip hand. It acts forcibly towards Ireland. It can be said to be a sort of cancer in Ireland, eating into it. Ulster is symbolic of the patient's father. He feels resentment against Ulster, i. e. his father.

We see in this slip of the tongue an expression of two attitudes, the Oedipus and a homosexual one. The Oedipus complex is shown in his fear and resentment against the father = Ulster = duodenal

ulcer (ulster) which eats into Ireland (the mother) i.e. sexual intercourse. The homosexual attitude is that the father = Ulster = duodenal ulcer (ulster) enters into the patient's bowels (anal coitus).

AN INTERESTING ANALYTICAL HOUR

BY

ADOLPH STERN

NEW YORK

That much in the way of gathering up loose ends towards the close of an analysis usually takes place as the termination of a great deal of preliminary work, and that much of this summing up may occur in a relatively short space of time, is something that has happened to all analysts. The following report is an instance of this kind, and may be deserving of mention on account of the large amount of material that became crystallized, and the short space of time, one hour, in which it took place. It might also be stated that an important factor in the process was the fact that for a few days before this gathering up of loose ends took place, the patient knew that the treatment was to end in three weeks, owing to external circumstances, even though the patient was not completely cured at the time the decision had to be made, and I could not be at all certain that the most important elements in the neurosis would be cleared up before the final session.

Though at the risk of not giving a clear picture of the entire neurosis, but with the object of limiting this report in so far as it is possible to the interesting results of the one hour of analysis, and adding extra material only where necessary, I shall begin with the communications made by the patient at the beginning of the hour. These consisted of the report of two dreams. One was that I stood at the book-case containing my magazines, and that I asked the patient whether I had ever given him any of the magazines, to which he replied 'no'. The other dream was a very vague one, in which there was the question of changing or exchanging one thing for another, a window, or something for a window.

The patient began the associations to the first dream by stating that in the first dream there was the thought that in the magazine that he expected me to give him, he expected to find valuable psycho-analytical material, some of which I might have written.

The patient then passed to the second dream, and stated that this dream could be interpreted as an indecision between the homosexual and the heterosexual, in that window represented an opening, and could symbolize the vaginal orifice.

At this point the patient left the associations to the dreams, and began to complain that he saw nothing in the way of a cure ahead, that after spending a great deal of time with the treatment, he was no better off than at the beginning; adding that it seemed to be his misfortune always to associate himself with men who disappointed him in the end, who left him at a time when he most needed help.¹ The patient was becoming increasingly angry, and stated, as if in the nature of a resolution, that he would henceforth no longer repress his homosexual impulses, but allow them full expression. I at this point asked him to explain what he meant, and he stated that by free expression he meant that he would, on any occasion, when a homosexual impulse came to him, allow it to become fully conscious, and indulge in the wish, for now the homosexual no longer appeared to him as something disgraceful. It seemed to me that the patient was giving 'full expression' to revengeful impulses, and threatening the destruction of the fruits of the treatment, because of the termination of the treatment, at the same time revenging himself on me by threatening to indulge in homosexuality. It was at this point that I could once again, and with clarifying results, indicate to the patient the negative phase of the transference, and at the same time point out the most immediate source of the persisting homosexuality, namely the transference. The patient also brought to the fore, in his complaint that it was his fate always to meet with disappointment in his association with men, his great disappointment in the loss of the

¹ It appears that the patient was really unsuccessful in retaining friendships with men in a satisfactory manner for a long period of time. In some instances he terminated the friendship himself because he thought that the friends were losing interest in him or not giving him sufficient attention; or in some of the closer friendships, quarrels and disputes arose, in which the patient feels that he was unjustly accused of insincerity and hypocrisy. Whatever the cause, the result was usually the same, namely the termination of the friendship, with a feeling on the part of the patient that his friends left him in the lurch at a time when he needed them most. In this respect the present analytical situation is identified with many past experiences.

love of his father, which he had been attempting² so unsuccessfully to replace.

For the next few moments, the patient returned to enumerating, in a complaining voice, the symptoms which had been and still were giving him great discomfort; namely a peculiar sensitiveness at the top of his head, in the region of the anterior fontanelle, and a feeling of tiredness and weakness in both legs, so that on account of the latter symptom he was hardly able to walk, and felt like crumpling up in a heap. In reference to the former symptom, that at the top of his head, it occurred to him that when as a young boy it was his duty, and at times pleasure, to take care of and act as nurse to his younger brothers and sisters, he was warned by his parents to be careful not to touch or handle the top of the head in the region of the anterior fontanelle, because of the softness of the area and the danger to the child's brain from pressure in that region. As the patient recalled these warnings by the father, especially, his fingers wandered uncertainly over the top of his skull, and finally ended their search very definitely in the region of the anterior fontanelle. The patient suddenly reverted to the weak and tired and painful feelings in his legs, stating they felt so weak, that he could walk with difficulty only. I suggested to him at this point his apparent identification with an infant. The patient readily accepted the interpretation, and suddenly added that what he had phantasied on former occasions during the analysis, now again occurred to him, namely to take the analyst's penis in

² The matter of the homoerotic component of the sexual life of the patient was often alluded to in the dreams and associations to them, but with only moderate success, in that little became consciously accepted by the patient. As far as the patient knew, the father played a very minor rôle in the former's life, the mother having, from necessity assumed the position of the head of the house early in the history of the family. To his mother the patient had always been strongly attached, indicating the nature of this attachment even before he came for analysis by the occurrence of incestuous dreams, in which the mother was the love object. His feminine attitude to men in general, as seen in his dreams, indicated however the nature of the homoerotic libido. The important part played by the father and grandfather became apparent to the patient in the course of the analysis, and with increasing clarity in the few hours' work that was done following that detailed in the above report.

his mouth, and that he wished the analyst to look after him, as if he were a child; at this point he asked, 'Why should I want a man to look after me?', adding immediately, 'Because I took care of the children, just as if I had been their mother, and now I want someone to look after me the same way'. To the phantasy of taking a penis in his mouth, I suggested to the patient that if the penis were to symbolize a nipple, the picture of an infant would be complete; namely, the soft fontanelle, inability to walk, nursing and being taken care of. To this the patient replied in a jocular vein that what he now needed was to be reborn and to learn once again how to walk, and then he could grow up and be a man. However, as the patient realized almost as soon as he made the above remarks, such wishes had already been expressed in many dreams and symptomatically, and provision made to carry them out in a symptomatic way. The patient was intensely fond of the water, and an enthusiastic swimmer. He had had many dreams of saving people from the water, of diving into water, and of being himself rescued from the water. Many other dreams of rebirth had been analysed and their interpretation accepted by the patient. At this time he interpreted as a rebirth wish the following pleasantly anticipated experience. The patient had expected to spend the summer in the country, at a place situated on a river, so that he could go bathing daily. He had decided not to take any analysis during this period, even before he knew that the analysis was to be permanently terminated before he left for the country. It was with regret that he contemplated what he at first thought was to be a temporary stopping of the analysis, to be resumed in the fall. In order to compensate for this interruption, for the great sense of comfort and pleasure he was in the main in the habit of obtaining from the analytical sessions, he pictured to himself the invigorating and pleasant effect of a morning plunge, after which he would feel 'reborn'.³ Another pleasant phantasy to help along for his very tired feeling and weakness in the legs, was that a friend, who owned an automobile, was to spend the summer with the patient; and with this friend, in the automobile, he would ride around the country, obviating the necessity of walking. At this remark the

³ After the patient learned that the treatment was shortly to be permanently discontinued, he looked forward with even greater expectation to these invigorating baths, to compensate, together with the drives in the company of his friend, for his separation from me.

patient laughed and stated that going driving with this friend was very much like being taken out in a baby carriage, as he had been accustomed years ago to take the little ones out for a 'ride'. Following these associations the patient referred again to the penis phantasy, stating that it was often his habit to sit of an afternoon in a rocker, slowly rocking himself to sleep, with his thumb in his mouth. There were then added to this, associations to symptoms which had been frequently discussed in the course of the analysis, namely a peculiar unpleasant taste in the mouth, digestive disturbances, and anxiety at times in connection with eating especially in restaurants. In conclusion the patient then took up the first dream, and to it associated his very strong curiosity to look into the books of learning from which his father and grandfather read, and which the patient thought contained highly desirable knowledge. These books were all on religion. From his fifteenth year on, the patient turned from the religion of his parents, and made it a point to read agnostic and atheistic literature in order that he may the more readily and successfully argue against his father along religious lines. In this connection the patient stated that in reference to the analyst the attitude had been the same; namely, a strong curiosity to read psycho-analytical literature. Though I had advised the patient to postpone the reading of such material until the termination of his treatment he had obtained without telling me of it, a copy of Prof. Freud's *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, and read several chapters before letting me know that he had disregarded my advice. He first gave me a hint of this on an occasion when he pointed out to me what he considered my not giving him sufficient consideration for his capacity to understand things, stating he had read in the book things I had not told him about, and which he understood very well, now that he had read about them. As a matter of fact these matters had been gone over repeatedly before. On another occasion the patient indicated to me instances where he thought that what I had said in reference to material discussed in the course of the analysis differed from that which Prof. Freud said in regard to the same material. As a matter of fact there was no difference of opinion; the patient wanted to prove me in the wrong.

L'AUTOMOBILE—SYMBOLE DE LA PUISSANCE MÂLE

BY

S. SPIELREIN

GENEVA

Je veux vous signaler un rêve qui prouve une fois de plus l'évidence du symbole de l'automobile pris pour désigner la puissance mâle. Une jeune femme rêve deux nuits de suite qu'elle doit guider une auto vide à travers les rues les plus étroites et les plus montantes de Genève. Elle marche à côté de l'automobile et dans les descents elle doit la retenir d'un mouvement d'épaule, comme font les hommes, qui descendent une rue avec une charette à bras. La première nuit, le travail est très difficile, elle craint toujours qu'à des tournants dangereux l'auto n'aille se jeter contre le mur, mais elle arrive tout de même à son but. La nuit suivante, elle a la sensation de reconnaître les impasses difficiles de la ville et elle guide avec plus d'assurance, sûre d'arriver où elle veut arriver et éviter le danger qu'elle craint.

Cette jeune femme, (38 ans) n'a jamais pu, malgré les multiples occasions qu'elle a eues, se marier ou se donner à un homme. Au moment du rêve cité, elle vient de rencontrer un homme qui lui plaît beaucoup et qui la désire. Elle ne veut pas se donner à lui et a toutes les peines du monde à maintenir la relation au nouveau d'intimité intellectuelle et morale qu'elle ne veut pas dépasser. Sa lutte s'est symbolisé dans le rêve comme une lutte avec une automobile qu'elle veut conduire là où elle le veut. L'ami en question, ayant perdu sa fortune, avait tâché de trouver une situation comme chauffeur.

L. M.

La petite communication de Madame L. M. est bien intéressante. Sans doute, l'automobile est un image ('symbole') de la puissance mâle. Pourtant une question reste encore à résoudre: la jeune femme veut-elle guider cette 'automobile' dans le rêve dans le même sens qu'en réalité? Veut-elle aussi dans son rêve éviter les rapports sexuels? Nos expériences nous ont bien des fois montré que les désirs du rêve sont en majorité des cas opposés aux désirs de la veille. La jeune femme craint dans son rêve que l'auto pourrait se heurter à un mur. Si l'auto est la puissance mâle—le mur serait un obstacle, qui s'opposerait à cette puissance, c'est à dire un obstacle, qui la fait craindre les rapports, désirés par l'inconscient. Dans son rêve elle arrive à triompher de cet obstacle, peut par conséquent être unie à l'homme qu'elle aime.

RÊVE ET VISION DES ÉTOILES FILANTES

PAR

S. SPIELREIN

GENEVA

Ces deux observations sont intéressantes par leur structure commune; les deux cas appartiennent aux sujets de nationalité différente; une des jeunes filles est bienportante, l'autre est une schizophrène. Malgré cela nous avons dans les deux cas l'image de la pluie d'or devant et en arrière l'image du désir personnel; dans le rêve c'est un plaquat au ciel portant en grandes lettres le mot 'amour', dans la vision c'est le bien-aimé lui-même.

1. Rêve des Étoiles filantes

Mlle. N. bien portante, raconte dans une petite société le rêve qui suit:

'J'étais près de la fenêtre de ma chambre; la fenêtre était fermée, il y avait beaucoup d'étoiles; je regardais comme-ça; tout à coup je vois beaucoup d'étoiles filantes. Je trouvais que c'était magnifique, ça ne voulait plus finir, ça continuait toujours. J'admirais toujours. Tout à coup je voyais que ce n'étaient pas des étoiles filantes, que c'était de la pluie, l'eau de la pluie qui coulait de l'autre côté de la fenêtre, la bise qui l'a jeté de l'autre côté de la fenêtre. C'était comme le reflet de la lumière des étoiles, un mouvement continu, l'eau qui coulait, des petits ruisseaux d'or, des fils d'or, quand-même pas des fils, c'était un mouvement coulant, pas une ligne'.

En se reveillant elle était étonnée. La contradiction que les étoiles et l'eau, la pluie, existaient en même temps dans le rêve l'a frappé. Quand elle a découvert que c'était rien du tout, 'rien que de l'eau' elle était déçue, mais elle se consolait que c'était quand-même très beau. On doit toujours désirer quelque chose quand une étoile file; c'était toujours trop tard pour elle. Cette fois elle se dit dans son rêve: 'Si tu est trop tard pour celle — la (étoile) — ça sera pour une autre'.

Analyse (Quelques jours après.)

Les étoiles filantes lui ramènent à l'esprit un souvenir d'enfance: elle se promenait avec sa tante, quand subitement une étoile tomba; c'est allé si vite qu'elle n'a pas eu le temps à se désirer quelque chose; puis un second étoile tomba; une million d'étoiles. La tante lui observa qu'elle a dû se désirer quelque-chose, sur quoi elle répondit qu'elle l'avait déjà fait en elle-même. 'Que j'étais bête alors', me dit-elle, 'cette fois j'aurais désiré toute autre chose'. — 'Qu'est ce que vous auriez désiré?' — 'Un grand amour'. Après cela elle m'avoue qu'elle n'a pas voulu dire tout son rêve devant tout le monde. Elle nous a caché ceci; sur un placard au ciel elle a vu écrit avec des lettres immenses le mot 'amour'; c'était des lettres rondes, noires, sur un fond rouge. 'Maintenant je pense à un plat; (Sorte de pouding brun, qu'on vend en poudre) je pense à la fabrique qui le fait; les lettres étaient rondes comme sur les enveloppes de ce pouding; je vois les ruisseaux d'or; je pense à une promenade du hier (après le rêve) nous étions dans un restaurant, on a bu le thé; il y avait une réclame avec une étoile-comète, qui a eu une queue, comme les ruisseaux d'or dans mon rêve'. 'On m'a dit qu'une fois, après avoir reçu un coup sur la tête, j'ai vu des étoiles. Étant enfant j'aimais beaucoup les bougies merveilleuses au sapin à Noël; une fois je m'y suis brûlée. Dans mon rêve j'ai vu aussi toute une pluie; un feu d'artific; c'est merveilleux, mais ça passe si vite! On dépense l'argent pour rien!

'J'aimerais avoir un grand amour, un amour immense; j'ai tellement peur que cela n'arrivera jamais'.

Le ruisseau d'or la fait penser à l'argent. 'Bonté Divine!', s'étonne-t-elle, 'je ne pense jamais à l'argent, c'est à dire je suis contente de pouvoir faire mes études, mais l'argent ne joue aucun rôle pour moi. Je pense à l'or, à Madame Holle et la pluie d'or; un sapin désirait avoir les feuilles d'or. Je pense à une triste histoire, arrivée ces jours à une jeune fille. Cette jeune fille cherchait comme moi toujours un idéal. Elle aimait un jeune homme et luttait avec ce sentiment; elle a cru de l'avoir vaincu. Maintenant ce jeune homme vient la demander en mariage. Pourtant il n'aime pas la jeune fille, il pense à l'argent. La pauvre, par contre, l'aime beaucoup, elle est très déçue'.

Mlle. N. est aussi très déçue. S'il lui arrivait une fois la même chose? Ces jours elle pense tout le temps à cette jeune fille. Mlle. N. n'a jamais fait une expérience aussi 'dégoutante'. Elle m'avoue

d'être 'amoureuse' d'un jeune homme pour la première fois. Elle doit partir ces jours, elle saura vaincre cet amour, mais elle se sent transformée depuis ce moment, elle sent qu'un nouveau élément, inconnu jusqu'à présent s'est glissé dans son âme avec lequel elle aura constamment à lutter. On lui a proposé une bonne place à R. Son chef-futur est très riche (pluie d'or, ruisseau d'or dans son rêve et les associations d'argent); mais on le dit très peu sympathique ('on l'a peint tout en noir' comme elle s'exprime). Il doit être paresseux, avare, malgré qu'il soit riche, il aimerait beaucoup le pudding. 'Avec cela je me suis dit qu'au fond il serait peut-être meilleur, qu'on ne le présente. Il aime le pudding, c'est comme moi'.

Je crois que le rêve est compréhensible sans explications: La jeune fille cherche un paradis sur terre, un ciel d'amour, quelque chose d'immense et pure. En même temps elle doute, si cela existe. La triste histoire de son amie contribue à rendre ce sentiment de doute plus intense. Elle même a connu ce dernier temps les tourments d'amour. Elle se sauve, en gardant au fond de son âme un désir secret, inconnu par elle-même, de trouver cet amour idéalisé dans la personne de son chef-futur. Les lettres du placard sont noir — on l'a peint en noire, mais il est bon au fond — le fond est rouge (= couleur de la passion); les lettres sont rondes comme sur l'enveloppe du pudding — il aime le pudding, comme elle aussi. Il y a encore des impressions des derniers jours qui ont leur part dans la formation de l'image du placard. Ces lettres noires la font penser à une affiche de la comédie, ça serait une représentation... ici elle hésite 'La dame de chez Maxime'. L'affiche de cette pièce elle confond avec une autre, qui était en lettres noires sur un fond rouge. Il a un trait commun à ces deux affiches, c'est qu'ils annoncent les deux une pièce d'un caractère un peu léger 'peu convenable'. L'idée du 'ciel sur terre', le doute ('un faux éclat qui passe si vite'), l'image du chef, qui est très riche (= or), évoquent l'image des étoiles filantes dans le rêve; il y a une raison de plus s'appuyant sur la croyance populaire qu'une étoile filante pourrait porter bonheur. Les images des étoiles jouent un grand rôle chez Mme. N. depuis son enfance. Comme l'association libre nous montre ils se transforment en images de la pluie d'or. Les deux contes 'Mme. Holle' et 'le petit sapin' sont connus: Mme. Holle récompense la belle et bonne jeune fille en faisant tomber sur elle une pluie d'or: cette pluie la rend encore plus belle, la rend riche et lui

amène pour finir un beau prince. Elle a entendu ce conte entre 4—5 ans, l'a voulu toujours avoir répété. Le conte du petit sapin l'a encore plus impressionné: Le petit sapin n'était pas content de ses piquants; il a voulu avoir des feuilles en verre; aussitôt son désir accompli — les feuilles étaient cassées par le vent; après cela il se désirait des feuilles en or — les enfants lui ont arraché cette parure; son troisième changement était aussi malheureux que les deux premiers: les belles feuilles vertes, qu'il a eues cette fois étaient mangées par des bêtes. Alors il était tout heureux d'avoir de nouveau ces anciens piquants.

On pourrait croire que le rêve exprime une idée d'ordre moral, puisque ces contes contribuent à la formation de ces images. L'observation objective ne justifie pas cette supposition; tout le long du rêve nous ne voyons que l'entrecroisement du désir et de son négatif, du doute; le désir arrive à être vainqueur: le placard au ciel — est l'image du désir accompli. Même les étoiles filantes, qui donnent lieu à tant d'associations de doute procurent en fin du compte une grande jouissance à la rêveuse: le grand amour ce n'est qu'un feu d'artifice; ça passe si vite. Elle découvre 'que c'était rien du tout, de l'eau', en même temps elle sent que c'était malgré tout 'très beau'.

2. *Vision des Étoiles Filantes*

Une malade (Schizophrène) a lu quelque part dans la Bible qu'au moment du dernier jugement il y aura une pluie d'étoiles filantes qui tomberont sur la terre et détruiront le monde. Dans son délir, par un jour de pluie, il lui semblait que c'était une pluie d'étoiles filantes; en arrière marchaient des anges, habillés en bleu; ils introduisaient à la malade un Mr. K. dont elle était amoureuse. Elle voyait tout ça par la fenêtre de sa cellule.

La malade me dit d'elle-même: 'Oui alors, dans mon délire la pluie d'étoiles filantes signifiait tout autre chose que dans la Bible! C'était au contraire une telle jouissance! Une telle force! Une excitation des sens. Je repasse par la même état, quand j'y pense!'

En même temps elle sentait une chaleur agréable.

Donc ici, comme dans le rêve précédent, le symbol de la pluie d'étoiles est devenu l'image du désir personnel, qui, disait-on, doit être préparé ou introduit, mis en valeur, en même temps que caché peut-être, par le moyen de ce symbol.

SLIPS OF THE TONGUE IN THE NORSE SAGAS

BY

CLARENCE A. SEYLER

SWANSEA

1. Two cases of errors in speech are recorded in the Orkneyinga Saga (*Icelandic Sagas*, Vol. III, Rolls Series 34). I quote from Sir G. W. Dasent's translation. In the Earl's Saga, it is related that Earl Rögnvald had fallen out with his kinsman Earl Thorfinn, and the two erstwhile friends made bitter warfare on each other. Rögnvald has burnt Thorfinn's house over his head, and Thorfinn escaped unknown. 'No man thought anything else but that Earl Thorfinn had lost his life there', says the Saga. However as his body was not found it is evident that Rögnvald must have been haunted by the repressed dread that his enemy was still alive. The Saga then continues 'Earl Rögnvald sat in Kirkwall and drew thither the stores he needed to have for his winter quarters. He had a great band of men and much good cheer. But a little before Yule, Earl Rögnvald fared with a great following into the little Papey to fetch malt to be brewed for Yule. And at even as they were on the isle they sate long over a roasting fire, and he who made up the fire said that the firewood began to fall short. *Then the Earl made a slip of the tongue*, and these were the words he spoke 'Then are we full old when these (fires) are burnt out'. But *he meant to have spoken that they would then be full warmed*, and as soon as ever he found it out he said 'I have not made a slip of the tongue before this, so that I call it to mind. It comes into my mind what King Olaf my foster-father said at Sticklestead when I took him up for a slip of the tongue: If ever it happens that I made a slip of the tongue I might make up my mind that I should then have but a short time unlived. *Maybe that my Kinsman Thorfinn is still alive*'.

Then Thorfinn suddenly appears and sets fire to the house, Rögnvald escapes but is pursued and slain.

2. Reference to the Icelandic original might be expected to throw light upon the word associations that contributed to the slip. The actual words are 'Tha maelti jarl mis-maeli, ok tók til orða Tha eru vér full-gamlir, er thessir (eldir) eru *brunnir*. En hann vildi that maelti hafa, at tha vaeri their full-bakathir'.

The Norsemen used at the end of the day to 'bake' themselves in front of a roaring fire, and rub themselves down when a bath could not be obtained. The King intended to say that if the fire-wood became exhausted, seeing that it was difficult to obtain, 'Then we shall be quite old before we are quite *baked*'. The words probably had something of the humorous turn which they have in modern English. Instead of this he said 'Then we shall be quite old before these (fires) are quite *burnt*'. The Freudian explanation of the mistake is clear. In the Earl's mind was the unconscious fear that his kinsman was not dead and that the fires of his own life were perhaps well nigh burnt out. He immediately recalls a similar slip on the part of his foster father King Olaf and his last words are 'Perhaps my kinsman Thorfinn is yet alive'.

3. The slip that King Olaf made is related in the Flatey book, Col 490 (loc. cit. p. 339) and is even more instructive. Just before the battle of Sticklestead A. D. 1030, King Olaf is watching the gathering of his enemies the Norwegian freeman (bondir). 'Where they were standing there were *berries* on a mound. The King takes them and squeezes them in his palm. Then the King saw the banner of the freeman was set up. Then he spoke and said '*Miserable berries*' quoth he. Rögnvald Brusi's son answers 'You made a slip of the tongue just now, King, you must have meant to say "people"'. 'Thou sayest right, Earl', quoth the King 'Thou wilt not make a less slip of the tongue when thou hast but a short time to live'.

4. The Icelandic original is richer in word-associations than in the first case.

Thar er their vóru stoddir ber a einni thufu. Konungr takr berjum, ok *rennir* i *lófa* ser. Tha sa Konungr, hvar upp vóru sett merki *bonda*. Hann maelti tha '*Vesöl ber*', kvath hann. Rögnvaldr Brusa son svarar 'Mis-maeli varth ther nu, Konungr. '*Lith* mundir thu nefna vilja'. 'Rett sigir thu, jearl' kvath konungr 'Eigi muntu minna mis-maeli maela tha er thu att skamt *olifat*'.

5. In the first place we have here a very typical Freudian symptomatic action. The King is watching the assembly of the

stubborn freemen (*bondir*) whom he has so often striven to crush. Where he stands the mound is covered with berries (*ber*). He takes some and squeezes them in his hand. The word used is *renna*, which means to make run, and is applicable alike to the juice of the berries, to the blood from a wound or to the flight of his foes.

Even so would he crush his enemies and put them to flight.

6. But King Olaf was nervous of the issue of the fight. He knew well the numbers and stubborn spirit of the *bondir*. His irritation betrays his nervousness. When he saw the standard raised he meant to say 'Miserable crew'. The word he wished to say is *lith*. But a number of associations, many of which we can trace, rush into his mind. The first of these must certainly have been *lif*, life, and *lifa*, to live. This is shown by the irritable way he turns upon Rögnvald when corrected and says 'When you have only a short time to *live* you will make no less a mistake'. Other associations with the lapsed word *lith* can easily be found. The verb *litha* from which *lith* is derived means to go and also to pass away; *lifa* means to live or to be left, *lik* means body or corpse, *liggja* to lie or lie dead. Further the word *lif* suggests *lófi*, the word actually used for the hand in which the King squeezes the berries. His enemies were the *bondir*, that is *buandir*, from *bua* to dwell, live. (Compare also the phrase *bua um lik*, to prepare a body for burial.) The word alliterates with *ber*, berry or berries (it is used both in the plural and singular sense) (an associative link may be the word *berja* to strike). The suppressed thought was 'Perhaps this miserable crew (*lith*) of *bondir* will cause me to lose my life (*lif*) and be crushed as I now squeeze these berries (*ber*) in my hand (*lófi*). It is easy to see how the king instead of saying "Miserable crew" said "Miserable berries"'.

7. It is interesting to note both the characteristic irritation at being corrected and the superstitious dread which is shewn of a slip of the tongue. The latter has its origin in a dim perception of an infirmity of purpose which may well be a factor in disaster. It should be remembered too, that the actors in these sagas had only recently become Christianized. Rögnvald was fighting his own kinsman and shows by his words that he had a repressed sense of the evil of his deeds. Olaf, though he was soon to be regarded as a martyr and a saint had all the old heathen barbarity and had been a bitterly hard master to the Norwegian freemen. He must often

have experienced a conflict between his instincts and the religion of peace. In the words of Freud (*Psychopathology of Everyday Life* transl. by Brill p. 311) 'The greater part of superstition signifies fear of impending evil, and he who has frequently wished evil to others, but because of a good up-bringing has repressed the same, will be particularly apt to expect punishment for such unconscious evil in the form of a misfortune threatening him from without'.

These beautiful examples are a great tribute to the freshness and first-hand observation in the Norse sagas. No book-learned clerk of that age could have invented these intimate psychological details. It matters not if they are rightly told of the characters to whom they are attributed. They come straight from the heart of the old sea-rover. Thanks to the key which Freud has put into our hands we can unlock their secrets as easily as those of the words which the Norseman inscribed upon the runic stones he raised.

ABSTRACTS

General

J. F. W. Meagher. Psychoanalysis and its Critics. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1922, Vol. IX, p. 324.

A warm defence of psycho-analysis, with an amusing account of many of the less-informed criticisms of it. The author is optimistic in saying that, although psycho-analysis had a hard time in its early stages, since 1907 it has come to be accepted by a majority of the best psychopathologists. Nor do we think it scientific to appeal to the majority argument, as in the following statement: 'One of the most convincing arguments that can be advanced in favor of psycho-analysis is that practically all the best known psychopathologists believe in it. [Then follows a list of names.] No student can go wrong in following these men'.

The author has nothing good to say for lay analysts. 'Of course, for a lay person to attempt analysis is an absurdity and an abomination. They do a great deal of harm. A medical and psychiatric training is an essential prerequisite'.

E. J.

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W. H. R. Rivers, A. G. Tansley, Alexander F. Shand, T. H. Pear, Bernard Hart and C. S. Myers. Symposium on the Relations of Complex and Sentiment, *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, 1922, Vol. XIII, p. 107.

Rivers starts by pointing out that the term 'Complex', though at first used by Jung without any precise definition, soon came to denote 'a system which has become or tends to become separated from the rest of the mental structure or personality and by its domination of the mind has destroyed or tends to destroy the unity which is essential to mental health'. The meaning of the term was extended by Hart to denote any emotionally toned system of ideas which determines conscious behaviour, the hobby and political bias being taken as examples. In this broad sense it becomes almost if not quite identical with the sentiment of recent British psychology. A sentiment may be defined as an organized system of emotional tendencies grouped about an object. Rivers suggests

'that we can give to the terms "complex" and "sentiment" their greatest value in psychology and psycho-pathology if we make suppression the keynote of the complex while fusion forms the essence of the process upon which depends the formation of a sentiment'; the concepts of 'suppression' and 'fusion' being used as in the author's book on *Instinct and the Unconscious*. The complex is unconscious, relatively simple in structure ('simplex' would have been in some respects a better word), relatively incapable of modification, more or less morbid in character and possesses the 'all or none' characteristics of 'protopathic' mental products. The sentiment, on the other hand, is conscious, relatively complicated in structure, always changing through the influence of new experience, possesses the graduated character of 'epicritic' mental products and is a necessary and constant feature of normal mental life. The distinction between the two kinds of structure is not, however, absolute, since there may exist all intermediate degrees of consciousness, modifiability etc.; many mental structures partaking partly of the nature of the complex and partly of that of the sentiment.

Tansley endeavours to show (by quotations from *Über die Psychologie der Dementia Praecox*, 1907) that the word 'Complex' was originally employed by Jung, following Neisser (*Individualität und Psychose*, 1906), to signify

'a complex of presentations united by a common feeling tone' and 'was not restricted to repressed or dissociated complexes, though in the usage of psycho-analytic writers it has come to have this restricted denotation.'

Such a restriction is, Tansley thinks,

'unfortunate, because it obscures the essential connexion of the normal and pathological phenomena. A word for the whole range of phenomena is wanted and if it is held that "complex" is no longer available it is possible to use "constellation", though little confusion results from the retention of "complex" in the wide sense, in spite of the specialised psycho-analytic use. In McDougall's use the "sentiment" is intended to be the exact equivalent to the unrepressed complex, though the universal common meaning of sentiment as an affective phenomenon is a grave objection to this identification'.

Shand agrees with Rivers's use of the term 'complex' and disapproves of the extended meaning given to the word by Tansley. There is, he says, pretty general agreement as to the use of the term to denote emotional systems that have been repressed.

'As regards the broader employment of the term, we have to ask whether there is sufficient identity between complexes of the abnormal mind and the so-called complexes of the normal mind to justify our employing the same term for both'.

He answers this question in the negative, finding an important distinct difference between the two cases in that the repressed complex is beyond all voluntary control, whereas the analogous systems of the normal mind can all be controlled, albeit in some cases with difficulty. Shand goes on to consider the distinction between sentiments and emotions and defines this distinction as follows:

'the sentiment is a mental system which is capable of adapting itself emotionally to the changing situations of its object without becoming morbid: the emotion is a mental system which is capable of adapting itself to only one kind of situation, and when it persists beyond this system tends to become morbid'.

As an alternative definition he says that

'a sentiment is a system of several emotional dispositions, having different conative tendencies, connected with a common object, and subordinated to a common end'.

He regards this plurality of emotional dispositions and conative tendencies to be of the essence of a sentiment and protests against the view that a phobia may be a sentiment or, generally, that there exist sentiments composed of only one emotion.

Pear considers that the most important aspect in which the complex and the sentiment appear to differ is:

'that while the sentiment is an organized system of emotional tendencies grouped about an object, the complex... seems to be a relatively unorganized collocation, sometimes an almost fortuitous concourse, of such tendencies collected about an object.... While the internal arrangement of the emotional dispositions in the sentiment appears to be orderly, those in the complex seem in comparison to be untidily thrown together. One presents the trimness of a Dutch garden; the other exhibits the tangle and the undergrowth of the jungle'....

The working value of this distinction (a matter to which Pear devotes some consideration) seems to lie chiefly in the fact that behaviour issuing from sentiments is far more predictable than that issuing from complexes. The differentia between the complex and the sentiment cannot be found in repression, since many important sentiments, such as those of the lover and the patriot, involve some repression. A difficulty in distinguishing sentiments from complexes sometimes arises from the fact that

'mental growths possessing the characteristic of internal untidiness, and therefore unworthy of the name of sentiment, arise during the early stages of the formation of a sentiment, and during its decay or death. The "love" for its parents of a child under six months of age can scarcely be termed

a sentiment.... The inconstancy of such a young child's behaviour is its most striking feature, contrasting vividly with the regularity of its conduct when, a few years later, it has had time and opportunity to form real sentiments'. 'In this view, psycho-analysis would be a sorting out and disentangling of the emotional tendencies in the complex, a "straightening", to borrow Samuel Butler's term'.

Hart considers that the wide use of the term 'complex', as in the author's *Psychology of Insanity*, has value in that it serves to

'mark off a class of functional units, all of which have certain common features'. But 'it is essential that the concept should be subdivided into subordinate classes. The most obvious of the possible subdivisions is into repressed and unrepressed.' The use of the term 'complex' for the first variety only is 'unfortunate in that it tends to obscure the essential similarity of both varieties as functional units.'

If however the use of the term is so limited, there is room for another term to indicate the wider concept. As regards the sentiment, the organization demanded by Pear

'might be taken to refer either to the internal organization of the complex or to the organization of the complex to the mind as a whole. In the former case sentiment and non-sentiment would constitute a line of cleavage which has nothing to do with repression and non-repression.' In the latter case however 'the line of cleavage between sentiment and not-sentiment would bear an indirect relation to that between repression and not-repression, although it would be by no means identical therewith. This indirect relation would arise from the circumstance that repression would necessarily limit the degree of organization of the complex with the whole structure of the mind, and repressed complexes therefore would be unlikely to attain to the dignity of sentiments.' 'If, as would seem desirable, sentiment is only applied to units which satisfy this criterion [of organization], then the relation of sentiment to complex [in the wide sense employed by Hart] would be that of a subordinate to a wider concept' and 'sentiment would be limited to a comparatively small class of functional units distinguished by a high degree of integration and organization with the whole structure of the mind'.

Myers in conclusion however favours a wider use of the word 'sentiment'. He distinguishes between sentiment dispositions and sentiment feelings. These latter are more stable than emotional feeling.

'Sentiment is not merely organized by but also organizes the various emotions which can assist its end: it is dependent not only on acquired experience but on inherited dispositions peculiar to the different sentiments. An emotion is related rather to a broad situation, a sentiment to a definite object or idea on which it confers a certain "value". In the former a single feeling, in the latter a variety of feelings is evoked. If we accept this and employ "complex" in its narrower sense, it appears that a sentiment

feeling may grow from a complex and assume some of its characters, as when we hate anything without knowing why. When this is the case a sentiment feeling may be subject to inversion, projection, transference etc. and thus show characters very different from those of gradation, "tidiness", and "predictability" which previous contributors to the Symposium have held to distinguish the sentiment from the complex'. 'In such circumstances the sentiment may justly be regarded as a complex'. 'The sentiment, even in its "tidy" form is, as is shown by the fairly organized and predictable feelings in paranoia, not necessarily the product of a normal mind; nor are complexes necessarily morbid'. 'Our daily prejudices are often due to them; surely these are not to be termed "pathological"'. Again, 'just as our sentiment feelings may not always be finely graded, so our complexes need not always be of the "protopathic", "all-or-none" type. We must not confound loss of higher control with complete absence of gradation... all that we can safely say is that with higher control comes greater delicacy of gradation.'

J. C. F.

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G. C. Field, F. Aveling and John Laird. Symposium—'Is the Conception of the Unconscious of Value in Psychology?' *Mind*, 1922, Vol. XXXI, p. 413.

Mr. Field is unable to accept the idea of the Unconscious, as he 'cannot attach any meaning to it and cannot see any necessity for it'. He complains that the Unconscious is useless as an explanatory principle, since we can form no notion at all as to its nature.

'If the Unconscious is merely a negative idea something of which all that we can say is that it is not physical and not conscious, then it ceases to be anything which could be given as a real explanation. It is simply an x , an unknown cause. And to ascribe anything to it is simply a confession of ignorance'.

What actually happens when the Unconscious is evoked is that

'writers slip into a way of talking,... and at times of thinking, of the Unconscious as of another conscious person of exactly the same kind as the conscious personality that we know, which exists alongside it and every now and then affects it in some way or other, so that to explain an event by referring it to the Unconscious becomes just the same kind of explanation as to say that something was done by John Jones instead of by Tom Smith'.

We may perhaps note in passing that it is here probably that there exists the most fundamental difference between Mr. Field and the supporters of the Unconscious, who would say that this very process of drawing an analogy between our own Unconscious and the consciousness of another person to which we have no direct access is, within limits (the Conscious and the Unconscious are not of course 'of exactly the

same kind'), extremely useful and illuminating. Freud indeed has made use of the very same illustration to *justify* the concept of the Unconscious (*Sammlung kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre*, Vierte Folge, S. 298).

After these more general considerations, the author goes on to deal with some of the facts to explain which resort has been made to the Unconscious, illustrating his arguments with reference to Dr. Rivers's (now so well known) case of claustrophobia published in an Appendix to the latter writer's *Instinct and the Unconscious*. Cases of this description can be adequately explained, he contends, by assuming that the original trauma had left a disposition, as the result of which an exaggerated emotion is felt whenever the patient finds himself in circumstances in any way recalling those of the trauma. It is unnecessary to assume that the effect which the event produced on the person should be regarded 'as if the original event somehow went on existing and working'. The existence of these dispositions caused by an event is not a mere assumption but 'a necessary inference' and one universally made under certain circumstances, as when 'we speak of a man being bad tempered without meaning necessarily that he is at that moment actually feeling anger'.

These dispositions may be regarded as physical or psychical in character. The former view has the advantage that we can,

'ideally at least, look forward to an increase in our knowledge to a point at which we could know what kind of material pattern in our nervous system constituted the permanent tendency to this or that kind of behaviour' whereas on the latter (psychical) view, 'we could never, so far as we can see, hope to arrive at any kind of knowledge of what this permanent structure was like apart from the conscious activity to which it leads'. Mr. Field is of opinion moreover that, 'as a methodological assumption [the hypothesis of neural dispositions] will work just as well as the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes',

a statement with which psycho-analysts, who are continually in the course of their work experiencing the utility of the latter hypothesis will of course emphatically disagree. Mr. Field is willing to admit however that 'if we believe in the existence of a mind as a separable or distinguishable entity' (unfortunately he does not explain to us more fully what he means by this) 'we can, with proper precautions speak of unconscious regions of the mind' and moreover 'cannot refuse to admit the possibility of processes going on in that mind besides the conscious processes which we are aware of'; though he does not think there is any necessity 'thus to erect an altar to the Unknown God'. All can be more satisfactorily explained by assuming neural dispositions and psycho-physical interaction.

Mr. Field concludes his contribution by a consideration of the difficulties involved in the assumption of unconscious memories from the point of view of a Realist. From such a standpoint 'it is impossible to accept any description of the "experience" as continuing to exist and to act in the mind'. This 'involves a failure to distinguish the object known from the knowing of it'.

He also considers that much of what is apt to be called 'unconscious' is really present in the fringe of consciousness.

Dr. Aveling, for the purpose of his contribution, uses the term Unconscious to signify

'something which is experiential in character; that is to say, something which at one time actually formed part of experience, and of which the subject of the experience may also have been aware; something which, in appropriate conditions, may (or may again) come to awareness; something, however, which is not now part of awareness'. 'This signification links up the Unconscious, by way of the sub-conscious and the minimal, with the maximal degree of awareness.'

The term in this sense has a definite and useful meaning for empirical psychologists. It must however be distinguished from

'that other Unconscious which, of its nature, can never directly form part of awareness at all—that "unconscious psychic" which is essential or dispositional rather than experiential; which yet may be necessary as a concept, as is matter or force in physics or substance in metaphysics, for a final completion and explanation of the science of psychology'.

The failure to observe this distinction, as also the corresponding distinction between psychology as an empirical science and psychology in the older transcendental and metaphysical sense, is responsible for much misunderstanding.

The principal justification for the Unconscious is that it enables us to bridge over the gaps that remain in the train of psychological causation so long as we confine ourselves to the study of consciousness and that it does so without introducing concepts alien to those of psychology.

'I conceive', says Dr. Aveling, 'the starting point of psychology to be an examination of the data of consciousness: i.e. awareness; and its end a statement of the laws of their concomitances and successions. When all the data have been examined... and when the laws have been formulated, it will be found that certain hypothetical elements have been necessarily introduced to complete and round off the whole after the manner of a science. But those hypothetical elements will be—or should be—appropriate to the original data. They should not, unless it is impossible to complete the science otherwise, introduce characters which the original data do not display'.

With regard to Mr. Field's objection on the ground of the confusion of the known object with the knowing of it, Dr. Aveling contends that for purposes of psychology the distinction between object and subject is for the most part irrelevant. 'All the data or "processes" of consciousness are, in one respect at least, of exactly the same character. They are all mental'. In this respect psychology is parallel to the physical sciences. For 'in all these abstraction is made from the fact that the data with which they deal are in reality mental; and these are considered as if they had a real existence in a world indifferent to mind'.

'But in arranging and explaining the data, considered thus abstractly, each science keeps to its own point of view; each introduces hypothetical elements, where these are necessary, appropriately similar in kind to the original data.... Consider, for example, the flight of an arrow, and that of a bullet fired from a rifle. In the one case, there may be data observable from the moment when the arrow is fitted to the bow-string to that when it is fixed in the target. In the latter case there may be no such data; but ballistics assigns relative position, as part of the hypothetical data, throughout the whole course of the flight.... Psychology, as a science, pursues a similar method. It completes its observations and relating of data with hypothetical elements similar in kind to the original data. And it is here that the conception of the Unconscious naturally arises.... It is no real objection to urge against this conception of the Unconscious that its nature cannot be known as things are known by inspection, for that is true as well of the physical hypothetical elements—and indeed also of the physical concepts. The Unconscious can only be known by reflexion upon what it does. It provides a nexus or principle for the explanation of the processes which occur in awareness. Its nature then, will be consonant with these; and it will be inferred from these'.

Dr. Aveling bases a further argument for the Unconscious on the fact that consciousness itself is not sharply delimited, but is present in all degrees from clearest to minimal awareness. The Unconscious and the dimly conscious can both be made clearly conscious in much the same way; this pointing to some similarity and continuity of nature between them. The fact that resistances have to be overcome in making conscious the Unconscious in Freud's 'systematic' sense does not imply any break in this continuity of nature.

In a later part of his contribution Dr. Aveling applies this argument from continuity individually to each of the main aspects of mental life—cognition, conation and affection. Each of these aspects may on occasion be only minimally represented in consciousness or may even be undiscoverable in consciousness at all, but we are nevertheless compelled to assume its equivalent in an unconscious form.

With reference to Mr. Field's objection that the Unconscious comes to be regarded as another conscious person of exactly the same kind as the conscious personality we know (e.g. John Jones instead of Tom Smith), the difficulty arises again, Dr. Aveling suggests, from the fact that Mr. Field is here taking the transcendental point of view and is crediting empiricists with doing it also.

'If Tom Smith who, for the empirical psychologist, is the sum total of processes occurring in awareness, be completed empirically by the sum total of "unconscious" processes which, similarly, are John Jones, the addition of the two will not constitute two "persons", but one complete phenomenal consciousness—Thomas John Jones-Smith. Indeed, there would not be even one "person" so constituted; for it could hardly be asserted that a phenomenal consciousness, no matter how complete, was a "person". But this conception has, none the less, the advantage of remaining within (at least theoretically possible) empirical limits, and of providing a ground for the establishing of scientific concomitances and sequences, without the necessity of having recourse to metaphysical notions'.

Professor Laird concludes the Symposium with a very breezy paper, which makes delightful reading, but which does not appear (to the present reviewer at any rate) to add much of serious value to the discussion. He is mostly concerned to demonstrate the absurdity of the assumption of unconscious mind, which is to him synonymous with 'unconscious consciousness' and therefore just as 'preposterous' as Mr. Churchill's 'cannibals in all respects except the act of devouring the flesh of the victims'. This, we may note, is the device, so frequently employed by opponents of the Unconscious, of assuming that the mental and the Unconscious are co-extensive and then triumphantly showing the impossibility of unconscious mentality (cf. Ernest Jones's review of Prof. Knight Dunlap's *Freudianism, Mysticism and Scientific Psychology*, this *Journal*, 1922, Vol. III, p. 391). In so doing, these critics ignore the very distinction that is drawn by the upholders of the Unconscious. It is one thing to talk, as these latter do, of 'unconscious mental life, and quite another to assume, as Prof. Laird seems to think they do, the existence of 'unconscious consciousness', which is of course absurd.

Prof. Laird is willing to admit however that 'there is no demonstrable contradiction in the general term 'unconscious mind' if this term means simply 'that in the mind which is *de facto* unconscious'.

'Usually', he says, 'when we speak of a mind, we ascribe dispositions, tendencies, potentialities and capacities to it. These are dangerous terms, to be sure, but they are not unmeaning, and the facts they purport to describe are seldom, if ever, conscious facts. On the other hand, the New Uncon-

scious, so far as I can see, has neither elucidated these conceptions, nor added to them on any point of principle. The New Psychology, we may concede, has shown that we have many tendencies which were hitherto unsuspected or ignored, and that many of our dispositions have sinuous, sinister and surprising effects. But this is another story, however important it may be. The results of the new psychology would neither be altered nor gainsaid if the new unconscious were in fact physiological, or even if consciousness itself were ultimately a quality that our nerves can sometimes assume'.

Prof. Laird then proceeds to examine certain distinctions within consciousness which, he thinks, throw light upon the problem of the supposed 'Unconscious', but which in his opinion afford no justification for the assumption:

1. The distinction between reflective self-consciousness and consciousness *simpliciter*. 'There is an idea abroad, often left unchallenged, that a man is conscious only of that which he avows to himself upon reflexion. This idea is simply false. Unselfconscious thinking may and does occur'. But this is only 'unselfconscious consciousness', not 'unconscious consciousness'.

2. The distinction between connected and dispersed consciousness. This distinction, evident and important though it is, does not mean that our dispersed thoughts are unconscious.

Similar arguments apply to (3), the distinction between the 'centre' and the 'margin' of consciousness. However marginal experiences may be, they are still conscious.

Likewise in the case of (4), the distinction between schematic and detailed consciousness. Schematic knowledge does not imply unconscious detailed knowledge, e.g. the schema of an oration, although it guides the speaker, is not the oration itself and does not contain the oration.

Memory also, according to Prof. Laird, presents no difficulty which would justify the assumption of the Unconscious. The question of how a past event modifies present thought and present behaviour is one, it would seem, that principally concerns the physiologist. The psychologist, so far as he has to do with the matter, has, Prof. Laird admits, 'a harder task'. 'But he ought not to take metaphors literally, whatever the provocation'.

J. C. F.

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J. H. Cooper. The Psycho-Analytical Method Applied to the Study of Repression. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 1921, Vol. XVI, p. 144.

The author first points out that the symptoms of the psychoneuroses are the resultant of two opposing forces, namely, sexual need or desire which is repressed, and sexual repugnance, i.e. inability to love. He

further states that the repressed force has been widely studied, but the other one, the repressing force, we have been 'only too ready to forget', and adds, 'Is it not equally astonishing that the psycho-analyst, while making a very extensive study of the repressed affections, has shown no interest in the repression?'. 'Why have psycho-analysts avoided the study of repression? Could it be due to their own resistances?'

The author apparently has an extremely limited knowledge of the psycho-analytical literature and especially that dealing with the theories of psycho-analysis and the mechanisms concerned in it. Freud has devoted an entire article to the question of 'Repression' besides numerous references to, explanations of, and technique regarding it. Other authorities on psycho-analysis have also dealt very fully with this question. Psycho-analysts have certainly not 'avoided the study of repression' as the author suggests, and his question 'Could this avoidance be due to their own resistances?' can only revert on his own head.

The author has made the discovery that 'Repression is a sexual act and gratifies a sexual desire towards one or both parents usually the mother' and that other influences such as religious teachings, disgust for sexual actions are secondary causes merely strengthening the repression.

The author has apparently arrived at this conclusion from analysing (?) the 'repression'. He says, 'In the treatment of psycho-neurotic patients I have found it necessary, before satisfactory results could be obtained in the most severe cases, to resort to an analysis of their repression'. His analysis of the 'repression' gave him the following results.

1. 'Quite early in childhood the patient pleurably performed some sexual act for which the beloved parent showed displeasure'. The author was astonished to find in more than one instance that this pleurably performed sexual act of the primary trauma was taking the mother's nipple in the mouth. The repression was started when the mother shamed, punished and showed displeasure for the child's desire to nurse, and consequently the child gained the impression that the mother did not want it to have sexual desires or pleasures.

2. To please the mother the child wished to have no such desire. Keeping desire out of the mind (repressing) was to the child tantamount to having no desire. In other words the child repressed to please the parent.

3. The patient gets a pleasure out of wishing to please the parent.

4. Analysis of this pleasure, i. e. the discovery what desire is gratified, shows that it is a sexual desire towards the parent that is gratified in thus keeping sexual desires out of mind. In other words, Repression

is a sexual act and gratifies a sexual desire towards one or both parents, usually the mother.

The author evidently considers that repression is a conscious effort on the part of the infant and a concrete act, whereas the psycho-analytical view is that repression is purely unconscious and is merely a concept to explain certain aspects of mental functioning. D. B.

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A. Gordon. Illusion of 'The Already Seen' (Paramnesia) and of 'The Never Seen' (Agnosia). *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1920, Vol. XV, p. 187.

In this short article the author comes to the conclusion that of all the views expressed for the interpretation of the mechanism of the illusions under discussion the most satisfactory one is that of the disturbance in the organised motor reactions. It is significant that he makes no mention of Freud's writings on the subject.

D. B.

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Gregory Stragnell. Psychopathological Disturbances from the Avoidance of Parental Responsibility. *New York Medical Journal and Medical Record*. September 6, 1922.

In psycho-analytic work up to the present considerably more attention has been paid to the filio-parental relationship from the point of view of the children than from that of the parents. Such an article as this is therefore welcome, although it admittedly deals only with one factor in the complex conditions that determine the attitude of parents towards their children. The author takes his text from four recent plays—Sir James Barrie's *Mary Rose*, Clemence Dane's *Bill of Divorcement*, Eugene O'Neill's *Anna Christie* and Franz Molnar's *Liliom*. In all of these plays a parent shirks the responsibilities of his or her parenthood by disappearing in one way or another during the whole period of the child's growth. In searching for the motives underlying behaviour of this kind, Dr. Stragnell finds, in addition to the obvious desire to escape from the lengthy and complicated burdens incidental to human parenthood, a number of important factors connected with the parent's unconscious process of 'identification' of himself with his child. Thus on the one hand the parent, in virtue of this identification, 'endeavours to live again those days of childhood unmarred by care and responsibility'. But on the other hand 'the process of identification brings with it not only the joys of childhood but also its trials and pains, those connected with the unaided struggle with sex and all manner of tabooed topics being the most difficult to manage.... Those

topics... we do not recall.... Therefore the common [tendency] on the part of parents to avoid the important discussion of sexual topics with their children.... In these instances the relationship between parent and child which arises from the forbidden sexual topic is transferred to all other subjects which may come up between them. The result is a state of friction or a flight from the situation.'

The ultimate explanation of the flight from parental responsibility is to be found however in the operation of an incest taboo; the primitive incestuous tendencies being aroused once more (and therefore once more repressed) in virtue of the identification of the parent with his child. It is noteworthy in this connection that in all of the plays under consideration the parent and child are of the opposite sex. Incestuous tendencies are tabooed through the working of 'unconscious memory'. Repression of the type in which the wish is repressed before it emerges into consciousness is to be accounted for in the same way as the instinctive act of a spider or a wasp. 'The avoidance of incest may be classed as a protective mechanism just as many of the unconscious protective activities of animals'. The ultimate biological justification of incest repression is to be found, according to Dr. Stragnell, in the eugenic advantages of outbreeding, especially for peoples engaged in very frequent warfare.

These last biological and psychological considerations suffer (as is perhaps inevitable in a short article) from a great over-simplification of the facts. Nevertheless we owe Dr. Stragnell a debt of gratitude for having drawn attention to the interest and importance of the biological question involved.

J. C. F.

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B. M. Hinkle. A Study of Psychological Types. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1922, Vol. IX, p. 107.

In a comprehensive paper, ninety pages long, Hinkle extends Jung's hypothesis of two broad psychological types, the introverted and extroverted, and suggests a further sub-division of each group into three, according to the degree of subjectivity or objectivity present. The conception is applied to the contrasts between nations, especially America and France. It is to be hoped that the account given of these nations is more accurate than the remarks on England: English readers will be astonished at, for instance, the statement, 'It is not chance that... instead of a mother country England should be referred to as father'.

E. J.

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W. H. R. Rivers. Freud's Concept of the 'Censorship'. *Psycho-analytic Review*, 1920, Vol. VII, p. 213.

A criticism of Freud's censorship concept. It unfortunately begins with an important misapprehension, for Rivers repeatedly describes Freud's concept as involving an agency 'working within the unconscious', whereas Freud insists that his censorship activity acts at the junction of the unconscious and preconscious. Rivers would substitute for the censorship concept the idea that the distortion and symbolisation observable in many forms of mental activity, dreams, neuroses, etc., are inherent attributes of the unconscious and primitive mind and not, as Freud holds, a compromise-formation resulting from the interaction of the unconscious and preconscious. Rivers thinks that the preconscious plays no part in dream formation, a view surely contradicted by analysis of the material from which the dream is made up. E. J.

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H. S. Langfeld. Psychophysical Symptoms of Deception. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1920-21, Vol. XV, p. 319.

This article deals with an experiment in the use of association-word reactions in the detection of a 'crime', and is coupled with some remarks on blood pressure alteration during the test. It might be pointed out that the word association test is not one of the principal instruments of the psycho-analyst as the author seems to suppose.

D. B.

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A. W. Stearns. The Kind of Men in State Prison. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. 1920-21, Vol. XV, p. 335.

The authors give a statistical analysis of 107 men in the state Prison at Charlestown all of whom had been convicted of a felony, the shortest sentence of which was two and a half years. The most important conclusion that they come to is, that the present temporary institutional care of delinquents does not effectually cure the individual or protect society, and that the medico-sociological study of individual delinquents forms the most rational basis for treating the individual and for formulating methods of care, and is inadequately applied.

D. B.

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F. C. Sumner. Psychoanalysis of Freud and Adler. *Pedagogical Seminary*. Vol. XXIX, p. 139.

The writings of psycho-analysts are often stigmatised as being far-fetched and over-imaginative. More indubitable, however, is the extraordinarily stimulating effect that psycho-analysis produces on the imagination of those who possess but a bowing acquaintance with it. This article is really a supreme example of the process.

The author begins with a conventional account of the views expressed by various writers on the subject of bisexuality, a concept he appears fully to accept. Then follows an extremely sketchy and inaccurate account of Freud's and Adler's theory of the neuroses. His acquaintance with the subject may be indicated by his reference to 'Adler and Freud, the two great founders of psycho-analysis', and by the following misstatements. According to him, Freud regards the libido as equivalent to psychic energy in general and identifies it with Bergson's *élan vital*, Freud being here obviously confounded with Jung. He describes Freud's psychology as being the effort of the libido to express itself in despite of external obstacles, there being no hint of the inner conflict between the sexual and non-sexual aspects of the personality, on which Freud lays so much stress. Freud is supposed to hold that the libido 'comprehends hunger and sex as primarily identical'. Component instincts (*Partialtriebe*) are defined as impulses dissociated from the original sexual one, the author perhaps thinking of the process of sublimation; he is under the illusion that the following are examples of component instincts: love of the beautiful, fondness for music and dancing, religious love, morality, and timidity.

Armed with this profound knowledge of Freud's views, the author embarks light-heartedly on what he calls a psycho-analysis of Freud and Adler, mainly the former, and attempts to shew that both their theories are of purely subjective origin, being projections of their individual 'neurotic fiction'.

His essential thesis is that Freud's theory is nothing but the projection of a feminine mind. Freud belongs to the men 'qui sont femmes par la tête et par le coeur'; he is an instance of Gautier's statement: 'It often happens that the sex of the soul does not at all correspond with that of the body, and this is a contradiction which cannot fail to produce great disorder'. For him, therefore, a man is a parasite on women; masculinity has no existence in itself, but is to be regarded only from the woman's point of view, as either an oppressor or as a subsidiary completion. 'Outstanding' is his primary emphasis upon women', a discovery which should console those who complain that in psycho-analysis most complexes and conflicts are regarded only from the point of view of the male. The author's proof of this curious view

is the statement, one of his numerous gratuitous untruths, that Freud's 'experimentation is for the most part confined to women'. Another 'argument' is the *ipse dixit* that Freud 'has an unquenchable impulse to be a woman, to conceive, to give birth, to experience the joys of maternity as in the case of the primitive couvade-practice which he analyzes'. What does it matter to the author that it was not Freud, but Reik, who analyzed the couvade-practice? It surely was someone with a feminine soul, therefore it must have been Freud, therefore Freud has a feminine soul.

It is well known that, in Freud's opinion, the desire to be loved is more characteristic of the woman, and the desire to love of the man. We learn here, however, that, according to Freud, 'only in so far as a man is feminine, i.e. possesses a feminine emotional life, is he able to love', a simple inversion of the truth. This misapprehension is supposed to give the clue to Freud's insistence on the importance of the sexual life, i.e. woman's life, for 'Freud is at one with Madame de Staël when she wrote that "Love, which is not an episode in the life of man, is the entire history of woman"'. Not only so, but this is also the reason why Freud lays stress on the infantile, for woman is much nearer to the infantile than is man, on the unconscious, for this is representative of femininity, and on the phyletic aspects of life, for woman is nearer to the phyletic, the racial. This is further the reason why Freud has taken more interest in the repressed rather than the repressing part of the mind, for is not woman 'repressed' by man (no matter if this is in a quite different meaning of the English word)? Finally Freud's classic phrase 'Perversion is the negative of neurosis' is one more proof of his vain fight against feminine homosexuality, the author being evidently under the impression that Freud is speaking of inversion when he says perversion.

Perhaps the most priceless remark is that 'Adler, endowed by heredity with pronounced strains of Teutonic virility, could not by nature bear subordination to the feminism of Freud'. What boots it that Adler is as Jewish as Freud? For the purpose of this theory he must be a Teuton. Jung, on the other hand, 'has very much in common with Freud, differing only in his greater feminine tendency'. So much for Jung!

Then follows a parallel between Adler and Nietzsche and between Freud and Jesus. Those who have felt the lash of Freud's tongue will be astonished to learn that he 'has a horror of aggression', that he is a typical Christian with a 'morality of turn-the-other-cheek'.

This farrago of nonsense would not be noticed were it not that it is apparently taken seriously in America. One might have thought that dishonest ignorance would be corrected by those in a position to know

better. Yet we have to record the facts that at Clark University, where Freud once gave a course of lectures, this essay was accepted as a doctorate thesis, and that Stanley Hall, the President of that University, regarded it as of sufficient value to warrant publication in the most important journal of educational psychology in America. E. J.

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E. Bleuler. Zur Kritik des Unbewußten (Criticism of the Unconscious). *Zeitschr. f. d. ges. Neur. u. Psych.*, Bd. 53, S. 81.

A reply to Kretschmer's article under the same name appearing in the same journal (Bd. 46, S. 368).

The unconscious is not merely a name which can be replaced at will by 'non-conscious', itself incidentally a false one. Neither is the whole doctrine of the unconscious a working hypothesis or a theory; on the contrary, the unconscious is a well-founded, clearly-defined concept. It is impossible to regard the unconscious as outside the psyche, for it possesses all the psychical functions and together with consciousness forms a unified whole.

Kretschmer has proposed the term 'voluntary strengthening of the reflex', and explains repression as only a special case of this. Apart altogether from the circumstance that this term in no way expresses the unconscious, it is at best applicable only to the most elementary forms of war-hysterias; it cannot be extended to more complicated unconscious mechanisms, and is entirely unadapted to intra-psychical symptoms. The concepts of 'short-circuiting' and of automatism are equally unfitted for general application; moreover, the process which it is thus intended to describe is by no means the essential one in repression.

Examples are adduced to show that the unconscious does actually exist and that Kretschmer's own examples are not sufficiently explained by the assumption of a 'strengthening of the reflex'. It is merely *one* mechanism among many.

Unconscious mechanisms must be taken into account in normal persons as well as in the whole of psychopathology. In the delimitation of the term 'illness' the unconscious therefore has no part.

By non-recognition of the unconscious, however, a serious injustice may be done to the patient, since his attitude to health and illness will then be accounted to his consciousness, so that the estimate of his moral standards is completely falsified. E. Blum.

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Emanuel v. Geijerstam. Über die Psychoanalyse der Züricher Schule. (On the Zurich school of psycho-analysis). *Zeitschrift für Psychotherapie und medizinische Psychologie*. Band VIII, S. 57.

This is an excellently written and very clear description of the well-known ideas of the Zurich School and may be read with advantage by everyone who has to investigate such problems. Geijerstam is sufficiently critical of the opinions of Jung and Maeder to be enabled to describe more clearly than his masters the development of their theory from that of Freud and by so doing he facilitates our forming our judgement.

According to Jung, we analyse neurotic phantasies; if the patient finds himself in the presence of some difficulty he avoids it instead of struggling against it. He behaves like a child and gets into the mood of obstinacy which he once had, for example, towards his father. In other words, the Oedipus complex becomes acute, the infantile element in the neurotic patient which had never been completely mastered reappears; the primary element of the neurosis is therefore to be found in laziness, indolence, and displeasure in work. But Jung's adversaries, the Freudian school, call special attention to the fact that these general human qualities cannot be the basis of neuroses. On the same ground Jung refuses sexuality as an aetiological factor.

Psycho-analytical investigations have convinced Geijerstam that the nucleus of the problem of the neuroses is of an ethical nature: the patient suffers from an incredible incapacity and unwillingness to see his own ethical lack, his own shrinking from this or that life-task. The Freudian school reproaches Jung with the fact that with him sexuality has not a real but only a symbolic meaning. And justly, for according to Jung, incest is considered to be far less a reality than a regressive phantasy, and the conflicts arising from it are considered to be based upon an 'anatomical maintenance of the infantile attitude' rather than upon real incest wishes. The mind acts in a way as if similar wishes had once existed. At the same time there exists an Oedipus complex of the child as an actual sexual wish.

Stekel says not without reason that he who does not see the sexual factor in the child is blind or does not wish to see it. If the neurosis is based upon the repression of sexual complexes then indolence (withdrawal from the issue of the conflict) becomes the primary pathological factor. In the normal child every situation of anxiety excites a longing for the beloved persons; in the neurotic patient anxiety is a consequence of his longing for love—a product of the transformation of this longing. This theory advanced by Kaplan overlooks the fact that without the existence of an anxiety situation there is no change from libido to anxiety. The Oedipus complex (in opposition to Jung)

may be real enough; but how much sexuality it contains or contained—that is a secondary question. Jung's concept of infantile sexuality differs from Freud's. To Jung the gain of pleasure is in no way identical with sexuality; his libido is an even more extended concept than Freud's, it is desexualised and turned into an hypothetic life impulse; it is practically speaking the same thing as interest. The term libido is not very happy because it gives occasion for misunderstanding; the importance of the enlarged libido-concept lies in the fact that it can open the way to a wider understanding of sexual symbolism. Freud translates psychical phenomena of a general character into the sexual, and he is right in doing so; but we must also translate from the sexual into the general. For example, according to Strömme the pollution-dream has also an anagogic meaning, and the examination-dream besides the sexual meaning found by Stekel has also a progressive one. Freud's sexual symbolism apart from some exaggerations is well founded. Jung considers the archaic element of dream-language (the primitive way of thinking) to be the reason for the use of symbols. We may set aside the peculiar doctrine of congenital sexual symbolism. Silberer's functional phenomena are of the greatest importance. Another difference between the schools of Vienna and Zurich lies in the relation to dreams and sexual symbolism. For Maeder the symbol is not simply sexual in character but has a far more extended content. Sexual interpretation is a preliminary step, the actual situation has become more and more entangled with it, and we must ask not only 'Whence?' but also 'Whither?'. Sexual interpretation is of no therapeutic value, the symbol only represents a life task if we give it a larger content. In neurosis the libido is introverted, in dreams it sees clearly its own path. Unfortunately the neurotic patient misunderstands his own dreams. According to Maeder Freud's concept of the dream as wish-fulfilment is one-sided since it does not take into consideration that quality of the dream which exerts an influence on future activity in waking life by solving actual conflicts. By dream interpretation during treatment we have opportunity of watching the progress towards health; here psychical influence is most important. Psycho-analysis is the first method which not only makes use of the ties of sympathy but also at a later period unties them. The dream that the analyst is dying which frequently appears at the end of a cure we must recognise as the activity of the progressive Ego. Progress does not agree with the theory of wish-fulfilment, hence Freud's attempt to designate punishment as a wish-fulfilment is somewhat artificial; nevertheless Freud is absolutely consistent and is quite right from his point of view, but he takes too much notice of the egoistic factor

in dreams; there often exists a contradiction, but only an apparent one between the sexual and the anagogic interpretation.

According to Jung the constitutional basis of the neuroses is congenital sensitiveness, according to Geijerstam it is a peculiar combination of immorality, recession and delicacy of conscience. According to Strömme the neurotic takes the symbol literally, that is to say, he who finds himself on shaky ground suffers from vertigo. In this way symptom-formation arises (consequently it is primarily a functional process [Reviewer]).

Geijerstam reminds us that his attempt to explain the problem of the neuroses does not claim to be a complete work. We must object however that his essay gives the impression of completeness. The above abstract will suffice to show that the differences of opinion between Freud and Jung are fundamental and divergent. It would be more honest and less misleading to the ignorant if the Zurich school would leave aside all consideration of true psycho-analysis (Freud) and proceed with their own studies. It is clear from the above that Freud's views on sexuality, symbolism, dream-formation, anxiety, etc. have not even been understood, so that nothing said about them can refute them. The unconscious, repression, sublimation and many other things, it will be seen, find no place in the 'psycho-analysis' described in this book.

Landmann.

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Morton Prince. A Critique of Psychoanalysis, *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 1921, Vol. VI, p. 610.

Prince discusses psycho-analysis, quite correctly, from the three aspects of (1) a method of examination, (2) a body of doctrine, and (3) a method of therapeutics.

1. As a method of examination it is, when used in conjunction with other methods, useful in the discovery of particular facts and causes, but unreliable in determining the laws and mechanisms of the mind.

2. Two principles, for which we are indebted to the genius of Freud, are contributions of the highest importance. These are the doctrine of repression and of conflict. Beyond this, however, Prince accepts nothing of psycho-analytic doctrine. He thinks that most conflicts are not sexual, and holds that there are no unconscious mental processes except those that have once been conscious. He thinks that there are many processes in the subconscious that do not possess the attributes described by analysts as characteristic of the unconscious. (This is of course so, because we are speaking of two different regions of the mind).

3. Prince advocates re-education, but not of the Freudian kind, which he regards as often harmful. He pays generous tribute, however, to Freud for his influence on contemporaneous thought in compelling attention to neglected aspects of psychology. 'This, to my mind, is the great gain for which we must be thankful to Freud—the acceptance of the dynamic approach and the dynamic conception of aberrations of the normal personality however manifested',

E. J.

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Delgado, Dr. Honorio F. La formación de la personalidad y el carácter. *Rev. de Psiquiatria*, 1920, Año 11, No. 4.

In this paper Delgado considers the significance for character-formation of the development of the libido and its various stages. His presentation confines itself in general to psycho-analytic views, but suffers from the circumstance that the author interweaves with these views ideas taken from Adler and Jung, as if complete accord existed between the latter authors and psycho-analysis. One must of course keep in mind how difficult it is to follow from a country as far distant as Peru the psycho-analytic movement in all its developments and to form correct judgements on them. North American literature, which naturally meets with much consideration in South American countries, contains much material conducing to these ambiguities.

Delgado makes an interesting attempt to derive the ideas of omnipotence in children from the intra-uterine state. He assumes that the state of being without wishes, the freedom from all effort in the sense of adaptation, in this condition is the model for all later phantasies of omnipotence. The author introduces the name 'auto-hedonism' for this condition. After birth the infant organism is compelled to its first attempts at adaptation; this performance is accomplished by its organs (breathing, nutrition, sensory functions, etc.). Pleasure is bound up, however, with each such function; we can therefore speak of a second stage of 'organ-hedonism'. There follows the third stage of 'social hedonism' which is introduced by the desire for the love of others. Delgado's presentation is here lacking in sufficient differentiation. In the above he describes only narcissism, and this only in a one-sided fashion, nor does he do justice to the phenomena of transference. Nevertheless, the article seems worthy of notice, particularly in reference to the excellent characterisation of the early phases of development.

K. Abraham.

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Valdigan, Hermilio, Professor de Psiquiatria. Ensayo de psicología del enfermo. *Rev. de Psiquiatria*, 1920, Año III.

The author points out the universal need that physicians should have a psychological understanding of sick persons. He goes in detail into the importance of psycho-analysis in this respect. K. Abraham.

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W. Whately Smith. Experiments on Memory and Affective Tone. *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, 1921, Vol. XI, p. 236.

This is a very interesting paper and deserves careful study in the original. The author finds that affective tone, as measured by the psycho-galvanic reflex, may influence memory in two diametrically opposite directions: a word that evokes well marked affective tone may be recalled with either greater ease or greater difficulty than a less intensely toned word. 'Affective tone, [as thus measured] should therefore be regarded as of two kinds, one of which facilitates, while the other impedes, the remembering of words which it accompanies.' The reaction time in Jung's association experiment and the reproduction test in the same experiment measure the latter kind of affective tone only. J. C. F.

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C. Lloyd Morgan. Psychical Selection: Expression and Impression. *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, 1921, Vol. XI, p. 206.

The author deals in an interesting manner with the importance of certain psychical factors in evolution, most of his examples being taken from bird life. Psychical Selection occurs when certain qualities attributes or tendencies acquire survival value through the impression which they make on others; the *impression* made on one individual being correlated with the *expression* of another. 'In psychical selection there is preferential appeal of the best expression; under other forms of natural selection there is differential weeding out, the incidence of which falls initially on the worst individuals, those which are bionomically deficient. Psychical selection works from above downwards; natural elimination works from below upwards. But the net result in either case is the preservation of efficiency'. Psychical Selection is perhaps most clearly manifested in courtship and thus forms an important mechanism in a large proportion of the cases coming under Darwin's *Sexual Selection*. The greater part of the present paper is concerned with a detailed consideration of the psychology of expression and impression within this field. J. C. F.

Clinical

Helene Deutsch. Über die pathologische Lüge [Pathological lying] (Pseudologia phantastica.) *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1922, Band VIII, S. 153.

The author does not discuss lying in general but only that variety known in psychopathology as 'pseudologia phantastica' or phantasy lying. She defines this as really a day-dream which is told to others as reality. It differs from the day-dream in that it is freely told to others while the day-dreamer secretly keeps his dream to himself.

She gives in considerable detail the analysis of the pathological lies of a seventeen-year-old girl which consisted largely of love phantasies regarding a youth whom she knew only by sight. The analysis showed that the lies went back to actual happenings of a sexual nature between herself when five years old and a brother seven years old. These memories had been repressed and were later revived and displaced upon another object after puberty. The author compares the mechanism with that of hysteria. A short analytic sketch of a similar case in a boy is also given.

The chief conclusion is that such lies represent the distorted reappearance of something that once happened in reality, the memory of which has been repressed.

C. R. Payne.

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W. S. Inman. Emotion and Eye Symptoms. *British Journal of Psychology (Medical Section)*, Vol. II. p. 47.

It is pointed out that the mental and emotional state of the patient is overlooked in the treatment of errors of refraction; the author states that the eye rarely produces other than ocular symptoms unless the patient is emotionally unstable, also that some form of psychotherapy is more likely to relieve him than the use of glasses. The headache for which glasses are so frequently worn is out of proportion to the strain produced by the error of refraction. This and other symptoms are definitely related to emotional causes and are relieved by treatment directed to these factors. The result of questioning one hundred consecutive cases elicited the fact that the error of refraction was not such an important cause of the symptoms as the mental complexes. A description of two cases of glaucoma follows in which the symptoms are directly traced to the emotional factor. Unequal pupils and watering of the eyes have also been proved to have had an emotional foundation. The author has noticed an existing relationship between squint and left-handedness; this has also been referred to by Dr. W. H. Rivers. The

psychological significance of left-handedness and stammering has been appreciated, these symptoms being undoubtedly connected with parental influences in the child's upbringing. The author believes them to be symbolic of resistance to parental authority and quotes a case illustrating this theory, of a stammer and squint existing in the children of a naval captain who employed his quarter-deck manner in their education. These symptoms are not so likely to occur in the children of parents who are themselves free from infantile fixations. It is suggested that the eyes may reveal so much of character because they are the channels of communication with the outside world, also their significance as an erotic zone is acknowledged.

R. M. Riggall.

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S. Herbert. The Psychogenetic Root of Enuresis. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1922, Vol. IX, p. 263.

A short note on the case of a patient seen fourteen times, whom the author maintains was cured of enuresis by means of psycho-analysis. He agrees with Freud that enuresis is of sexual origin, being related to infantile urethral-erotism.

E. J.

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D. W. Fay. Adolf, A Modern Edipus. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1922, Vol. IX, p. 267.

A detailed account, fifty-six pages long, of an exceedingly interesting case of dementia praecox in a youth of eighteen. As a reaction against conscious incestuous attraction he became homosexual and developed the psychosis at the age of seventeen. The author traces the sense of inferiority, on Adlerian lines, to the patient's left-handedness and slender build, but that this was not a final analysis is revealed by the patient's delirious remark that he was 'ambidextrous and ambisexual (bisexual)', shewing that the left-handedness was a symbol for the castration idea behind the homosexuality. The case is well worth reading in the original.

E. J.

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E. Bleuler. Über psychische Gelegenheitsapparate und Abreagieren. *Allg. Zeitschrift f. Psychiatrie*, Bd. 76, Heft 5, S. 669.

Abreaction of affects is an old idea which was brought more especially to practical significance in the original cathartic method out of which psycho-analysis was evolved. In the neuroses and psychoses for which it has mostly been utilized, however, there are processes which are not compatible with it.

Any resolve, from the simplest reflex action up to the problem of life which ends only with death, produces an activity (*Apparat*); psychical activities of different complexity can also arise from practice or habit. If they are not to keep on permanently functioning they have to be 'cut off'; this happens either automatically through execution of the action intended, or by a counter-order, or through inhibition in consequence of other opposing functions. Many activities are repressed instead of being 'cut off' or divested of 'current'. Their source of power is contained in themselves, as with every nervous function; it is not an accumulation of energy that is expended, and thus such activities, particularly if they are repressed, can often act with undiminished energy for years.

The effect of psycho-analysis rests on the fact that an 'occasional' activity of this kind is connected by association with the conscious ego, and is thus accessible to discharge or to stoppage and can thus be rendered ineffective.

But even activity which is cut off or divested of 'current' leaves behind an engram, and may therefore be reproduced by a similar stimulus. Hence the risk of relapses in disease. Habit and strength of affect increase the reliability of the 'connections' in an activity.

Symbolic reactions of an activity, arising in consequence of repression and tending not in the direction of the purpose but only in a similar path, mostly do not have the effect of a discharge; because the stoppage does not occur through the reaction as such, but through its result.

The author's attempt to demonstrate psychical processes by likening them to a machine, in particular to an electrical switch-board, enables him to illustrate clearly various normal and pathological processes, and to render intelligible the mechanisms of the unconscious and its effects which are so important psycho-analytically.

We must not forget, however, that a comparison of the psyche with a system of apparatuses is a piece of symbolism which does not in all respects do justice to the facts.

A. Kielholz.

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Christin. L'Angoisse. *Revue Médicale de la Suisse Romande*, Février 1921, p. 109.

Après avoir passé en revue les différentes théories modernes de l'angoisse, le Dr. Christin se résume ainsi:

'L'ambition, le devoir l'orgueil, peuvent être cause d'angoisse. Mais dans l'immense majorité des cas, c'est bien une perturbation dans la vie sexuelle qui en est la cause. On a trop schématisé le concept

freudien en n'y voulant voir que l'abstinence sexuelle; c'est une sottise. Il faut absolument individualiser et surtout se rappeler que chez le civilisé moderne le côté sentimental, intellectuel, affectif joue un rôle très important à côté de l'élément physique. C'est aussi bien l'excès que le manque, toute déviation ou toute privation d'une des multiples composantes de cet instinct complexe qu'est l'amour qui peut être la source de l'angoisse.'

R. de Saussure.

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L. Pierce Clark. Some Emotional Reactions in Epileptics. *New York Medical Journal*, June 1, 1921, p. 785.

Dr. Clark draws attention to the crudeness and short duration of affect in the epileptic. His narcissistic concern limits the wide range of his affective life, and his sensitivity limits the depth of emotional reaction. This lack of detailed variety and richness of the emotional nature of the epileptic is innate and a real part of his character long before the appearance of the epilepsy. There is a quantitative and qualitative defect in the instincts underlying the epileptic's emotional life. These instincts are more frequently perverted than arrested.

He further says that on a more intense analysis one finds the epileptic suffers from a defect of the adaptive instinct, and that his egocentricity or self-superiority is proportionately enlarged to meet this maladapted instinct. It is the disparity between the biologic defects of adaptive instincts at the core of the epileptic personality and the assumed genuineness of his narcissistic self-concern that cause such unfortunate social criticism. It seems clear from this that the author considers that epilepsy is the result of a biological defect which precludes the epileptic's adaptation to reality. His use of the term adaptive instinct is not in accordance with our present knowledge, for we have no evidence that such an instinct exists. The author says that the epileptic must be encouraged to break down his narcissistic wall of egoistic concern, and this in the first place by rooting out or building up his inferior instincts which breed a sense of inferiority.

In a case the author details he shows that the patient prefers his disease rather than give up his egoistic desires.

The article is useful as showing some of the psychological difficulties to be encountered in treating epileptics.

D. B.

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James Young. Study of a Severe Case of Obsessional Neurosis. *British Journal of Psychology (Medical Section)*, 1921, Vol. I, p. 135.

The author describes a case presenting an obsessive desire to urinate at inconvenient times, the prevention of which desire would cause *ejaculatio seminis*. The study is undertaken on Jung's lines. The author regards the desire to micturate as an expression of power, the libido being summoned too soon. This psychological hurry is a will to dominate every situation and is regarded as an emotional over-value. When the patient desired to meet a situation his available energy expressed itself through the organic channel as urinary or seminal discharge. His libido was short-circuited, the higher psychological paths being insufficiently canalized and resulting in inadequate expression. The inferior function of feeling remains inferior because the restricted family life hinders its development. Auto-erotism has developed with a well organized intellectual system and become a 'Will to Power'. The author has called this the superior function, it results in what Jung has called 'God-Almightiness'. The method by which the inferior function was made a conscious adapted function is described. The patient orientates his sexuality and is thus delivered from his compulsive micturition. 'After six months analysis all sexual repressions had been brought into consciousness.' A dream of playing the piano faster and more freely than ever before is quoted as an example of the idea of greater compass and range, and is the unconscious representation of the potentiality for canalization of the crude psychological mass which the author calls the inferior function. He considers that as masturbation had almost ceased during analysis, there is no repression on which the genesis of the dream depends, according to the Freudian hypothesis, therefore it does not refer to the sexual history and the past, but to the psychological potentiality and the future. It is assumed that the Freudian interpretation would reduce this dream to a repressed masturbation complex. The article concludes with an explanation of the aetiology of obsessions according to Jung and emphasises the view that because all sexual repressions had been brought into consciousness in six months, it was justifiable to consider the enlargement of the obsessive field beyond the purely sexual.

R. M. Riggall.

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E. Prideaux. Expression of Emotion in Cases of Mental Disorder as Shown by the Psycho-Galvanic Reflex. *British Journal of Psychology, (Medical Section)*. Vol. II, p. 23.

In his theoretical considerations as to the meaning of the term 'emotion', Prideaux discusses the theories of Stout, Shand, McDougall, Drever and others, finally defining emotion as 'a subjective feeling, consisting of central excitement and consciousness of peripheral

sensations, occasioned by situations which powerfully oppose or facilitate the aim of any instinctive impulse.' The muscular expression of emotion cannot be treated as a separate problem divorced from the question of control. In considering the question of the reality of emotion in hysterical persons, the author is inclined to agree with the views of James and Janet and believes that if it is restricted to subjective feeling, emotion may be artificial. He is only prepared to accept the over-determination of emotion by displacement in part, but believes that this mechanism occurs more frequently than is generally recognised. The development of the theory that emotion is expressed according to the amount of the visceral reaction, depends on further knowledge of the psycho-galvanic reflex. This reflex is, in the same person, at the same time and under the same conditions, an indication of the intensity of crude emotions as subjectively experienced.

Prideaux employs Féré's method of measuring emotional reactions and subjects each case to five or six stimuli, these being by (1) whistle, (2) dropping weight, (3) motor horn, (4) flashing of light, (5) threat to prick, (6) Dalby's clacker. The average of responses in terms of absolute decrease in ohmic resistance indicates the sensitivity for the galvanic reflex. According to his results, the normal decrease of resistance is 100 ohms; anxiety states, paranoia and delusional insanity are rather less; conversion hysteria, manic depressive, epilepsy and dementia praecox shew far less decrease, in imbeciles and idiots the resistance only falls 13.6 to 6.8 ohms, while in general paralysis there is no decrease at all. Prideaux considers that the reflex is conditioned by the state of the cerebral cortex, but that the relative parts played by the skin, the optic thalamus and the reactivity of the autonomic nervous system are still undetermined.

R. M. Riggall.

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Pierre Janet. The Fear of Action. *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 1921, Vol. XVI, June-September, p. 150.

The author states that the phobias of diverse objects or diverse situations are at the bottom phobias of action, as for instance, fear of the razor in barbers is fear of having to perform his trade, phobia of church bells, etc. fear of having to perform religious acts, fear of blushing is fear to expose oneself to social judgements, etc.

He says that 'Historically speaking, the symptoms of the various phobias of the different manias or obsessions were at the start innumerable, but they reduced themselves little by little to a very small number of phenomena of which they constitute the varieties or combinations'. This

does not seem to be the usual experience, for it is generally noticed that the phobia commences in a small way and gradually its sphere of influence is extended.

He considers that in all these curious disturbances mere depressions of activity are concerned which are more or less profound, and that they either involve the mind as a whole or bear down upon some one tendency or group of tendencies. The energy of performance being diminished but more especially the tensional level being lowered, the process of activation can no longer attain to the superior forms of behaviour.

D. B.

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Owen Berkeley-Hill. The Anal Complex and its Relation to Delusions of Persecution. *The Indian Medical Gazette*, July, 1921, Vol. LVI.

The author quotes two cases in support of Stürcke's and Ophuijsen's view that all delusions of persecution can be traced back to the anal complex.

The first case is that of a Goanese, aged thirty-three, who states that he is being persecuted by a certain Roman Catholic priest by means of a telescope which is connected with his (the patient's) head. The other end of the telescope is 'plugged'. By means of this instrument 'terrestrial magnetism' is conveyed to the patient by the priest. The patient also states that the priest has gone 'raving mad', and has jumped into a basket in which he has been ever since, deprived of all food and drink, and is unable to get out. The patient believes that by scratching the back of his left hand with his right forefinger he can cause the priest to pass a copious motion into the basket. He is now able to 'taunt' the priest on account of the amount of motion all about, for the priest cannot help having an evacuation of the bowels whenever the patient chooses to scratch his left hand.

The author adds that the patient prior to his admission to the Asylum had been for years a victim of severe constipation, and was largely indifferent to the defective action of his bowels.

In commenting on this case the author points out that the telescope with a plug in it clearly indicates a constipated bowel. The patient's delusion enables him to revenge himself on one or other of his parents (the priest acting as a substitutive figure for the parent). The whole idea might be expressed as follows: 'I will now show you what it is like to be dictated to in the matter of the evacuation of one's bowels'.

It seems that the author's remark that the whole idea can be summed up in the above quoted passage is a little too premature, as this only expresses one aspect of the case, whereas another, the homosexual, is

not touched upon. This latter aspect is also evident in the account of the case.

The second case is that of an elderly Eurasian female, a widow. This patient has delusions of being persecuted and robbed. She spends hours daily in collecting small pieces of quartz and other rubbish which she treasures up, declaring them to be 'jewels'. She has made a bag for these treasures which has an extraordinary resemblance to the lower portion of the large intestine including the rectum. The opening at the end of that portion which resembles the rectum in shape and size is like an anus with puckered edges. She is very irascible, very obstinate, and extremely neat and orderly, indicating the anal erotic character. Finally she is of the opinion that she has given birth to an incredible number of children.

The author does not make any comments on this case, but it undoubtedly supports the association of delusions of persecution with the anal complex.

D. B.

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Ralph Reed. Some Notes on the Stammering Problem. *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*. Vol. XVI, June-September, 1921, p. 161.

The author considers that the essential physical mechanism of stammering is nothing more than an undue amount of energy overflowing into the muscles of speech, i. e. the stammerer simply over-energizes his speech.

On the psychical side the author seems to lay most stress on the inferiority complex as a factor leading to stammering, but he fails to indicate the intrinsic relationship between the two.

He advocates psycho-analysis in cases of stammering.

D. B.

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Ch. Trepsat. Traitement d'un tiqueur par la psychanalyse. *Le Progrès Médical*, 22. Avril, 1922, p. 182.

It is pleasing to find evidence of French medical men taking an interest in psycho-analysis, however tentative that interest may be, and the article by Dr. Trepsat is welcome from this point of view. But, on the other hand, we would have preferred that the author should have chosen some other title than 'Treatment by Psycho-Analysis', because unfortunately psycho-analysis was not employed; the author simply used what might be called 'psychological analysis'. We deprecate the misuse

of the word psycho-analysis because readers are very apt to be misled by it. Writers on these subjects would be doing a much greater service to psycho-analysis if in reporting cases they showed how such cases could be explained according to Freud's theories. This the author has not attempted.

The case reported by the author, which by the way he says he radically cured in a few days by the application of the psycho-analytic method, is that of a severe tic occurring in a man aged twenty-seven years, and which had commenced when he was fifteen years old.

The tic consisted of contraction and extension of the right arm and leg with a rotation of the body to the left. It lasted four to five seconds, leaving the patient somewhat exhausted and emotionally disturbed for a minute or so after the attack.

The author in his treatment of the case made use of Jung's method of word association and free association on the reaction words, and a superficial analysis of the patient's dreams.

The chief element in the case seems to be remorse over adolescent masturbation, which in being talked over brought about a cessation of the spasms.

The author does not advance any explanation of the genesis of the tic.

D. B.

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William Brown, Charles S. Myers, W. McDougall. The Revival of Emotional Memories and its Therapeutic Value. *British Journal of Psychology (Medical Section)*, 1920, Vol. I, p. 16.

The first number of the *Medical Section* opens with a symposium on the revival of emotional memories. William Brown believes that the important therapeutic factor is the revival, with emotional or hallucinatory vividness, of the forgotten painful memories. He considers the liberation of the pent-up emotion by abreaction to be the most important factor, but he also attaches some importance to the abolition of amnesia and the re-synthesis of the mind. In cases of hysterical shell-shock a two-fold dissociation occurs. First, certain psycho-physical functions, with their accompanying memories, become dissociated from personal consciousness and, secondly, there is a dissociation between the psycho-physical and physical counterparts of the emotional reaction of fear. The physical counterpart then persists instead of being evanescent. The former dissociation is concerned with the sensorimotor, and the latter with the sympathetic nervous system. These dissociations may be abolished by revival of the emotion with hallucinatory vividness. Emotional over-emphasis is considered

responsible for the relative autonomy of these memories and the value of this method, which the author calls 'autognosis', consists in the withdrawal of the emotional over-emphasis. This abreaction is not merely mechanical but intellectually controlled at every stage.

C. S. Myers is unable to accept Brown's view that the revival of emotional expression is the most important factor, and considers that the return of the unpleasant memory of the scene is more important, i.e., the revival of the dissociated affective and cognitive experience. In treating these cases he discourages undue prominence of emotional response and suggests to the patient that he will be enabled to re-experience calmly the painful events. Myers believes that it is the recall of the repressed scene and not the 'working out' of the 'bottled up emotional energy' which is responsible for the cure. In support of this theory he cites Freud's remark that it is the unpleasant which is repressed and not primarily the emotional. Therefore the cause of functional amnesia is not the repression of the emotional, but repression of the affective component. The value of Brown's 'autognosis' lies in the relief of affective-cognitive repression and not so much in the securing of emotional revival as in the redintegration of the dissociated components of the mind.

W. McDougall thinks that the theory of abreaction is based on the Freudian conception of an emotion as a quantum of energy which may become attached to any idea. His criticism of this theory is that it savours too much of the old theory of ideas, according to which an idea is an entity which may remain in the mind. If this theory is not accepted, why should the revival of an emotional experience bring relief? It might, as is sometimes the case, accentuate the trouble. McDougall thinks that Brown recognises that the emotional excitement is not in itself the curative process, but that it is contributory only to the relief of the amnesia or dissociation, this being the essential step in the process of cure. Display of emotion in the process of abreaction is only of value in making the scene more complete. Emotional excitement only contributes to the relief of dissociation. Cognitive processes may become dissociated although they are still connected with their affective dispositions, which are in a condition of abnormal activity. McDougall considers that Brown's 'autognosis' works through the redintegration of dissociated cognitive processes rather than by the abreaction of pent up emotion.

In replying, William Brown explains that he uses the term 'autognosis' to emphasise a new factor of self-objectification and self-scrutiny. He considers Myers' distinction between affect and emotion to be artificial, but agrees with his statement that conflict and attempted repression do not necessarily precede dissociation. He suggests that

the reinstatement of intense emotion may act physically in overcoming synaptic resistances. In elaborating his physiological theory of dissociation and re-association, he thinks that McDougall really accepts abreaction as an explanation of reintegration. He cannot, however, agree with McDougall's statement that the question of emotional memory is an unusual one, and mentions that Freud has difficulty in contrasting 'unconscious affects' with 'unconscious ideas', recognising that the problem of the former differs from that of the latter.

Robert M. Riggall.

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C. G. Jung. The Question of the Therapeutic Value of 'Abreaction'. *British Journal of Psychology (Medical Section)*, Vol. II, p. 13.

This paper is written in consequence of some important considerations brought forward by William McDougall in his paper on 'The Revival of Emotional Memories and its Therapeutic Value'. McDougall's article appeared in the *Medical Section* of the *British Journal of Psychology*, Vol. I, Part 1, and has previously been abstracted.

After pointing out that the traumatic origin of the neurosis is generally an artifact of medical phantasy, Jung proceeds to discuss certain cases in which the trauma is actually causative in the sense of *causa efficiens*. He agrees with McDougall's statement that in some cases abreaction is not only inadequate but actually harmful. Also he concurs with the view that the essential factor is dissociation, and that the integration of this dissociation is more important than the abreaction. Jung has found that a traumatic complex creates a dissociated condition of the psyche which is removed from control and is in a condition of psychical autonomy. Abreaction is an attempt to re-integrate this autonomous complex. Jung then explains, according to his own views, the importance of transference in the abreaction. This transference he considers to be the result of the human interest and personal devotion of the physician: these are moral qualities. The therapeutic effect depends upon the amount of labour the physician employs to enter into the patient's psyche. The author endeavours to point out the error of the exclusively sexual interpretation of dreams and phantasies and states that the patient in his wilderness of sexual phantasy, ends by clinging to the physician with a convulsive erotic transference which means spiritual devastation.

The article continues in this strain of eulogy for the author's mystical and somewhat religious ideals, the Freudian analytic technique being severely criticised. Transference is dealt with in some detail and the importance of the individual relationship between physician and patient is emphasised. This, the author considers, should replace the slavish and

degrading dependence on the transference in the building up process. It is further stated that the advancement of the healing effect depends primarily on the mental and moral nature of the physician.

R. M. Riggall.

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Delgado, Honorio F. *Psicología y Fisiología. Relaciones entre el alma y el cuerpo, desde el punto de vista médico. Rev. de Psiquiatria, 1920, Año III.*

In this article Delgado denies the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, as well as all attempts to explain psychic processes anatomically. As in his other writings, here too he takes up his position on psycho-analytic ground and emphasises the importance of the erotogenic zones, whose function best enables us to understand the connection between the organic and the psychic. Unfortunately, here again the author brings Adler's theory of organ-inferiority too closely into relation with psycho-analysis.

K. Abraham.

Dreams

Mary Sturt. A Note on Some Dreams of a Normal Person. *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, 1922, Vol. XIII, p. 149.

A superficial analysis of six dreams relating to a conflict concerning a homosexual affection, these dreams being brought into connection with certain verses produced by the dreamer on the same theme. These verses are produced in a way that seems to be removed from the direct control of consciousness, although the actual writing is carried out in a conscious state. The conflict with which the dreams are concerned was one of which, we are told, the dreamer was 'fully conscious'; and the author seems to consider that the dreams are of interest (apart from their connection with the poetry) because 'when it is so frequently assumed that the conflicts which are represented in dreams belong to the "unconscious", evidence that this need not be so is of value'.

J. C. F.

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W. H. R. Rivers. Affect in the Dream. *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, 1921, Vol. XII, p. 113.

In this paper the author follows up the line of thought with regard to the Censorship that he has already taken up in an article on 'Freud's Concept of the Censorship' in the *Psychoanalytic Review* (republished in *Instinct and the Unconscious*). In the latter article he had argued that

'the fantastic character of the dream is not due to any process of distortion designed to elude the vigilance of some anthropomorphic agency watching at the threshold of consciousness, but is the natural result of the infantile character of the dream'—a character which he regards as 'the direct consequence of the coming into activity of modes of behaviour which in the waking state are held in check by levels of mental activity embodying the experience of later life'.

In the present paper he endeavours to show that the nature of the affects experienced in the dream also follows naturally from the fact that the dream constitutes a regression to an infantile level of mentality.

A dream, says Dr. Rivers, is an attempt to solve in sleep the conflicts of waking life.

'If the guise in which a conflict finds expression in a dream is one which would be terrifying to a child, the dream will be accompanied by affect in the form of terror. If, on the other hand, the imagery and symbolism in which a conflict is finding expression are of a kind so natural to the child that they would not be accompanied by affect, there will be no affect in the dream. The situation as portrayed in the dream may be one of adult life, but the dream-reaction is that of the child so far as the affect is concerned'.

While this seems to be the main thesis of the paper, the author also holds that the degree of affect corresponds to the extent to which a repressed tendency is transformed or disguised—the greater the disguise, the less the affect. War dreams and frankly sexual dreams have strong affect—unpleasant and pleasant respectively—because a repressed tendency is openly expressed in them.

As a third proposition it is maintained that the quality of the affect is closely related to the success with which the dream finds a solution for the conflict to which it gives expression.

'The affect is painful when the conflict fails to satisfy the most prominent wishes of the dreamer. On the other hand, it is pleasant when these wishes are gratified. But in the majority of dreams the affective aspect is slight or absent because the struggle is transformed and the solution of the conflict is only of a symbolic kind'.

Unfortunately no attempt is made here to consider in detail the relationship between these three propositions concerning the conditions that determine the affect of dreams, so that, interesting and suggestive as the paper undoubtedly is, the impression left on the reader is that Dr. Rivers's views on the dream, at the time of writing this paper, were still in certain respects nebulous and ill-defined and had not yet been clearly worked out to their logical conclusions.

J. C. F.

Maurice Nicoll. An Outline of the Idea of Rebirth in dreams. *British Journal of Psychology, (Medical Section)*, 1921, Vol. I, p. 125.

This paper is written according to the teaching of the Zurich school. Nicoll states that the rebirth theme is the very basis of our psychical life and that the symbols of death and resurrection stand for a dynamic principle which is responsible for neurosis formation. During certain critical periods of life such as puberty, biological transformations seek an outlet as from within, and rebirth dreams are especially common. The coming function which is in the unconscious as energy, is represented as a symbol and repression is connected with the future. Rebirth symbolism in dreams represents a crisis in life and primarily expresses a movement towards or into the mother. The concrete expression of this movement as an incest wish is horizonless and blots out the ultimate meaning which is an attempt at healing or regeneration. The second significant feature is lying in the womb; associations are important in determining whether the baby represents the birth of individuality and psychological freedom or merely infantility which represents psychological bondage. The emergence from the womb is the third act in the rebirth drama and means that something is to be gained after rebirth. This idea is significant in myth and ritual. To remain in the mother is disastrous.

R. M. Riggall.

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F. Parkes Weber. Thoughts about Thinking and Dreaming, and the Freudian Explanation of Dreams. *Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology*, 1920, Vol. I, p. 24.

A general article containing no point except an expression of the author's personal disbelief in the frequent occurrence of sexual symbolism in dream formation.

E. J.

Childhood

Ernest Jones. Some Problems of Adolescence. *British Journal of Psychology (General Section)*, 1922, Vol. XIII, p. 31.

A very interesting and suggestive paper that should be read in the original.

The author asks first, in what does 'growing up' consist? Among the principal criteria of mental growth he finds:

1. increase of intellectual power; though he is inclined to believe that advance here is less great than is often supposed, since the in-

hibitions inseparable from the process of education frequently hinder the free use of the intellect.

2. greater integration, i.e. greater co-ordination among the various components of the mind—this being dependent on a heightened capacity for inhibition.

3. decreasing ego-centricity and self-sufficiency, accompanied by a greater interest and love for persons and things in the outer world. Connected with this is the replacement of phantasy by greater adaptation to reality.

4. a diminution in the degree of dependence; this being due in the last resort (as psycho-analysis has shown) to an outgrowing of the infantile attachment to one or other parent.

5. sexual development, along the lines revealed by psycho-analytic research.

Having considered these criteria of growth, the author proceeds to the main thesis of the paper, which is that during adolescence 'the individual *recapitulates and expands* the development he passed through in the first five years of life', adolescence being thus in some ways comparable as regards growth to early childhood, while later childhood with its relative fixity and stability has a closer resemblance to fully adult life. This recapitulation, he maintains, is to be seen most easily in the sexual sphere (though it can also be observed as regards the other aspects of development), and with a view to making this clear, he proceeds to a somewhat detailed comparison of sexual development in infancy and adolescence respectively. In both of them he distinguishes five stages, though he points out that any such division is schematic and represents an over-simplification of the facts. These stages are: (a) diffuse auto-erotism, (b) the 'pregenital' organisations, (c) narcissism, (d) homosexuality, (e) heterosexuality. As regards the last stage

'the heterosexual impulse commonly shows the following difference in its fate at the two periods of life. At both it most often breaks through the barriers of prohibition and reaches a directly sexual goal, but whereas in childhood this part of the impulse usually becomes increasingly subordinated to the constituents that are inhibited in respect of this goal, i.e. to family affection and the like, in adolescence it is for physiological reasons the directly sexual ones that grow progressively stronger, often entering into severe conflict with the other set before harmony is finally established by a fusion of the two in successful love'.

The author then endeavours to establish the parallelism between infancy and adolescence as regards the other above-mentioned criteria of growth. As regards intellectual power and integration (1 and 2 above), both are largely dependent on inhibition and

'the two periods of life at which the acquirement of inhibition is most active are those of infancy and adolescence.... In its development into childhood the infant learns to hold in suspense the action of various stimuli on the mind... to endure it without immediate motor or emotional response, to postpone such response to the most satisfactory moment, and to co-ordinate it with the other forces operative in the mind. The adolescent, passing into manhood or womanhood, acquires a still higher degree of this capacity to tolerate stimulation and inhibit response'.

Possibly in infancy the inhibition aims primarily at motor control, in adolescence at emotional control. In this emphasis on the occurrence of inhibition as a necessary condition of advance in intelligence, the author makes good an omission in the earlier part of his paper, where he had dwelt only on the adverse effects of inhibition on intelligence, and comes into line with certain other important workers on intelligence who have laid stress on the inhibition that is necessarily involved in an intellectual process. At the same time the earlier-mentioned adverse effects of (excessive) inhibition are also of great significance—as psycho-analytic work is beginning to show—so that it seems probable that one of the most important problems for future research on intelligence (both from the theoretical and the practical point of view) will be the determination of the direction and degree of inhibition that will ensure the maximum development of intelligence. 'The growth of the power of inhibition at the two ages in question must certainly be correlated with the circumstance that they are the two most emotional ages of man; in fact it would seem as though the inhibition is a reaction to the rush of emotion so characteristic of these periods of life'. Though if there is any truth in the view, recently advocated in various quarters, that emotion—like intelligence—is connected with an inhibition of response, it would appear that the opposite process also takes place.

The same correspondence in development also takes place as regards the third criterion of mental growth—the increasing interest in the outer world, though the process of adaptation to reality is, at both ages, closely connected with the sexual change from narcissism to object-love.

As regards the fourth criterion—diminishing dependence—the adolescent appears to work through again the primitive Oedipus situation, with the result that 'when the fully adult stage is reached, the incestuous attachments are abandoned; a strange love object is found, who is loved not only with feeling of an "inhibited" nature but also with those of a directly sexual kind'. It is, the author thinks, the 'inhibited libido' of incestuous origin which is chiefly used in the process of education. Hence this process is endangered both by excessive auto-erotic functioning and by excessive non-incestuous hetero-erotic activity.

The child grows up in virtue of an internal urge, which tends to make it recapitulate the history of the species. This force is opposed by a conservative tendency to cling to former levels of development, the tendency that manifests itself in 'regression' and 'fixation'. There exist external influences corresponding to and favouring both of these tendencies—in particular the reluctance of parents to see their children grow up constitutes a serious external hindrance to development. Society in general appears to exert an influence towards an ever increasing postponement of maturity.

The author believes that man is the only animal in which development is gone through twice in the way indicated in this paper.

J. C. F.

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David Forsyth. *The Infantile Psyche, with Special Reference to Visual Projection. British Journal of Psychology (General Section) 1921, Vol. XI, p. 263.*

This is a very suggestive paper which will well repay study in the original.

The author deals first with the extreme importance of visual imagery in children, an aspect of the infantile psyche which, he thinks, has received inadequate attention at the hands of child psychologists. These images, he holds, are connected with emotions, and their essential function is 'to serve as a substitutive or imaginative relief of feeling in lieu of real gratification'; their purpose is 'to realise an unfulfilled desire'. It is to be regretted that this important thesis, which is stated rather dogmatically, should not have been developed and illustrated more fully. In the early years of life images are 'projected' and seen with hallucinatory vividness. 'Younger children at any rate never doubt that they are seeing real objects, and even fairly old children, though they may seek to explain them away as imaginary, can by no means altogether dispossess themselves of the feeling that they are real'. The same may happen to many adults under stress of feeling and may occur habitually in the insane.

These hallucinations tend to constitute the 'psychic reality' of the child, as distinguished from the 'objective reality' of the adult, which arises from the stimulation of the sensory capacities externally *via* the sense organs (as distinguished from their stimulation from within in the case of hallucination). The one kind of reality gradually gives place to the other; the conflict between the two constitutes one of the most important problems that have to be dealt with in the course of mental development and itself affords a considerable stimulus to intellectual progress.

It is obvious that on this view of development very great importance must attach to the process of learning to distinguish the image (in the narrow sense of the term usually employed in psychology) from experiences of sensory character, and the details of the process are worthy of more attention than they have yet received. Unfortunately the author tells us little or nothing in this paper as to how the image loses its hallucinatory vividness and thus comes to be distinguishable from experiences aroused *via* the sense organs. It would seem possible that the study of hypnagogic and hypnopompic phenomena may eventually prove of much interest in this connection.

The two kinds of reality correspond to Freud's distinction between the Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle. 'The Pleasure Principle represents the quest of psychic truth, the Reality Principle that of objective truth. The one concerns only the relief of feeling, the other the recognition of peripheral sensory impressions'. Following on these considerations, the author is of opinion that 'the Reality Principle is not genetically derived from the Pleasure Principle but arises independently'. He is however willing to admit that the Reality Principle has also 'at any rate one root which is hedonic'. Like Freud he regards this common element as being concerned with the relief of tension. But his conception of the nature of this 'relief of tension' in the case of the Reality Principle seems to be quite different from that of Freud. Whereas the latter conceives (if the present reviewer understands the matter rightly) that the Reality Principle ultimately serves the gratification of the same wishes as are gratified in the case of the Pleasure Principle, only by a longer, more difficult but more permanently satisfactory method, Dr. Forsyth appears to think that the gratification afforded by the Reality Principle is directly connected with the process of peripheral stimulation. 'Peripheral sensations', he says, 'imply excitation of the peripheral organs whichever these may be, and this stimulation involves the relief of tension and is a source of pleasure. Sensory impressions therefore are themselves pleasurable in the first instance'. This latter view, it is important to note, seems to be in direct opposition to that enunciated by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

The Pleasure Principle, in its further evolution leads to Religion, while the Reality Principle is connected with the development of Science.

In the later part of the paper Magic, Animism and the Projection of Feeling are dealt with in the light of the preceding considerations.

There is, we may observe, one difficult and (from the theoretical point of view at least) important problem which arises directly out of the questions here dealt with but which finds no mention in this paper.

The problem concerns the primitive relation between images and sensation in the nascent mind, both in the individual and the race. Phylogenetically there is reason to suppose that sensation is prior to image. Imagery is an aspect of those 'free ideas' which psychologists usually regard as implying a relatively advanced stage of mental development. Again, on Dr. Forsyth's own showing, imagery implies insistent stimulation from within, or, in psychological terms, not easily satisfied wishes; and these also, as has recently been clearly stated by Dr. Varendonck (*L'Evolution des Facultés Conscientes*, p. 173 ff.), are signs of a high degree of development. Imagery, moreover, only copies and recombines that which we have experienced in sensation, and therefore seems to be, both historically and functionally, dependent on sensation. These facts do not seem to fit in well with the historical position of the Pleasure Principle, as usually stated, and suggest that the Pleasure Principle does not strictly speaking correspond to the most primitive level of our mental life, but is more in the nature of an intermediate stage made possible by the development of images. This is a problem to which Bleuler has already drawn attention (*Das autistische Denken*, *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse*, 1912, Bd. IV, S. 28) but which has so far received but little notice from psycho-analysts.

J. C. F.

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Affective Disturbances on Responses to the Stanford-Binet Test. *Mental Hygiene*, 1922, Vol. VI, p. 39.

Terman claimed in 1916 that the intelligence quotient, as determined by the Stanford-Binet scale, remains constant for the individual, and that there is not one case in fifty in which the I. Q. proves unreliable. Bronner showed the great importance of affective conditions at the time of the test, but Terman contends that anomalies due to affective disturbances arise only when the scale is used by 'untrained and indiscreet examiners'. Further experience has, however, convinced the clinician that in certain cases, at least, the I. Q. does not become stabilised until the end of the developmental period is reached, at fourteen or sixteen years. This is recognised in the case of the low-grade feeble-minded, in which the I. Q. drops as physical age increases, and in some cases of superior children with whom spurts of mental development may occur, but the extent to which an average intelligence may be masked by the operation of affective factors has not yet been realised. The authors bring forward evidence of great value, for the majority of the fourteen cases quoted were tested and graded as to their I. Q. by well-known and thoroughly competent psychologists; the

anomalies observed cannot therefore be ascribed to carelessness or indiscretion on the part of the examiner.

These fourteen cases are described in detail. They cover not only such factors as the after-effects of an attack of psychosis, of the withdrawal of drugs and of organic illnesses such as encephalitis, but, what is of greater practical importance, the influence of an emotionally unstable make-up, now often referred to as 'psychic constitutional inferiority', and even such slight emotional disturbances as the anxiety and fear caused by unusual surroundings. In each case, variation in the I. Q. as determined at two or three different periods was directly ascribable to affective conditions, and in each the variation was in the direction of normality as the disturbing factors gradually subsided. As a rule it was not suspected at the time of the first testing that the I. Q. obtained was not the true index of the intelligence level, this only transpiring when the later improvement in the social responses of the individual seemed to call for a revision of judgment.

The most significant of these cases, in relation to the general reliability of intelligence tests, are those of 'psychic constitutional inferiority', for it is just in such cases that the emotional disturbances are likely to be unsuspected beforehand, and extremely difficult to detect during the application of the test; and the judgment of border-line deficiency is almost sure to be given. In four such cases quoted here, the I. Q. first determined at 62-72 was later raised to 81-88, thus bringing these individuals from high-grade deficiency to within the range of normal intelligence. The authors insist that where there is any indication of emotional instability, and the first test rates such an individual as of border line intelligence, two or more tests must be given. No I. Q., moreover, should be taken as final where there is a scattered and uneven distribution of performance or when any peculiarities of response—such as slow reaction time, necessity of repeating instructions constantly, irrelevant associations, etc.—are observed, as these are certain indications of affective blocking; and 'it cannot be too strongly emphasised that not the I. Q. alone, but the whole clinical picture, past history, etc., must be taken into account in deciding the intelligence of the individual.'

S. S. Brierley.

Applied Psycho-Analysis

G. Stragnell. A Psychopathological Study of Knut Hamsun's *Hunger*. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1922, Vol. IX, p. 198.

Stragnell suggests that the hard lot which befel the principal character of Hamsun's *Hunger* was not due, as might superficially appear, to the adversity of circumstance, but to a cardinal trait in his

personality—masochism—which made him reject the actual possibilities of success and indulge in conduct that infallibly led to poverty. This trait Stragnell then connects with the childish wish for dependence on the father.

E. J.

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Constance Long. *Mary Rose*. A Study of the Infantile Personality. *British Journal of Psychology*. (Medical Section), Vol. II, p. 68.

This is an analysis of Barrie's play according to Jung's teaching. The author states that it is the story of the Oedipus myth in modern form. The disappearances of Mary Rose and 'the Island that likes to be visited' are symbolic of a disappearance into the unconscious or into the region of dreams and phantasies. Mary Rose's phantasy of 'the little old woman' or 'queer one', personifies the lure of the unconscious on its dread side; the beckoning of the mother-deep. In 'The Little White Bird', Barrie says: 'The only ghosts I believe who creep into this world are dead young mothers, returning to see how their children fare... they do not know their child.' The analysis of this symbolically true picture would shew a personification of the longing for the idealised mother that persists in the adult. The author explains that the maternal image becomes split off from consciousness by repression and reappears as an automatism; this causes undue phantasy and escape from reality. The ghost becomes a projection of the unconscious incestuous wish. Mary Rose portrays psychological incest which is unconscious adaptation to the parents and the stabilisation of the wish to remain a child; the wish for pleasure instead of reality. This regressive tendency to the mother narrows the personality and creates irresponsibility, old thoughts and feelings express themselves everywhere, these tendencies are found in all classes. Analytical psychology shews that these tendencies are solved either by adaptation to life or regression to old channels. Ambivalency causes the mother to stand for the child or herself, promoting adaptation or causing a perpetual alteration of values. Those who never free themselves from parental complexes fail to fulfil the rôle of successful parenthood themselves. Parents should assist in the mental liberation of their children. Mary Rose's parents betrayed their child to death because they refused to let her think out her own problems. Mary Rose's first dissociation occurred at twelve years of age in the pre-puberty stage. In Maeterlinck's drama *The Betrothal*, the phantasies have a prospective meaning but in *Mary Rose* they are retrospective and regressive and lead to contraction of the personality. Mary Rose's absence is compared to a dissociated state or psychosis, the drama like a dream depicts something that is psychically true. Dr. Long has interpreted it on the subjective plane.

Mary Rose's wish for the child rôle is revealed when she says 'the happiest time... will be... when my child takes me upon his knee instead of my taking him on mine.' In the final scene, as a ghost, she accomplishes her wish. Mary Rose's parents have been unable to escape from their bondage in psychological incest: they were in love with their child. Her mother wishes to make everyone a child over whom she can reign as queen; she therefore is responsible for this domestic tragedy. The father has repressed his thinking function and rejects the male task. Mary Rose's son unconsciously sought his mother when he ran away to sea; when he meets her angry ghost holding his own knife, Dr. Long rejects the concrete incest wish and thinks the knife symbolises the weapon of the will, this should be in his own hands and not in those of his mother.¹ He recovers the knife and releases not only his mother (his subjectivity), but himself. He thus overcomes his infantile attitude and the power of the mother imago is counteracted.

R. M. Riggall.

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F. M. Cornford. The Unconscious Element in Literature and Philosophy. *Proceedings of the Classical Association*. 1922.

An important theme handled in this paper is that of the universal meaning of the myth and its connection with the unconscious psychic layers. Mr. Cornford, whose contributions to the enquiries into the relations between prehistoric institutions and Greek culture are well-known, urges that ideas such as that of marriage with the Earth-mother, or 'participation in the barely personified life of all nature' (the Eniautos Daimon of Miss J. E. Harrison's researches), inevitably become 'enshrined in a continuous tradition of myth, legend, poetry' and remain also latent in human experience as a system of knowledge 'linked together by chords of association that vibrate without the interposition of rational, directed thinking.' Passing on to the results of psycho-analysis as they touch the humanistic studies, the writer argues with a convincing lucidity that the appeal of the myth (and therefore of the tragedy of which it is the kernel) lies in the fact that it, like the dream, symbolises 'the universal inner experience' that 'besets every new life that comes into the world to confront the task of adapting itself to what it finds there.' Hence 'a play like the Oedipus is not a stiff archaic monument of a bygone age but a living thing that shakes every fibre of our moral being'.

¹ Dr. Long omits to mention the important symbolism in the final scene of this play when the son enters the empty nursery through a short and narrow passage, holding a lighted candle in his hand. His mother's ghost then appears.

The line of thought, it will be seen, is that worked out in psycho-analytic detail by Dr. O. Rank in his *Mythenforschungen* but its presentation by one of the most distinguished English exponents of Greek literature and thought cannot fail to be of much significance.

It is impossible here to do more than refer to that part of the paper that deals with the unconscious in philosophy. Mr. Cornford suggests that Anaximander's concept of the 'unlimited' (*τὸ ἄπειρον*) worldstuff may have arisen from the unconscious mind of the philosopher himself, dimly aware of what Dr. Jung calls the 'collective unconscious' within him, and that with both may be connected the primitive image of Mana.

C. J. M. Hubback.

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Alfred Loisy. Les rites totémiques des naturels australiens. *Revue d'hist. et de littérature religieuses*. Mars 1920.

Dans cette étude Loisy ne se laisse aller à aucun essai d'interprétation des symboles ou des rites. Il se limite à la description purement extérieure, mais très complète et circonstanciée, des rites totémiques des naturels australiens, tels qu'ils ont été étudiés sur place par Spencer et Gillen, Howitt, Strehlow. On y trouvera une grande richesse de documentation, et d'autant plus variée que l'auteur précisément ne se laisse guider par aucune théorie interprétative quelconque.

Ferdinand Morel.

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J. S. Van Teslaar. The Death of Pan: A Classical Instance of Verbal Misinterpretation. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1921, Vol. VIII, p. 180.

It is here maintained, following Reinach's investigations, that the early Christian traditions about the death of Pan arose as a simple mis-hearing. An Egyptian pilot named Thamus confounded the chant *θαμνος, θαμνος, θαμνος πανμηγας τεθνηκας* with the message *θαμνος, παν ο μεγας τεθνηκας*.

E. J.

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Leo Kaplan. Analysis of 'The Picture of Dorian Gray'. *Psyche and Eros*, 1922, Vol. III, p. 8.

An interesting analysis of Oscar Wilde's 'The Picture of Dorian Gray'.

E. J.

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C. Moxon. Epileptic Traits in Paul of Tarsus. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1922, Vol. IX, pp. 60.

A short paper maintaining that St. Paul displayed epileptic character traits. E. J.

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Ralph C. Hamill. The Role of the Risqué Story. *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, Vol. XVI, October-November, 1921, p. 269.

The author considers that risqué stories are developed, listened to and told in order to meet the elements of terror arising from the problem many experience in adjusting themselves to the sensuousness inseparable from the function of reproduction. In other words, 'That which was a fear is spoken of as a joke and tension is eased'.

D. B.

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Alfred Loisy. Les rites d'initiation chez les naturels australiens. *Revue d'hist. et de littérature religieuses*. Juin et sept. 1920.

Ici encore Loisy se borne à donner une description de l'aspect extérieur de certains rites australiens en utilisant les récits de Spencer et Gillen, Howitt, Strehlow. On trouvera dans cette étude une foule de détails concernant l'initiation à la virilité par la circoncision et la subincision, par le rite du 'choc de la dent', par le rite figurant la mort et la résurrection des candidats à l'initiation commune, par le rite très significatif de la séparation des fils d'avec les mères. L'auteur, qui est très sobre d'interprétation, admet toutefois que le rite de la circoncision et celui de la subincision sert à *faire* le développement—en l'exagérant—de l'organe viril, en dégageant l'organe du prépuce.

Ferdinand Morel.

BOOK REVIEWS

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. By Sigm. Freud, M.D., LL.D. Authorized Translation by James Strachey. (The International Psycho-Analytical Press, London, 1922, Price 7s. 6d. or 1.80 Dollars.)

I

THE ADVANCE IN INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

On considering the development of the sciences as a whole, it is repeatedly forced upon one that progress in a straight line usually leads rapidly to a dead stop, so that further advance can only be made successfully from some other, often quite unexpected or unlikely, point of departure. I was able to demonstrate so universally surprising a fact on a previous occasion, when I had to consider Freud's *Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*, a purely psychological piece of research, as an important advance in biology, that is, in a physical science discipline, an advance that biology would never have achieved by its own efforts. This 'utraqismus' of a real politics of science, as I should like to call it, is maintained not only in the striking contrast of the objective (physical sciences) and subjective (psychological) methods of knowledge, but also within the limits of psychology itself. We had hardly soothed ourselves with the assumption that individual psychological psycho-analytical facts are the essentials, the 'application' of which would solve the more complex manifestations of the group mind (art, religion, myth-formation, etc.), when already Freud's newly published work on *Group Psychology* destroys the certainty of this assumption: on the contrary, it shows us that research into the processes of group psychology can solve important problems of individual psychology. In the following I shall emphasize the most important advances that the normal and pathological psychology of the individual owes to Freud's dissection of the group mind.

The author puts aside the idea, usually mechanically adopted by all writers, that mass manifestations only occur in a 'crowd', that is, in a circle of a large number of individuals. Rather he establishes the fact that the same affective and intellectual manifestations may equally well

occur among a small number of people, for instance, in the family; indeed, in the relationship to one single person, in the 'group-formation of two people'. This point of view permits us to alter fundamentally our opinion of one of the most remarkable and, for individual psychology, most important processes, that is, of hypnosis and suggestion.

While the earlier writers tried to explain group phenomena by suggestion, without being able to show in what the essence of the latter consisted, Freud found that really the historical development of group phenomena must be made use of to explain the processes concerned in suggestion between two individuals. The source of susceptibility to hypnosis, according to Freud, may be traced back to primitive human times, to the human horde, for whom the eye of the dread horde-father, lord of death and life for all, still had actually throughout life for all members of the horde the same paralysing effect, the same circumscribing of every independent activity, of every individual intellectual effort, that the glance of the hypnotist produces even to this day on his 'mediums'. Hypnotic power is therefore to be attributed to the fear of this glance, while the other methods of producing hypnosis (monotonous noises, fixation of the eyes upon a point) only take up the conscious attention of the person to be put to sleep, so that his unconscious may yield the more surely to the power of the hypnotist. In opposition to Bernheim's assumption, which we had hitherto preferred, according to which hypnosis would only be a form of suggestion, we must now assume with Freud that the capacity for being hypnotised is the fundamental phenomenon which must explain suggestibility; the capacity for being hypnotised itself, however, signifies not only, as we had thought until now, a vestige of childish fear of the stern father, but also a return of emotions experienced by human beings of the primitive horde period in the presence of the dreaded leader of the horde. Research into group psychology therefore gives us the phylogenetic parallel for the autogenesis of the capacity to be hypnotised. If now we consider the central position of the question of suggestion and hypnosis in the pathology and therapy of the neuroses, in pedagogy, etc., it is at once evident that the fundamental revision of the views hitherto held about them will make itself felt throughout the whole of normal and pathological psychology.

The second essential novelty that individual psycho-analysis owes to these researches into group psychology, is the discovery of a new developmental stage of the ego and the libido. As is well known, the transference neuroses, the starting-point of every psycho-analytical research and for a long period its only object, enabled Freud to reconstruct the developmental phases of the sexual instinct almost without a gap. The second factor in the formation of a neurosis, the ego,

remained, however, last as first an unanalysable, compact mass, concerning the structure of which only the most highly conjectural conceptions could be formed. Some light was certainly introduced into this obscurity by the study of the narcissistic neuro-psychoses and of the love-life of normal people; but Freud was only able to establish a real 'grade' in the ego on the basis of this research into group psychology. This higher ego-grade that replaced the primitive narcissism of the child and of humanity is arrived at by detaching from the permanent primary narcissistic ego an 'ego-ideal', the model that one sets up internally against which to measure all one's activities and qualities. This ego-ideal (which Freud in any case had previously suspected and designated 'ego-nucleus') takes over the important function of the testing of the reality of things, the functions of the moral conscience, of self-observation and dream-censorship; it is also the force at work in creating the 'repressed unconscious' so significant for the formation of the neuroses. The development of this grade in the ego runs parallel with a libidinal process of its own, that must now be inserted as a special developmental phase between narcissism and object-love (or, more correctly, between the still strongly narcissistic-oral and sadistic-anal stages of organisation and real object-love)—namely, identification. By this process the various objects of the external world are not, as in the cannibalistic phase, actually but only imaginarily 'incorporated' or, as we have hitherto been in the habit of expressing it, introjected; that is, their qualities are annexed and attributed to one's own ego. When one identifies oneself thus with an object (person) a bridge is instantly made between the ego and the external world, and this connection later allows of the displacement of the accent from the intransitive 'to be' on to the transitive 'to have', that is, of the development from identification to real object-love. Fixation upon this stage of identification renders it possible, however, for a regression to take place from every later phase of object-love back to the stage of identification; this occurs most noticeably in certain pathological processes, but not less markedly in the hitherto uncomprehended manifestations of the group mind. Naturally, hypostatizing these new stages in the development of the ego and the libido opens up a wide perspective; it will certainly bring many as yet insufficiently elucidated manifestations of individual psychology and psychopathology nearer to comprehension.

Although in his work on group psychology Freud has occupied himself above all with the dynamics of the group mind, nevertheless he could not but also elaborate some particular chapters on the neuroses that he had left incompleted in earlier researches. From the wealth of material before me I shall select only a few examples.

Previous clinical analytical research had established that masculine homosexuality usually appears as a reaction to an earlier heterosexual tendency which had been unduly strong. Now, however, we learn from Freud that this reaction also occurs as a regression from object-love to identification. Woman is given up as an external love-object, but is set up again within the ego instead by means of identification, in place of the ego-ideal; the man therefore becomes feminine, and finally turns to another man in order that the originally heterosexual relationship should be once more established, even if reversed.

A new insight into the pathogenesis of paranoia is afforded us by the doctrine of the libidinal nature of the social bond with the leader and with fellow human beings. Now for the first time it is really comprehensible why so many people become paranoiac as a result of a social wound. The hitherto socially bound libido is set free as a result of the wound and would fain find grossly sexual—most often homosexual—expression; this form of expression however is rejected by the very exigent ego-ideal, and escape from this severe conflict is found in paranoia. The earlier social bond still manifests itself as persecution by groups, communities and associations (Jesuits, Jews, etc.). Thus paranoia proves to be a disturbance not only of the (homosexual) father-bond, but also of the (in itself sexless) social 'identification'.

The previously elaborated metapsychology of melancholia receives a fresh confirmation from the solution of the problem of group psychology; this psychosis also proves to be the result of installation of the outwardly foregone, because hated, object in the place of the ego-ideal. The manic phase of cyclothymia however discloses itself as the temporary opposition of the primary narcissistic ego-traces to the tyranny of the ego-ideal. As we see, the evaluation for psychology of the new grade in the ego and phase in libido-development has a promising beginning.

Hysterical identification differs from that just discussed in that, among other things, the (unconscious) incorporation of the object is only partial, concerns only particular qualities. The remaining peculiarities may remain charged with object-libido.

Important chapters of normal love will also have to be revised in the light of the new views. The distinction between direct sexual tendencies and those inhibited in their aim (tender) proves in this research to be even more significant than it previously appeared; this naturally increases the significance of the latency period during which this inhibition in regard to the aim takes place.

Indeed the correct estimation of the sexual tendencies inhibited in their aim compelled Freud to a new conception of the dynamics of neurotic illness; according to the newer description, the neurotic conflict takes place between the sexual tendencies inhibited in their aim (ego-

justified) set up by the ego-ideal, and the direct (ego-repugnant) ones. The processes of libido-excitation in the condition of being in love also appear to a great extent in a new light since these researches into group psychology. The feeling of shame indeed comes to be understood as the expression of a phenomenon of group psychology, as a reaction to the disturbing effect of publicity on the always asocial heterosexual manifestation of the instinct.

To return to the starting-point of this commentary, we must in conclusion again point out factors of group psychology at work in all psychotherapies, which make the study of this work of Freud's essential for anyone desirous of treating sick minds. In the treatment of the patient does not the physician represent the whole of human society? He, like the catholic priest, can loose or bind; for his sake the patient learns to put that more primitive 'conscience' that made him ill out of action; on his authority the latter allows himself to overcome his resistances. In the long run therefore it is not physicians who should pay the author of this work the tribute of gratitude and admiration; in certain processes of group psychology he has found, nevertheless, the explanation of the efficacy of psycho-therapeutic measures in general, whereupon they are for the first time able to understand the *modus operandi* of the instrument they have in daily use. S. Ferenczi.

II

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY

Right away in the Introduction a crowd of opinions which most people at least take for granted, but which on close examination are nothing but scientific prejudices, are cleared out of the way; for instance, the distinction between individual and group psychology. In every individual analysis we have of course to do with a number of people, whose relationships to the patient constitute his mental world and who are present as objects in his thoughts. It can already be foreseen, however, that the same laws which we observe in analysis operating in the individual's inner life must also be valid for his social activities, that is, for social psychology, if we do not want to forego the connection between thought and action. At the most a dividing line between narcissism and object-love could be drawn here, according to which narcissism would fall completely within the province of individual psychology but object-love would be the material of both disciplines. But then the always somewhat artificial distinctions between social and group psychology would also disappear, as it is impossible to attribute so much importance to the moment of numbers as to make it the dividing line between the two sciences. The social instinct too, be it never so old,

must once upon a time have had a phylogenetic beginning, and it must therefore be possible to analyse it, to trace it back to its origin (p. 2-4).

The second and third parts of the book review what has so far been done in group psychology, chiefly in reference to Le Bon, McDougall and Trotter. The agreement with Le Bon is especially far-reaching; he says that in groups inhibitions vanish and the unconscious manifests itself in its primitive form, and further he sees in group activities a kind of hypnotic influence, a condition of hypnotization; the points of view arrived at here are well adapted for the formulation of a self-contained theory of group-formation. Hitherto the magic word that turned up at the right moment with every writer who described group-formation was 'suggestion'; the nature of this process, however, itself remained utterly obscure. Now it is obvious that any individual who yields up his individuality in a group does this because of the others, 'for love of' them; accordingly it would be worth while seeking for the explanation of group-formation in love-relationships, in libido. 'We will try our fortune, then, with the supposition that love relationships (or, to use a more neutral expression, emotional ties) also constitute the essence of the group mind.' (p. 40). Let us accordingly follow our leader along this new path. An example must be selected and it must be one that demonstrates the general attributes of groups particularly clearly. 'In a church... as well as in an army... the same illusion holds good of there being a head—in the Catholic Church Christ, in an army its Commander-in-Chief—who loves all the individuals in the group with an equal love.' (p. 42). The members of the community are brothers in Christ, and undoubtedly the bond of each individual with Christ is also the cause of their bond with one another. A significant insight now dawns upon us: we cannot neglect the leader if we wish to understand the crowd; that is (anticipating), the hypnotised crowd implies a hypnotist. When these mutual bonds (which all depend on the great bond with the leader) break, then we have libido with the negative prefix—the stricken terror of panic (p. 46). It is also this same love for the leader (Christ) that restrains the primitive aggressiveness of human beings against each other and partly changes it into love of others; and as this does not hold for those outside the Christian community (the leader's company), this primitive aggressiveness manifests itself unchecked against the outsiders—in religious wars.

The author then depicts in the briefest, suggestive rather than exhaustive, manner the 'further tasks' of a group psychology. Thus for example a classification of groups would be an important detail (with and without a leader, an abstract idea in place of a leader, a negative attitude, hatred of a given person or institution having just as unifying an influence and evoking the same bonds of feeling as

positive adherence). Do not let us get on to these side issues, however; the author steers straight for the goal: the discovery of the libidinal structure of a group. We know that comparatively negligible differences of race, class, religion or political party are capable of setting free degrees of hatred that can by no means be explained adequately by the interests of the conflict involved. The starting-point is much rather to be sought in the narcissism of each individual, who feels the least deviation as a criticism of his own kind, as a disgrace and depreciation of himself. In the crowd, however, this behaviour disappears entirely; there must therefore be object-relationships at work which are more powerful than the narcissistic impulses. Pre-eminent as such are to be considered the object-cathexes already so familiar in clinical psychoanalysis, with this difference of course that we are dealing here not with direct, but with sexual instincts inhibited in their aim. There is, however, also an object-cathexis of non-sexual origin, a relationship of the *ego* to the object, namely, identification. The little boy takes his father as his ideal; he would like to be like his father and to possess his mother. 'The distinction... depends upon whether the tie attaches to the subject or to the object of the ego.' (p. 62). Later, however, the boy notices that his father stands in his way with his mother, and now the identification becomes a hostile one; he wants to replace his father with his mother. 'Identification, in fact, is ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone's removal. It behaves like a derivative of the first *oral* phase of the organisation of the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such. The cannibal, as we know, has remained at this standpoint; he has a devouring affection for his enemies and only devours people of whom he is fond.' (p. 61-2). Identification can in fact be hostile—in the service of object-love—or it can take the place of object-choice; object-choice can regress to identification. There is, however, also a third kind, quite independent of object-cathexes, and that is, identification by means of a symptom as 'the mark of a point of coincidence between the two egos which has to be kept repressed.' (p. 65). Male homosexuality arises (in many cases) from a turning away from the mother object-choice to identification with the mother, which in turn brings with it a father object-choice. In melancholia the object is introjected into the ego and the aggressiveness primarily directed against the object is thereby directed against the self. Here then we observe a splitting in the ego, the institution of a criticism, the narcissistic 'ego-ideal', which from now on depreciates in every way that part of the ego ('real ego') that has been identified with the object.

The description of certain exaggerated forms of being in love serves as an amplification and contrast: here the object is uncritically and narcissistically idealized as the ego, that is, '*The object has taken the place of the ego ideal.*' (p. 75). This is a condition that in literature is often described as fascination, and once again language may serve as a trustworthy guide in matters of psychology, for fascination, with its mystical uncanny meaning, is an explanation bordering on the region of hypnotism (reviewer). The hypnotised person too behaves just like this type of lover: 'the hypnotist has stepped into the place of the ego ideal.' (p. 77). The 'testing of the reality' of things also belongs to the functions of the ego ideal, and naturally the ego will take anything for real 'if its reality is vouched for by the mental faculty [the hypnotist] which ordinarily discharges the duty of testing the reality of things.' (p. 77). Hypnotism too is a group-formation in little; the hypnotist corresponds to the leader, the hypnotised to the individuals of the group. In hypnotism and in groups the bonds are more durable than in the condition of being in love, because the aim-inhibited sexual instincts have no path of discharge (as have the genital instincts in orgasm), and are therefore constantly maintained at the same degree of tension. The way is now open for a first formulation, and this runs: '*A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego.*' (p. 80).

But the author asks himself immediately whether he has not been guilty of one-sidedness and exaggeration by over-emphasizing the part of the leader, and thus neglecting the reciprocal influence of the members of the group upon one another. Some one else perhaps is on the right track and we only need assume that a certain 'herd instinct' (Trotter) exists to have explained the herd. 'Biologically this gregariousness is an analogy to multicellularity and as it were a continuation of it. From the standpoint of the libido theory it is a further manifestation of the inclination, which proceeds from the libido, and which is felt by all living beings of the same kind, to combine in more and more comprehensive units.' (p. 83). For Trotter the herd instinct plays the part of the ego ideal, all resistances and also all repression start from it. But it may be demonstrated that the 'herd instinct' is by no means an unanalysable primary entity. Such an instinct develops first in the nursery '*as a reaction to the initial envy with which the elder child receives the younger one.*' (reviewer's italics, p. 86). The elder child is forced by the equal love of the parents to an identification with the new pretender to the throne, and 'The first demand made by this reaction-formation is for justice, for equal treatment for all.' (p. 86). '*Thus social feeling is based upon the reversal of what was first a*

hostile feeling into a positively-toned tie of the nature of an identification' (reviewer's italics, p. 88) and it is a common bond with a person outside the group that brings this reversal about. The true key to the manifestations of to-day, however, lies again in the past, in phylogenesis. Just as there is primitive man in everyone, so the primal horde is lurking in every group. The single individuals of a group are the brothers; the leader, the hypnotist, is a copy of the primitive father. From the very beginning there are two psychologies: individual psychology for the leader, and group psychology for the led. The individuals of the group were constrained into the group state, compelled into it by the primal father; he himself, however, remained free. 'To objects his ego gave away no more than was barely necessary.' (p. 93).

Here another question, little discussed in psycho-analysis, is attacked—the question of the successor in the primal horde. 'If he died, he had to be replaced; his place was probably taken by a youngest son, who had up to then been a member of the group like any other.' (p. 93). The possibility of direct sexual satisfaction enables the transition from group to individual psychology to be made, since it brings to an end the significance of the aim-inhibited instincts. In the postscript there is a supplementary theory of the escape of the individual from the group, which is described as the joint production of the author and Otto Rank. The first epic poet was one who in fantasy escaped from the group in order to put himself in the place of the primal father. His hero killed the father (the totemic monster) alone, whereupon he, as it were, concentrates the group in himself in order to do penance in the repentant stage, as general scapegoat (reviewer). In the hero who would replace the father we have the first ego-ideal, and in the 'youngest son' of fairy tales there is a trace of the fact that it was probably the youngest son who, protected by maternal love, took over his father's inheritance in the primal horde period. A host of little animals, who, as in dream-symbolism, indicate brethren, help him to the deed as proof that here in phantasy an individual has put himself in the place of a group. His day-dream corresponds to the secret wishes of his fellows; along with them he tears himself free from reality and this common fantasy creates a new reality. Or, to express it otherwise: By union a wish becomes reality. 'The lie of the heroic myth culminates in the deification of the hero. Perhaps the deified hero may have been earlier than the Father God and may have been a precursor to the return of the primal father as a deity. The series of gods, then, would run chronologically: Mother Goddess—Hero—Father God.' (p. 115).

The illusion of the equal love of the leader (Christ) for the brothers of the community can now be translated in 'primal horde language'

as 'an idealistic remodelling of the state of affairs in the primal horde, where all of the sons knew that they were equally *persecuted* (reviewer's italics) by the primal father, and feared him equally.' (p. 95). We have this transformation already as a fiction in the totemic clan and as an approximate reality in the monogamous single family (in contrast to the 'zyklopaic' one of the primal horde). The tracing back of the group to the primal horde also explains what is uncanny about it, as about hypnotism, according to the known theory that the uncanny, the repressed, is something intimately known. The hypnotist exercises his power by his glance just as the glance of the chief and of the deity is insupportable to the savage. The mysterious power of the hypnotist, 'the mana' of savages, is just the bond between the brothers and their primal father-ideal.

With this the psychology of the group has really been stated. The peculiar attitude of the individual in the group is, according to this, to be understood as a survival, a precipitate of former times. (Since the primal father prevented the undeveloped young males of the horde from having any direct sexual satisfaction, these impulses transformed themselves into 'aim-inhibited instincts' that, remaining always undischarged at the same degree of tension, served to bind the individuals of the group to one another.) The libidinal organisation of the group, however, presupposes a splitting of the ego into two parts; for the identification of the individuals in the group with one another proceeds on the basis of a substitution—common to all—of their ego-ideal by the primal father. The periodic transgression of all prohibitions in the rites of saturnalia rests on a remission of the ego-ideal in which all restrictions vanish; ego and ego-ideal are co-extensive for the evanescent period of the feast (p. 105). Of course a sort of 'transitory' melancholia follows, the 'blue devils', during which the ego-ideal reasserts itself and turns against the real ego. 'Everything is permissible at Purim, but after Purim one knows well enough who has been the fool'—the Jewish proverb too betrays the origin of the ego-ideal in an 'introjection of society into the ego', for the unfortunate thing is that 'one' (society) does in spite of all disapprove of those who have taken the festal liberty too literally (reviewer).

The author of an interesting essay in *Imago* recently observed that psycho-analysis was an entirely new science, 'lying midway between ethnology and medicine'.¹ This statement seems to apply to no work more appropriately than to that under consideration. What we find in it is the otherwise missing 'psychic link' uniting things hitherto widely disparate. Our task can naturally only be the evaluation of these new views from the ethnologist's standpoint, and accordingly in

¹ *Imago*, 1921, Bd. VII, S. 133.

the account of its contents we have only included as much of the non-ethnological side of the book as seemed to us unavoidably necessary for the understanding of the new truths concerning folk psychology.

With some hesitation we next attempt to suggest a few amplifications of the magnificent prospects here opened up. The hesitation is due on the one hand to our anticipation that a more mature insight into the author's trains of thought will compel us to recall our own modifications; but on the other to a doubt whether modifications and amplifications are really in place here at all, since they likewise are only based upon a sharper emphasis of one or other parts of the book.

We have learnt that we can distinguish three kinds of identification: hostile identification, identification as object-cathexis, and identification on the basis of common mental trends. Which kind may the brothers' bond with the primal father of the horde have been? How far can we here speak of a 'group' with a 'leader'? 'The weaker young males of a herd of monkeys do not as a rule succeed in copulating, for the leader, the old troop master, keeps a jealous watch on all propinquiries and wards them off with tooth and claw. In such battles the more powerful young males are often driven away from the herd and *then form peculiar smaller or larger herds by themselves (thus semnopethecus, hylobathes hulock, etc.).*'² (Reviewer's italics). This peculiar herd consisting only of young males is certainly to be regarded as the prototype of group-formation. What feelings can the herd animals cherish in relation to the leading animal? We have too few observations at our disposal to be able to answer this question off-hand. It helps us, however, to suppose that they are certainly forced into group psychology by the leading animal, that he represents no protecting, but essentially only an antagonistic, force. This would indeed correspond with many of Freud's statements that we have italicized in our account of the contents of his book; Freud sees all social attitudes as *reaction-formations* against a *primary aggressiveness*. Accordingly we should conclude that the attitude of the primitive group towards its 'leader' would be an exclusively 'negative bond'; the brothers would be united by their common hatred against the primal father. We could at most soften this conception somewhat by representing to ourselves that it held good only during the rutting season and that in the intervals the more friendly aspect of identification prevailed, the subsequent ambivalent character of which would then too be partly a consequence of the disappearance of the chronological separation of periods devoted only to the sexual instinct and those dedicated only to the ego instincts (the storing-up instincts of Stärcke). It is also noteworthy that these outcast herds have special leaders,

² Hesse-Doflein: *Tierbau und Tierleben*, 1914, Bd. II, S. 694.

towards whom there probably exists a positive object-relationship; in the nature of things however they cannot be identified with the old male who coerced the young ones into group psychology.³ In these 'opposition party leaders', who are the strongest among the outcasts and achieve the place of bell-wether, we may perhaps have to see the first historical nucleus of the hero; he would therefore be no purely fantastic figure, but would also appear instead in reality as a mediator, although a tyrannical mediator, between father and sons: those who were again cast out by him would, it is true, have an ambivalent attitude towards him, their earlier positive attachment would now be over laid by a negative attitude.

But let us go a little further. The savage always identifies himself with those whom he has killed; here we have classic examples of the reactionary origin of the social feelings.⁴ This happens especially when the savage not only kills but also eats his victim, and as Freud so illuminatingly emphasizes, we have here the clearest case of identification on an oral basis.⁵ But here too from the ethnological material the conclusion seems to follow that one should not too blindly accept the statements of savages that they eat up the dead as a sign of love and piety. Indeed we often obtain similar explanations from them that cannot bear analytical examination and that prove to be only reaction-formations against the aggressive component-instincts. I merely recall the torturing and maiming of youths in puberty-rites, which are also prompted by 'love'. We shall therefore assume that the primary thing in anthropophagy is the wish to annihilate the dead altogether. Accordingly we should construct the primal history of the human race thus: the brothers trooped together into a group in order to kill the primal father, and then identified themselves with him and with one another by devouring the murdered leader.⁶ But now a fresh contest broke out

³ cp. Hesse-Doflein: *ibid.*, S. 698.

⁴ 'The spirit of the first man slain by anyone, leaving the body of the dead man enters that of his slayer by the fundament and taking up its abode in the vicinity of the liver, henceforth acts as the tutelary guardian of his welfare.' A. Oldfield: 'The Aborigines of Australia'. *Transactions of the Ethnological Society*, Vol. III, p. 240. 'Slain enemies take up their abode in the head-gear of their slayers'. C. G. Seligmann: *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, 1910, p. 298.

⁵ Compare Steinmetz: 'Endokannibalismus', *Mitt. d. W. A. G.*, Bd. XXVI, S. 1—28. Róheim: 'Das Selbst', *Imago*, 1921, Bd. VII, S. 12. Compare also H. Nunberg: 'Der Verlauf des Libidokonfliktes in einem Fall von Schizophrenie'. *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1921, Bd. VII., S. 309.

⁶ Concerning this possibility of relating identification with the history of the primitive horde, compare Freud: l. c. 77.

and only the strongest of the brothers remained in possession of the women and of the father's place of power. In these contests however lay the germ of the splitting of the ego into real ego and ego-ideal. All the earlier associates were now become enemies. Each had to fight with the others who like himself had killed the father. After his father each wants now to kill his brother and so to repeat the great and terrible deed of primal history. This repetition of the parricide is however at the same time a revenge, for it is carried out upon those who had killed the father. Thus each will be murderer and avenger in one, and this provides the natural foundation for the splitting of the ego. We should therefore say: *the ego-ideal arose during the period of the wars of the brothers, in that a part of the ego opposed itself to the primitive ego on the side of the murdered father, identifying itself with him.* (The ego-ideal comprises the sum of all the limitations in which the ego has to acquiesce. p. 105. Limitation = society = father.) *The unending struggle in the ego between primal ego and ego-ideal would accordingly be the re-enactment, become endo-psychic, of that contest of the brothers upon their father's grave.* We should then supplement the formula for group formation to this extent that the exchange of the ego-ideal for a common object merely signifies in the group a regression to the historical origin of the critical faculty in the ego: *in the group the ego-ideal takes the form of a copy of the primal father.* If this were correct, then various things would follow, namely, that repression (or perhaps subsequent expulsion as distinct from primary repression) only occurs after the murder of the father, etc. Concerning the question of the successor to the mastery of the horde, the observant reader of Freud's writings will have noticed a not unimportant modification. In *Totem und Tabu* we read: 'Atkinson, who was without the clues given by psycho-analysis and was unacquainted with the work of Robertson Smith, found a less violent transition from the primal horde to the next social level, at which many men live together in peaceful community. He attributes it to maternal love that to begin with only the youngest, and later other sons also, remain in the horde, etc.' (S. 191 n.). One now gets the impression that this theory of Atkinson's, of the youngest son as the father's successor in the primal horde, which at that time he rightly rejected, has since been accepted by Freud.

The decisive thing as far as this is concerned was probably the fairy-tale material, but actually it seems to me inconceivable that in the days of fisticuffs and 'claw law' just the youngest son should have been able to maintain himself in this position against his certainly much more powerful brothers. The fairy-tale of the youngest son's succession to the throne goes back partly to the social arrangement of

historical times, to the right of the youngest (borough-English⁷), and at a more ancient level to the fact that in the primal horde era it was the youngest son who had just the least prospect of the desired paternal position and was therefore much the most likely to achieve it in the hallucinatory wish-fulfilment of poetry. The series: mother-goddess—hero (son)—father-god, would also be difficult to prove ethnologically; we hold (with Reik in his *Probleme der Religionspsychologie*) that the son-religion is younger than the father-religion and the mother-religion is certainly not older than tillage and tillage-cult. It might of course be quite possible that the 'mothers' of this stage should prove to be regressive manifestations from far distant periods in the history of mankind, periods previous to all now-known beginnings, and Professor Freud probably has weighty reasons for these assumptions. We can only beg of him not to withhold them from us.

It is more difficult to exhaust the wealth of established new knowledge that is here stored up for ethnology and folk psychology, and for this reason too reference can only be made to what lies nearest at hand. On page 63 Freud describes the two contrasted types of identification. A little girl identifies herself with her mother by copying her mother's illness (a tormenting cough); she wishes to replace her mother with her father and punishes herself for this hostile identification by the illness. Similarly the totem animal (father-symbol) among the Wotjoballuk signifies the dreamer himself (the dreamer wishes to attain to being the totem, that is, to become the father, to replace the father with the mother) but it also carries the punishment for this aggressive identification and foretells illness for the dreamer.⁸ Among the Intichiumi the eating of the totem is usually considered an identification-rite, and so it is, too, but primarily with a hostile intention. Thus the Kaitish, for instance, say, that if they were to consume too much of their totem animal they might devour the whole animal-world,⁹ a fear in which we recognise a wish that has succumbed to repression. When therefore the Haidah tattoo the totem on their bodies¹⁰ they indicate thereby the successful deposition of the father, whose place they themselves now occupy. The Torres Straits islanders believe that the members of a totem also take on the characteristic qualities of the animal concerned; they are good runners or redoubtable warriors.

⁷ I. A. Macculloch: *The Childhood of Fiction: A study of Folk-Tales and Primitive Thought*. 1905, p. 372.

⁸ A. B. Howitt: *Native Tribes of South East Australia*. 1904, p. 145.

⁹ B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen: *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*. 1904, p. 323.

¹⁰ J. G. Fraser: *Totemism and Exogamy*. 1910, Vol. I, p. 28.

according as the animal is swift-footed or dangerous.¹¹ It is very probable that such an ego-change does actually manifest itself in the character of the clan members. In the animal we have a displacement substitute for the father who is to be understood as a primal ego-ideal, and by this displacement the ego-ideal too is displaced; then one endeavours to be like the given animal and undoubtedly to a certain extent the aim is achieved. In a similar way too we conceive of the development of national character. After it is once established, in the end by literary influences, how a real Englishman or Frenchman should look and behave, the individual ideals combine into a narcissistic national type and everyone regards it as his duty to conform as far as possible to the model. Frequently this national ideal is identical with the father of the people; we would merely recall how many replicas of the Emperor Franz Josef used to turn up in the Austrian civil service and in the army. The bond of the individual clan brothers with one another mentioned above is to be referred to the relationship which those members of a primitive race who have been 'initiated' together have with one another; a magic mystical bond embraces them all. In the prohibition against hair-cutting (fear of castration) as in the belief in their invincible powers, the savage chiefs even of to-day express the isolated position psychologically of the leader so brilliantly discovered by Freud; the reviewer too has in his day sought¹² to ascribe the uniqueness of primitive kings to narcissism. The confirmation is also striking when Freud designates the leader of the primitive group as the prototype of the hypnotist; it is indeed just the shamans, the hypnotists, who play a striking part in every primitive community.

At a meeting of the Hungarian society, Dr. Pfeifer¹³ observed that paranoia had its phylogenetic root in the horde of brothers. We now learn from Professor Freud that it is simply an idealistic remodelling, an illusion, that the leader declares to the group that he loves them all equally; originally the sons were all aware that they were equally persecuted by the father (p. 95). Now all the persecutory figures of the paranoiac are father-*imagines*, so that we can still trace the well-known reversal of the formula backwards. Accordingly it would in the last instance be, not 'I love him', but 'I love my father' and this too would already be a reaction-formation of a still more primitive formula: 'I hate my father.' According to this the homosexual tendency would

¹¹ A. C. Haddon: *Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits*. 1904, Vol. V, p. 185.

¹² Róheim: *Spiegelzauber*, 1919, S. 82.

¹³ S. Pfeifer: Paranoia ähnliche Mechanismen während einer Hysterie-analyse. Lecture delivered before the Hungarian Psycho Analytical Society (Budapest), February 1, 1920.

already be a secondary phenomenon in the structure of paranoia, and the homosexual attachment to the father an unsuccessful cover for the original Oedipus complex. Then however the paranoiac attempt at cure would be a direct regression to the primal horde situation, and the statement that he was persecuted a truth, but a truth in the phylogenetic sense. But in many cases it is not an individual who is the persecutor but a whole host, eventually with a powerful person at its head. The host would be most simply motivated by the primal father's situation; he indeed justly dreads the insatiable enmity of his sons, and we should also find in him the narcissistic constitution (see above) necessary for paranoia. We will even attempt to define the phylogenetic root of paranoia more exactly. The paranoiac's persecutors are partly existing fellow-men, partly supernatural forces. I think something concerning these supernatural forces can be extracted from Schreber's memoirs. His persecutors are chiefly souls, and the persecutor-in-chief is God himself, someone who mostly has to do only with souls and corpses,¹⁴ and who accordingly is probably himself a soul or a corpse. Now we know or suppose that in the herd of the outcast young males direct homosexual activities must occur between the brothers.¹⁵ When, however, after the death of the father they were driven to fight each other and were reciprocally in each others' way in the once more open heterosexual object-choice, then the former lovers became each other's persecutors and these persecutors were then also identified with the father as the earlier persecutor; they appeared to the guilt-laden individual as avengers and reincarnations of the persecutor-in-chief, of the slain father-god. The psychiatrists will have to decide from their case-material whether this interpretation can be confirmed; it has been set down here only to show how from single phrases of this new masterpiece the clues lead us on through as yet unknown labyrinths. Once more we owe to Freud the foundation-stone of a new science; may the storeys of the building follow in an approximately similar style (as far as this is possible), so that at last we may be able not merely to write about collective psychology, but also to form some idea of what it is.

G. Róheim.

III

THE TRANSLATION

Students of psycho-analysis who have not been able to read the works of Freud in the original, and have endeavoured to acquire some knowledge of his discoveries from the only translations available until

¹⁴ D. P. Schreber: *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken*. 1903, S. 319.

¹⁵ See Freud: work under review, p. 94, Footnote.

recently, will feel a debt of gratitude to Mr. Strachey. Intelligibility in their writing is not required only of translators, but it is a consideration that ought to rank first in importance with them, and it is one that appears to have been neglected beyond all extenuation by those who had the privilege of first introducing so much of Freud's work to the English-speaking public. Until recently, the war prevented any realization by Freud himself of the defects in the form in which his work had appeared to a great number of his readers, and efforts are now being made to improve matters in future. The fortunate circumstance that Mr. Strachey, who was lately studying with Freud, was willing to undertake the translation of one of the recent books, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, leads us to hope that the high standard it sets may be maintained in further publications.

No one who has not attempted to render psycho-analytic writings into English could realize the difficulty of the task or altogether appreciate the achievement that this book represents. To begin with, this new science was entirely without a terminology in our language. Then the long literary traditions of English have so hardened and stereotyped the meaning of such numbers of our words, so many others have become degraded and colloquialized till they are unfit for use in an impersonal document, that we cannot fall back, to anything like the degree that is possible in German, on our ordinary speech for rendering these new conceptions. Our English shyness in matters of sex, our extreme sensitiveness in matters of 'taste', results in an almost insuperable difficulty in expressing ourselves at all, outside poetry, on anything relating to the emotions. Psycho-analysts have to grow accustomed to mentioning love, but even they cannot find an English word for *Verliebtheit*, the state of being in love. All these things increase the difficulties of the translator.

Efforts have been made to bring the terms, or at least those used in authorized translations of psycho-analytic work, up to some standard of uniformity and accuracy. In this, beauty of language can only be a secondary consideration, however much those responsible may regret that it is so. But apart from technical terms, which matter comparatively little, a rendering of the original that furnishes the reader with a complete and clear expression of the writer's thought, in the spirit of his own language and undisturbed by any reminiscence of the original wording, has a beauty of its own, and this Mr. Strachey has achieved most remarkably.

Joan Riviere.

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Fundamental Conceptions of Psychoanalysis. By A. A. Brill, Ph.B., M.D., Lecturer on Psychoanalysis and Abnormal Psychology, New

York University. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1922. Pp. v+336. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book, which is based on lectures given at an elementary course in the Department of Pedagogics of the New York University to those 'occupying themselves with problems of education and psychology' (p.v), instructs by the modern conversational method. While reading one is a little regretful that even for educationalists and psychologists everything must be made easy and that 'fundamental conceptions' must be so simplified that they can be taken in at a glance. It is a pity that this book, whose title makes such a strong appeal to the student, does not utilise to the best advantage the good material collected in its pages—except in 'anecdote' (if we may have the author's permission to borrow the term)—and that the examples are not so correlated that the reader is led to understand the deeper meaning which they often contain. To take an instance: 'We may define a symbol as an imperfect comparison between two objects which in reality may have very little resemblance; it is nothing but a form of comparison' (p.59). Later we read that in the 'unconscious, however, the same process of imperfect comparisons prevail' (p.64); and of symbols occurring in dreams he says, 'as we are usually ignorant of their origin they strike us as mysterious and foreign' (p.64), and again 'many symbols have lost their original meaning for us to-day, though they are still commonly used under different forms' (p.66). Thus, as we turn these pages, we see the concept of Symbolism growing and becoming more significant, then (p.68) we find the subject rounded off with this: 'In brief, a symbol is simply an analogy between impressions of the present and the past and depending on the individual it is either simple or complex'.

Other subjects are dealt with in the same manner. In discussing dream analysis great stress is laid on the relation to present problems, the infantile sources being hardly mentioned, and we are confronted with a great number of superficial analyses, when a few deeper ones would have illustrated the subject better. Infantile sexuality is alluded to but its ramifications in dream- and symbol-formation, in wit and perversion are passed over in a few slight sentences; manic-depressive disease is sketched without reference to the fixation on the oral phase of development, and paranoia without reference to the anal. The castration complex and the concepts of ego-development and repetition compulsion are omitted. The overcoming of resistances—the aim of analytical treatment—is ignored and transference is disposed of in this footnote (p.287):

'The term transference is very often misused by so-called psychoanalysts. They seem to think that a proper transference requires the patient to fall in love with the physician. This notion causes much harm and I have seen cases in which it has actually led to scandal, to say

nothing of the fact that it renders the whole of the psycho-analytical treatment absurdly fruitless. Neither Freud nor his school ever advanced such an idiotic idea. The transference mechanism involves the giving and the taking of hostile and affectionate emotions alike; it does not mean exclusively one or other. Every individual's transference is always in terms of the sum total of his present reactions to the environments. To understand, therefore, the one, we must understand the other.'

In one point only—and that an exceedingly important one—does the book justify its comprehensive title—*wish-fulfilment*, for on this 'fundamental conception' the whole book is based. We see the topic closely argued, point after point carefully driven home—the most obstinate doubter could hardly resist the conclusions drawn. We see its effect in the dream, in symptoms, in myths, in rites, in wit, in slips of the tongue and in the selection of vocations.

If the general reader cannot take in more than one big idea at a time why not bow to the inevitable and call the book 'Wish-fulfilment in Dream, Symptom and Everyday Life'? Nothing would be lost and the respect would be gained of those who know how difficult it is to comprehend and to describe the subtle processes of the mind.

John Rickman.

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A Young Girl's Diary. Prefaced with a letter by Sigmund Freud. Translated from the German by Eden and Cedar Paul. (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1921. Pp. 271. 12s. 6d.)

One of the most interesting considerations in connexion with this book is the reception it has been afforded, even in some quarters where enlightenment and a scientific attitude might have been expected. It has been termed an obvious invention, a literary fraud, a disgusting and perverted portraiture of a young girl's mind: all of which is very significant to the psycho-analyst, helping to confirm Freud's view that the recognition of disturbing truth must inevitably be met with profound resistance. Those who have some psychological knowledge and experience and are capable of reading without bias will agree that we have rarely been presented with so genuinely convincing a document, with one so bearing the stamp of sincerity, reality, and we may add, normality. It is true that the form may present certain problems—such as the quantity produced in the given time, the concentration involved, the high standard in a literary sense—but these are not unusual characteristics, especially when we remember that the writer was a very precocious Austrian child brought up in a cultured and intellectual environment. That her diary seems to many readers 'abnormal' is no doubt due to the barrier existing between the child and adult, which prevents, save in rare circumstances, free expression on the part of the

former, and causes the latter to ignore and fear the child's psychic situation. Part of the great value of this diary is that it will serve to break down that barrier by giving the adult more realization of the child.

Here is a three years' record kept by a young schoolgirl between the ages of eleven and fourteen, providing a picture of her outer and inner life day by day, with nothing toned down, added, or suppressed. She lives in a very normal environment, with her parents, brother and sister, and attends the high school where she has manifold social and intellectual interests: an affectionate, impulsive creature, rich in emotional life, critical and narcissistic (as is to be expected in her adolescent stage), with a strongly-developed father-complex—a typical adolescent girl of good endowments and artistic development. The incidents portrayed are very typical also—many of us could parallel them almost exactly. We see her in her devotion to her father, her first love-object since the mother was dispossessed; her critical affection towards the mother with its strong element of hostility; her rivalry towards her elder sister, mingled with admiration for the latter's superior knowledge and experience; her various passions at school, focussed upon one or two of her own companions, one of the women-teachers, again a man-teacher; her attitude towards her 'subjects', and her own personal ambitions which are very high. All this builds up a very normal existence, at least externally, and here comes in the great interest—the deep gulf which lies between this seemingly restrained and ordinary outward existence and the inner life of the child. For this latter is a thing entirely separated from the rest, consumed with passionate interest in 'grown-up' affairs, in every sexual aspect of life (aspects which she realizes only in a confused, distorted way) and even in philosophic considerations. And we realize that this situation is not true of the diarist alone, but also of numbers of her school-mates and of the boys and girls she meets outside school. We are forced, indeed, to conclude—and this is one of the most valuable, even if humiliating, discoveries obtained from a study of the diary—that these normal children can pass through their educational and adolescent period even in an environment of good homes, efficient schools, cultured and sympathetic teachers, all unguessed, shouldering alone, or only with the help of other equally ignorant children, their emotional burdens, while the education they are receiving day by day leaves untouched the most significant aspects of their life.

The easy belief on the part of parent or educator that the child is 'an open book' for them to read with facility is no longer tenable with the illumination granted by this record, and the reality must be faced that—as Professor Freud points out in his prefatory letter—the diary

is a record showing 'how the mystery of the sexual life first presses itself vaguely on the attention, and then takes entire possession of the growing intelligence', and this must be of importance to us since it is just that sphere of thought and feeling which is practically taboo in most systems of education—in other words that which is of the most vital and predominant interest to the young creature is not spoken of nor dealt with, often even prohibited, during its educational years. If such a situation is inevitable—if the sexual development of the child cannot be recognised and aided by the educator and the family—it is well to face it; if, as psycho-analytical knowledge would lead us to think, understanding on the part of the educator and parents and more appropriate methods of education can bring any solution, then that too must be faced and acted upon.

In many directions the diary has much to reveal which would be material for psycho-analytical investigation. The whole sexual history of the diarist, her confused 'knowledge', her striking combination of adult interests with entirely childish desires (she is often the fascinating *little* girl, winsome and baby-like, and at other times she is a woman in her emotional life, destined for tragic ends), her Don-Juan-ism—all these characteristics are of great importance to understand and evaluate justly. One of the most puzzling features of her psychic life is the almost entire absence of fantasy, as revealed in her diary, which seems to denote unusually strong repression. We are accustomed to associate adolescence with a rich fantasy-life (especially in the case of an imaginative and ardent creature such as the diarist), but it may be that the first pre-occupations with sexual life are sufficiently dominating and gratifying to render fantasy unnecessary. This, however, hardly explains the absence of narcissistic fantasy and more light on the matter would be very valuable. There is no need to recommend any psychologist to study this book—it is obvious how much it can bestow—but it may be added that in addition to its psychological value it is a delight as a picture of a most attractive and endearing human being.

Barbara Low.

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The Significance of Psycho-Analysis for the Mental Sciences. By Dr. Otto Rank and Dr. Hanns Sachs. Authorised English translation by Dr. Charles R. Payne. Pp. 127. Price 1.50 Dollars.

The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement. By Professor Dr. Sigmund Freud, L.L.D. Pp. 58. Price 0.60 Dollars.

(Nos. 23 and 25 respectively of the Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series. Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, New York, 1916.)

These two works, having been published in their English form about six years ago, do not call for extended comment in this *Journal*. They are, or should be, already familiar to readers of psycho-analytic literature.

The book of Drs. Rank and Sachs forms an invaluable introduction to the non-medical applications of psycho-analysis, indicating the principal fields outside therapeutics on which psycho-analysis is throwing light, or from which it has itself gained useful corroborative material. The wide extent and varied nature of these fields are sufficiently indicated by the titles of the chapters, which, (excluding the introductory chapter) are as follows: Investigation of Myths and Legends; Theory of Religion; Ethnology and Linguistics; Esthetic and Psychology of Artists; Philosophy, Ethics and Law; Pedagogy and Characterology. The domain which is most fully treated is that dealt with in the first of the above mentioned chapters—a chapter that is for the most part devoted to a detailed consideration of the 'Brother motive' as an example of the application of psycho-analysis to folklore.

The book is specially to be recommended to two classes of readers. In the first place those who have studied psycho-analysis solely from its clinical aspects; to such it may well prove a startling revelation of the great vistas opened up by the young science, which they have hitherto known in one of its applications only. In the second place to specialists in the various fields indicated above. It is to be hoped that a careful perusal of the book by a wide circle of such readers on both sides of the Atlantic may help to bring about a collaboration between psycho-analysts and their fellow workers in these overlapping and closely interconnected branches of research—a collaboration which promises to be of great significance for the advancement of our knowledge in those most urgently important but, at the same time, difficult and backward disciplines which together make up the science of human life in all its manifestations.

Professor Freud's brief history (in the original it carries the more modest title *Zur Geschichte der psychoanalytischen Bewegung*) is a document of unique interest that is likely to become a classic in the history of science, unless (as would be most desirable) it is later on superseded by some longer and more detailed work of an historical and autobiographical character from Professor Freud's pen. The early history of psycho-analysis (up to about 1902) is known only to its founder, who was for years the only (and therefore an isolated) worker in the subject. He alone therefore can reveal the intimate details of the manner in which the fundamental psycho-analytic conceptions gradually came to light. The history of psycho-analysis is in fact intimately bound up with the psychological history of Professor Freud

himself. In this book he lifts the veil a little and shows us something of the way in which he came to formulate his principles and of the environmental influences which assisted him in his formulation. It is written in the intimate style which Professor Freud can on occasion adopt, and this, together with its frankness, makes it very fascinating reading. In the later part of the book Professor Freud deals with the gradual acceptance of his ideas in various quarters (an acceptance which, we gather, he had come to regard as unlikely to take place in his own lifetime), with the work of his early collaborators and followers, the attempts at organisation of the psycho-analytic movement, the psycho-analytic congresses and the origin of the movements associated with the names of Jung and Adler.

J. C. F.

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Psycho-Analysis in the Service of Education. By Dr. Oskar Pfister. (Henry Kimpton, London, 1922. Pp. 176. Price 6s.)

As might be expected from Dr. Pfister, we find in this latest translated volume of his work, the theme of which is the application of Freudian principles to education, the same care, accuracy, and sincerity which marks all his previous work. The present book is rather what the sub-title suggests (an 'Introduction to Psycho-Analysis') than an educational work in any narrow sense. Indeed, Dr. Pfister is careful to say that he by no means supports the idea of every teacher embarking upon analysis of his pupils: 'Psycho-analysis is an edged instrument which it is dangerous to wield awkwardly. We cannot too often warn people against thoughtless application of the treatment, and we must consider as an abuse every treatment that is not fully aware of the possible consequences and dangers. It is better to leave the analysis of children severely alone than to launch upon a semi-quack system' (p. 155). This is a timely warning, for the tendency to-day would appear to be in the direction of hasty attempts to apply to educational work ill-digested fragments of Freudian theory (often mixed up with quite irrelevant matter), in the form of actual practice or of misleading discourses to teachers.

Dr. Pfister has confined himself mainly to the exposition of general psycho-analytical principles, but always keeping in mind the bearing of these upon education: he shows how psycho-analytical findings are to be traced, how to interpret the psychic phenomena presented, and the chief significance of these, illustrating largely by vivid and homely examples which will appeal to most readers.

In his first section (pp. 1-32) we are given some exposition of the significance of psycho-analysis and the spheres in which it operates, a few vivid and apt illustrations bringing before us the kind of problems

—physical, mental, spiritual—before which the educator so often remains helpless. The author deals with such types as the inveterate idler, the hopelessly inattentive, the dull and stolid, the shirker, the rebel, and shows that only through psycho-analytic knowledge can we solve the problems they present. The friendly exposition encourages the reader not much acquainted with psychological theory, and will probably lead him to further study.

The second section, 'The Scientific Justification and Demand for Analytic Education' (pp. 33-127) comprises the larger portion of the whole book, and is probably the most successful and the one most useful to the learner and student. Here repression is dealt with in detail: clear demonstration of the effect on character of inhibition of vital impulses is given, and also of the manifold manifestations of such inhibition, which the teacher has ample opportunity of studying in the course of his work. Dr. Pfister treats of anxiety in the child, inability to concentrate, tiresomeness, and so forth, pointing out what such phenomena may indicate in the child's psychic condition, and not only in the child's but also in the teacher's. 'That which psycho-analysis has to offer the educator depends in great measure upon the educator himself. Psycho-analytic work has confirmed by unexpected observations the often experienced fact that the education of the educator is a fundamental condition of pedagogic success.' (pp. 153-4).

On the positive side, the question of sublimation, for instance, Dr. Pfister has helpful advice to give to the educator, especially in those pages (pp. 90-6) where he distinguishes between sublimation and reaction-formation, but there would appear to be some confusion between sublimation in Freud's sense and what may be termed moral development: the two processes are by no means identical.

In the concluding section of his book, 'The Practice of Pedanalysis' (pp. 128-76)—surely a rather more euphonious term could be selected—Dr. Pfister takes up practical problems such as the place of psycho-analysis in general education, the training of the educator, objections to psycho-analysis, and similar other matters. He emphasizes the danger of any casual 'treatment' of the sick and suffering child by the layman, without consultation with the medical man experienced in mental science. He considers the best field for the educator (after he has gone through his own mental education) is in the sphere of those children, adolescents, and adults who need training and guiding on account of repressions, though not necessarily acutely afflicted. Very convincingly he shows how great is the scope of psycho-analysis, and how its most precious function, perhaps, is not the curing of disease but the raising of the so-called 'normal' and 'healthy' individual to higher levels and finer development.

A tendency apparent throughout the book must be noted, namely, a simplifying of various complicated phenomena. This may be in part inevitable, since so large a mass of material is dealt with in small compass, but it would seem, at times to indicate something fundamental in the author's own outlook. This tendency is particularly notable in connexion with dream-interpretation, and with the rapid results suggested (in one instance we are assured that a state of irresponsibility and an utter neglect of work and career, owing mainly to a powerful father-complex, were 'cured' through one interview only which the young man had with Dr. Pfister!), and may be very misleading to the learner. As the book is valuable and useful in so many respects, one could wish this defect remedied.

Barbara Low.

The Technique of Psychoanalysis. By Smith Ely Jelliffe, M.D. (Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., New York and Washington, Monograph Series No. 26, Second, revised, enlarged Edition, 1920. Pp. x+168. 2.50 Dollars.)

After reading this book one is left with three impressions; first, of page-long quotations from Freud and Rank, second, of advice based on the experience of the author, and third, of his philosophy. The quotations are familiar and appropriate and when reading them one cannot help contrasting them with the rest of the book and wondering how an author who quotes so fully from competent analysts can have gained so little insight into the subject; the advice obviously does not originate in deep psycho-analytical experience; the philosophy is unique. We begin with the last. The author is overwhelmed by the age of the earth and the antiquity of man, calculated in millions and millions of years. It affects him so much that he finds it 'advantageous to impress upon patients the immense importance of this time element in the slow elaboration of instinctive reactions which are so highly conservative and protective' and to insist 'upon the fact that the neurosis is in line with the whole process. It also is a bit of conservation—something compensatory and protective....' (p. 37.)

He correlates the periods of human development (pre-natal, called by him 'Archaic'; birth to seven years, called 'Organ Erotic';¹ seven to fourteen years, called 'Narcissistic'; fourteen years onwards, called 'Social') with the Paleozoic, Cenozoic, Mesozoic and 'Psychozoic' epochs respectively. This psycho-paleontology, I have no doubt, means a lot to Dr. Jelliffe, but does he not concentrate too much on 'thought-fossils' (p. 135) to the neglect of the *dynamics* of his subject? He

¹ Described as a valuable term and defined as 'the desire part which lies behind the "vital" action of an organic function' (p. 135n).

says, '*Analysis, therefore, is to be utilised to trace the evolution of the individual from these infantile sources of power belief, or as we have already expressed it, to reconstruct the action pattern of these partial libidos or strivings in their building up of the combined libido, which determines the individual's conduct*' (p. 45) [author's italics]. Thus we see that for him analysis is not the overcoming of resistances—a proof that he has not moved with the times.

His intellectual daring, which sometimes strikes deep, sometimes goes astray, reminds us of Kempf. Who else could plunge into metapharmacology and write: 'the opium smoker by the toxic action reduces the oxidation processes in the cells of the body. This is a typical example of a *regression* to an *archaic level*,' (p. 42)—and, having written, remain serene?

The author's advice on technique finds characteristic expression in the use of libido-charts or 'psychograms' which, when shown to and discussed with the patient 'may help him to objectify his work and afford standards of comparison in the dynamic progress of the case' (p. 138). Examples of the charts are given, but the patients' comments on them are not.

This work ran as a serial in *The Psychoanalytic Review* for nearly four years. The appearance of translations of Freud's articles on Technique will remove any necessity for another edition.

John Rickman.

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Les Principes de la psychologie de la religion et la psychanalyse. Leçon d'ouverture de la chaire de psychologie de la religion. Par Maurice Neeser, Docteur en Théologie, Professeur à la faculté de Théologie. Neuchâtel, Attinger frères, 1920.

The title alone of this little work reveals a significant phase in the history of theological science. Every friend of the psychology of religion is filled with pride and pleasure to find that Switzerland has devoted a special professorship to the subject; and that it is in charge of a man who appreciates psycho-analysis and judges it with sympathy is certainly not less important. Religious psychology in Germany, in spite of the courageous efforts of men like Vorbrodt, Runze and others, still continues in a parlous state. Surrounded on every hand by an outworn psychology which still identifies conscious with mental, and which wastes its energy in hair-splitting experiments and stereotyped arguments about matters of terminology, it never gets near enough to living religion to say very much that is essential and useful. For this reason it is just as well that, as a rule, people do not attempt to learn such a science, since it is already foredoomed to sterility.

It is totally different with a religious psychology built on a broader and less prescribed basis, which is capable of seizing upon the motives working in the unconscious. It was the theologians of Geneva who first used the unconscious to explain piety. As far as I know, Latin Switzerland has the honour of having established the first professional chair for religious psychology, and rightly, since she leads the modern mind in this subject. Flournoy, the greatest Swiss psychologist, was the first professor of theology to carry out unofficially detailed experiments for months and years on living people in order to investigate the genesis of religious consciousness. He was able to do this after he had studied psycho-analysis. Thus, as the first professor in this chair he opened up the long-sought way to satisfactory religio-psychological research, and he was fortunate enough to find intelligent disciples.

Of these, Maurice Neeser is one, a man of similar mental orientation. His inaugural lecture starts with the two principles which Flournoy had already laid down in 1888; first, the exclusion of transcendency; secondly, the acceptance of a biological explanation. Has psycho-analysis complied with these two principles? In reviewing the religio-psychological works of Flournoy, Berguer and Maeder, he finds that these adherents to psycho-analysis fully recognise the biological postulate.

He thinks, however, that they have not excluded transcendentalism in their analytic-psychological work with sufficient care. He finds also that they differ, in that Flournoy and Berguer regard religious conceptions as products of the libido, or at least occasionally mention this psychical origin—both these scholars certainly believing in the objective reality of religious conceptions—whereas Maeder and Morel, on the contrary, show merely a materialistic subjectivism.

For Neeser the psychology of religion aims only at the understanding of the psychical function involved and he demands a clear division of the question of religious psychology from the question of the truth of religion.

Much as I should like to follow Neeser in his interesting views, I must confess that I should probably feel obliged to give judgement against his statement about Flournoy, Morel and Berguer. These three have certainly in their psychological works respected the principle of exclusion of transcendency. Maeder has not; as Clerq of Geneva has shown and I also in my book *Zum Kampf um die Psychoanalyse*. In Maeder the unconscious and the libido are penetrated with metaphysics, reminiscent of Eduard von Hartmann.

I have never understood Flournoy's and Berguer's conception of sublimation in the sense in which Neeser presents it; moreover, several years before Flournoy's idea of sublimation was known, I had one of

my own which I formed in my psycho-analytical investigations of religious persons. Sublimation is already according to Freud a transference of psychical energy, formerly used for primitive functions, on to non-primitive functions. Sublimation therefore only occurs where the course of life becomes complicated and where, as a result of the check imposed on the primitive activities, a stimulus arises which links up the psychic forces with different higher processes. Flournoy never thought the God of the mystics to be *only* a product of libido; just as he could not assume that a cured alcoholic who devotes himself to social service perceives society only in his own individuality (purely 'autistically') as a personification of his instinctual life. There is room for other forces working besides. If Flournoy mentions that his famous mystic wanted auto-suggestion in order to arrive at divine experience it is by no means thereby asserted that transcendency of divinity is thereby excluded. One must also remember that even a well-founded scientific opinion may also become a conviction by way of a long auto-suggestion. Neeser overlooks that the content of conceptions and their epistemological origin must be disregarded, so that the dynamics alone of the psychical forces concerned may be investigated, as Flournoy and Berguer rightly do. If a physicist describes a house according to purely physical laws he will not enter into the purpose of the house nor into an aesthetic appreciation of the architecture. But does he therefore deny both of them? I believe therefore that Flournoy's and Berguer's formulations testify to the scholarly exclusion of the problem of transcendency. Nobody can justly reproach them with having denied the reality of the existence of the religious contents of the psychodynamical processes in question.

In his conclusion Neeser points out with conviction that a full understanding of piety requires not merely a psychological but also a philosophical explanation.

In spite of the dislike of the opponents of psycho-analysis who all without exception ignore the value of investigations of devout persons living at the present time, the fact remains that the first official professor of religious psychology in Switzerland accepts the data of psycho-analysis. His apt conclusion is significant: 'It is possible that Freud will be accepted in the future by all men as some already appreciate him at present, as the Newton, Lavoisier and Darwin of psychology. The libido theory offers psychology the basic hypothesis for which every science is seeking'.

O. Pfister.

Aspects of Child Life and Education. By G. Stanley Hall, L.L.D. and some of his pupils. (D. Appleton & Co., New York, 1921. Pp. 326. Price 9s.)

This is an interesting volume consisting of a series of nine essays contributed by Dr. Stanley Hall and some of his pupils under the editorship of Dr. Hall himself. The idea of the book arose from the various psychological studies dealing with child life carried out at Clark University and began, we are told, 'more than three decades ago'. From this accumulation of material, Dr. Hall selected the contents of the above volume, 'not with a view to unity, but rather to suggest as wide and diversified a range of topics as possible (Preface, p. ix). Such a purpose, indeed, leads to some lack of continuity and even to some distraction, but in compensation, it gives a very varied and interesting selection, as will be realized from the titles of the Essays. Three of them, 'The contents of children's minds', 'The story of a sand pile', and 'Boy life in a Massachusetts Country Town forty years ago', are by Dr. Hall himself; in addition we have, 'A study of dolls', by Dr. Hall and A. Caswell Ellis, 'The collecting instinct', 'Curiosity and interest', 'Fetichism in children', 'The psychology of ownership', etc.

From the psycho-analytical standpoint, this book provides excellent material, but it can hardly be said that the various writers have treated their material from such a point of view. In two of the most interesting essays—'A study of dolls' and 'Curiosity and interest'—it is striking that, in spite of ample material for the purpose, references to and conclusions concerning the unconscious mind are almost absent. One feels that the absence of psycho-analytic knowledge goes a good way towards vitiating the work. For instance, in the essay on 'Curiosity and interest', the meaning of curiosity, its sexual source and its emotional motivation seem quite unrecognised, and the distinction made between what is termed 'legitimate' and 'perverted' curiosity is not truly based. In the section dealing with curiosity relating to the origin of life, a good deal of misunderstanding is apparent: the authors appear to think that intellectual knowledge, correct information given at appropriate stages, will solve this difficult problem, thus ignoring the whole matter of the fantasies of the unconscious mind which are so profound an influence.

'The story of a sand pile', the narration of an experiment from which two boys, aged three and five respectively, with the help of companions, developed over a period of eight or nine years, a comprehensive community, is certainly full of psychological interest, but here again, the psycho-analytical findings are absent. How far this type of education will afford sublimation, in what respects it fails to do so, what are the

most significant unconscious trends revealed in the process, the relationship between the little model community created by children and that larger adult one outside, whether the 'make-believe', extended over a prolonged period, intensifies too greatly unconscious fantasy—these with other kindred considerations are the important matters to tackle. Much the same criticism may be applied to the other essays which make up the book; in spite of this, it is a collection for which we can be grateful, since it presents so much material for the psycho-analyst.

Barbara Low,

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The New Psychology and the Teacher. By H. Crichton Miller. M.A., M.D. (Jarrolds, 1921. Pp. 232. Price 6s.)

In his introduction the author tells us that this volume is based upon a course of lectures delivered in 1921 to an audience of educationalists and parents, and, therefore, as is to be expected, it is written in popular non-scientific style appropriate to the general public. For this very reason it is especially important that such a book should be accurate in its conceptions and terminology (if these conditions are fulfilled 'popular' works dealing with profound and complex subjects can be of undoubted value), but the present volume can hardly be said to carry out such a demand.

The title itself is ambiguous—what exactly is the connotation of 'The New Psychology', one wonders—and its vagueness seems to suggest that the author has no very definite conclusions as to his view point; certain it is that to-day the term 'New Psychology' is being made to cover such extraordinarily disparate things as Freud's theories, Couéism, the speculations of Jung and the dithyrambics of Dr. Rudolf Steiner, and it would be well to know for which of these Dr. Crichton Miller stands. It seems that he intends to deal with the most modern theories in psychology and their application to educational theory and practice, and the topics treated cover a wide range. The following chapter-headings show something of the scope of the book: 'Authority and Suggestibility' (chap. ii), 'Reality and Phantasy' (chap. iii), 'Emotional Development' in the boy and girl (chap. iv & v), 'Mental Mechanisms' (chap. vii), 'Dream Symbolism' (chap. viii).

There is a great deal of quite interesting matter in this volume, especially in the direction of helpful practical considerations and apt illustration. The last chapter, 'Educational Methods' (pp. 219-32), one of the best in the book, makes some useful applications to pressing problems and points out some methods of solution: the valuable aspects of the Montessori Method, the Boy Scout Movement, the 'free' school experiments (e.g. Oundle, St. George's Harpenden, the George Junior Republic in America, etc.), the question of attention, its meaning and

capability of development, individual and 'team' work—all these topics are dealt with, slightly, it is true, but in an interesting manner. Unfortunately there is much that reveals serious misunderstanding throughout the book. The author would appear to treat Unconscious Mind from the standpoint of Jung (he refers frequently to Jung's theories though whether with real appreciation of what they involve, it is doubtful), but claims at the same time to speak with knowledge of Freud's work. In view of this claim, it is curious to note Dr. Miller's misconceptions of some most fundamental matters—misconceptions which might have been avoided through a more careful study of Freudian literature. A few examples must suffice. In his 'Introductory' he writes (pp. 21 and 22): 'The Freudian School of Psycho-Analysis claims to have established the fact of a "thorough-going determination in the mental sphere"... Let us grant that the sense of spontaneity in human life may be an illusion. If this is so, it is an illusion which the writer believes that all educationalists would do well to cherish very jealously'. In this protest there is clearly an implication that the Freudian belief in mental determinism precludes, and even desires to counteract, 'the sense of spontaneity in human life', which is surely a misunderstanding of what determinism implies.

Throughout chapter vi, 'The Unconscious Motive', there is confusion between repression and suppression. Dr. Miller seems to regard these two processes as identical, and fails to realize that the former is an unconscious mechanism. The case of the corporal suffering from shell-shock (pp. 132-5) is one illustration: throughout the discussion, *conscious* motivations and *suppression* only are dealt with, yet Dr. Miller sums up in a concluding paragraph as follows: 'The case of the corporal has been chosen to show in simple and diagramatic outline the primary principle of the unconscious motive at work' (p. 135). In 'Mental Mechanisms' (chap. vii), Freud's view of the unconscious is surely not derived from Freud, at least in certain of the strange aspects set forth by Dr. Miller. 'The unconscious is conceived by Freud as secondary and personal' (p. 155); 'To the Freudian school the unconscious material is necessarily that which is antagonistic to conscious thought, and opposed to ethical and social ideals' (p. 157); 'On the Freudian view the chief dynamic appears to be regarded rather as a downward push from consciousness' (ibid.), 'Freud now conceives that there are two censors, and both appear to the writer [is 'the writer' Dr. Miller or Professor Freud, we must ask] to perform a strictly personal function within the impersonal ego of a deterministic theory' (p. 159).

The above quotations, the treatment of sublimation, which Dr. Miller regards as a conscious process, and concerning which we

read most curious statements (for example 'the work of a barmaid, it is obvious... offers very little opportunity for any useful form of sublimation at all' (p. 213)) of Extroversion and Introversion, of Dream Symbolism (chap. viii) all show that Freudian findings have certainly not been applied, nor can we discover what other scientific basis the conclusions rest upon.

At the end of the book is a short list of works of reference. It is of considerable significance that the name of Freud is not once mentioned.

Barbara Low.

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The Foundations of Character. By Alexander F. Shand M.A. (Macmillan & Co., London, 1920, pp. 578. Price 20s.)

The somewhat comprehensive and challenging title of this volume is apt to excite expectations which, in the cases of readers versed in psycho-analytical contributions to Characterology, are far from being fulfilled. Here will be found an erudite and detailed discussion of character manifestations, from the descriptive and classificatory standpoint, which is still the main preoccupation of most general psychologists, and from this point of view Mr. Shand's treatise has a generally recognised importance; but its value as a current contribution to characterological research is impaired, not only by his adherence to this older point of view, but even more by his failure to take into account, or even acknowledge, the existence of those far-reaching contributions to characterology, which are perhaps the most striking results of psycho-analytical investigation.

Nowhere in these pages is the name of Freud mentioned, and this omission is rendered even more pointed by citations from psychopathologists like Kraepelin who have made no important contributions to characterology, yet are quoted curiously enough apropos of the relationship between sorrow and melancholy, which is the theme of one of Freud's most penetrating researches into the structure of the Ego.

Mr. Shand's orientation in the genetic aspects of his subject is revealed by the following admission (p. 128): 'We vaguely surmise that our character develops as we grow up, and that at a certain age it is set and its chief characteristics defined'. There is surely no longer any need for such vagueness in a modern treatise on character: it has long since been replaced elsewhere by a definite collection of data.

Mr. Shand's 'Law of organisation', which he elaborates into an ascending scale of superimposed 'systems' of impulses, emotions and sentiments, really refers to the vicissitudes of Ego-development; but we miss any reference to the dynamics of conflict, the processes of repression and sublimatory displacement, the introjection of early parental influences,

the subsequent rôle of the Ego-Ideal, in short to all these important and intricate dynamic factors in the development of personality which psycho-analysis has brought to light.

Moreover the term 'sentiment' is seen to embrace diverse mental dispositions, which psycho-analysts find it both theoretically and practically useful to distinguish. Thus from one point of view, a sentiment is clearly a conscious facet of the Ego-Ideal, but it also includes the conscious manifestations of a 'complex', both as representing a repressed infantile interest (sentiment of avarice) and as expressing a reaction-formation on the part of the Ego against such an interest (sentiment of disgust). A sentiment is also, as in the case of 'desire for knowledge', a sublimation of an infantile trend. Mr. Shand's position with regard to the psychogenesis of such sentiments, is best indicated by his acceptance of Preyer's explanation of the violent food antipathies of children, as due to a largely developed capacity in discrimination of taste and smell, by his own derivation of the 'desire for knowledge', from the child's impulse to solve a doubt, and above all, from the absence of all references to the paramount influence on character formation of anal erotism. Only once does the author allude to the existence of recognised sources of character traits other than those he discusses. After deriving love of cruelty from the interaction of anger and fear, he adds in a footnote (p. 270) 'There is another recognised source of cruelty in the sexual instinct which cannot be considered here'. He does not give his reasons, but they would probably throw considerable light on his failure to come to grips with the deeper problems of psychogenesis.

James Glover.

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The Glands regulating Personality. By Louis Berman. M.D., Associate in Biological Chemistry, Columbia University; Physician to the Special Health Clinic, Lennox Hill Hospital. (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921, pp. 300. Price 18s.)

Solution of the problems of the physical basis of personality would seem so urgent a need that not a few have found satisfaction in systems such as palmistry and phrenology; in these pages the author has exploited endocrinology in an energetic and perhaps not altogether unsuccessful attempt to force it into a similarly facile system. Man dominated by his ante-pituitary has, it appears, a superb brain, whereas his post-pituitary energises the tender emotions and if excessive induces anxiety neuroses. Courage and other qualities attributed to animals are apportioned to suprarenal activity; vitality and sensitivity are controlled by thyroid secretion, a fluctuation of which may bring about manic-depressive insanity. The thymus preserves childlike characters

at the price of homosexuality. The gonads, in common with all ductless glands, have something to do with the sexual instinct. Pure types of personalities dominated by each of the most important glands are distinguished and can be recognised by their characteristic somatic manifestations, such as the nature of the teeth: the size of central incisors is directly proportional to pituitary predominance, the size and regularity of the lateral incisors are proportional to the influence of the interstitial cells of the gonads, the size of the canines is a measure of adrenal activity.

Earlier chapters include a sketch of the science of endocrinology, the value of which is impaired by frequent inaccuracies and a failure of necessary perspective in evaluating conclusions suggested by the many incomplete investigations in this field. The account of the pituitary gland may serve as illustration: the biochemistry of its secretions is represented by unquestioned acceptance of Robertson's 'tethelin' as the specific active principle of the anterior lobe, a substance that has never been widely accepted as such, and is now known to be a very impure mixture of fat-like bodies; moreover, the statement that 'pituitrin' has been obtained in solution and is believed to be the internal secretion of the posterior lobe implies a somewhat different state of knowledge from the actual fact that in all probability there are at least two specific substances in posterior lobe extracts, collectively known as pituitrin, neither of which has been isolated. Physiological functions such as the influence of the anterior lobe on growth are described much more dogmatically than is justified by the inconclusive evidence on this point; increase of flow of milk and urine is said to follow injection of pituitrin, whereas in fact no true galactagogue effect is found though there is temporary acceleration of flow without change in total amount secreted, and the balance of the conflicting evidence bearing on its effect on the kidneys seems to be in favour of a normal ante-diuretic effect corresponding to the well-known diminution of secretion of urine in diabetes insipidus achieved by pituitrin injections.

Paucity of evidence relevant to psycho-physical correlations in this subject is compensated by ingenious selection of hints from clinical pictures attributed to diseased conditions of the various glands, amplified by enthusiastic application of experiments such as those of Cannon who demonstrated change in suprarenal activity concomitant on fear and rage, by way of inferring that suprarenal secretion causes these emotions—this despite Cannon's denial of such a view and experimental proof to the contrary. The author is evidently uninformed of the trends of psycho-analytic research which might have directed his attention to groups of mental phenomena whose intrinsic organisation and external relations suggest probable correlation with some such organic changes

as internal secretions, nevertheless occasional gibes at Freudians and the employment of some of their technical terms indicate a superficial acquaintance with their literature. Perusal of so boisterous and popular and exposition of an adventurous speculation is very entertaining, but is unlikely to lead many into the error of supposing this work to be representative of modern endocrinology.

F. R. Winton.

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Suggestion and Mental Analysis. An outline of the Theory and Practice of Mind Cure. By William Brown, M.A., M.D., (Oxon) D.Sc., M.R.C.P., (Lond.). Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford; Lecturer on Medical Psychology, Bethlem Royal Hospital, London. (University of London Press, Ltd., London, 1922. Pp. 165. Price 3s. 6d.)

Dr. Brown is becoming an author of small octavo volumes. This is a matter for regret, his position in English psychology demands that his contributions to current literature should be more substantial and that they should encounter the problems in closer engagement than is possible in general essays. Further to devote 40 pages to 'The Philosophical Background' in a short book on *Suggestion and Mental Analysis* suggests a flight into ambiguity ('But the ultimate solution can only come from Metaphysics', p. 165) which does not encourage us to believe that he puts much faith in observation.

Neurasthenia, which is classed with the psychoneuroses, is amenable to 'autognostic working over of past experiences', its aetiology is obscure.

'If we fall in love we experience certain sentimental feelings in regard to a certain person, and we extend this feeling in some degree to a great many things connected with him. If we afterwards fall out of love again, these sentimental feelings will continue to be connected in our mind with certain experiences, and this association only dies out very gradually. In these cases of neurasthenia too much emotion has been linked up with certain experiences, too little with other experiences. This has tended to produce conflict, strain. The more this has happened the more a person is repressed and unnatural, or mentally awkward'. (p. 71).

It will surprise many neurasthenics to see no mention of the relation of their trouble to masturbation, but this is, perhaps, only another example of the author's ambiguity.

He alludes to Freud's 'very interesting theory as regards compulsion neurosis' (p. 76), but adds,

'one is certainly tempted to believe that a very important factor in compulsion neurosis is great exaggeration of the innate tendency towards

anxiety which these patients possess. That is why analysis sometimes does not help the patient much—may even make him worse—and why suggestion treatment often does make him better.... I do not think that these cases are hypnotizable, though one may temporarily increase their suggestibility by making them passive, and thus *help them to fight down their fixed idea* [Reviewer's italics throughout] and also get rid of this general tendency towards anxiety' (p. 78).

It looks as if suggestion here increased repression, but how this can get rid of anxiety he does not explain.

On auto-suggestion he makes a statement to the analysis of which he should devote an entire volume:

'Almost all patients need help by suggestion from another person before they can obtain much success through auto-suggestion' (p. 120).

He should try to reconcile this with another statement (p. 38):

'Freud explains suggestion in terms of transference and holds that when symptoms are removed by suggestion treatment, no real cure has been produced, but that the symptoms have merely been replaced by another symptom, viz. psycho-sexual dependence upon the physician. The facts of auto-suggestion alone are sufficient to refute this theory.'

John Rickman.

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Functional Nervous Disorders. By Donald E. Core, M.D. (Manc.) M.R.C.P. Honorary Assistant Physician, The Manchester Royal Infirmary; Lecturer in Neurology, the Victoria University of Manchester. (Bristol, John Wright and Sons Ltd., 1922. 8vo. Pp. xiii + 361. Price 25s.)

Punnett's book on Mendelism contains a sentence which may be applied in many different fields of research: 'By this respect for the individuality of the different plants, however closely they resembled one another, Mendel found the clue that had eluded the efforts of all his predecessors'. Freud has rendered a similar service to psychology—and by the same method; he respects the individuality of the patient's symptoms, of his dreams, of his every act, and has found a clue that no psychologist can afford to neglect. And so we find in Mendelian literature that constant reference to observation and experiment which we claim with pride is the character of Freudian literature also.

The book before us stands out as an example of the opposite method of work and we cannot help regretting that such a carefully written book should spare as an average only one or two words per page to case histories. It is the more incumbent on the author to produce the material of close observation when he presents us with such novel ideas as the following:

'Hysteria is a form of behaviour in man which approximates most to that which obtains normally among the non-human animals. It is essentially associated with defective control of the emotions as a whole, psychical dissociation, and emotional relief through kinetic somatic behaviour' (p. 66).

His chief difficulty is to say something new on the psychoneuroses without taking into account unconscious factors and with only a scanty reference to sex. He considers the 'anger neurosis' is due to the servant question instead of realising that the servant question and these outbursts of temper at domestics are due to repressed homosexual impulses. Psycho-analysis 'is not a sound method of treatment in hysteria' (p. 335) but may be employed in the 'mnemoneuroses' [*Zwangsneurose*, presumably] and this is surprising because he says:

'Anyone who has performed psycho-analysis realises how surely, as the proceeding goes on, the patient, sooner or later, becomes angry; the very remorselessness of the questions, quite apart from their implication, induces in many a feeling of bitter hostility' (p. 354 n.).

Yet we read (p. 335)

'Methods of suggestion, hypnosis, simple suggestion, and psycho-analysis must therefore be considered inferior to those which aim at rendering the symptom consciously obnoxious in the environment of adjustment; of the three, perhaps, simple suggestion is the most satisfactory.

'The importance of conscious disagreeable associations as a means of cure is well exemplified by the ancient method of treatment of the hysterical convulsive attack, copious douching of the patient with cold water. Given that the douching be sufficiently free, the water sufficiently cold, and that there be no preparation of the patient to receive the flood, there is inevitable cessation of the attack and an absence of any recurrence. The whole setting of the treatment is devoid of any elaboration; the means employed are absolutely ordinary; there is, in fact, an element of the ridiculous about the treatment which is utterly opposed to the centripetal orientation of the patient. The subsequent discomfort is an eloquent commentary upon the undesirability of the symptom, and is completely conscious. The important factor in this treatment is never to allow the faintest atmosphere of invalidism to intrude when the fit has ceased; it is indeed a good thing to make the patient clear away the mess produced'.

If a physician can trace a connection between hysterical behaviour and normal animal behaviour perhaps he is at liberty to employ it in his treatment of patients; but if he would learn to respect the individual symptoms he might discover that what neurotics need—but cannot get—is love; horse-play has added little to our understanding of animals.

John Rickman.

Disguises of Love. By W. Stekel, Neurologist and Psycho-therapist, Vienna. Authorised Translation by Rosalie Gabler. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., London, 1922. Pp. vi + 171, 8vo. Price 6s. 6d.)

If the *Ladies Home Journal* is in need of a Vienna correspondent we commend to them the author with this book as a 'reference'. What more suitable than that such a Journal—with its introduction to dainty homes, its cosy corners, its lingerie, its 'uplift', its voluptuous advertisements—should feature the pretty Science Talks of this 'Physician of the Soul'?

The style is almost unbearably fluent, and deep problems are approached with the urbanity that is more deadly than any of the other *Disguises of Folly*.

'He who is self-dissatisfied can change himself into a new being. He has but to let himself be submerged in his own identity, to know himself, conquer himself, struggle with his defects, fortify his good qualities, render his vices impotent, and reinforce his virtues. But he must not run away from his own Ego, he must know himself, he must concentrate inwardly—but without losing touch with the return path to real life' (p. 153).

Dr. Stekel should be an authority on the Ego (*The Beloved Ego* is one of his own productions) but he does not tell us how to avoid running away from it. Indeed he makes it rather a tempting object:

'All celebrated philosophers, all prophets, all poets draw their inspiration from the unfathomable well of the soul, and it is they who teach us to lower our pitchers deep, that we may draw them forth filled with priceless treasures' (p. 152).

But Dr. Stekel does not help us to do this and we are disappointed.

However the book carries a message, and a clear good message, to the hungry soul and to the family hearth, where it may safely be read: *Things are not always what they seem.* He leaves it at that.

John Rickman.

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Benign Stupors. By August Hoch, M.D. (Cambridge University Press. 1921. Pp. xi+284. Price 14s.)

This is a posthumous work from the pen of one whose untimely decease was a great loss to the psychiatric world. The book was not quite completed, but, from copious notes left, his colleague Dr. MacCurdy has been enabled to present Hoch's observations in their entirety. Following the line taken by Adolf Meyer in regarding the so-called functional psychoses as psychobiological reactions, Hoch has strenuously

avoided the conception of nosological entities and has developed individual study to endeavour to trace wherein lies the failure of adaptation. His previous work on the benign psychoses is well known and he has endeavoured to show that in the manic-depressive group, though elation and depression are the most frequent affects noted, there are not uncommonly others such as perplexity, anxiety, or apathy which are just as characteristic. Within these pages he demonstrates the importance and signification of a special syndrome centering around apathy or benign stupor. In text books on psychiatry the most sterile chapter usually has been that devoted to 'anergic stupor' as a special entity which was as devoid of any psychological meaning as the other psychoses described. Hoch has not only here given us the essential symptoms seen in the stupor reactions, viz: (1) More or less marked interference with activity, often to the point of complete cessation of spontaneous and reactive motions and speech; (2) Interference with the intellectual processes; (3) Affectlessness; (4) Negativism; but these are analysed and seen to be significant as definite reactions to emotional situations. What ideational content can be noted is found constantly to bear upon the idea of death, and according to how the personality views such a theme the affect may vary. Thus at first it may be reacted to with anxiety, the thought of living after death with some loved one may produce elation, non-acceptance of the idea may bring about projection and fear of being killed, the wish to die may result in suicidal attempts, but when death and nullity are accepted, stupor appears. From some unhappy situation causing depression, the psyche defends itself by a continuous regression towards the infantile life without effort, towards Nirvana, death and rebirth. As the libido is withdrawn from the external world we see the increasing inactivity, intellectual defect and apathy. The spoilt child reactions, autoerotic habits and negativism are all regressive symptoms.

It is here presumed that all the physical manifestations of the stupor are secondary to the mental changes, even the fever commonly noted at the onset, which one might be inclined to think was due to some infective process. However, careful investigation does not reveal any, so that the author falls back upon a speculative hypothesis that associated with the apathy there is an insufficient adrenalin supply and that the engendered unbalance of the involuntary nervous system brings about a failure of heat loss which is responsible for the rise in temperature. It is frankly stated that this explanation of the pyrexia is only tentative and that further observations are necessary to confirm or disprove it. Certainly it seems doubtful, but we are the more inclined to fall in with it because as Hoch says it is 'consistent with the view that stupor is essentially a psychogenic form of reaction'.

Epileptoid attacks occasionally occur and this fact is the more interesting since such convulsions are practically unknown in manic-depressive insanity but do happen in dementia praecox. This then constitutes a link between the benign and malignant forms of stupor. A speculative theory is put forward that if MacCurdy's idea is accepted—that an epileptic convulsion may be due to the sudden loss of consciousness which removes a normal inhibition on the muscle—in stupor the tendency to part company with the environment may come on with great abruptness instead of slowly, with the same result.

With the lifting of the stupor towards recovery, the patient retraces his regressive steps towards reality and a study of such cases shows that stupor *per se* does not involve a bad prognosis. The clinical and psychological differentiation from the malignant stupors as seen in dementia praecox is well dealt with and special stress is laid on the point that in the latter there is a perversion of energy and attention and not the mere limitation of the former.

Apart from the physical and hygienic treatment necessary, it is important to note that appropriate stimulation is the keynote towards inducing recovery, family visits being most potent in this respect. This is in marked contradistinction to what is found in most manic-depressive psychoses where such visits are only provocative of harm to the patient.

In a final chapter on the literature of stupor one is struck by the previous paucity of study which has been devoted to stuporose reactions. Newington in 1874 wrote interestingly on the subject and well formulated the differentiation of energetic stupor (benign) from what he termed delusional stupor (malignant). Since little of worth has been done until the present volume.

It is difficult to speak too highly of this book. It should be in the hands of every psychiatrist as a prototype for future investigation and as illustrating the method of approach in all clinical work. The student will find in such reading a stimulation to gaining at any rate some insight into the interplay of human instinctive tendencies and emotions which result in mental instability and disorder, and he will see thereby that the mere routine labelling of groups of symptoms and being satisfied with pigeon-holing his cases can be his rôle no longer. It is only by an understanding of the motive forces at work that mental therapeutics can make any progress. All psycho-analysts will also find herein much instruction and food for thought.

C. Stanford Read.

*

The Psychology of Society. By Morris Ginsberg M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy University College, London. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London. 1921. Pp. xvi+174. Price 5s.)

This is another of the excellent small books on psychology recently published by Methuen & Co. Within the space of 190 pages Mr. Ginsberg has given us an eminently useful account of many of the more important aspects of recent thought and speculation on the psychology of society. That the reader is apt to rise from the perusal of the book with a feeling of disappointment and dissatisfaction is not the fault of the author but of the present condition of the subject. Indeed we are inclined to suspect that the arousal of such a state of mind in the reader is part of Mr. Ginsberg's aim, for his work—so far as it is not merely expository—is largely critical in nature and aims at upsetting what he conceives to be the top-heavy theoretical constructions of certain other authors and at producing a realisation of our actual ignorance and of the genuine difficulties of the subject.

After a short historical introduction in which certain main lines of thought are briefly discussed (one of these lines consisting in the social application of psycho-analysis), Mr. Ginsberg deals first with the 'General nature of instinct' and then with 'Instinct in society'. He here points out the futility of the attempt to explain social behaviour in terms of instinct, unless at the same time account is taken of the full complexity of actual social conditions, determined as these are by history, traditions, ideals and institutions: he even ventures to assert in this connection that 'the real problems of sociology are left unsolved by the writers of the instinct school' (p. 21). In the next chapter on the 'Rôle of reason and will' he deals with the modern reaction against 'rationalism', and although he agrees that this reaction has been useful in pointing out much that had been previously neglected, he considers that the anti-intellectualists are sometimes guilty of abstractions similar to those of which they have accused their opponents, and deprecates what he considers to be a false view of reason which identifies it with a 'bare and cold logical faculty of comparing and relating' and which would set up 'a false separation between reason or rational will and impulse'. Understanding reason in a rather unusually wide sense, he tells us that 'the rational impulse is not in all its stages conscious of itself. It is essentially ... an effort towards harmony or integration and is operative long before the stage of self-conscious theorizing. It may, therefore, be that social institutions do embody such a principle of unity, even though they have not always, or perhaps ever, attained the stage of conscious control of the conditions of their development' (p. 43).

The two following chapters are devoted to 'The theory of a social or group mind' and 'The conception of a general will' respectively, and it is here that Mr. Ginsberg's critical bent is most clearly manifested. He considers that such concepts as Group Mind and General Will are

fundamentally erroneous, useless and misleading, and insists upon the desirability of regarding the individual as the fundamental unit for purposes of social psychology. The reader will perhaps feel that these discussions devote a rather unjustifiably large proportion of the available space (forty-nine pages out of a total of one hundred and ninety) to subjects of preponderantly 'academic' interest: and it must be confessed that, although Mr. Ginsberg's remarks here as elsewhere are full of shrewdness and sound common sense, the detailed examination and criticism of the theories of the Group Mind might in some ways have been better reserved for a technical journal of psychology or sociology (the chapter on the General Will has, as a matter of fact already appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society) than for a book intended for a wider circle of readers, as is presumably the case with the present volume. Certainly the contrast between the length of the chapters devoted to this somewhat abstruse subject and that of the brief following chapter on the far more generally interesting topic of 'Racial and National Characteristics' is very striking. In this latter chapter Mr. Ginsberg considers that national character may be regarded as 'the psychical qualities of a people... which are widespread among them, forms of feeling, willing, thinking and acting which are important in the shaping of their behaviour, and characteristic of them in the sense that they enable us to distinguish them from members of other groups' (p. 99). He is of opinion, however, that very little work of indubitable value has as yet been done in this field and makes the very true and important remark that 'a really scientific psychology of peoples will only become possible when we have a developed science of character and have elaborated a reliable system of record and observation' (p. 99).

The following chapters are devoted to 'Tradition' and to 'Community, associations and institutions'; in the latter of which, following the recent work of Maciver and G. D. H. Cole, a community is defined as 'a group of social beings living a common life, including all the infinite variety and complexity of relations which result from that common life or constitute it', while an association is regarded as 'a group of social beings related to one another by the fact that they possess or have instituted in common an organisation, with a view to securing a specific end' and an institution as 'a definite and sanctioned form of relationship between social beings, in respect to one another or to some external object' (p. 120).

The remaining chapters deal with 'The psychology of the crowd', 'The public and public opinion' and 'The psychology of organization and democracy', all treated in Mr. Ginsberg's cautious and critical manner. In the last chapter there are some interesting considerations as

to the psychological difficulties of democracy, which, the author thinks, may be grouped under the following four heads (p. 157):

1. The tendency inherent in all organization towards oligarchy.
2. The psychological difficulties in securing an adequate system of representation for complex interests.
3. The failure of the representative system, owing to the ignorance and gullibility of the masses, and the existence of agencies for the distortions of opinion.
4. The psychological difficulties in securing effective collective deliberation in large assemblies.

The book is, as we have already indicated, by no means altogether cheerful reading, since the reader is everywhere impressed with the small progress made by social psychology in comparison with the vastly important problems that lie before it. Nevertheless this is probably the best all round book of its size that has been written on the subject in the English language, for—as psycho-analysts, especially, will realize—a state of Socratic ignorance is a preferable foundation for a scientific structure than a more imposing but less stable basis of doubtful and often mutually contradictory theories and rationalisations. Psycho-analysts will also be able to sympathise with Mr. Ginsberg's insistence on the fundamental importance of the study of the individual for the proper understanding of the phenomena of society—an attitude which has, among psycho-analysts themselves, already been explicitly adopted by Dr. Ernest Jones in his brief but pregnant study of *War and Individual Psychology*. Psycho-analysts may even be inclined to be slightly more optimistic than Mr. Ginsberg, for it seems not improbable (as Mr. Ginsberg himself admits in one place, p. 156) that the knowledge of unconscious factors revealed by the analytical study of the individual may before long throw considerable light upon many difficult problems of sociology and politics, of which no full comprehension could be won so long as observation was conducted only by the more superficial methods hitherto employed by social psychology.

J. C. F.

*

Disorders of the Sexual Function. By Max Huhner M.D. (F. A. Davis Company, Philadelphia, 1922. Pp. 303).

This is evidently a popular book. It first appeared in 1916 and there have been fourteen reprintings since then. The present one is called the second edition.

The author is a genito-urinary surgeon and he writes from the point of view that 'the treatment of sexual neuroses belongs to the genito-

urinary rather than the neurological specialist.' We presume that he includes medical psychologists under the latter term, for neurology and psychology are often confused with one another—sometimes deliberately and with malice aforethought.

Max Huhner ascribes masturbation, impotence, pollutions, priapism, satyriasis and even enuresis to congestion of the posterior urethra and his great panacea is to pass an urethral endoscope and to apply a solution of silver nitrate to the verumontanum, in some cases with massage of the prostate; yet exactly the same or analogous conditions in the female are regarded as primary neuroses and you can do nothing for them. There is not even a hint of psychological treatment in the whole book, except perhaps when the author alludes to the psychical effect of passing an instrument with an electric light on the end of it up the urethra.

There is a special chapter on Coitus Interruptus, which is one of the causes of a congested verumontanum as well as of cardiac symptoms (with oedema of the feet, by the way), 'nervous exhaustibility', 'general neurasthenia' and gastro-intestinal symptoms; but there is not a word about fear or apprehensiveness and the author has evidently never heard of the anxiety neurosis. Treatment consists of abstinence from coitus, the application of silver nitrate to the verumontanum and the administration of bromides. There is no mention of other methods of contraception.

There is an unnecessarily long chapter (30 pages) on the possibility and justifiability of continence.

Throughout the book the clinical cases are well recorded. One of the cases of impotence—admittedly psychical, by the way—should be of psycho-analytical interest. It is quoted from de Caux, but unfortunately there is no reference. The patient was a mathematician who 'was always diverted from coitus by a certain geometrical problem coming up at the psychic moment'. Psycho-analysts would like to know what the geometrical problem was, in order—if possible—to estimate its doubtlessly rich symbolic value.

If Dr. Max Huhner were to read an up-to-date work on the neuroses and to study the psychology of his patients he would be enabled to render his book even more popular than it is—and certainly far more useful.

W. H. B. Stoddart.

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The Nature of Woman. By J. Lionel Tayler, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., 1922. (Jonathan Cape, London. Pp. xxiii+186. Price 7s. 6d.)

There is little need for us to criticise this book. We need only give it a moment's hearing, and let it condemn itself. Indeed, to take it too

seriously would be no compliment to the readers of this *Journal*. It is true that the words 'scientific' and 'really scientific' occur so often on its pages that we weary of the sight of them; but whether the author has any notion of scientific method, of the manifold biological and psychological problems opening out before the student of sex differences, or of the actual state of knowledge of these problems, may well be judged by the fact that there is not a single reference to the work of Freud or Havelock Ellis, although there is a chapter entitled 'Some Landmarks in the Subject'; nor even any mention of well-known experimental studies, save a misleading remark (p. 14, not given in the index) about the work of Helen Thompson.

But the scientific information, discipline and acumen of this writer on the nature of woman are most easily revealed by his own words. 'There is a similar disposition in German sex psychologists, which is, unfortunately, shared by some French and English scientists, to treat the psychology of sex from the physical point of view. So far has this gone that many writers for the general public have published larger volumes "for its benefit" than is allotted to such matters in medical text-books for the medical man acting as trained adviser. This fact alone is sufficient condemnation of the movement' (p. 21-2). Since this passage occurs in a chapter on 'The Woman's Movement', we have to infer that 'the movement' here is 'the woman's movement'. Apparently the study of sex psychology 'from the physical point of view' is, for Dr. Tayler, a by-product of feminism.

The number of pages given to 'the lower side of sex' is an interesting obsession with this author. Speaking of the effect of modern education upon woman, he says (p. 80 and footnote) '... she has produced books, and encouraged men to produce them, which in their unhealthiness of thought can have no real claim for existence.... A few simple facts drawn from some advertisements that have reached me from various sources will demonstrate this point and place it beyond dispute. It is first necessary to observe that medical text-books on physiology, or on a branch of medicine where such matters have to be adequately discussed, seldom allot more than a chapter, and sometimes a small chapter, to the whole field, and though some writers, perhaps, have given too little attention to questions that are of very great social importance, yet it is certain that thirty to forty pages is an outside limit for the needs of medical men, and less than half this for the non-medical mind, yet the following space has been given by various writers of books that claim to be written with a moral rather than an immoral intent:

'One of the least objectionable writers is responsible for four volumes, and two women for another four, on a subject that could easily have been compressed into a little pamphlet; another devotes seven

hundred pages to physiological details; two more one thousand odd in length, and another almost as long, and all of these are written by English writers.... An American work... devotes thirty odd chapters and four hundred odd pages to similar thoughts, and these are the best books of their class.' And this is not the end of the terrible catalogue—but we weary of quoting it. No names of authors; no honest statement of what is meant by 'such matters' and 'similar thoughts'; no indication of whether the books in question are sensational novels or serious studies. It appears likely, indeed, that Dr. Tayler has not looked into these books which he condemns from the advertisements for their size alone. We suppose that is why he does not tell us anything about the size of the print.

We are presently allowed to hear the author's *credo* (p. 40), and cannot thereafter doubt that his book is 'really scientific'. 'My life has been spent in science, and I believe in science because I know, however imperfectly, something of what the search for truth and reality is capable of, but if I thought that the study of eugenics, of parental hygiene, of heredity were only tending to focus human minds on the morbid unhealthy side of life, I would devote the rest of my life, such as it is, to discouraging these studies. Men and women must be taught to see that the lower side of sex is a relatively simple matter, and that its hygiene can be expressed in a few words, but that what is wonderful, strange and complex is womanliness of the mind and manliness of the mind and the reactions that grow out of these in human marriage and parentage.'

Dr. Tayler's ignorance of the fundamental conditions of scientific controversy is shown by his frequent failure to quote the names of authors whose position he criticises, as in the case of the reference to O. Weininger on p. 21; and by the whole atmosphere of innuendo, which we in our turn cannot but stigmatise as 'unhealthy' and 'morbid'.

It is not hard to understand why this book was written in 1912; it was part of the general social phenomena of the period. Why it should have been reissued, in the year of grace 1922, is a secret of the author's individual psychology. Perhaps the quoted passages, with the following, are a partial key to this. 'A woman who loves a man feels as Homer felt, as Shakespeare felt... in their *scenic*, contemplative side. Greece is, England is, my husband is, it is enough, I see, I know. A real wife knows her husband as the husband does not know even himself, with his littlenesses, with his shadows, but also—for there is this side in all men, if it can be reached—his glory... Tell the real wife—for a woman's genuine love goes down to the reality that is good and reaches it, much or little as it is there—...' (p. 105-6).

S. S. Brierley.

The North West Amazons. Notes of some months spent amongst cannibal tribes. By Thomas Whiffen, F.R.G.S., F.R.A.I., Capt., H.P. 14th. Hussars. (Constable & Co., Ltd., London, 1915. Price 12s. 6d.)

The author of this interesting book writes as follows in his preface: 'Some months of the years 1908 and 1909 were passed by me travelling in regions between the Rivers Issa and Apaporis where white men had scarcely penetrated previously. In the remotest parts of these districts the Tribes of Nomad Indians are frankly cannibal on occasion, and provide us with evidence of a condition of savagery that can hardly be found elsewhere in the world of the twentieth century.'

We may quote a few passages to show how rich the work is in material of interest to psychologists. The following is an attempt by the author to suggest in the metre of 'Hiawatha' the song-words of a dance performed for his benefit by some Witoto. But before giving it we must reproduce a note by Captain Whiffen on page 154:

'Every Indian has two names, his own name and his secret name (name of genitalia). The latter is generally a significant name and is used in ribald jesting round the fire e. g., "The Okaina (a rodent) went to the stream to bathe" etc., etc., ad nauseam.'

The words of the song will now be intelligible:

To our tribe there comes a stranger,
Comes a welcomed, honoured stranger,
And whence comes to us this stranger?
From what far and foreign country?
Wherefore comes this friend among us?
What the quest that brings him hither?
Are there in his native country
Empty fields and unkind women,
That he comes to seek among us,
So to satisfy his wishes?

By what name is called this stranger?
Tell us what his people call him
Call him Whiffena, Ri-e-i
Call him Wiffena, the White Man.
Partly, too, his name's Itoma
But his friends and bosom cronies—
Tell us, how do they address him?
He is nicknamed by his cronies
Ei-fo-ke, the Turkey Buzzard.

Ei-fo-ke, the Turkey Buzzard
 Is this, then, the name endearing
 That his lovers whispered to him
 When of him they grow enamoured?
 No, not good: The Turkey Buzzard
 Is a bird with beak of scarlet,
 And a loose and hanging wattle,
 No, his name is not Ei-fo-ke.
 Let his love name be Okaina.

'This went on ad nauseam. The true object in all such songs is to bring in and discuss sexual matters, and no song has advanced far before it has become essentially carnal in idea and thoroughly licentious in expression.' (pp. 209-10.)

Here are some remarks on the subject of Indian riddles:

'The riddles are nearly always concerned with animals and the test of wit is the amount of sexual suggestion contained in the reply. A typical query is "When is a howler monkey not a howler?" The answer would be—"When he is covering his mate".—The dumb show of the actors delights the audience and leaves no small characteristic to the imagination.

'The riddles may defy translation, but the actions accompanying them are certainly not beyond interpretation.' (p. 202.)

If from their songs and riddles we turn to their folk-lore and myths we still find much the same material:

'The Good spirit when he came to earth showed the Indians a manioc plant, and taught them how to extract the evil spirit's influences. But he did not seem to have explained how the plant might be reproduced.

'The Indians searched for seeds, but found none. They buried the young tuberous roots, but to no effect. The Good Spirit was vexed with them; that is why he did not divulge the secret.

'But long, long after, a virgin of the tribe, a daughter of the chief, was found to be with child.

'When questioned she replied that long, long ago, when sick to death and under the medicine man's magic (i. e., Nacotic) she wandered far, far into the bush.

'In the bush she found a beautiful manioc plant. She was seduced by the tuberous root.—Some Indians say the plant was metamorphosed into a beautiful young hunter and in due course she gave birth to a girl child, who could both walk and talk at birth.

'This child took the woman of the tribe to a beautiful plantation of manioc far, far up a certain river, and there the precious infant

explained how to reproduce the plant with bits of the stalk. So to this day the chief food of the people is cassova.' (pp. 237-8.)

We have quoted enough to give some idea of the interest of the material collected by Captain Whiffen. His book did not receive as much attention as it would otherwise have done owing to the war following so soon after its publication; but neither its value nor its interest is diminished by the passing of the last seven years. It is illustrated with fifty-four photographs taken by the author, has three maps, two sketches, eight appendices, an index and a list of reference books.

C. Dangar Daly.

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August Strindberg: A Psychoanalytic Study with special reference to the Oedipus Complex. By Axel Johan Uppvall. (Badger, Boston, 1921. Pp. 95. Price 2.50 Dollars.)

August Strindberg im Lichte seiner Selbstbiographie: eine psychopathologische Persönlichkeitsanalyse. By Dr. Alfred Storch (Tübingen). (Grenzfragen des Nerven- und Seelenlebens. No. III. Bergmann, Munich, 1921. Pp. 75.)

Strindberg und Van Gogh: Versuch einer pathographischen Analyse unter vergleichender Heranziehung von Swedenborg und Hölderlin. By Karl Jaspers, Dr. Med., Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Heidelberg. (Arbeiten zur angewandten Psychiatrie, No. 5. Bircher, Leipzig, 1922. Pp. 131.)

Few paraphrenics can have left behind them more voluminous material for an analysis than Strindberg. In the great German edition his works already fill over forty volumes, and there are many more to come. Of these a large number are either autobiographical or give direct expression to his own opinions and judgements; while his plays, novels, and short stories reveal the events of his life and the processes of his mind with a lack of disguise that is not often to be found in imaginative writings. Indeed, his passion for parading his most intimate affairs before the public, not merely during his life-time but almost immediately after their occurrence, is evidently to be regarded as one of the pathological features of his character. Moreover, in addition to this great bulk of self-revelation, there are a respectable number of more or less illuminating outside accounts of him by his contemporaries. It is perhaps the very quantity of the available material which has acted as a deterrent to commentators. In any case, there seem hitherto to have been not more than two or three serious psychological studies upon Strindberg, and the strictly psycho-analytical work on the subject is practically limited to an illuminating foot-note in Rank's *Inzestmotiv*

in *Dichtung und Sage*. It cannot be said that the three small books now before us—all of which have appeared in the course of the last few months—go very far towards removing the barrenness of the field. They approach the discussion from three very different standpoints—from that of the Centre (to borrow a political metaphor), of the Moderate Progressives, and of the Extreme Left. Professor Jaspers is willing to discuss the *symptoms* of Strindberg's psychosis in terms of psychology; but he considers that what he calls the schizophrenic 'process'—the disease itself—is something non-mental, something which is, from the point of view of psychology, 'given', and that the greater number of the mental symptoms are merely reactions to the 'process', and attempts of the patient to explain or interpret it. Dr. Storch goes considerably further. He attempts to give a psychological account of the disease itself, he investigates (superficially, it is true) Strindberg's childhood, discovers—for Dr. Storch is a follower of Kretschmer—that he belonged to the 'schizoid' type, and even refers to Freud in one or two foot-notes. Finally, Dr. Uppvall represents the psycho-analytic view. He finds it necessary, indeed, to be somewhat apologetic in places. He feels obliged, for instance, to deplore the existence of the Oedipus complex and to describe 'the male child's psycho-sexual fixation on the mother' as something 'repulsive'. He is also at pains to make it clear in the preface that he is not (as might have been imagined by readers of the book itself) so limited as to be a strict follower of Freud, but is broad-minded enough to harmonize the views of Freud, of Adler, and of Jung. But in spite of these sops to the Cerberus of respectability, it must be admitted that the psychological interpretations in the text of the work are almost wholly upon psycho-analytic lines and are for the most part, indeed, an elaboration of the hints given by Rank in the passage which has already been referred to. Unluckily, however, Dr. Uppvall's powers of clear exposition are not of the highest; and both his narrative of the events of Strindberg's life and his dissection of the structure of his neurosis leave much to be desired as regards lucidity and precision. From the purely biographical point of view—that is to say, from the point of view of the quantity of material which they offer to an analyst—the reader is advised to turn rather to the two other volumes under review, to Dr. Storch for an account of Strindberg's childhood and to Professor Jaspers for the details of the psychosis. Anyone who will read these, bearing in mind at the same time the rather sketchy interpretations thrown out by Dr. Uppvall, and also, what is far more important, Freud's analysis of the Schreber case, will inevitably be struck by the reflection of what an interesting psycho-analytic study upon Strindberg *might* be written. The elements, or some of them, are so patent: the fixation on his mother, the homosexuality,

the succession of paranoic mechanisms for keeping it repressed, the increasing withdrawal of the libido from the outer world, the *Weltuntergang*, the growing megalomania, the sense of being marked out by God for special persecution, and the final solution of the conflict along these lines. All of this seems so simple. But, indeed, it is far too simple—too simple at any rate for expansion as it stands into a monograph of the dimensions of Dr. Uppvall's. And that in effect is what he has done. There is a lack of precision in his work which is irritating in itself and moreover contrary to the spirit of psycho-analysis, whose essence it is to feed upon details. What we long to have is a close investigation of Strindberg's childhood and of the development and interrelations of his component instincts. Dr. Uppvall fails to construct any coherent theory even of such important matters as Strindberg's attitude towards his father and his reaction to the castration complex. And, again, in dealing with the neurosis itself, he makes no attempt to show why one particular symptom should have arisen at one particular moment: what, for instance, were the precise determinants which forced Strindberg's persecution mania into the anti-feminist form it took? It is the lack of particularization on such points which leaves a sense of hollowness over the whole work. For these particulars furnish at once the interest and the test of all analytic work. James Strachey.

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The Poetic Mind. By Frederick Clarke Prescott. (New York. The Macmillan Company, 1922.)

Mr. Prescott is a professor of literature at Cornell University, and he writes primarily for the general reader, confining himself in the main to the broadest applications of analytical psychology to the interpretation and criticism of the poetic mind. He is, however, unusually well qualified for such a task, by comprehensive study, by range and flexibility of thought, and by an accurate grasp of the chief principles at issue, and he has produced what is by far the best book of its kind yet published in America or Great Britain. It is pleasing to note in particular the precise use of terms and the orderly progress of argument, qualities which have sometimes been very conspicuously absent in earlier undertakings of similar intention. The work is also a rich storehouse of illustrative material well justifying the author's hope that it may be useful to psychologists as well as to others, on the principle that 'if the student of literature lacks the much needed psychological training, the psychologist on the other hand might lack the wide reading in literature which must supply a large part of the evidence'.

In the general aims and methods of Professor Prescott's work psycho-analysts will find little to quarrel with. They may however regret that he has not carried further or utilized in more detail his study of the psycho-analytical literature. He speaks for example of the 'deeper meanings' inherent in poetic thought, and occasionally illustrates them, but he makes no very serious attempt to define or to classify them. Yet there are surely good and quickly verifiable grounds for such procedure, the evidence for the importance in literary inspiration of the Oedipus complex, to mention only one of the richer veins, being sufficiently weighty to demand at least a passing notice in a book devoted to general principles. Thus it is disappointing to find that although Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is frequently cited and is altogether treated at some length, no reference is made to the important work which has been done in associating the play with this particular nucleus of poetic activity.

In a note, too, on page 71, there is a suggestion of definite misunderstanding. Quoting from Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* as follows 'The psychic activity in dream formation resolves itself into two functions—the provision of the dream thoughts and the transformation of these into the dream content' the writer proceeds 'And so Freud writes all through as if the dreamer first contrived his abstract latent content and then translated it into the concrete manifest one. This is surely the error of those who suppose that the Greek contrived his moral and then invented a myth to embody it. The dream content is the actuality; the dream thought is a fiction of the psychologist.' Here it is evident that Mr. Prescott does not realise the necessarily schematic nature of Freud's description. Because, for instance, Freud, for reasons of convenience, describes the mechanisms of condensation and displacement separately, he does not imagine that they occur in separate units of time. The total process of dream-making, of course, goes on synchronously as a whole.

L. C. Martin.

REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL CONGRESS

BERLIN, 1922

Minutes of Business Meeting

(Dr. Ernest Jones, President of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, in the chair.)

I. The Minutes of the business meetings of the previous Congress were taken as read and accepted as correct.

II. The President read the following Report on the activities of the International Psycho-Analytical Association since the last Congress.

According to the Constitution of the Association, it is the duty of the President to present a report of the happenings since the previous Congress. I am glad to be able to say that the report I have to present is in all essential respects a favourable one. The progress made by the psycho-analytic movement since the last Congress has been very considerable, whether we consider the extension of our branch societies, the increased prestige of our science in the world, the literary activity in both publications and translations, and, most important of all, the increase in actual knowledge.

At the last Congress, it was necessary to review the events of the preceding seven years; lengthy reports were presented both by the President and by the leaders of the various branch societies. On this occasion, after so much smaller an interval, my report can be correspondingly condensed, the more so because closer contact between the various societies than was previously possible has enabled all the happenings to be rapidly communicated throughout the Association. It will be remembered that the last Congress expressed a desire that the next one should be held in a year's time. Soon

afterwards however, the Central Executive discovered that there were difficulties in the way of fulfilling this desire, and therefore asked for a reconsideration of the question on the part of the constituent societies. The voting of this referendum gave a considerable majority in favour of postponing the Congress to the present year, and the Central Executive thereupon decided on this course. We would further recommend that the plan of holding the Congress only every two years be regularly adhered to, otherwise the amount of work entailed in elaborating the arrangements of the Congress would seriously interfere with the other activities of those principally concerned.

The total membership of the Association has risen from 191 at the time of the last Congress to 239 at present. The largest increase has been in the British, New York and Swiss Societies. The only Society which is smaller now than two years ago is the Hungarian one.

I regret to announce that we have lost the following members through death during the last two years: Dr. Rorschach, Vice-President of the Swiss Society, Dr. Skevinsky, Member of the New York Society, and Dr. Rivers, Associate Member of the British Society. The death of Dr. Rorschach signifies a severe blow to the psycho-analytic movement; although he had, as yet, published relatively little work, there was every reason to believe that we might expect valuable contributions from him in the future. I will ask the meeting to rise in honour of our dead members.

I have the pleasure of announcing that an Indian Psycho-Analytical Society has been formed in Calcutta under the presidency of Dr. Bose and with a membership of twelve. As the lines on which this Society was organised showed remarkable care, and as we were familiar with Dr. Bose's knowledge of psycho-analysis from an excellent book he had recently written, we decided to accord to this Society the provisional acceptance as a constituent branch of the Association for which they asked, and I will ask the Congress to ratify the decision. A Russian Psycho-Analytical Society has been founded in Moscow, and in spite of the difficulty in communication we are getting into touch with them. New Societies have also been formed at Leipsic and Cardiff. Though these have applied for admission into the International Association we did not feel that they were far enough advanced in the work to justify our accepting them, and we therefore postponed the matter pending further investi-

gation. As similar questions are sure to arise more frequently in the future I wish to ask the Congress to discuss the principles involved and for that purpose have tabled a resolution which will presently be laid before you.

The following changes in the officials of the branch societies have occurred: Dr. Liebermann, the Secretary of the Berlin Society was unfortunately compelled through ill health to resign his post and his work has been continued by Dr. Eitingon. Dr. Reik has been appointed co-secretary of the Vienna Society, together with Dr. Rank. Dr. Oberndorf has been appointed President of the American Society in place of Dr. Brill. Drs. Stern and Isham are President and Secretary of the New York Society in place of Drs. Oberndorf and Brill respectively.

It would be impossible here to review the scientific productions of the past two years, but I cannot pass by the topic without remarking especially on the extensive and valuable contributions made by the younger members of the Hungarian and Berlin Societies. Those of us who, like myself, belong to less productive Societies, can only admire and congratulate the high order of scientific achievement shown by the societies I have named.

As has been announced in the *Zeitschrift*, the last prize for the best article on medical psycho-analysis was awarded to Dr. Stürcke for his essays entitled 'Der Kastrationskomplex'¹ and 'Psychoanalyse und Psychiatrie';² that for applied psycho-analysis was awarded to Dr. Róheim for his essays 'Das Selbst'³ and 'Über australischen Totemismus'.⁴ I understand that Prof. Freud will presently make an interesting announcement on this matter.

I now come to the report which the Central Executive was instructed by the last Congress to draw up on the subject of the desirability of granting a diploma, and the conditions of membership to branch societies. As is known, the Questionnaire on these subjects, which was answered in full by each branch society, has been analysed by the Central Executive, and our report summarising the results and containing our own recommendations has already been circulated among the branch societies. The whole question stands

¹ See this *Journal*, 1921, Vol. II, p. 179.

² See this *Journal*, 1921, Vol. II, p. 361.

³ *Imago*, 1921, Band VII, S. 1, 142, 310, 453.

⁴ Not yet published.

as a separate point on the Agenda of to-day's meeting, so that I will say no more about it in the present report. Three other matters also, which belong to my report, will be dealt with separately. The progress and prospects of the *Verlag* will be presented to you by Mr. Storfer, the financial state of the Association by our secretary, Mr. Flügel, and the gratifying progress of the Berlin Polyclinic by Dr. Eitingon. In conclusion I wish to congratulate the Vienna Society on its having, after overcoming considerable difficulties, recently established a Polyclinic. We shall hope at the next Congress to hear that it has followed on the same successful lines as the Berlin one.

III. Dr. Van Emden, Dr. Oberholzer and Dr. Abraham read reports on the activities of the Dutch, Swiss and Berlin Societies respectively.

IV. Dr. Eitingon read a report on the working of the Berlin Psycho-Analytical Clinic.

Dr. Jones proposed that this report should be printed in the *Zeitschrift* and *Journal*.⁵

V. Dr. Hitschmann read a report on the 'Ambulatorium' in Vienna.

VI. Dr. Jones (in introducing the report of the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag) thanked Mr. Storfer for the Calendar that had been presented to members of the Association who attended the Congress and proposed that all members, while continuing to pay the same fees as at present, should have the right of receiving either the *Zeitschrift* and *Imago* or the *Journal* according to choice. This proposal was accepted.

VII. Dr. Otto Rank, in the place of Mr. Storfer (who was prevented by indisposition from attending the meeting) then read the report on the activities of the Verlag. The Subscriptions to the *Zeitschrift* and *Imago*, Vols. IX, 1923, will be as follows: Switzerland, 14 francs; England, 14s.; Holland, 7 florins; America 3 dollars. The prices for Germany, Austria and Hungary will be regulated from time to time according to the method now adopted by the booksellers in those countries.

⁵ See p. 253.

VIII. Professor Freud proposed that, with a view to making the *Journal* more definitely international in character, the list of collaborating editors should be the same for the *Journal* as for the *Zeitschrift*, with the addition of the name of Dr. Frink and Dr. Bose, one further new name to be added to this list, as a rule that of the president, to represent each new group as elected to the Association.

Professor Freud, after a discussion by Mr. Flügel, Dr. Bryan, Dr. Frink and Mrs. Riviere, brought forward a modification of his original proposal, to the effect that the title page of the *Journal* should contain also the names of all present assistant editors. The proposal in this amended form was accepted.

IX. Dr. Jones presented the Report of the Central Executive, which was accepted, on the questions of Diploma and conditions of Membership, and brought forward a resolution proposed by the Central Executive 'that this Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association urges the constituent Societies to demand of all candidates for membership a due standard of knowledge as indicated in the Report of the Central Executive to this Congress on the subject of a Diploma, the conditions of membership, etc.'

In the discussion that followed:

Dr. Sachs asked whether the Societies could in any way control the practice of psycho-analysis.

Dr. Jones suggested that the only influence they could exercise in this direction was by withholding membership from undesirable practitioners.

Dr. Simmel drew attention to the dangers of 'wild psycho-analysis' and suggested that the Association should indicate in some way that those who were not members of the Association were not qualified to practise.

Dr. Boehm wished to support Dr. Simmel's suggestion.

Dr. Liebermann proposed that some resolution in support of Dr. Simmel's suggestion should be passed by the Congress and that the Societies should be left to take practical steps at their discretion.

Dr. Federn thought that the practical difficulties in carrying out Dr. Simmel's suggestions were too great to be overcome.

Dr. Sachs thought that the Societies already did what was possible in this direction.

The resolution of the Central Executive was then put to the vote and carried *nem. con.*

X. Professor Freud announced that he had awarded the literary prize for medical psycho-analysis for the past year to Dr. Alexander for his work on 'Character and Castration Complex'.⁶ He further announced that the prize for the ensuing year would be allotted to the best work on a given theme, the theme chosen for this purpose being 'The Relation of Psycho-Analytical Technique to Psycho-Analytical Theory' (See this *Journal*, 1922, Vol. III, p. 521). Competing essays should be sent to Professor Freud not later than May 1, 1923. Dr. Abraham and Dr. Eitingon would assist Professor Freud in the task of judging. The value of the prize would be 20,000 Marks.

XI. Mr. Flügel reported on the financial position of the Association and proposed in the name of the Central Executive that as a temporary measure the subscriptions to the Association of members of the Austrian, Hungarian and Berlin Societies should be fixed at 25% of the amount paid by these members for the corresponding period to their local Societies for purely local purposes (i.e. after deduction of subscriptions to Journals and of the sums hitherto paid to the Association).

Dr. Abraham supported this proposal, which was then adopted.

XII. Dr. Jones announced that two new Societies, one from India, the other from Moscow, had applied for permission to join the Association.

Dr. Sachs read a translation of the history of the Indian Psycho-Analytical Society.⁷

The President's provisional acceptance of this Society as a constituent Society of the Association was ratified.

Professor Freud described what he knew of the Moscow Psycho-Analytical Society and proposed that it should be elected as a constituent Society.

⁶ See this number of the *Journal*, p. 11.

⁷ See this number of the *Journal*, p. 249.

Dr. Bryan pointed out that this could not take place at the present meeting, as the statutes of the Moscow Society were not yet in the hands of the Central Executive as was demanded by Statute XII of the Association.

Professor Freud then proposed that the Central Executive be empowered to admit the Moscow Society as soon as the formal conditions of admission should be satisfied. This proposal was accepted.

XIII. Dr. Jones moved the following addition to the Statutes:

Each constituent Society shall (on obtaining permission of the Central Executive) have the power of accepting provisionally the affiliation of small groups within the country of the Society, the members of the affiliated groups to have the following rights and duties:

1. The right to attend meetings of any constituent Society and the Congress.

2. The right to purchase publications of the *Verlag* at the reduced terms available to members and the duty of subscribing to the official Journals.

3. The right to expect all reasonable support from the parent Society to which the group is affiliated.

Members of such affiliated groups shall not enjoy the right of voting on business matters relating to the Societies or to the Association.

Such groups may at any time be removed from affiliation should the Society to which they are affiliated so decide.

Membership of a group shall in no way exclude from membership of the parent Society or vice versa.

Professor Freud supported the proposal as regards its content, but wished it to be made clear that affiliation should apply only to the case of *small local* groups. Larger and more important groups, he suggested, might not unnaturally be unwilling to become affiliated to an already existing Society. Dr. Jones thought that this was adequately conveyed by the wording of the proposed new Statute. Dr. Spielrein commented on the application of the new Statute to conditions in Russia. Dr. van Ophuijsen thought it would be preferable for those who were contemplating formation of, or adhesion to, a new group to join one of the already existing Societies. Dr. Jones replied that the existing Societies might not in all cases desire to admit such persons as full members. Dr. Oberholzer

thought it would be preferable to institute co-ordinated Societies rather than affiliated groups.

The proposed new Statute was then put to the vote and carried *nem. con.*

XIV. Dr. Reik then read a report on methods of abstracting and reviewing in relation to the activities of the Association.

Professor Freud proposed that Dr. Reik's report be printed and discussed by the Societies and that the Central Executive should collect the reports and forward them to Dr. Reik for his further consideration.

This proposal was accepted.

XV. Dr. Jones then resigned the chair in favour of Dr. Oberholzer, who invited the Congress to nominate a President.

Professor Freud proposed the re-election of Dr. Ernest Jones as President and remarked that under present circumstances it would, in his opinion, be desirable to elect a Secretary resident in Central Europe. He advised Dr. Jones to recommend Dr. Abraham for this office.

Dr. Jones said he would be pleased to recommend Dr. Abraham for the office of Secretary, but pointed out that this proposal was contrary to Statute VIII of the rules of the Association. He therefore proposed the deletion from Statute VIII of the words 'from among the members of his branch Society'. This proposal was carried.

Dr. Jones was then re-elected President and Dr. Abraham was elected Secretary.

XVI. Dr. Jones, returning to the chair, thanked the Congress for his re-election and tendered his warm thanks to those who had helped him during his past period of office, particularly Mr. Flügel and Dr. Eitingon. He then drew attention to the difficulties involved in holding the Congress in September and proposed that the next Congress should be held at Easter, 1924. This proposal was accepted *nem. con.*

XVII. Dr. Jones then invited discussion as to the place of the next Congress.

Dr. Groddeck invited the Congress to Baden-Baden. Dr. Piaget invited the Congress to Geneva. Dr. Oberholzer supported the latter invitation. Professor Levi Bianchini proposed the acceptance of Dr. Groddeck's invitation. Dr. Federn suggested Vienna but proposed that the decision should be left to a later date.

On Dr. Federn's proposal being put to the vote, it was carried by 22 votes to 19.

XVIII. Dr. Ferenczi thanked the President for the work he had done for the Association. Dr. Jones in acknowledgement said he wished to pass on thanks to those who had helped him in the work, particularly to Mr. Flügel, Dr. Eitingon and Dr. Abraham.

Dr. Radó thanked the Berlin Society for the excellent organisation of the Congress. Dr. Abraham, speaking in reply, thanked the members of the Association who had attended the Congress.

Dr. Jones in conclusion said he hoped to arrange a shorter and less tiring programme for the next Congress, and thereupon declared the meeting closed.

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BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Report for the Third Quarter

On account of the vacation the Society held no scientific meetings from July until September, 1922. Preparations were being made for the Seventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress, which took place in Berlin on the 25th, 26th and 27th of September.

Report for the Fourth Quarter

October: Business Meeting:

W. Schmideberg (cand. med.), who had transferred his membership from the Vienna Society, was appointed Secretary in place of Dr. M. Eitingon who was on leave of absence.

The annual subscription of membership of the International Society was fixed at 4 gold marks.

November 7th: Short Communications:

Dr. F. Boehm: Theoretical contribution on the subject of the perversions.

Dr. E. Simmel: Note on the 'It' in a faulty action.

Dr. J. Glover: A case of alcoholism.

Dr. O. Fennichel: (1) Libido-development in dreams. (2) On fear of the dead.

Dr. I. Harnik: (1) The significance of clocks. (2) Influence of analysis on third persons.

Frl. Schott: A child's theories of sex.

Frau Dr. Balint: The female castration-complex. (Observation of children.)

November 14th: Dr. I. Harnik: The problem of time. Discussion.

November 28th: Discussion continued.

From Leipzig we received the information that a new Society had been formed by certain medical students, under the presidency of Herr Voitel (cand. med.), organised upon strict lines for the study of psycho-analysis.

For November and December the Society inaugurated the following course of lectures at the Policlinic:

1. Dr. Karl Abraham: Introduction to Psycho-Analysis. (Section I. for medical men and teachers.) Psychology of Childhood; Theory of Instincts; Dreams; General Theory of the Neuroses. (Number present, 75.)
2. Dr. Hanns Sachs: The Perversions: general section. (Number present, 18.)
3. Dr. H. Liebermann: Technique of Psycho-Analysis. (Number present, 10.)
4. Dr. Carl Müller-Braunschweig: Practice. Notes and Discussions on the writings of Freud. *Introductory Lectures*, Section III, General Theory of the Neuroses. (Number present, 16.)
5. Dr. Ernst Simmel: Practical Introductory Work in Psycho-Analytic Therapy.

Lectures arranged for the First Quarter, 1923:

1. Dr. Karl Abraham: Introduction to Psycho-Analysis. (Section II. Special Points in the Theory of the Neuroses.)
2. Dr. Felix Boehm: The Perversions: special section.
3. Dr. Hanns Sachs: Problems of Resistance and Transference.
4. Dr. H. Liebermann: Clinical Notes on Psycho-Analytic Technique.

5. Dr. Carl Müller-Braunschweig: On the writings of Freud. (Errors and Dreams.)
6. Dr. M. Eitingon and Dr. E. Simmel: Practical Introductory Work in Psycho-Analytic Therapy.
7. Dr. Sándor Radó: The Unconscious.

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THE BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

QUARTERLY REPORT

Annual General Meeting

The Annual General Meeting of the Members of the British Psycho-Analytical Society was held on October 4, 1922.

The following Officers of the Society were re-elected for the ensuing year:

President: Dr. Ernest Jones.

Hon. Treasurer: Dr. W. H. B. Stoddart.

Hon. Secretary: Dr. Douglas Bryan.

Mr. J. C. Flügel was re-elected a Member of the Council.

The following Associate Members nominated by the Council were re-elected: Dr. Mitchell, Dr. Hart, Prof. Percy Nunn, Dr. Brend, Mrs. Porter, Dr. Davison, Dr. Jago, Dr. Wright, Dr. Culpin, Dr. Thacker, Dr. Rickman, Dr. Smith, Dr. Herbert, Dr. McWatters, Rev. P. Gough, Mrs. Walker, Dr. J. Glover, Dr. Rees Thomas, Mrs. Brierley, Dr. Herford, Miss Sharpe, Dr. E. Glover, Miss Saxby, Dr. Wilson, Dr. Josephine Brown, Dr. Torrance Thomson, Dr. Sylvia Payne.

The following Associate Members nominated by the Council were elected as Members of the Society: Dr. Mitchell, Dr. Wright, Dr. Rickman, Dr. J. Glover, Dr. E. Glover.

Major Owen Berkeley-Hill, Dr. Bose, and Dr. Chuckerbutty cease to belong to the British Psycho-Analytical Society in virtue of their transference to the Indian Psycho-Analytical Society.

The following were elected Associate Members: Dr. Warburton Brown, Mr. James Strachey, Mrs. Strachey, and Mr. F. R. Winton.

Dr. Cole proposed the following alteration of Rule II. 'That the words "by the Council" be deleted, and that the words "by the Members" be substituted for them'. This was discussed and Dr. Cole finally withdrew her proposal.

The following resolution proposed by Miss Low 'That the Officers of the Council be increased in number by at least one additional Member and preferably by two Members' was negatived after a short discussion.

The Hon. Treasurer's report was adopted.

The Hon. Secretary reported that the Society now consisted of seventeen Members, twenty-six Associate Members, and two Hon. Members. Five new Members had been elected. Nine new Associate Members had been elected during the year. Three Associate Members were not re-elected. One Associate Member, Dr. Rivers, had died. Eight Members and seven Associate Members attended the Congress at Berlin. During the year there had been fifteen Meetings of Members and Associate Members, six Meetings of Members, and six Council Meetings. There was an average attendance of fourteen Members and Associate Members at the Meetings.

No Meetings of Members and Associate Members have been held during this quarter.

Changes of Address

- Dr. Ernest Jones, 81 Harley Street, London, W. 1.
 Rev. P. Gough, S. Mark's Vicarage, 5 Abbey Road, London, N. W. 8.
 Dr. W. J. Jago, 39 Lee Park, Blackheath, London, S. E. 3.
 Dr. Stanford Read, 11 Weymouth Street, London, W. 1.
 Dr. J. Rickman, 26 Devonshire Place, London, W. 1.
 Miss E. Sharpe, 26 Mecklenburgh Square, London, W. C. 1.
 Dr. H. Torrance Thomson, 13 Lansdowne Crescent, Edinburgh.
 Dr. Maurice Wright, 86 Brook Street, London, W. 1.

Addresses of new Associate Members

- Dr. Warburton Brown, 18 Queen Anne Street, London, W. 1.
 Mr. James Strachey, 41 Gordon Square, London, W. C. 1.
 Mrs. Strachey, 41 Gordon Square, London, W. C. 1.
 Mr. F. R. Winton, 39 Fellow's Road, London, N. W. 3.

Douglas Bryan, Hon. Secretary.

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

June 11, 1922: Meeting in Amsterdam.

- a. Dr. August Stärcke: A symptom in depressive states which has not hitherto been described.

In two patients suffering from depression and anxiety the lecturer noticed, as an objective accompaniment of their complaining of a sensation of oppression, that a condition of considerable flatulence was present, while the patients made incessant gulping movements. He regards this symptom as a return to the aerophagy of the sucking infant. It confirms Abraham's ingenious thesis that in manic-depressive psychosis the fixation-point of the libido is to be found in the first pregenital, i. e. in the oral-erotic or cannibalistic, phase. Stärcke found that in the history of these patients there was a remarkable number of abnormal experiences connected with sucking in the first year of life.

Regarded from the point of view of the libido, this symptom of gulping air is a regression to oral-erotism; from the point of view of the ego-instincts, it is a regression to the phase of rhythmic repetition.

- b. Dr. August Stärcke: A Bridal Song.

A well-known author composed a bridal song for the wedding of a girl of good education and family. In this song, under the disguise of apparently nonsensical neologisms there was an obvious genital symbolism. The song was sung with special delight by the girls who were present at the wedding and they appeared only partly to fail to appreciate its significance. This behaviour provides food for reflection from several points of view.

- c. Dr. August Stärcke: Classicism.

Freud and Rank have shown that, in Romanticism, artistic composition is inspired by powerful object-erotic motives, especially of a positive and negative incestuous nature. Classicism, on the other hand, has been but little investigated. Stärcke found in it, side by side with a primitive religious nucleus, auto-eroticism derived from various erotogenic zones. The anal-erotic side is particularly strongly developed and is transmuted into the tendency to systemization and the delight in construction and material.

The lecturer concluded with remarks on the essential nature of the relations existing between religious, aesthetic, ethical and logical feeling.

July 8, 1922: Meeting at the Hague.

- a. Dr. J. Varendonck: Unconscious symbolism in the realm of aesthetics.
- b. Dr. J. H. van der Hoop. Three dreams of patients.

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In September, Dr. van Ophuijsen removed to Berlin and therefore resigned his office of Treasurer. Dr. A. van der Chijs was elected to succeed him.

In November, Dr. Simon Weyl was admitted as a full member.

Changes of Address

Dr. A. Endtz. Asylum Oud-Rosenburg. Loos-duinen.

Dr. J. H. W. van Ophuijsen. Sybelstraße 69 II. Berlin, Charlottenburg 4.

Dr. Simon Weyl. Oude Delft 68. Delft.

Dr. Adolph F. Meijer.
(Secretary.)

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HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY¹

October 14, 1922: Dr. S. Ferenczi: Report on the Seventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress.

October 28, 1922: Dr. I. Hermann: The bases of artistic talent, and in particular of poetic talent, as deduced from the analysis of patients, with special reference to the life and works of Petöfi.

November 11, 1922: Continuation of Dr. Hermann's lecture.

The lecturer gave an exposition of those points of view which should be kept in mind in a psycho-analytic investigation of special artistic talent. The talent of the draughtsman has been shown to be based on a strong libidinal feeling-tone attaching to the 'hand' and an infantile narcissistic complex regarding the subject's own beauty or ugliness. In analogy with this poets who have been subjected to analysis have been found, on the one hand, with marked oral-erotism (the mouth is the poet's appropriate organ of expression) and, on the other hand, a 'complex of the dead', i.e. loving in

¹ Reproduced from reports furnished by the speakers.

actual sexual life one who is dead and yet alive, or being loved as one both dead and alive. Further, there is found a 'seer-complex': a conviction of prevision of the future. The complex of the dead has its roots in sadism and the form it takes is expression by means of speech; it is the conditioning factor in skill in expression by words. For words have an ambivalent life: they live and yet they are not living; they give life to that which is lifeless, yet are immediately extinct. The seer-complex rests upon early infantile experiences and finds expression in the metrical form of poetry (repeating itself in the rhythmic flow of thought, in metre and rhyme.)

The presence of such constituent factors, even in a great poet, was demonstrated by examples from the life and works of Petöfi. On the theoretical side the lecturer laid emphasis upon the importance of the peripheral processes and, further, upon the peculiarities in configuration (*Gestalt*) of the libidinal processes (susceptibility to transposition), and the libidinal bases of the processes of form.

(Signed on behalf of the Secretary)

Frau Dr. Radó-Révész.

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HISTORY OF THE INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

On January 22, 1922, Mr. M. N. Banerji, Dr. G. Bose, Dr. N. N. Sen Gupta, Mr. H. Maiti and Mr. S. Mitra convened a meeting at 14, Parsibagan, Calcutta, to discuss the possibilities of starting a Psycho-Analytical Society and to frame the rules and regulations. The following gentlemen were present besides the conveners:

Rai Jaladhar Sen Bahadur.

Mr. Gopeswar Pal, M.Sc.

Mr. A. Majumdar, B.A., B.L.

Mr. R. C. Ghose, B.A.

Dr. N. C. Mitra, M.B.

Mr. Govindchand Bora, B.A.

Capt. S. K. Ray, M.B., I.M.S.

Dr. N. N. Sen Gupta M.A., Ph.D. was elected Chairman.

At the request of the Chairman Dr. G. Bose explained the scope and objects of the proposed society. Dr. G. Bose remarked that in India psycho-analytic investigations were likely to yield very fruitful results both from the scientific and therapeutic standpoints. The mental cases practically went untreated and the immense variety of social and religious customs, some of them of extremely ancient origin and others comparatively recent with the people existing in different grades of civilization from the most primitive to the most modern, offered an immense field for the psycho-analyst. The resistance the analyst was likely to meet with was more of the individual than social type as the peculiar *shastric* tradition of the Hindu prevented him from taking up a prudish attitude towards sexuality. Almost all the complexes unearthed by psycho-analysis could be found in their naked manifestations in some form or other of the innumerable religious sects found in India. Unfortunately, however, workers were few and the opportunities for mutual exchange of ideas were absent. Dr. Bose pointed out that in 1909 when he first began work the name of Professor Freud was almost unknown in India and as far as he knew there was no other medical man taking interest in the subject. But conditions were more favourable at the present time. The interest in psycho-analysis grew apace and a fair number of medical men and scientists began to pay attention to this fascinating subject. The University of Calcutta opened post-graduate classes in Experimental Psychology which included a course of Mental Pathology in the year 1916, and University lectures on psycho-analysis were commenced from the year 1917. In April 1921 Dr. Bose got into communication with Prof. Freud and Dr. Ernest Jones and the idea of starting a psycho-analytical society in Calcutta took shape in July 1921. Both Prof. Freud and Dr. Jones expressed their sympathy with the scheme and Dr. Jones suggested that the Society should be an all-India one and made certain important observations as regards the constitution which were embodied in the draft rules submitted for the approval of the meeting.

After Dr. Bose had explained the purpose of the meeting it was unanimously decided to form the society. It was settled that the name of the society should be The Indian Psycho-Analytical Society and its object should be the cultivation and furtherance of the science of psycho-analysis as founded by Freud by:

1. Scientific discussion,
2. Providing facilities for original work,
3. Organising lectures, and
4. Making arrangements for translating into English and the vernacular the important works on psycho-analysis.

Nine members were then enrolled and the first council was nominated with Dr. Bose as President, Mr. Banerji as Secretary and Dr. Sen Gupta and Mr. Bora as members. A formal application for affiliation to the International Association was made to Dr. Ernest Jones, the President of the Association, and in March 1922 the intimation of provisional affiliation was received. Prof. Freud and Dr. Jones sent their good wishes for the Society. The Society was formally affiliated at the last Congress.

Since its inception the Society has held six meetings in which psycho-analytical papers were read and discussed. A list of present members is appended.

List of Members

1. Girindrashekhhar Bose, D.Sc., M.B., *President*, I.P.S., 14, Parsibagan, Calcutta.
2. Narendra Nath Sen Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., Lecturer in Philosophy, and Lecturer in charge of the Department of Experimental Psychology, Calcutta University. 11, Ghosh's Lane, Calcutta.
3. Haripada Maiti, M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy and Child and Educational Psychology, Calcutta University. 8, Hali Bagan Rd., Calcutta.
4. Suhrit Chandra Mitra, M.A., Lecturer in Animal Psychology, Calcutta University. 16, Bhabanath Sen St., Calcutta.
5. Gopeswar Pal, M.Sc., Lecturer in Experimental Psychology, Calcutta University. 7/1, Parsibagan, Calcutta.
6. Govindchand Bora, B.A., Secretary, Jute Balers' Association. 7/2, Halliday St., Calcutta.
7. Nibaran Chandra Mitra, M.B., Late Capt. I.M.S. 46, Raja Dinendra St., Calcutta.
8. Satya Kumar Ray, M.B., Captain, I.M.S. 2, Amherst St., Calcutta.
9. Haridas Bhattacharya, M.A., P.R.S., Reader in Philosophy, Dacca University. The Chummary, Ramna, P.O. Dacca.

10. Rangin Chandra Haldar, M.A., Lecturer in Psychology, Patna University. B.N. College, Patna.
11. Sarasilal Sarkar, M.A., M.B., Civil Surgeon, Maldah.
12. Jiban Ratan Dhar, M.B., Captain, I.M.S. 6, George Town, Allahabad.
13. Owen Berkeley-Hill, Major, I.M.S., European Mental Hospital, Ranchi.
14. R. C. Mc. Watters, Major, I.M.S. Shaharanpur.
15. Manmatha Nath Banerji, M.Sc., *Secretary*, I.P.S., Lecturer in Physiological Psychology, Calcutta University. 30, Tarak Chaterji Lane, Calcutta.

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VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

October 18, 1922: General Meeting

Agenda

1. Statement of Accounts.
2. Election of Officers.
3. Report of the Congress.
4. Programme of the Society.
5. Subscription of membership and to the Journals.
6. The Policlinic and Lectures.
7. Abstracting.
8. Alterations in the rules.
9. Admission of new members.

1. Dr. Nepallek, as Treasurer, having made a statement of the accounts for the previous year, it was examined by Dr. Federn and adopted.

2. In consequence of his duties as Director of the Policlinic, Dr. Hitschmann resigned his office of Vice-chairman of the Society. Dr. Reik, who is at the head of the Central Department for psycho-analytic literature, resigned his office of second Secretary. On Dr. Hitschmann's nomination, Dr. Rank was elected Vice-chairman, and Dr. Federn and Dr. Bernfeld Secretaries. The results of the election of the Committee were thus as follows: Chairman, Prof. Freud; Vice-chairman, Dr. Rank; Secretaries, Dr. Federn and

Dr. Bernfeld, Director of the Policlinic, Dr. Hitschmann; Librarian, Dr. Reik; Treasurer, Dr. Nepallek.

3. Frau Dr. Deutsch gave a report of the Berlin Congress and summarised the advances made in psycho-analytic theory and in the psycho-analytic movement.

4. Dr. Reik discussed the programme of lectures to be held in the immediate future and informed the Society that notices of lectures had been received from: Silberer, Reich, Reik, Frau Deutsch, Fräulein Teller, Hoffer and Frau Kempner.

5. Dr. Nepallek proposed that the subscription of membership be fixed at Kr. 40.000 annually. Herr Storfer announced the amount fixed for the subscription to the Journals, reckoned on the basis of the new method of calculation. Both proposals were adopted, also an additional proposal to separate the subscription of membership from that to the Journals, which is levied according to the current changes in prices.

6. Dr. Hitschmann gave a short report of the activities of the Policlinic and announced the first courses of lectures starting at the beginning of November: 'An Introduction to Psycho-Analysis' by Dr. Hitschmann, and a special course entitled: 'What must the practising physician know about psycho-analysis?' by Dozent Dr. Deutsch. Further general and special lectures are to follow.

7. Dr. Reik reported on the abstracting from the Journals and on the recent organization for reporting on 'Advances in Psycho-Analysis'.

8. Dr. Nepallek put the following motion: 'That the meeting determine upon the following alterations in the Rules of the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society: (1) that in § 3, under the second heading, the word 'without payment' be deleted; (2) that in § 4, section 2, for the words 'ten Kronen' the words 'at the current rate appointed for the International Psycho-Analytical Association; (3) that in § 9, section 3, the words 'equal number of votes' be substituted for the words 'four members'. The proposal was unanimously adopted.

9. Herr August Aichhorn was elected a member of the Society.

Change of address: Dr. Wilhelm Reich, Wien XIX/I, Scheibengasse 1/3.

It was unanimously agreed to send a letter of thanks to the Berlin Psycho-Analytical Society.

REPORT OF THE BERLIN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL
POLICLINIC.¹*March 1920 — June 1922*

Many of you will doubtless remember that at the foundation of our Institute we referred to the inspiration we received from a lecture delivered by Professor Freud to the Congress at Budapest on 'The Paths of Psycho-Analytic Therapy'. He warned us then to be ready for the moment when the public conscience would awake and the State would regard it as a pressing duty to make provision for the mental well-being of its citizens, no less than for the preservation of their lives and the promotion of their health. Public centres and Institutes would then be founded, the business of which would be to make psycho-analytic treatment accessible to wide circles of people. When these words of Freud were spoken—half as prophecy and half as challenge—we still had in our midst a man whose memory will always live amongst us, a man who, boldly planning, strove to bring all these hopes for the future nearer to realization, and it is not merely the respect due to a late colleague which leads me to recall the name of Dr. Anton v. Freund, now that I am about to describe the road we have travelled since the foundation of this Policlinic.

To make psycho-analysis accessible to a wider circle was from the beginning our wish, as it is of so many amongst us to-day; and when the war came to an end at the close of 1918 and we returned to our respective places of work, we felt this need to be constantly more urgent and more imperative. The extent of neurotic distress had vastly increased, and at the same time there was an increase in public demand for psycho-analytic treatment and also some sort of growing confidence in us. In the first years of the war, it seemed that psycho-analysis must be swallowed up, like so much else that had vastly increased, and at the same time there was an increase in through the war, psycho-analysis gained ground enormously. The war-neuroses demonstrated the Freudian mechanisms in the plainest manner even to the blindest and most bigoted, and towards the end of the war there was a prospect of psycho-analytic treatment-centres for neurotics being set up in the Austro-Hungarian army (as it then was), whilst our colleagues in Germany had similar expectations.

¹ Read at the Seventh International Psycho-Analytical Congress — September 26, 1922.

The Fifth Analytical Congress in Budapest seemed to confirm this prospect. When with the end of the war the crash came in Austria and Germany there was an end of these hopes, and in Germany nothing more could be looked for in this respect from the State or from Government authorities. The old scientific and public institutions were in lack of funds and their very existence was menaced. The hope of new foundations was illusory, especially where the system in question was still, in spite of everything, entirely opposed by the scientific authorities of the profession, for, as you know, the catastrophe had not led to the removal of so very many of these authorities of the old school. Freud's forecast had been correct. Private initiative would have to make a beginning. Private initiative must act, if we did not wish to wait too long, and must act quickly if the favourable moment were not to slip by. It did not surprise any of us that a time of such general collapse, fraught with such great external difficulties, was favourable for psycho-analysis. Psycho-analysis had no part in the illusions which had now perished; from the beginning it had called attention to the latent mental forces and hidden mechanisms of human beings, regarded both individually and collectively, and now that so many veils had fallen or been torn away these were all the more exposed. Such was the spirit of the times that people cried out more loudly for psycho-therapy, and what was called psycho-therapy could only answer with phrases and common-places and could point out no path, while the path of psycho-analysis had been steadily pushed further, through all the distractions and misery of war. Firmly founded, surely built, and far-reaching, the road lay there. To throw it open and make it accessible to many was now our business. It needed no little courage to meet great needs with small possibilities of fulfilment and not to be daunted by little beginnings. In the course of long conversations between my fellow-worker, Dr. Simmel, and myself the details of our undertaking rapidly matured and there emerged clearly the form of organization and the principles of our Institute, which when we came to carry them out needed no radical alteration; only the dimensions of our enterprise increased even as we planned it.

One thing was clear to us from the very beginning: one of the most important factors in analytic practice is the element of time—the strength of our position lies in being prepared for the length of the fight. Indeed, you all know that over against the timelessness of the unconscious and the regressions which for the most part stretch

very far back we have to set actual time—duration of time, the effective duration of our endeavours. If we wished to achieve an appreciable quantum of work, we must have an appreciable quantum of time for it and, moreover, that time must be as far as possible continuous and unremittent. This ruled out beforehand one possible way of ensuring a considerable amount of working time, though at first sight it would have seemed simpler and easier—namely, that of obtaining from a larger number of fellow-workers amongst our colleagues smaller and wholly voluntary contributions of time. This seemed to us too discontinuous, altogether too uncertain. We decided upon the other, more difficult way, which would be possible only under favourable conditions—namely, that of requiring from a smaller number of people a greater part of their working-time for the Policlinic, to be devoted to it above all regularly and if possible daily, not as a wholly voluntary gift but on the basis of a regular engagement.

Financial means for a modest beginning were placed at our disposal from a private quarter for some years, and in Summer 1919 Dr. Simmel and I asked the Berlin Psycho-Analytical Society for a mandate to open and carry on the work of a policlinic. Our proposal met but little scepticism; it speedily won growing sympathy among our Berlin colleagues; we began our preparations and, after overcoming various external difficulties, we were able to open our Institute as early as February of the next year, i. e. 1920. At first there were three permanent workers—Dr. Simmel, our assistant Fräulein Dr. Smeliansky, and myself, putting in between us 14 hours of work daily. Some other members of the Association, in particular, Dr. Liebermann and Dr. Boehm, at once offered us their help and took over single cases for analysis; other members gradually followed their example, Dr. C. Müller, Dr. I. Müller, Frau Dr. Horney, and later Frau Dr. M. Klein, who most readily agreed to come to Berlin from Budapest. But the permanent workers, whose number grew, formed the fixed nucleus. In December, 1920 we appointed our colleague, Dr. Harnik of Budapest, to the Policlinic; in the autumn of 1921 we added to our number Dr. F. Alexander, who had been trained in Berlin and in a surprisingly short time had risen to the front rank among analysts. In the same year the staff of the Policlinic was further augmented by the appointment of Fräulein Schott for children's analysis and Herr Dr. Lampl who had also been trained by us here in Berlin.

In this year we had already seven permanent workers doing together from twenty-five to twenty-eight hours work a day, exclusive of the analyses conducted for the Policlinic by the above-mentioned members of the Society, who were joined during this year by our Russian colleague, Fr. Dr. Naiditsch. Besides these there were the analyses conducted under our control by our students, the psycho-analytic pupils of the Policlinic, who complete their year of practice here, and who at this time included five physicians and a woman psychologist. In the second part of my report I will say more of this side of the activity of the Institute—the Policlinic as a training-school in psycho-analysis.

The five rooms for treatment in the Policlinic are already proving inadequate; our work needs more and more space, but the housing-shortage prevents our extending our premises. Let me once more outline the organization of the Policlinic. With the growth of the Institute, the purely democratic constitution of the medical Staff had to be exchanged for a rather stricter organization, our original principles being still adhered to. The control is now in my hands, Dr. Simmel being my co-adjutor. We have three assistants: Frl. Dr. Smeliansky, Dr. Harnik and Dr. Alexander, and in addition our staff includes Dr. Lampl and the children's analyst Fräulein Schott. The members of the Staff receive small salaries which now, as at the beginning, bear no relation to their services or to the sacrifice they make. We expect and accept this sacrifice because without it our work could not be carried on; and whilst we feel ourselves constantly indebted to the assistants of the Policlinic, we are at the same time glad to know that, as their status becomes more and more official, we have some share in assisting them also in the struggle for existence. I have already mentioned that the most necessary funds have been put at our disposal for a period of time which has not yet expired. We work with a very modest Budget, as even those colleagues who are not foreigners will recognize.

Budget

Initial outlay in autumn 1919: about 20,000 Marks. (We were assisted by many gifts in kind.)

Expenditure.				Receipts.
1920	Feb. to Oct.	about	20,000 M.	2,500 M.
1920—21	Oct. " "	" "	60,000 M.	17,500 M.
1921—22	" " "	" "	150,000 M.	25,000 M.

The estimate for the coming year, so far as we can make it beforehand, runs to about 250,000 to 300,000 M. Our expenditure is divided between (1) salaries, (2) rent and service, (3) cost of upkeep and management.

Patients

In the two-and-a-half years in which the Polyclinic has been in existence, from 600 to 700 persons have applied for assistance and advice. Some came on seeing the door-plate; others upon the advice of friends and acquaintances; others again were sent to us by physicians, at first one here and there but afterwards in increasing numbers. It was remarkable how long after the Clinic was opened patients still came because they had seen in the papers the notice of the opening. Consequently we refrained from advertising or carrying on propaganda in any other way, because we were afraid of a rush of patients beyond our powers of dealing with, in spite of the not inconsiderable amount of energy we devoted to the work. Directly after the opening of our Institute—at that time there were only 3 permanent workers—we began with about 20 analyses. The increase in the number of analysts was always greatly exceeded by that in the number of those waiting to be analysed; last year we generally had from 50 to 60 analysis cases on our books. All the workers were nearly always fully occupied and we had to be constantly trying to increase the amount of work we could put in. Since making analysis possible for a larger number of people was by no means synonymous to our minds with carrying on 'mass-therapy', we were very well satisfied when the stream of patients, at first so incessant, later grew rather less and gave way to a smaller demand, which was on the other hand constant. Amongst the patients of the first days of the Polyclinic there were many chronic cases of inveterate neuroses, of long-standing organic illnesses and of psychogenic formations engrafted upon the remains of organic diseases; patients who for many years had gone from clinic to clinic, from one panel doctor to another, and now felt that they must tell their tale in the new Institute. Gradually we had fewer and fewer of this category. The material upon which we had to work was composed of the most diverse elements in respect of age, sex, occupation and social standing.

STATISTICS

1920—1922.

(Drawn up Berlin, September 20, 1922.)

Year	1920						1921						1922					
Sex	Consul- tation			Treat- ment			Consul- tation			Treat- ment			Consul- tation			Treat- ment		
	Men	Women	Children	Men	Women	Children	Men	Women	Children	Men	Women	Children	Men	Women	Children	Men	Women	Children
Number .	40	51	7	14	26	2	38	73	7	30	36	3	31	56	2	10	21	2
	98			42			118			69			89			33		
Total . .	140						187						122					
Men . .	163						Total Number of consultations						Total Number of cases treated					
Women .	263																	
Children .	23																	
Total Number	449						305						144					

Our patients ranged from a 6 year-old child to an old man of 67, from factory-girls and domestic servants to a daughter of a general, a niece of the chief Minister of State (of the régime following on the 9th Nov.), and a very influential politician. As time went on, however, the proletarian element diminished, while the 'intelligentsia' and the lower middle class began to preponderate. As well as the increasing numbers sent by physicians, more and more people now come to the Policlinic on the recommendation of former patients. Sometimes it seemed as though whole groups and circles of acquaintances with a considerable pathological taint wished to be analysed, and of these we accepted only the most urgent cases; for, keeping our therapeutic goal always before us, we were not willing to embark on the task of improving the general condition of the nation while our numbers were still so small.

Classification by age

Under 10		10—15		15—20		20—30		30—40		40—50		50—60		Over 60	
Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
3	8	6	6	10	5	72	65	52	122	42	52	8	13	1	6
11		12		15		137		174		94		21		7	

Classification by occupation

Occupation	Male	Female
Artisans	25	35
Clerks	22	41
Civil servants	7	3
Teachers	16	19
Domestic servants and nurses	—	27
Trades-people	23	—
Students	12*	2**
Professional***	56	59
Married, no occupation	—	63
Widows	—	6
No occupation	2	8
* 5 Medical. — ** 1 Medical. — *** 1 physician and 14 of academic education.		

Treatment

For those persons presenting themselves at the Policlinic for the first time there is a daily consultation-hour, excepting only Sundays and one week-day which is reserved for another object of the Clinic—namely, the work of instruction carried on by its directors. Originally the consultations were conducted by Dr. Simmel and myself, simultaneously or alternately. But we very soon found it was far more advisable for the whole business to pass

Statistics of Diagnoses

Diagnosis	Male	Female
Hysteria	10	95
Anxiety-hysteria	8	23
Anxiety-neurosis	6	19
Obsessional neurosis	37	25
Neurasthenia	9	3
Hypochondria	3	5
War-neurosis	3	—
Disablement-dole neurosis	—	1
Neurotic characters	12	1
States of inhibition	9	20
Stammering	3	—
States of depression	14	19
Hysterical frigidity	—	4
Psychogenic impotence	14	—
Psychopathia	4	1
Latent homosexuality	6	—
Manifest homosexuality	1	—
Sado-masochism	2	—
Alcoholism	1	1
Kleptomania	1	2
Pseudologia phantastica	1	1
Cyclothymia	1	—
Paranoia and paranoid states	6	10
Mania	—	1
Climacteric maladies	—	11
Epilepsy	6	1
Dementia praecox	6	9
Progressive paralysis	3	—
Imbecility	1	3
Tic nerveux	1	1
Multiple sclerosis	1	1
Arteriosclerosis	2	6
Neurosis with organic disease	1	1
Lues	—	4
Disturbance of internal secretion	—	1
Graves' disease	—	1
Organic illness without psychic disturbance	—	7

Berlin, 20th September 1922.

Duration of treatment

Time	Number
Under 3 months	35
3—6 months	49
6—9 "	30
9—12 "	13
12—18 "	6
Over 18 months	8

Statistics of the result of treatment¹

Result	Number
Cured	22
Condition improved	7 2
Condition unchanged	28*
Treatment discontinued	19
* In many of these cases the analysis is still in progress.	

through the hands of one person and last year I took over the work of consultation entirely, so that it was easily possible to make a survey of the whole material. On the ground of discretion, which the physician has to observe even more than usual in this kind of work, we try as far as possible not to have more than one analyst present at the preliminary interviews, that is, whichever of us is taking the consultations. If one of the regular consultants is represented by an Assistant, after having taken down a detailed anamnesis, he tells the patient to come again to see the Director whose business it is to decide as to treatment. As regards this we had only one strict rule: the consideration of the urgency of the case. Although in consequence of the economic independence of the Polyclinic the possibility of analysis is incomparably easier for us than in private practice, yet if we do not wish to be inundated with

¹ Fuller details relating to the individual cases will be found in the *Internat. Zeitschr. f. Psychoanalyse*, 1922, Bd. VIII, S. 517—520.

patients, we must have some sort of gradation according to urgency. Apart from this aspect, in a case of neurosis we advised analysis when the patients desired it or when they said they were ready to undergo it and seemed really to be willing. As a matter of fact, too, we have had relatively few if any more cases of unsuccessful attempts at analysis than commonly occur in private practice. It is a point of great importance that at the Institute we are able to exercise a certain selection in regard to the analyst who is to take on any particular case. Certain broad principles to guide us in the concrete particulars of our practice have already crystallized out, though it would not be easy to reduce all the details of our procedure to definite formulae. As I have already said, our permanent workers between them put in 25 to 28 hours a day. Besides this those colleagues whom I have mentioned as assisting us with individual cases gave several hours a day. For the most part they work at the Polyclinic; only by way of exception and in order to save time do they give treatment at their own houses. Our students contributed as many hours, sometimes rather more.

It was originally our intention systematically and in every case to reduce the length of the analytic sitting from one hour to half-an-hour, but we have had to give up this idea. It could be managed only in the case of a small class of persons who were still, in spite of their neuroses, amenable to discipline, cases such as are not seldom to be found in Prussian Germany amongst civil servants and others. Generally we give three quarters of an hour or the classical full hour. The patients come from three to four times a week, and in serious cases more often. With this apparatus and with this amount of working time at our disposal we have been able to carry out the respectable number of 130 analyses, exclusive of numerous quite small attempts at analysis.

For so protracted and so searching a treatment as ours this is surely an imposing figure! And here for the first time analysis can present statistics to those who hanker after them, showing figures collected in a single place and in a relatively short time.

If asked about our results, we may be entirely satisfied with them and may confidently set them side by side with the results of other difficult modes of treatment, for instance, such as deal with serious somatic diseases.

Even in the Polyclinic we have not as yet solved the question of time; we do not succeed in shortening it in serious cases, as you

will have gathered from my references to the familiar long periods of analysis which we too so often require.

At the same time the question of speeding up or shortening the analysis has been our chief endeavour at the Policlinic and is a subject to which we devote constant attention; but so far on the whole without result, though we eagerly make use of every favourable factor. Psycho-analysis is simply that process to which Freud gave this name and which Freud created. Anything else is no true analysis and cannot be counted a success for it. The prophecy which Freud made at Budapest, that 'when it comes to the application of our therapy to large numbers of people we shall have to mix some alloy with the pure gold of analysis' we have not yet been able to realize, for the simple reason that we have so far found no metals suitable for any such alloy. The 'copper of direct suggestion' is wholly useless to us; far more beneficial is the indirect suggestion of our milieu steeped in analysis, and the pressure exercised upon the patients of the Policlinic by the fact that they know that a definite number of people have been entered and are waiting for an analytic hour to become free. Even the circumstance that they are not alone in the waiting-room has, in my opinion (and in this I have often been confirmed by my colleagues), a favourable effect; in the crowded waiting-room reality impresses upon the neurotic that he is not the only one to whom the physician is a Father. The position of the latter is very considerably strengthened by the fact that, as an analyst of the Policlinic, he is entirely disinterested materially as regards the patient, and this fact also at once lays bare the nature of many a resistance. In one particular the practice of the Policlinic has caused much worry and anxiety to many of our colleagues both *intra muros et extra*. I allude to our method of dealing with the question of fees. People were afraid that we were foregoing an important means of putting pressure on the patient and a good opportunity for bringing to light complexes of vital importance, as for example the anal-erotic. It has surprised us much that these anxious people appear to have failed to hear or to have overlooked a very interesting sentence in that discourse of Freud's at Budapest which we have taken for our guide. Freud, who is certainly quick enough to recognize the subtlest tricks of the mind in a patient undergoing analysis and the faintest increase in the difficulties of technique, speaking of the psycho-analytic centres and institutes to

be founded in the future, said plainly with his own incomparable sureness: 'these treatments will be free'.

Now we have not even gone so far as to set up the principle of free treatment. From practical as well as educative motives we desire and expect our analytic patients to pay, and to pay as much or as little as they can or think they can; even when they say that they are not able to pay at all we believe them and of course take them for analysis in that case too. Analyses for which nothing is paid and others for which quite good fees are now paid are conducted side by side in the Policlinic, and here where we are able to leave the analyst out of the question we cannot say that the factor of the patients paying or not paying has any important influence on the course of the analysis. But I should like to emphasize a favourable contributory effect of the Policlinic analyst's independence of fees, because it perhaps constitutes a slight innovation and reminds me of a sketch of a future possibility for our technique outlined to me by Freud many years ago. Moreover it represents a kind of 'active therapy', an idea which has not been sufficiently assimilated from the writings of Ferenczi who was the first to introduce the method of 'active' psycho-analysis. I mean this: when as the representative of the Institute and yet also in our individual capacity we at first allow patients subject to neurotic constellations to pay little or nothing, we are for a time acting according to a rôle (generally that of the father but in some cases that of the mother) which the patient forces upon us in the transference, and we act in this rôle till the right moment comes for us to induce the patient to renounce this childish game. Up to this point we rescue or make possible many analyses which in private practice could never be undertaken, because it is only rarely that life allows of so costly a performance. And thus we extend the circle of those who can have the benefit of analytic treatment. To be sure, even so we cannot call it 'therapy for the masses'. That is not within the power of a single Policlinic, or perhaps of numerous Policlinics. You will remember that we are referring here only to the question of making psycho-analysis accessible to more people whilst admitting that although we regard the activities of our Institute with great and, as I think, justifiable satisfaction, we do not consider the Policlinic method of psycho-analysis the superlative form of our therapy, but certainly as a very gratifying comparative.

There is still another point to which I invite your attention, a thing not new in itself, but one which with us has crystallized out into a definite form. I allude to what are known as fractionary analysis. Doubtless you have all had cases in which, although the treatment has had to be broken off on account of some external circumstances, no bad effect has ensued if the interruption came at a favourable stage of the analysis. Now our purpose is primarily practical and therapeutic, not that of research, and, in certain suitable cases, we have made a kind of principle of this experience, with good results as we maintain and are justified in maintaining. When there is some improvement in the patient's condition and he has attained to a considerable measure of efficiency and capacity for life we sometimes break off the analysis at this point and require him to put to the test what has been accomplished and to try to maintain it. He may and is to come back if it is not sufficient. Thus resumed, the treatment often proceeds at a quicker rate, there is a further improvement and a final cure. I cannot better conclude this part of my report than by gratefully quoting the impressive closing words of Freud's lecture at Budapest to which allusion has so often been made: 'whatever form this psycho-therapy for the people at large may take, of whatever elements it may be composed, we may be certain that its most effective and most important components will still be those that are derived from strict psycho-analysis without any ulterior tendency.'

You will have observed that the growth of the Polyclinic has necessitated an almost continuous increase in the number of our workers; we were indeed constantly endeavouring to enlarge our staff. A most burning question now arose—namely, that of propagation of the psycho-analytic species, the most important practical problem of our movement, one which is ever more urgently requiring solution. Opportunities had to be made for people to learn to analyse and to train as analysts. This was our second purpose in founding our Institute. In most of the local centres of the various Societies arrangements were already in existence before this for introductory lectures and addresses designed to give a general idea of the subject, so as to extend the knowledge of psycho-analysis. We proceeded at once in a methodical manner to arrange systematic courses of instruction and training. With Dr. Abraham at our head, with our colleagues Dr. Simmel and Dr. Sachs, together with Frau Dr. Horney and Dr. Liebermann, members of the Berlin Society, we constituted

a small teaching body for the purposes of training, for which we prescribed a period of least one to one and a half years.

In the years of our work 1920—1 and 1921—2, Dr. Abraham conducted the following courses at the Polyclinic:

1920, Spring: An introductory course in Psycho-Analysis.

Autumn: The same course. (Twenty to twenty-five students in each course.)

1921, I—II: A course of psycho-analytic study for advanced students; discussion of new psycho-analytic works. (About twelve students.)

V—VI: An introductory course. (Thirty to forty students.)

XI—XII: The same course. (Thirty to forty students.)

1922, I—II: The advanced course. (Twenty students.)

V—VI: Introductory course on 'Observations made in Psycho-Analytic practice'. (Thirty students.)

During the same period Dr. Sachs repeatedly treated the questions of the application of psycho-analysis to the mental sciences, the theory of dream-interpretation, the technique of dream-interpretation, and sexual problems met with in psycho-analytic practice. He also held advanced practical classes on the application of psycho-analysis.

Frau Dr. Horney and Dr. Simmel lectured repeatedly on 'Aspects of the psycho-analytic attitude of the practising physician'.

Three or four times a year I hold, or open, in conjunction with Dr. Simmel a practical course to which no definite time-limit is assigned, entitled 'An Introduction to Psycho-analytic Therapy'. Dr. Simmel also has a course on 'Psycho-analytic Technique'. Students taking these courses with the intention of becoming analysts are required to have previously been analysed themselves. In the other lectures we do not insist upon this condition, e. g. in the case of physicians who only wish to gain an accurate idea of psycho-analysis and do not think of practising it.

We are all firmly convinced, with only too good reason, that henceforth no one who has not been analysed must aspire to the rank of a practising analyst. It follows that the analysis of the student himself is an essential part of the curriculum and takes place at the Polyclinic in the second half of the training period, after a time of intensive theoretical preparation by lectures and courses of

instruction. In order to enable these analyses of our students to be carried out by an analyst whom we regard as competent, we have appointed Dr. Sachs to the Policlinic to conduct these didactic analyses.

In these last two years twenty-five persons have been partly or wholly analysed by him for the purpose of training. These included 18 physicians—13 men and 5 women, 1 medical student, 5 persons engaged in pedagogic work or wishing to put analysis to some other practical application, and one woman student of ethnology.

Of these, 9 were foreigners: 1 Austrian, 4 Hungarians, 1 Dutchman, 1 American and 2 Englishmen. Only 8 of these had previously had anything to do with analysis. Since then 4 of them have become regular members of the Berlin Society, while 10 are its permanent guests; 13 practise psycho-analysis, 12 for therapeutic purposes, while 1 analyses children. Two of those analysed, Dr. Alexander and Dr. Lampl, after completing their course and doing a short period of practical work with us, were appointed to the permanent staff of the Policlinic.

A quite specially important part of our curriculum is the practical training by work in the Policlinic, a new feature only possible in such an institution. It was not easy to discover the right form for this work, although here again there seemed to us to be only one possible way; the element of risk it appears to contain we modified by a vigilant control. We entrust to students who have already made good progress by means of theoretical study and being analysed one or more cases known to us from consultation and suitable for beginners, and on these we let the young analysts at once try their hand alone. By means of detailed notes which learners have to make, we follow the analyses closely and can easily detect their mistakes and gradually eliminate the whole host of errors which the inexperienced analyst makes in consequence of a mistaken conception of the aim and method and an all too rigid attitude towards single theories and results of psycho-analysis. If I tried to tell you our experience in this respect more fully, I should exceed the limits of this report; for the technique of this instruction virtually amounts to instruction in the technique and cannot be casually spoken of.

We protect the patients who are entrusted to beginners by the control we exercise over their treatment and by always being ready to take the case away from the learner and go on with it ourselves.

We may be satisfied also with the results of the instructional side of our Polyclinic: in these two years our students have learnt much and learnt well, which proves to us that our method is the right one. Only it does not yet take us far enough, for even good opportunities of training are only a beginning. What we now have to aim at is the extension of the facilities the Polyclinic offers: let us hope that before long we shall succeed in this also!

Dr. M. Eitingon.

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